专业背景、主观印象及情绪对刑罚决策的影响

为了考察司法决策者对案件当事人的主观印象如何影响刑罚决策及情绪在其中的作用,本研究要求法律与非法律专业被试对案情相同但对案件当事人的主观印象不同的刑事案件进行刑罚强度决策,并要求被试对犯罪行为所引发的情绪强度进行评定。研究结果发现,在施害人消极印象比在积极印象条件下,被试产生更强的愤怒和厌恶情绪,更少的同情情绪,同时,给予的刑罚更重;在受害人积极印象比在消极印象条件下,低年级组被试对施害人给予的刑罚更重,但在高年级组被试中不存在显著差异,两组被试在情绪强度上也没有显著差异。法律专业比非法律专业被试对犯罪行为所产生的情绪强度更低。被试的专业背景对量刑决策没有显著影响。中介效应检验发现,在施害人的主观印象对刑罚决策的影响过程中,愤怒和同情情绪表现出部分中介效应,厌恶情绪表现出完全中介效应。     

案件无关情绪和案件相关情绪对法官量刑决策影响的实验研究

本研究通过两个模拟量刑实验,具体考察了案件无关情绪和案件相关情绪对法官量刑决策的影响。结果发现案件无关情绪显著影响法官量刑。法官在悲伤情绪下所判刑期短于中性情绪,愉悦和愤怒情绪与中性情绪下刑期无显著差异。案件相关情绪显著影响法官量刑,法官同情情绪下刑期更短,厌恶和愤怒情绪下刑期更长。性别对法官量刑无显著影响,从业时间对法官量刑无显著影响。性别和从业时间对案件无关情绪和相关情绪诱发均无显著影响。     

消极刻板印象对老年人医疗决策的影响及归因偏差的作用

随着年龄的增长, 对老年人的消极刻板印象和医疗决策逐渐成为了与老年群体越来越相关的两个概念。在此背景下, 很有必要系统地探讨消极刻板印象对老年人医疗决策的效应及其机制。本研究以158名老年人为被试, 通过两个实验考察了消极刻板印象、归因偏差和老年人医疗决策质量间的关系。实验1结果发现, 消极刻板印象负向影响老年人的医疗决策质量, 同时, 归因偏差在刻板印象对老年人医疗决策质量的效应中起到中介作用。实验2结果表明, 减少归因偏差的干预控制可以有效降低刻板印象对医疗决策质量的消极效应。本研究对理解刻板印象效应机制、缓解刻板印象消极效应、以及改善老年人医疗决策质量具有一定的理论意义和实践价值。     

网民对“人祸”事件的道德情绪特点——基于微博大数据研究

本研究采用大数据研究方法,对爬取的"动车事故"发生后40天内的94,562条相关微博进行情感分析,以探讨网民对"人祸"的道德情绪特点,同时对不同群体情绪表达差异进行探讨。结果发现:(1)网民对于动车事故主要表达的道德情绪有:愤怒、鄙视、厌恶、同情和爱。(2)包含不同道德基础的事件与不同的道德情绪相关联;(3)对于愤怒、厌恶和鄙视,男性普遍有更高的表达倾向和表达强度,而女性更倾向于表达爱和同情且强度更高;(4)对于爱和同情,团体VIP用户组表达的可能性和强度都高于其他用户;个体VIP用户比非VIP用户更可能表达愤怒、鄙视和厌恶,而团体VIP用户表达这类情绪的强度最小。研究表明,虚拟网络中人们道德情绪特点依然符合道德基础理论;不同群体在表达道德情绪时的差异性是对道德基础理论相关研究的补充。总言之,数据挖掘技术和情感分析方法是进行情绪研究的有效手段。     

分视野范式呈现的情绪性面孔的加工

研究采用36名被试(女20名,男16名),采用4种变化强度(5%、10%、20%、30%)的5种情绪面孔(愉快、惊讶、悲伤、厌恶、愤怒),记录被试对左右视野呈现的中性面孔和情绪面孔识别的正确率,考察情绪效价单侧化效应的性别差异。结果发现:积极情绪面孔比消极情绪面孔的识别正确率更高;表情强度高的面孔识别正确率高于表情强度低的面孔;女性被试对左视野出现的消极情绪面孔识别正确率高于右视野出现的消极情绪面孔,相反,对右视野出现的积极情绪面孔识别正确率更高。说明在女性被试上出现了效价单侧化效应。     

