Winners love winning and losers love money

Salience and satisfaction are important factors in determining the comparisons that people make. We hypothesized that people make salient comparisons first, and then make satisfying comparisons only if salient comparisons leave them unsatisfied. This hypothesis suggests an asymmetry between winning and losing. For winners, comparison with a salient alternative (i.e., losing) brings satisfaction. Therefore, winners should be sensitive only to the relative value of their outcomes. For losers, comparison with a salient alternative (i.e., winning) brings little satisfaction. Therefore, losers should be drawn to compare outcomes with additional standards, which should make them sensitive to both relative and absolute values of their outcomes. In Experiment 1, participants won one of two cash prizes on a scratch-off ticket. Winners were sensitive to the relative value of their prizes, whereas losers were sensitive to both the relative and the absolute values of their prizes. In Experiment 2, losers were sensitive to the absolute value of their prize only when they had sufficient cognitive resources to engage in effortful comparison.     

Adolescent sexuality and love

Adolescent love in its approach to human sexuality emphasizes freedom, to the exclusion of responsibility. Less than twenty percent of the adolescent couples who engage in sexual relations use any type of contraception, and three-quarters of all pregnancies occur prior to marriage. Further, children born out of wedlock from such unions suffer frequently from social, economic, health, and educational handicaps. In addition, there are the problems of increasing abortions and venereal disease for the young parents, along with child abuse and a suicide rate among teenage mothers ten times that of the general population. Four possible ways to aid in the solution of these problems are suggested.The Rev. John A. Clippinger, Ph.D., Professor and Chairman of the Psychology Department of Baker University, is a minister of the United Church of Christ, a member of the American Association of Pastoral Counselors, and a certified clinical psychologist. He is the author of eighteen articles in books and periodicals in the fields of psychology, psychiatry, religion, and sexual research. He is also listed in theInternational Directory of Sex Research and Related Fields and is associate editor ofCorrective Psychiatry and Journal of Social Therapy.This paper was originally presented at the Fall Conference, 1977, of the Central Region of the American Association of Pastoral Counselors and the 1978 national meeting in Chicago of the A.A.P.C.     

Potential space and the Rorschach: an application of object relations theory

This article examines the concept of potential space, developed by Winnicott (1971), and its relevance for Rorschach assessment. I propose that the response process can be viewed as occurring in the potential space between reality and fantasy and that various forms of psychopathology can be conceptualized as forms of the collapse of potential space. I suggest that this model can be of utility in interpreting the Rorschach protocols of a variety of difficult-to-diagnose patients. Examples from the Rorschach of a patient diagnosed with a dissociative disorder are presented to illustrate these points.     

Ego identity and desperate love

The relationships between ego-identity consolidation, a romantic attitude toward love, and a desperate style of fusional love relations were examined using several questionnaire measures: Tan, Kendis, Fine, and Porac's (1977) Ego Identity Scale, Sperling's (1985) Desperate Love Scale, and Knox and Sporakowski's (1968) Attitude Toward Love Scale. Results based on an initial undergraduate sample of 84 men and 87 women, and a follow-up sample of 116 men, supported the primary hypothesis of a negative correlation between ego-identity consolidation and desperate love, as well as the secondary hypotheses.     

Subject-centred reasons and bestowal love

Speaking roughly, there are two competing accounts of the basis of love. First, the appraisal view: love is based in reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved. Second, the bestowal view: love is not based in reasons derived from the valuable properties of the beloved, but love is based in the lover, who then bestows value onto the beloved. While both models deserve due attention, the bestowal model is of present concern. Despite numerous virtues, the bestowal model faces trenchant objections. In this paper, I outline and defend a version of bestowal love, according to which bestowal love is based in the lover’s motivating reasons, and which preserves the virtues while overcoming the difficulties facing bestowal love.