Social construction: big-G grounding,small-g realization

The goal of this paper is to make headway on a metaphysics of social construction. In recent work (forthcoming), I’ve argued that social construction should be understood in terms of metaphysical grounding. However, I agree with grounding skeptics like Wilson (Inquiry 1–45, 2014) that bare claims about what grounds what are insufficient for capturing, with fine enough grain, metaphysical dependence structures. To that end, I develop a view on which the social construction of human social kinds (e.g., race) is a kind of realization relation. Social kinds, I argue, are multiply realizable kinds. I depart from the Wilson by further arguing that an appeal to grounding is not otiose when it comes to social construction. Social construction, I claim, belongs to the “big-G” Grounding genus, but it is the specific “small-g” relation of realization at work in cases of human kind social construction.     

Advance specification and programming interactions: A reply to Rosenbaum,Barnes, and Slotta (1988)

Summary Choice reaction time often depends on the relation between the responses from which subjects have to choose. Rosenbaum, Barnes, and Slotta (1988) criticized the interpretation of a particular set of such effects which can be observed when subjects have to choose between left-hand and right-hand responses that have same or different spatio-temporal patterns. This set of effects had been interpreted in terms of a programming interactions (PI) hypothesis rather than in terms of the more popular advance specification (AS) hypothesis which is the foundation of a major portion of motor-programming research. It is made clear that the controversy is not about whether the one or the other hypothesis is correct in general, but about whether there are exceptions which cannot be interpreted in terms of the AS hypothesis. Further it is argued that the particular set of effects represents such an exception. It is shown that Rosenbaum et al. claim that the data are consistent with the AS hypothesis and inconsistent with the PI hypothesis is untenable.Supported by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (grant He 1187/3-1)     

The fundamentality of existence or quiddity: a confusion between epistemology and ontology

Regarding the exhaustive discussions of the fundamentality of existence versus the fundamentality of quiddity, it is a necessary preliminary to examine and analyze the first documented statement of the fundamentality of existence. Following this, we must inquire how the concept is obtained on the basis of which such a judgment could be formed. Then we must illuminate the meaning of propositions that state only that an object is or exists (ontological propositions). Finally, by explaining the meaning of the words “quiddity” and “existence” and comparing them, indications are found of confusion between epistemological and ontological issues.

“And yet it moves” or why grammar overrides frequency: a reply to Kempen and Harbusch

We show that Kempen and Harbusch's (Cognition (2003) this issue) arguments against our claims cannot be upheld. On the one hand, their alternative account of our data that is based on the availability of constructions with object-experiencer verbs is not compatible with the literature on the processing of these types of sentences in German. Moreover, their allegation that we failed to conduct an accurate corpus count is simply a misreading of our paper. Insofar, the commentary in no way casts doubt on our claim that grammatical regularities override frequency during online comprehension.     

Modern to postmodern: Social construction,dissonance, and education

Modernist educational practice operates within an overarching norm of consonance, notions of sameness and agreement that permeate schools and classroom life. This paper posits a needed move to postmodern educational theory and practice through dissonance. Following an intellectual contextualization, two sets of philosophical claims are presented. The first promotes social construction of reality and the second poses dissonance rather than consonance. The paper concludes with a “look” at education from this postmodern perspective.     

Modern to postmodern: Social construction, dissonance, and education

Modernist educational practice operates within an overarching norm of consonance, notions of sameness and agreement that permeate schools and classroom life. This paper posits a needed move to postmodern educational theory and practice through dissonance. Following an intellectual contextualization, two sets of philosophical claims are presented. The first promotes social construction of reality and the second poses dissonance rather than consonance. The paper concludes with a look at education from this postmodern perspective.     

Common sense as psychosocial reality: A reply to Sjöberg

Attempted explications of common sense can be submitted to consensual validation. Therefore, purely programmatic discussion about common sense may be dispensed with in favor of actual studies. The failures to recognize the fundamental role of common sense may stem from an unreflective presupposition that psychological language and psychological reality are independent realms. Actually, language and psychosocial reality are mutually constitutive, and the total cultural order is built upon common sense. We are not free to choose conceptualizations. Our theorizing must consist of explications of common sense.     

Analysing cycling as a social practice: An empirical grounding for behaviour change

Despite significant national and local efforts over the last decade to stimulate uptake of cycling in the UK, levels of cycling (particularly utility cycling) remain at around 2% of journeys. Understanding of cycling behaviour and subsequent development of interventions has typically been undertaken using an individualist approach, often relying on psychologically based models of behaviour. This paper argues that Social Practice Theory (SPT) may be a valuable addition to practitioner’s toolboxes by providing an alternative means of understanding the complex dynamics between the elements that constitute the practice of utility cycling, allowing it to be considered as a social issue, rather than focusing solely on individual behaviour. This is demonstrated within the paper by the use of SPT to reanalyse quantitative and qualitative datasets that explore views and experiences of both cyclists and non-cyclists. Therein, the practice of utility cycling is described according to its three elements; materials, meaning and competences and the potential benefits of this approach are discussed; particularly its ideological shift away from ‘victim blaming’ and its natural support of interdisciplinary intervention design.     

Improvable,yes; insoluble,no: A reply to Flock

The relationship between apparent size and apparent depth in certain forms of the Müller-Lyer illusion is explored both Experimentally and theoretically. The Experimental results show that the apparent Sizes and apparent distances of the Müller-Lyer shafts in the normal and in the “reverse” illusions are related to each other. They also contradict specific predictions About the apparent depth location of Müller-Lyer shafts derived from the Misapplied size-constancy theory and Emmert’s Law. These results are interpreted In terms of the operation of the size-distance Principle, and this interpretation is supported by observations of other illusions.