移情在道德强度对企业道德决策影响中的作用

摘 要 本研究将一种重要的道德情绪--移情引入问题权变模型中,以探讨移情因素在道德强度对企业道德决策影响中的作用。本研究基于情景研究法,随机选取256名MBA学生为被试,要求被试基于所提供情景中假想参与者的行为,回答随后测量道德决策(道德识别、道德判断和道德意图)、移情反应、主观道德强度及移情特质的问题。结果发现,1）移情反应在道德强度对企业道德决策的影响中具有中介作用;2）移情关怀特质会通过影响主观道德强度和移情反应而作用于企业道德决策;3)结果大小、社会舆论和效应可能性对道德判断和道德意图的影响机制各有特点。     

法律决策中案件相关性及消减策略对后见偏差的影响

考察法律决策中案件自我相关对后见偏差的影响以及减少后见效应的策略.实验采用3(有无策略:后见组、分散注意组、指导组)×3(间接相关:无相关、积极相关、消极相关)两因素被试间实验设计,采用自编两个案例及问卷测查法律决策中的后见效应.实验结果发现,与积极相关和无相关的决策结果相比,在消极相关情境下更多的模拟法官认为法律案件中被告的行为存在过错,且所评定的过错严重程度更高.在法律决策中,案件的间接自我相关性会使后见效应对于被告过错的认定产生不同的影响.同时,两种策略都能够有效减少法律决策中的后见偏差.     

无聊倾向与主观幸福感:情绪调节效能感的作用

以409名大学生为被试,采用问卷法考察无聊倾向对于主观幸福感的影响,以及情绪调节自我效能感的中介作用。结果表明:无聊倾向负向预测积极情绪调节效能感、抑郁情绪调节效能感及愤怒情绪调节效能感;无聊倾向负向预测主观幸福感水平。积极情绪调节效能感和抑郁情绪调节效能感在无聊倾向和主观幸福感的关系中起到了部分中介作用。     

视频材料诱发情绪的效果评价

该文对预期可诱发快乐、愤怒、厌恶和恐惧4种具体情绪以及中性状态的视频材料进行效果评价,探讨此类情绪诱发材料的应用价值。首先参照James.J.Gross量化评定情绪电影片段的方法收集和粗选视频材料,再以大学生为被试,使用情绪主观报告法评价视频的情绪诱发效果。结果表明,所选的大部分视频材料情绪诱发效果较好,表现为靶情绪诱发强度、分化度和区分度均比较理想。研究证明视频材料可以成功诱发个体产生具体情绪,具有较强的应用价值。     

情绪对内隐刻板印象表达的调节

采用IAT范式探讨不同情绪对内隐刻板印象表达的调节作用：实验1通过音乐唤醒被试的不同弥散性情绪状态(悲伤vs.愉悦), 并操纵其即时观念(刻板一致vs.刻板冲突), 探讨二者对内隐性别刻板印象表达的影响。实验2通过视频诱发被试不同的指向性情绪(同情vs.厌恶), 研究其如何调节大学生对不同感染途径的艾滋病患者和病毒携带者的内隐刻板印象表达。在此基础上引入四重模型(Quad Model)分析技术, 进一步细化情绪的调节作用究竟发生在认知加工的自动加工过程还是控制加工过程, 以及不同情绪是通过哪些心理成分调节内隐刻板印象的表达。结果表明：(1)当即时观念与刻板印象内容一致时, 积极弥散性情绪促进内隐刻板印象的表达; 反之则会抑制其表达; (2)弥散性情绪通过调节认知加工的自动化加工过程, 进而调节内隐刻板印象的表达, 但未参与调节控制性加工过程; (3)积极效价的指向性情绪会抑制被试对艾滋病患者的内隐刻板印象表达, 消极效价的指向性情绪会促进其表达; (4)指向性情绪通过自动激活成分, 调节内隐刻板印象表达的自动化加工过程; 同时也通过辨识力成分, 参与调节内隐刻板印象表达的控制性加工过程。     

