Deterministic Frankfurt cases

According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), people are morally responsible for what they do only if they could have done otherwise. Over the last few decades, this principle has dominated discussions of free will and moral responsibility. One important strand of this discussion concerns the Frankfurt-type cases or Frankfurt cases, originally developed by Frankfurt (J Philos 66:829–839, 1969), which are alleged counterexamples to PAP. One way in which proponents of PAP have responded to these purported counterexamples is by arguing that they fall prey to a dilemma, both horns of which undermine their cogency. Recently, Fischer (Philos Rev 119: 315–336, 2010) has defended the Frankfurt cases against one horn of this dilemma. In this essay, I criticize Fischer’s defense of the Frankfurt cases and argue that he does not successfully show how the cases can avoid this horn of the dilemma. If I am right, then, despite Fischer’s claims to the contrary, the original dilemma plaguing the cases still stands.     

Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases

According to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP), a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. In what follows, I want to defend this principle against an apparent counterexample offered recently by Derk Pereboom (Living without free will, 2001; Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 29:228?C247, 2005). Pereboom??s case, a variant of what are known as ??Frankfurt cases,?? is important for it attempts to overcome a dilemma posed for earlier alleged counterexamples to PAP. However, I will argue that by paying closer attention to the details of Pereboom??s example, we see that his example fails to show a way between the horns of the dilemma posed for the earlier Frankfurt examples.     

Frankfurt cases and the Newcomb Problem

Philosophical Studies - A standard argument for one-boxing in Newcomb’s Problem is ‘Why Ain’cha Rich?’, which emphasizes that one-boxers typically make a million dollars...     

Frankfurt and the folk: an experimental investigation of Frankfurt-style cases

An important disagreement in contemporary debates about free will hinges on whether an agent must have alternative possibilities to be morally responsible. Many assume that notions of alternative possibilities are ubiquitous and reflected in everyday intuitions about moral responsibility: if one lacks alternatives, then one cannot be morally responsible. We explore this issue empirically. In two studies, we find evidence that folk judgments about moral responsibility call into question two popular principles that require some form of alternative possibilities for moral responsibility. Survey participants given scenarios involving agents that fail to satisfy these principles nonetheless found these agents to be (1) morally responsible, (2) blameworthy, (3) deserving of blame, and (4) at fault for morally bad actions and consequences. We defend our interpretation of this evidence against objections and explore some implications of these findings for the free will debate.     

Frankfurt versus Frankfurt: a new anti-causalist dawn

There is an important anomaly to the causalist/compatibilist paradigm in the philosophy of action and free will. This anomaly, which to my knowledge has gone unnoticed so far, can be found in the philosophy of Harry Frankfurt. Two of his most important contributions to the field – his influential counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities and his ‘guidance’ view of action – are incompatible. Frankfurt's counterexample to the Principle works only if we do not understand action as Frankfurt does in his guidance account. If, on the other hand, we understand agency in terms of the agent's guidance, then his counterexample to the Principle fails because, then, counterfactual scenarios of Frankfurt-type counterexamples are such that what happens does not count as the relevant agent's action. So Frankfurt-type counterexamples do not show that the agent could not have avoided acting as she did: so they fail to offer a scenario in which the agent is intuitively responsible even though she could not have avoided acting as she did. Therefore, Frankfurt-type counterexamples do not challenge the Principle, according to which ‘a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise’. The importance of this inconsistency goes far beyond the issue of coherence within Frankfurt's philosophy. I shall argue that this inconsistency represents an important anomaly within the causalist/compatibilist framework; so that we should start to seriously consider having to move on from the established paradigm.     

Frankfurt cases and the (in)significance of timing: a defense of the buffering strategy

Frankfurt cases are purported counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities, which implies that we are not morally responsible for unavoidable actions. A major permutation of the counterexample strategy features buffered alternatives; this permutation is designed to overcome an influential defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities. Here we defend the buffering strategy against two recent objections, both of which stress the timing of an agent’s decision. We argue that attributions of moral responsibility aren’t time-sensitive in the way the objectors suppose. We then turn to the crucial question of when an action is relevantly avoidable—when, in the parlance of the literature, an alternative possibility is robust. We call attention to two plausible tests for robustness that merit further consideration, showing that the agents in buffered Frankfurt cases don’t pass these tests, despite being morally responsible for their actions.     

Patterns of hypnotic response,revisited

It has long been speculated that there are discrete patterns of responsiveness to hypnotic suggestions, perhaps paralleling the factor structure of hypnotizability. An earlier study by Brenneman and Kihlstrom (1986), employing cluster analysis, found evidence for 12 such profiles. A new study by Terhune (2015), employing latent profile analysis, found evidence for three such patterns among highly hypnotizable subjects, and a fourth comprising subjects of medium hypnotizability. Some differences between the two studies are described. Convincing identification of discrete “types” of high hypnotizability, such as dissociative and nondissociative, may require a larger dataset than is currently available, but also data pertaining directly to divisions in conscious awareness and experienced involuntariness.     

