语篇理解中动允性信息的提取

通过三个实验考察了读者在语篇理解中对动允性(affordance)信息的提取状况, 以及动允性在阅读理解中的意义。实验一的结果表明, 被试在阅读理解中, 会自发地提取语篇中的动允性信息, 并围绕着动允性信息组织其他信息; 在IEF中的解析过程中, 动允性信息对其他信息有组织作用。实验二的结果表明, 被试在阅读理解中能够直接提取动允性信息。实验三的结果表明, 被试在阅读理解中存在两条提取动允性信息的通路, 一条是直接提取动允性信息, 另一条是先提取属性信息再推导出动允性信息, 选择哪条通路取决于被试是否得到了属性信息。三个实验的结果表明, 阅读理解中的动允性与知觉过程中的动允性存在着相当大的相似性。     

进化心理学与生态心理学的整合：理解适宜可用性

进化心理学源自达尔文进化论,以分析心理机能及起源为主要研究目的。同样,生态心理学在Brunswik(1956)和Gibson(1979)开创引领下,探讨了有机体的知觉、判断、行为等因素在环境适应中的作用。尽管进化心理学和生态心理学都具有生物机能主义倾向,但过去研究较少探讨二者联系。该文引入适宜可用性观点来整合进化心理学和生态心理学的理论与实证研究。适宜可用性的观点认为,生存与繁衍问题中的代价与利益分析有助于特定种群的动物采取趋近或回避行为来保证潜在适宜性。适宜可用性的观点源自进化生物学中的知觉理论,它解决了认识论中许多传统问题,也整合了进化心理学和生态心理学的实验研究成果。适宜可用性的观点为新世纪的感觉、知觉、认知、情绪和决策的研究提供了新的理论基础     

生成与动力:具身认知研究中的互动观

从方法论上讲,认知研究中的个体主义把研究的焦点放在个体身上,倾向于从个体内部寻求对社会行为的解释。与个体主义取向不同的是,具身认知中的互动观更注重人际和社会互动对于理解他人的重要作用。心理学中的生态学方法最早关注了环境与有机体之间的互动对知觉产生的影响。生成认知在此基础上更进一步,认为互动不仅发生在有机体与环境之间,而且表现为主体与主体的交互影响,两个主体间的交互不是两个笛卡尔式心灵的对话,交互的主体是身体,是一种“肉身间性”的过程。具身认知研究中的互动观强调身心一体论,反对身心二元论,在方法论上表现出反还原论的特色。     

抑郁的内隐认知与治疗

认知模型认为抑郁个体存在认知加工的偏向,但是,相对于外显认知,抑郁的内隐认知研究较少。现有研究表明：抑郁个体沉迷于特定的内隐认知偏向：抑郁个体倾向于注意环境中的负性刺激;在概念驱动内隐记忆测验中表现出偏向;更可能呈现出无望感的内隐态度。内隐认知可能是抑郁个体维持抑郁的重要因素,在治疗中,可采用知觉内隐认知、扩展功能失调思维记录、记忆日志和增进注意控制等认知技术改变抑郁患者的内隐认知偏向。     

平滑追踪眼动及其对运动物体时空特征表征和预测的影响

平滑追踪眼动是人们对环境中感兴趣的运动物体进行持续视觉追踪的一种眼动行为, 它受个体在其过程中获得的视觉信息和眼动反馈信息等感知觉因素, 以及心理表征和期待等高水平认知因素的影响。同时, 平滑追踪眼动过程影响着个体的预测性眼动追踪、追赶性眼跳、空间定位和接触时间估计等涉及运动物体时空特征表征和预测的行为。未来的研究应注意探讨在平滑追踪眼动过程中获得的感知觉信息和高水平认知因素对上述时空特征表征和预测行为的影响。     

测验和认知心理学

认知心理学是关于人怎样在心理上呈现和加工信息的科学。知觉、学习、记忆、推理、解决问题和做决定等诸种心理能力都属于它的研究范围。认知心理学既研究智力测验所测得的能力,也研究由较为特殊的能力倾向测验所测得的能力。因此看来,我们有理由相信当代认知心理学的发展将会影响到心理测量学的心理能力测验。大部分心理能力测验的内容是从差异心理学的研究中得到的,虽然认知心理学家倾向于强调刺激变异的重要性,差异心理学家倾向于强调个体变异的重要性,但它们都研究类似的、在有些情况下是     

