The Question of Conscientiousness and Religious Engagement in Public Schools

In this paper, I examine the question of how to nurture and develop conscientiousness thinkers and future citizens of diverse liberal-democratic societies from the perspective of virtue epistemology (VE). More specifically, I examine this question in terms of how public schools might frame engagement with religious perspectives in the classroom. I begin by distinguishing between good and bad conscientiousness through an exploration of current work in the field of virtue epistemology. I then follow Kenneth Strike in his defense of the need for a more robust engagement with religious perspectives as a liberal educational imperative. I argue that basing a framework for engagement on VE, particularly the notion of subjective justification, has significant benefits. My main interest in developing a framework for what I deem to be a necessary supplemental dimension of citizenship education focused on religious engagement is in underlining the responsibility that liberal educators have in regulating what is often a highly contentious and unfortunately caddish debate surrounding religion and the religious. I conclude that by eschewing this responsibility educators are potentially missing out on significant resources for supporting the liberal-democratic educational agenda.     

Telling Others to Do What You Believe Is Morally Wrong: The Case of Confucius and Zai Wo

Can it ever be morally justifiable to tell others to do what we ourselves believe is morally wrong to do? The common sense answer is no. It seems that we should never tell others to do something if we think it is morally wrong to do that act. My first goal is to argue that in Analects 17.21, Confucius tells his disciple not to observe a ritual even though Confucius himself believes that it is morally wrong that one does not observe the ritual. My second goal is to argue against the common sense answer and explain how Confucius can be justified in telling his disciple to do what Confucius thought was wrong. The first justification has to do with telling someone to do what is second best when the person cannot do what is morally best. The second justification has to do with the role of a moral advisor.     

Morally Relevant Features

This article summarizes the account of morality presented in Morality: Its Nature and Justification (Oxford, 1998), with emphasis on that aspect of morality that deals with justifying violations of the moral rules. Such justification requires a two-step procedure; the first is describing the situation using only morally relevant features. I list these features, noting how diverse they are, and describe their characteristics. The second step is estimating the consequences of publicly allowing a violation with the same morally relevant features, that is, allowing a violation when everyone knows that it is allowed to violate the rule in the same circumstances, and comparing this to the estimated consequences of not publicly allowing that kind of violation. I then explain why fully informed, impartial rational persons can sometimes disagree about whether a violation should be publicly allowed and note that such weakly justified violations are the controversial cases.     

Computer Ethics and Moral Methodology

In computer ethics, as in other branches of applied ethics, the problem of the justification of moral judgment is still unresolved. I argue that the method which is referred to as "The Method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium" (WRE) offers the best solution to it. It does not fall victim to the false dilemma of having to choose either case-based particularist or principle-based universalist approaches to the problem of moral justification. I claim that WRE also provides the best model of practical moral reasoning available for computer ethics. It does not pretend to provide quasi-algorithmic procedures for moral decision-making, but neither does it abandon the regulative ideal of communicative transparency in discursive public justification.     

What do we owe co-nationals and non-nationals? why the liberal nationalist account fails and how we can do better

Liberal nationalists have been trying to argue that a suitably sanitized version of nationalism—namely, one that respects and embodies liberal values—is not only morally defensible, but also of great moral value, especially on grounds liberals should find very appealing. Although there are plausible aspects to the idea and some compelling arguments are offered in defense of this position, one area still proves to be a point of considerable vulnerability for this project and that is the issue of what, according to the liberal nationalists, we owe both members of our nation, our co-nationals, and what we owe those who are not members of our nation. It is here that we see the project still has some distance to go if a version of liberal nationalism is, indeed, to be morally defensible. In this paper I examine leading liberal nationalist accounts of our obligations to co-nationals and non-nationals. I argue that liberal nationalists have not yet given us an adequate account of our obligations to non-nationals for a number of reasons. For instance, on the issue of the priority we may give co-nationals' interests over non-nationals', the theorists' view show significant tension, they seem to be confused about what their positions entail, the views are unhelpful, ad hoc, or the positions are quite unclear. Liberal nationalists also have a misleading impression that their positions better capture the relation between personal identity and duty, but this turns out to be false. Other defects with their specific projects are highlighted. I go on to offer a more promising method for determining our obligations to non-nationals. Rather than this alternative precluding any scope for nationalism, it actually makes clearer to us how there might be some defensible space for nationalism once our obligations to put in place appropriate institutions and sets of rules have been fulfilled.     

