The Liar Paradox and the Inclosure Schema

In Beyond the Limits of Thought [2002], Graham Priest argues that logical and semantic paradoxes have the same underlying structure (which he calls the Inclosure Schema). He also argues that, in conjunction with the Principle of Uniform Solution (same kind of paradox, same kind of solution), this is sufficient to ‘sink virtually all orthodox solutions to the paradoxes’, because the orthodox solutions to the paradoxes are not uniform. I argue that Priest fails to provide a non-question-begging method to ‘sink virtually all orthodox solutions’, and that the Inclosure Schema cannot be the structure that underlies the Liar paradox. Moreover, Ramsey was right in thinking that logical and semantic paradoxes are paradoxes of different kinds.     

Badici on Inclosures and the Liar Paradox

Badici [2008] criticizes views of Priest [2002] concerning the Inclosure Schema and the paradoxes of self-reference. This article explains why his criticisms are to be rejected.     

A Contextual-Hierarchical Approach to Truth and the Liar Paradox

This paper presents an approach to truth and the Liar paradox which combines elements of context dependence and hierarchy. This approach is developed formally, using the techniques of model theory in admissible sets. Special attention is paid to showing how starting with some ideas about context drawn from linguistics and philosophy of language, we can see the Liar sentence to be context dependent. Once this context dependence is properly understood, it is argued, a hierarchical structure emerges which is neither ad hoc nor unnatural.     

Two Fallacies in Proofs of the Liar Paradox

Philosophia - At some step in proving the Liar Paradox in natural language, a sentence is derived that seems overdetermined with respect to its semantic value. This is complemented by...     

说谎者悖论及其相关悖论的一种解决

依本文之见,说谎者悖论以及某些与之相关的悖论之被导出源于对某些不合理的前提的接受;而这些前提之被接受又源于对＂是真的＂与＂是假的＂这两个词的关键语义特性缺乏认识。本文为决定这些语义特性的基础提供了说明;这一基础包含两个论点,第一,每一语句均有其含义;第二,每一语句陈说的字面内容是一个命题态度的内容,因而具有某种一般形式。借助于这一基础,本文为这两个词构造了一个不同于传统意义上的塔尔斯基式真理理论的意义理论以说明这些特性,并借助于该理论论证说谎者悖论及其某些相关悖论的导出没有根据。     

The Liar, the Strengthened Liar, and Bivalence

A view often expressed is that to classify the liar sentence as neither true nor false is satisfactory for the simple liar but not for the strengthened liar. I argue that in fact it is equally unsatisfactory for both liars. I go on to discuss whether, nevertheless, Kripke's theory of truth represents an advance on that of Tarski.     

说谎者悖论的一个新解决方案的纲要(英文)

首先,本文在第二节中提出了谎者悖论所包含的一些问题,比如加强的说谎者悖论,Curry悖论,Yablo悖论,偶然的说谎者悖论,以及塔尔斯基的真不可定义性定理。其次,在第三节简单介绍了塔尔斯基的分层理论,并且指出了他方案的一个最大不足之处就是把一个真谓词分成了很多个个真谓词,这和我们的直观很不符合。之后在第四节介绍了我的一个解悖方案,并讨论了它的一些性质,比如可靠性,完全性,以及我的方案和塔尔斯基方案的区别。第五节说明了第二节中提到的一些问题在我的这个方案下如何处理。     

Alethic Pluralism,Logical Validity,and Natural Truth

Philosophia - Alethic pluralism holds that there are many ways of being true. The view has been accused of being unable to do justice to the traditional account of logical validity, understood as...     

Lyotard, nihilism and education

This paper argues the Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition is to be interpreted as a response to nihilism, especially in relation to the question of the legitimation of knowledge and the so-called crisis of narratives, and that, therefore, it provides an appropriate response to the question of nihilism in educational philosophy. The paper begins with a discussion of Nietzsche's and Heidegger's views of nihilism as a prolegomenon to Lyotard's views concerning European nihilism and the end of grand narratives. These are important sources for a philosophical reception of the problem and the context in which Lyotard formulates his response and the immediate sources against that conditions Lyotard's response. The problem of nihilism raises its head in education in a double way: in relation to both the foundation of knowledge and the problem of its legitimation (The Postmodern Condition) and the problem of values (The Differend).     