The role of emotions for moral judgments depends on the type of emotion and moral scenario

Emotions seem to play a critical role in moral judgment. However, the way in which emotions exert their influence on moral judgments is still poorly understood. This study proposes a novel theoretical approach suggesting that emotions influence moral judgments based on their motivational dimension. We tested the effects of two types of induced emotions with equal valence but with different motivational implications (anger and disgust), and four types of moral scenarios (disgust-related, impersonal, personal, and beliefs) on moral judgments. We hypothesized and found that approach motivation associated with anger would make moral judgments more permissible, while disgust, associated with withdrawal motivation, would make them less permissible. Moreover, these effects varied as a function of the type of scenario: the induced emotions only affected moral judgments concerning impersonal and personal scenarios, while we observed no effects for the other scenarios. These findings suggest that emotions can play an important role in moral judgment, but that their specific effects depend upon the type of emotion induced. Furthermore, induced emotion effects were more prevalent for moral decisions in personal and impersonal scenarios, possibly because these require the performance of an action rather than making an abstract judgment. We conclude that the effects of induced emotions on moral judgments can be predicted by taking their motivational dimension into account. This finding has important implications for moral psychology, as it points toward a previously overlooked mechanism linking emotions to moral judgments.     

Defensive emotions and evaluative judgements: Sensitivity to anger and fear predicts moral judgements,whereas sensitivity to disgust predicts aesthetic judgements

Aesthetic and moral evaluations engage appetitive and defensive emotions. While the role played by pleasure in positive aesthetic and moral judgements has been extensively researched, little is known about how defensive emotions influence negative aesthetic and moral judgements. Specifically, it is unknown which defensive emotions such judgements tap into, and whether both kinds of judgement share a common emotional root. Here, we investigated how participants' individual sensitivity to disgust, fear, anger and sadness predicted subjective judgements of aesthetic and moral stimuli. Bayesian modelling revealed that participants who were more sensitive to anger and fear found conventional and moral transgressions more wrong. In contrast, participants who were more sensitive to disgust disliked asymmetrical geometric patterns and untidy rooms more. These findings suggest that aesthetic and moral evaluations engage multiple defensive emotions, not just disgust, and that they may rely on different defensive emotions as part of their computational mechanism.     

Differences between traces of negative emotions in smile judgment

While a smile can reflect felt happiness, it can also be voluntarily produced, for instance, to mask negative emotions. Masking strategies are not always perfect and traces of the negative emotion can leak. The current study examined the role of traces of anger, sadness, fear and disgust in the judgment of authenticity of smiles. Participants judged the authenticity of the smiles while their eye movements were recorded. They were also asked if the stimuli comprised another emotion and, if so, what the emotion was. Results revealed that participants were sensitive to traces of negative emotions. Variations were observed between emotions with performance being best for traces of fear and lowest for traces of anger in the eyebrows in the judgment task. However, when the presence of a negative emotion was reported, participants were less accurate in identifying fear but more accurate in identifying anger. Furthermore, variations were observed as a function of the location of the trace whether in the mouth or eyes as a function of the emotion. Traces in the eyebrows were associated with better performance than traces in the mouth for sadness but the opposite was observed for anger. The performance at the judgment task was not linked to eye movement measures or explicit knowledge of the masked emotion. Future research should explore other explanation for the variations in performance in the judgments of authenticity of masking smiles such as emotional contagion.     

Do emotions play an essential role in moral judgments?

The past few decades of moral psychology research have yielded empirical anomalies for rationalist theories of moral judgments. An increasing number of psychologists and philosophers argue that these anomalies are explained well by sentimentalism, the thesis that the presence of an emotion is necessary for the formation of a sincere moral judgment. The present review reveals that while emotions and moral judgments indeed often co-occur, there is scant evidence that emotions directly cause or constitute moral judgments. Research on disgust, anger, sympathy, and guilt indicates that people only reliably experience emotions when judging conduct that is relevant to the welfare of the self and valued others. Moreover, many recent studies have either failed to replicate or exposed crucial confounds in the most cited evidence in support of sentimentalism. Moral psychologists should jettison sentimentalism, and focus instead on how considerations of harm and welfare—the core concepts of rationalist theories— interact with empirical beliefs to shape moral judgments.     