Igniting the Flicker of Freedom: Revisiting the Frankfurt Scenario

This paper aims to challenge the view that the sign present in many Frankfurt-style scenarios is insufficiently robust to constitute evidence for the possibility of an alternate decision, and therefore inadequate as a means of determining moral responsibility. I have amended Frankfurt’s original scenario, so as to allow Jones, as well as Black, the opportunity to monitor his (Jones’s) own inclination towards a particular decision (the sign). Different outcome possibilities are presented, to the effect that Jones’s awareness of his own inclinations leads to the conclusion that the sign must be either (a) a prior determinate of the decision about to be made, (b) prior and indeterminate (therefore allowing for a contra-inclination decision to be made), or (c) constitutive of a decision that Jones has made but is not yet aware of. In effect, this means that, prior to the intervention of Black, Jones must have decided to do otherwise or could have so decided. Either way, although Frankfurt’s conclusion, that Jones could not have done other than he did, is upheld, the idea that he could not have decided otherwise must be rejected, and with it the view that the sign is nothing more than a flicker of freedom insufficient for assigning morally responsibility.

Social comparison and the drive upward revisited: Affiliation as a response to marital stress

To test theoretical ideas derived from classic and recent social comparison theory, two studies examined affiliative tendencies as a response to marital problems among individuals varying in marital dissatisfaction. Study 1 (n. = 632) showed that the higher the degree of marital dissatisfaction and the higher the uncertainty about how things are going in one's marriage, the stronger was the desire for affiliation (operationalized as the desire to talk with others about one's marriage). Moreover, among individuals high in marital dissatisfaction, a preference for upward affiliation was found, i.e. for contact with others having better marriages. Individuals with lower levels of dissatisfaction preferred affiliation with similar others. Women experienced more uncertainty and a stronger affiliative tendency than men. In Study 2 (n = 233), these findings were largely replicated. Moreover, it was shown that the desire to affiliate when facing marital stress was particularly strong among individuals high in interpersonal orientation.     

Across-task priming revisited: response and task conflicts disentangled using ex-Gaussian distribution analysis

The differential effects of task and response conflict in priming paradigms where associations are strengthened between a stimulus, a task, and a response have been demonstrated in recent years with neuroimaging methods. However, such effects are not easily disentangled with only measurements of behavior, such as reaction times (RTs). Here, we report the application of ex-Gaussian distribution analysis on task-switching RT data and show that conflict related to stimulus-response associations retrieved after a switch of tasks is reflected in the Gaussian component. By contrast, conflict related to the retrieval of stimulus-task associations is reflected in the exponential component. Our data confirm that the retrieval of stimulus-task and -response associations affects behavior differently. Ex-Gaussian distribution analysis is a useful tool for pulling apart these different levels of associative priming that are not distinguishable in analyses of RT means.     

Local pragmatics in a Gricean framework,revisited: response to three commentaries

There are two central themes that occupy the commentaries, and hence this response. The first is the character and role of what is said, both in my account, and in pragmatic theory in general. In response, I lay out in more detail the proposal from my original paper that the starting point for Gricean reasoning should be not what is said, but the pragmatically uncommitted what is expressed. As part of this argument, I restate and provide further arguments for my claim that global and local pragmatic effects are continuous. The second central theme of the commentaries concerns the value of a Gricean account, which is not intended to model the psychological processes of interpretation. I respond to this concern in Section 5, ‘Pragmatics, psychology and processing’.     

Simple reaction time as a function of response complexity: memory drum theory revisited

The prediction emanating from memory drum theory (Henry & Rogers, 1960') that simple reaction time (SRT) increases as a response becomes more complex (i.e., increases in number of movement parts) was investigated. Experiments 1 (N = 20) and 3 (N = 16) indicated that SRT was longer for responses consisting of two and three parts than it was for a one-part response and this may be interpreted as support for the prediction. Failing to support the prediction, however, was the finding that SRT was essentially the same for responses consisting of two and three parts. This may not be too damaging to the theory because it could simply be reflecting an upper limit in terms of numbers of parts or response duration for causing an increase in SRT. Experiments 2 (N = 20) and 3 revealed an SRT effect between two responses that were supposed to be equal in complexity. At first, this finding appeared to be contrary to the prediction, but it may be interpreted as support for it because one of the responses defined as having one movement part could actually have had two     

Introversion-extraversion: the Bell-Magendie law revisited

Evidence from several sources, including psychophysical, electrodermal and evoked potential measures, indicates that introverts display an enhanced response to sensory stimulation. There is also evidence, primarily from psychophysical studies, which suggests that extraverts may be disposed to emit short, strong bursts of motor activity which facilitate performance on tasks that involve gross motor activity but which impede performance on tasks which require refined motor control. The present paper develops an argument in which the differences between introverts and extraverts in the response to sensory stimulation and in the expression of motor activity may be referred to differences at the level of the sensory and motor nerve.     

Enlightenment and the Unconditional Good: From Fichte to the Frankfurt School

In a series of lectures from 1804–05, Johann Gottlieb Fichte sets out a conception of enlightenment whose basic structure is, I argue, to some extent reproduced in two more famous accounts of enlightenment found in post-Kantian German philosophy: Hegel’s account of the Enlightenment’s struggle with faith in his Phenomenology of Spirit and the conception of enlightenment rationality presented in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. The narrative I offer serves to highlight, moreover, the critical role played by the notion of an unconditional good in Fichte’s and Hegel’s critiques of enlightenment. The lack of an explicit appeal to, and account of, this notion in Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of enlightenment will be shown to raise questions concerning how successful their critique of enlightenment can really be thought to be.