冲突视阈下类别信息与个体信息知觉负载的认知控制效应

个体根据知觉选择、反应偏向以及实时更新的情境信息调节自身状态,以适应性地促进对当前知觉信息的灵活编码,这一过程即为印象形成的认知控制。采用词语判断任务与侧抑制任务的变式将他人信息(类别信息vs.个体信息)分成高、低知觉负载两种水平,考察了冲突视阈下认知控制策略对他人印象形成的调控作用及知觉负载的效应。结果发现:(1)知觉负载影响他人印象形成的认知控制策略。(2)当类别信息与个体信息存在知觉冲突且个体的知觉负载较高时,受到反应性控制的作用,他人印象形成易出现冲突适应偏向; 当个体的知觉负载较低时,他人印象形成易受主动性控制的作用,从而产生冲突抑制偏向。这些结果表明,当个体形成他人印象时,其认知控制策略因受知觉负载影响而呈现分阶段加工特征。     

关系属性:动允性概念的方法论蕴含

动允性是指环境提供给有机体的行动可能性。1977年,生态心理学家吉布森首次提出了“动允性”概念。这一概念有着深刻的方法论含义。首先,动允性超越了传统二元论思维的束缚。它既不是环境方面的物理属性,也不是动物方面的主观属性,而是环境与动物交互作用中的一个关系属性。其次,动允性所体现出来的价值和意义与动允性的关系属性是一致的。它主张意义既不外显于事物的外部,也不隐藏于事物的内部,而是嵌入于有机体和环境的互动互补关系之中。最后,这种关系属性使它免于被归结为物理的或心理的性质,从而超越了还原论的思维方式。     

通过身体动作理解人与环境:具身的社会认知

近年来,身体与环境的互动、个体认知过程中的情境因素已逐渐成为具身认知领域的研究热点。众多的具身认知研究开始探究何种情境才能有效地启动具身效应。个体的身体感知或者身体动作的变化会对其知觉、情绪等高级心理过程产生无意识的具身效应,认知神经机制的研究显示大脑的运动皮层在这一系列的高级心理过程中发挥了极为重要的作用。本文主要对具身社会认知神经机制的研究进行梳理与分析,旨在从认知神经机制的层面剖析身体动作如何影响个体对人与环境的理解和互动,以及从方法论的角度上思考目前具身认知神经机制的研究现状。     

知觉冲突信息对他人印象控制策略的影响:以直接信息与间接信息为例

个体根据知觉选择、反应偏向以及实时更新的情境信息调节自身状态,以适应性地促进对当前知觉信息的灵活编码,这一过程即为印象形成的认知控制。采用词语判断任务操控直接信息与间接信息,通过侧抑制任务的变式对知觉对象进行高、低负载两种水平的加工,考察了不同类型的冲突信息及其知觉负载对他人印象控制策略的影响。结果发现:知觉负载对印象控制策略的调节作用会依据知觉信息的类型(冲突vs.相容)而变化。具体而言,当知觉信息相容时,个体的印象控制策略仅受知觉负载的调节而产生效应,即高知觉负载的个体易采取主动性控制策略而进行自上而下的线索驱动性加工,低知觉负载的个体则易采取反应性控制策略而进行自下而上的探测驱动性加工; 当知觉信息冲突时,个体的知觉负载效应消失,即对冲突信息的印象控制策略受到知觉信息的类型(冲突vs.相容)与知觉负载双重调节:高知觉负载的个体易采取反应性控制策略而激活反刻板印象,从而在印象加工中出现冲突适应偏向; 低知觉负载的个体则易采取主动性控制策略而激活刻板印象,从而在印象加工中出现冲突抑制偏向。这些结果表明,仅当他人信息不存在冲突时,知觉负载对印象控制策略的调节才发挥单一效应。     

Affordances as Properties of the Animal-Environment System

In this article, I argue that affordances are properties of the animal-environment system, that is, that they are emergent properties that do not inhere in either the environment or the animal. I critique and review the formal definition of affordance offered by Turvey (1992). Turvey defined affordances as properties of the environment; I discuss some consequences of this and argue that Turvey's strategy of grounding the definition of affordance in terms of dispositional properties is problematic. I also suggest that Turvey's definition of affordance may lead to problems for the specification and direct perception of affordances. Motivated by these problems, I propose a new definition of affordance, in which affordances are properties of the animal-environment system. This definition does not rely on the concept of dispositional properties and is consistent with direct perception.     