Pluralism in Multicultural Liberal Democracy and the Justification of Female Circumcision

This article discusses the problems that a liberal, multicultural democracy has in dealing with cultural practices, such as female circumcision, which themselves suppress the liberal values of autonomy and pluralism. In this context I have chosen the justification of female circumcision as my issue for three reasons. First, with increasing immigration, in Western multicultural and pluralistic societies this practice has recently been given a good deal of public attention; second, I believe that it is time to put this cruel and discriminatory tradition finally in the past; and third, the paradox that the victims of this practice are also often its strongest proponents well demonstrates the problems that liberal democracies have in dealing with the question of autonomy and tolerance in real-life situations. My main argument is that, without giving up tolerance, we can show that there can be no moral justification for such a tradition as female circumcision, even within a multicultural and pluralist society.
I shall first show why neither female circumcision nor any other tradition that oppresses and harms individuals and is maintained by coercion can be satisfactorily defended by liberal arguments. Then I shall discuss why 'communitarian'counter-arguments which appeal to the significance of communal values and traditions or to cultural rights also fail to give any plausible support to the maintenance of this tradition. Finally, I shall consider in more detail how the value of autonomy should be normatively understood in a modern pluralist society [1].     

Unity with(in) Plurality: Rawls’s Idea of Public Justification Reinterpreted

Abstract

This paper explores and interprets Rawls’s idea of public justification by analysing the types of reasons that citizens use when engaged in public justification of a political conception of justice. In particular, I focus on the distinction between “consensual” and “distributive” modes of justification. Some critics have argued that Rawls is unclear whether he is relying on “consensual” or “distributive” forms of reasoning; others argue that Rawls shifts inconsistently between them. I attempt to clarify this puzzle. I show that consensual and distributive modes of public reasoning are not mutually exclusive to each other. On the contrary, they are introduced as necessary components of public justification in Rawls’s theory. Thus, his model is consensual-cum-distributive. I also suggest some reasons why this model can better account for the liberal idea of pluralism, and how it offers a more realistic moral and political psychology, giving the account greater epistemic virtue than its alternatives.     

Private Solidarity

It’s natural to think of acts of solidarity as being public acts that aim at good outcomes, particularly at social change. I argue that not all acts of solidarity fit this mold - acts of what I call ‘private solidarity’ are not public and do not aim at producing social change. After describing paradigmatic cases of private solidarity, I defend an account of why such acts are themselves morally virtuous and what role they can have in moral development.     

Equal Citizenship and Convergence

I argue against Lori Watson and Christie Hartley's recent criticisms of convergence approaches to public justification. In particular, I argue that convergence approaches can capture what is distinctive about democratic decision-making and provide an attractive account of stability for the right reasons.     

Liberal Neutrality and Moderate Perfectionism

This article defends a moderate version of state perfectionism by using Gerald Gaus’s argument for liberal neutrality as a starting point of discussion. Many liberal neutralists reject perfectionism on the grounds of respect for persons, but Gaus has explained more clearly than most neutralists how respect for persons justifies neutrality. Against neutralists, I first argue that the state may promote the good life by appealing to what can be called “the qualified judgments about the good life,” which have not been considered by liberal perfectionists including Joseph Chan and Steven Wall. Then I clear up several possible misunderstandings of these judgments, and argue that: (a) moderate perfectionism does not rely on controversial rankings of values and is committed to promoting different valuable ways of life by pluralistic promotion; and (b) moderate perfectionism requires only an indirect form of coercion in using tax money to support certain moderate perfectionist measures, which is justifiable on the grounds of citizens’ welfare. Thus, I maintain that moderate perfectionism does not disrespect citizens, and is not necessarily unfair to any particular group of people. It is, in fact, plausible and morally important. The defence of moderate perfectionism has practical implications for the state’s policies regarding art development, drug abuse, public education, and so on.     

Women Recruits' Perceptions of Workforce Diversity Program Selection Decisions: A Procedural Justice Examination

This study explores the attitudes of women and how their attitudes relate to diversity management practices. Specifically, we utilize organizational justice to examine women's attitudes toward the perceived fairness of outcomes and procedures in the context of managing diversity. We utilize Cox and Blake's (1991) marketing argument as a procedural justification for the need for diversity in the workplace. Our findings indicate that diversity programs that are not justified result in negative beneficiary attitudes, regardless of a positive outcome produced.     

WHETHER SPIES TOO CAN BE SAVED

Spies, like soldiers, do a job and employ tactics that need justifying. I offer an argument for how Christian ethics may handle the moral problems of spying and do so by looking at the morally troubling tactics used by spies through the eyes of those who played an important role in shaping Christian theology and philosophy and have become normative in Christian moral thinking on the use of force. I argue that spying may be justifiable when we conceive the profession as a kind of use of force that is governed by the just war criteria. Spying is a particular kind of use of force that takes its moral character from those who authorize it, with what justification, to what ends, and with what methods. Particular attention is given to the tactics of disregarding the rules of war, the telling and living of lies, running covert operations, and assassinating military and political leaders.     