Punishing hypocrisy: The roles of hypocrisy and moral emotions in deciding culpability and punishment of criminal and civil moral transgressors

Three experiments explored how hypocrisy affects attributions of criminal guilt and the desire to punish hypocritical criminals. Study 1 established that via perceived hypocrisy, a hypocritical criminal was seen as more culpable and was punished more than a non-hypocritical criminal who committed an identical crime. Study 2 expanded on this, showing that negative moral emotions (anger and disgust) mediated the relationships between perceived hypocrisy, criminal guilt, and punishment. Study 3 replicated the emotion finding from Study 2 using new scenarios where group agents were clearly aware of the hypocrisy of their actions, yet acted anyway. Again, perceived hypocrisy worked through moral emotions to affect criminal guilt and punishment. The current studies provide empirical support for theories relating hypocrisy and moral transgressions to moral emotions, also informing the literature on the role of moral emotions in moral reasoning and legal decision making.     

Punitive emotions and norm violations

The recent literature on social norms has stressed the centrality of emotions in explaining punishment and norm enforcement. This article discusses four negative emotions (righteous anger, indignation, contempt, and disgust) and examines their relationship to punitive behavior. I argue that righteous anger and indignation are both punitive emotions strictly speaking, but induce punishments of different intensity and have distinct elicitors. Contempt and disgust, for their part, cannot be straightforwardly considered punitive emotions, although they often blend with a colder form of indignation to favor low-cost, indirect, and collective forms of punishment such as mockery, exclusion, and ostracism.     

Correlations of trait and state emotions with utilitarian moral judgements

In four experiments, we asked subjects for judgements about scenarios that pit utilitarian outcomes against deontological moral rules, for example, saving more lives vs. a rule against active killing. We measured trait emotions of anger, disgust, sympathy and empathy (the last two in both specific and general forms, the latter referring to large groups of people), asked about the same emotions after each scenario (state emotions). We found that utilitarian responding to the scenarios, and higher scores on a utilitarianism scale, were correlated negatively with disgust, positively (but weakly and inconsistently) with anger, positively with specific sympathy and state sympathy, and less so with general sympathy or empathy. In a fifth experiment, we asked about anger and sympathy for specific outcomes, and we found that these are consistently predictive of utilitarian responding.     

Harcèlement moral au travail et pro/antisocialité du salarié victime : quels effets sur les jugements,les émotions et les intentions d’aide des témoins ?

Bullying at work is characterized by negative, repetitive and frequent acts towards a person, bearing reached with her physical and psychic health (Einarsen, Hoel, Zapf, & Cooper, 2003; Leymann, 1996). On the basis of research of Weiner (1996) and Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer, and Weiner (2004), we postulated that the bullying acts, the behaviors of the bullied employee and it revictimisation would influence the judgments and the emotions of the witnesses. Research was carried out within the framework of the paradigm of the judges of 72 participants. The variance analyses show that the gravity of the acts decreases the feeling of equity, increases the attribution of responsibility towards the harcelor, decreases the attribution of responsibility to the victim and increases the help. The bullying acts always interact with the victim’s pro or antisocial behaviors. The emotions of the judges are mainly positive with regard to the victim and negative towards the harcelor except when bullied employee has emitted an antisocial behavior. The gravity of the bullying acts increases on the one hand sympathy, fear and sadness towards the victims, on the other hand, anger and dislike towards the harcelor.     

Helping Following Natural Disasters: A Social‐Motivational Analysis1

The present investigation explores how judgments of responsibility influence affective and helping reactions toward natural‐disaster victims. Guided by Weiner's (1995, 2006 ) theory of social motivation, we hypothesized that judging victims responsible for a disaster would indirectly lead to low rates of helping. Two studies tested this hypothesis. In Study 1, a bogus earthquake was used to test experimentally the effects of responsibility judgments (low, high). In Study 2, we surveyed attitudes about the victims of Hurricane Katrina. Our results showed that Weiner's model was supported across studies. Responsibility judgments led to anger and sympathy, and sympathy led to helping intentions, which in turn led to helping behavior. Comparisons across studies and the relationship between helping intentions and behavior are discussed.