Liar,Reducibility and Language

First, language and axioms of Church's paper 'Comparison of Russell's Resolution of the Semantical Antinomies with that of Tarski' are slightly modified and a version of the Liar paradox tentatively reconstructed. An obvious natural solution of the paradox leads to a hierarchy of truth predicates which is of a different kind from the one defined by Church: it depends on the enlargement of the semantical vocabulary and its levels do not differ in the ramified-type-theoretical sense. Second, two attempts are made in order to justify the Russellian, and perhaps Churchian, idea that language should not be fragmented beyond what is required by type distinctions. After all, because of reducibility, which seems to allow a semantics without propositions, this comes out to be possible only at the cost of resorting to two disputable theses. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Scientism, deconstruction, and nihilism

I show how scientism leads to deconstruction and both, in turn, lead to nihilism. Nihilism constitutes a denial both of the existence of fallacious moral reasoning and the existence of a moral dimension to fallacious reasoning. I argue against all of these positions by maintaining that (1) there is a pre-theoretical framework of norms within which technical thinking function, (2) the pre-theoretical framework cannot itself be technically conceptualized, and (3) the explication of this framework permits us to identify both fallacies of moral reasoning and the immorality of fallacious reasoning.     

Minimalism, the Generalization Problem and the Liar

In defense of the minimalist conception of truth, Paul Horwich(2001) has recently argued that our acceptance of the instances of the schema,`the proposition that p is true if and only if p', suffices to explain our acceptanceof truth generalizations, that is, of general claims formulated using the truth predicate.In this paper, I consider the strategy Horwich develops for explaining our acceptance of truth generalizations. As I show, while perhaps workable on its own, the strategy is in conflictwith his response to the liar paradox. Something must give. I consider and reject variousalternatives and emendations to the strategy. In order to resolve the conflict,I propose an alternative approach to the liar, one that supports Horwich's strategywhile leaving minimalism maximally uncompromised.     

Philosophy of religion, fictionalism, and religious diversity

Until recently philosophy of religion has been almost exclusively focused upon the analysis of western religious ideas. The central concern of the discipline has been the concept “God”, as that concept has been understood within Judaeo-Christianity. However, this narrow remit threatens to render philosophy of religion irrelevant today. To avoid this philosophy of religion should become a genuinely multicultural discipline. But how, if at all, can philosophy of religion rise to this challenge? The paper considers fictionalism about religious discourse as a possible methodological standpoint from which to practice a tradition-neutral form of philosophy of religion. However, after examining some of the problems incurred by fictionalism, the paper concludes that fictionalism and religious diversity are uneasy bedfellows; which implies that fictionalism is unlikely to be the best theory to shape the practice of philosophy of religion in a multicultural context.     

Deleuze, Nietzsche, and the overcoming of nihilism

This paper critically examines Deleuze’s treatment of the Nietzschean problem of nihilism. Of all the major figures in contemporary continental thought, Deleuze is at once one of the most luminous, and practically a lone voice in suggesting that nihilism may successfully be overcome. Whether or not he is correct on this point is thus a commanding question in relation to our understanding of the issue. Many commentators on Nietzsche have argued that his project of overcoming nihilism is destined to failure because of the affinity between the problem of nihilism and the logic of negation. While Nietzsche wants an absolute affirmation of life, Spinoza’s principle that “all determination is negation,” as well as Hegel’s dialectical conception of negation, suggest that affirmation free of negation is not possible. However, some commentators indicate that Deleuze successfully shows how overcoming nihilism is possible because his “logic of difference” allows for an affirmation which is not dialectically reappropriated by negation. This paper argues that beyond such logical considerations, there are metaphysical and existential reasons why Deleuze’s interpretation of nihilism fails to show that it can be overcome. For Deleuze, the overcoming of nihilism hinges not just on a logic of difference, but on a radical interpretation of Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal return as “selective being.” Drawing on recent scholarship and on Nietzsche’s own writings I argue that this is not a tenable interpretation, and also, more importantly, that the metaphysical and existential implications of this understanding of eternal return reinstate nihilism at the very point where it is supposedly overcome. Moreover, I argue that there are attendant ethical and political dangers to Deleuze’s position on nihilism.     

Nietzsche,science, and philosophical nihilism

Abstract

Nietzsche offers us a critique of modern culture as threatened by a nihilistic crisis in values. Philosophy is specifically incorporated into Nietzsche’s critique, resulting in the claim that modern philosophy, as well as modern culture, is nihilistic. But why should contemporary philosophers give this view credence? In this paper, I put forward some reasons to take Nietzsche’s view seriously, focusing on the relationship between science and philosophy. I suggest that modern philosophy still tends to idealise science as an exemplar of objectivity, particularly as this relates to judgement, even despite widespread acknowledgement that science is not value-free. I therefore argue that Nietzsche’s critique is valuable in two respects: first, it calls the notion of a scientific ideal grounding objective, cross-cultural, judgement into question, and second, it facilitates a distinction between this scientific ideal and science itself.