Liberalism and the general justifiability of punishment

I argue that contemporary liberal theory cannot give a general justification for the institution or practice of punishment, i.e., a justification that would hold across a broad range of reasonably realistic conditions. I examine the general justifications offered by three prominent contemporary liberal theorists and show how their justifications fail in light of the possibility of an alternative to punishment. I argue that, because of their common commitments regarding the nature of justification, these theorists have decisive reasons to reject punishment in favor of a non-punitive alternative. I demonstrate the possibility of this alternative by means of a careful examination of the nature of punishment, isolating one essential characteristic—the aim to impose suffering—and showing how this characteristic need not guide enforcement. There is logical space for a forceful and coercive, yet non-punitive method of enforcement. This fact poses difficulties for many classical and contemporary justifications of punishment, but it poses particularly crippling problems for general liberal justifications.

Profiling Color

This paper examines philosophically the nature and possible moral justification of racial profiling in terms of color profiling. Precisely what is such profiling, and can it ever be morally justified? If so, under what conditions is it morally justified?     

Retributive Parsimony

Retributive approaches to the justification of legal punishment are often thought to place exacting and unattractive demands on state officials, requiring them to expend scarce public resources on apprehending and punishing all offenders strictly in accordance with their criminal ill deserts. Against this caricature of the theory, I argue that retributivists can urge parsimony in the use of punishment. After clarifying what parsimony consists in, I show how retributivists can urge reductions in the use of punishment in order to conserve scarce resources for other valuable social purposes, minimize the foreseeable and adverse effects of legal punishment on the innocent, and accommodate the fact that existing societies fail in numerous ways to satisfy the conditions that make retributive punishment fully justified.     

Common sense and the common morality in theory and practice

The unfinished nature of Beauchamp and Childress’s account of the common morality after 34 years and seven editions raises questions about what is lacking, specifically in the way they carry out their project, more generally in the presuppositions of the classical liberal tradition on which they rely. Their wide-ranging review of ethical theories has not provided a method by which to move beyond a hypothetical approach to justification or, on a practical level regarding values conflict, beyond a questionable appeal to consensus. My major purpose in this paper is to introduce the thought of Bernard Lonergan as offering a way toward such a methodological breakthrough. In the first section, I consider Beauchamp and Childress’s defense of their theory of the common morality. In the second, I relate a persisting vacillation in their argument regarding the relative importance of reason and experience to a similar tension in classical liberal theory. In the third, I consider aspects of Lonergan’s generalized empirical method as a way to address problems that surface in the first two sections of the paper: (1) the structural relation of reason and experience in human action; and (2) the importance of theory for practice in terms of what Lonergan calls “common sense” and “general bias.”     

Susan Myers-Shirk’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Helping the Good Shepherd</Emphasis>: A Review Essay

In this essay, I review a recent book that deals with the history of pastoral counseling. I offer an overview of the book, some criticism of the book, and a discussion of how this book relates to my own work. I argue that what Susan Myers-Shirk has identified as a “liberal moral sensibility” among pastoral counselors seems to have certain affinities with Peter Homans’s “mourning religion” thesis. I suggest that this thesis can shed light on the divide between liberal and conservative pastoral counselors, a divide that Myers-Shirk identifies, and that this thesis can build on Myers-Shirk’s historical work by providing a rubric for understanding the relationship between private experience and public theory among liberal pastoral counselors. I also suggest that Myers-Shirk should write a sequel to this book.     

Epistemic Generation in Memory

Does memory only preserve epistemic justification over time, or can memory also generate it? I argue that memory can generate justification based on a certain conception of mnemonic content. According to it, our memories represent themselves as originating on past perceptions of objective facts. If this conception of mnemonic content is correct, what we may believe on the basis of memory always includes something that we were not in a position to believe before we utilised that capacity. For that reason, memory can produce justification for belief through the process of remembering. This is why a subject may be justified in believing a proposition on the basis of memory even if, in the past, she was not justified in believing it through any other source. The resulting picture of memory is a picture wherein the epistemically generative role of memory turns out to be grounded on its intentionally generative role.     

Legitimacy, Democracy and Public Justification: Rawls’ Political Liberalism Versus Gaus’ Justificatory Liberalism

Public justification-based accounts of liberal legitimacy rely on the idea that a polity’s basic structure should, in some sense, be acceptable to its citizens. In this paper I discuss the prospects of that approach through the lens of Gerald Gaus’ critique of John Rawls’ paradigmatic account of democratic public justification. I argue that Gaus does succeed in pointing out some significant problems for Rawls’ political liberalism; yet his alternative, justificatory liberalism, is not voluntaristic enough to satisfy the desiderata of a genuinely democratic theory of public justification. So I contend that—pace Gaus, but also Rawls—rather than simply amending political liberalism, the claims of justificatory liberalism bring out fatal tensions between the desiderata of any theory of liberal-democratic legitimacy through public justification.