Inviting affordances and agency

Recently several authors have suggested that affordances are not mere possibilities for action but can also invite behavior. This reconceptualization of affordances asks for a reconsideration of the ecological approach to agency. After a portrayal of the role of agency in ecological psychology, we draw upon phenomenology to reveal what it means for an agent to be invited by affordances. We sketch a dynamical model of the animal-environment relationship that aims to do justice to this analysis. In the model, agency is conceptualized as the capacity to modulate the coupling strength with the environment—the agent can influence to what extent he or she is influenced by the different invitations. This account of agency keeps us far from the Cartesian idea that the agent imposes behavior. Indeed, by modulating the coupling strength, the agent simply alters the dynamics of the animal-environment interactions and thus the behavior that emerges.     

On Stoffregen's Definition of Affordances

Stoffregen (2003) has proposed a formal definition of affordances as emergent or relational properties of animal-environment systems. This definition contrasts with Turvey's (1992) formal definition of affordances as properties of the environment. In this commentary, my purpose is not to take sides on this issue but instead to bring to light what I believe to be a crucial flaw in Stoffregen's definition. Specifically, I show that Stoffregen's definition places no constraint on which relational or emergent properties legitimately deserve to be counted as affordances, thus allowing any relational property that can be predicated of an animal-environment system to be considered as an affordance. As such, Stoffregen's definition lacks any substantive linkage to the "opportunity for action" notion that has accounted for the scientific utility of the concept to date, a linkage I suggest should be preserved in any definition of affordances.     

Affordances can invite behavior: Reconsidering the relationship between affordances and agency

The concept of agency has been central to ecological approaches to psychology. Gibson, one of the founders of this movement, made room for this concept by arguing against the mechanistic conceptions in psychology. In his view, the environment is not a collection of causes that pushes the animal around, but consist of action possibilities, which he coined affordances. In making their way in the world, animals regulate their behavior with respect to these possibilities. Reed later developed this ecological conception of agency, following Gibson in conceiving of affordances as action possibilities. However, drawing upon industrial design, architecture, and phenomenology, we argue that affordances are not mere action possibilities but that they can also invite behavior. We suggest a mutualist perspective on invitations, suggesting that they depend on the animal-environment relationship in multiple dimensions. The implications of this new conception of affordances for the ecological account of agency are explored.     

Direct Perception Requires an Animal-Dependent Concept of Specificity and of Information

Specificity and information are at center stage in ecological psychology. Nevertheless, the usual theorizing on these concepts may have made the problem of accounting for perception and action more difficult by so far underestimating the role of animals as both meaning-detectors and meaning-determiners. The usual understanding of information and specificity in ecological psychology seems neither necessary nor even compatible with ecological premises and empirical findings. I argue that a reframing of these concepts to fully take animals into account is necessary to explain perception of action-specific meanings. The reframing proposed converges on ideas from developmental systems theory and in no way concedes to inputs-followed-by-processing-followed-by-representation models. Fully acknowledging the animal for properly defining information over the animal-environment system poses no threat lawfulness, realism, or direct perception. It also invites serious consideration of self-organization and interactivism as sources for further development of ecological science.     

The influence of athletic experience and kinematic information on skill-relevant affordance perception

Humans can perceive affordances both for themselves and for others, and affordance perception is a function of perceptual–motor experience involved in playing a sport. Two experiments investigated the enhanced affordance perception of athletes. In Experiment 1, basketball players and nonbasketball players provided perceptual reports for sports-relevant (maximum standing-reach and reach-with-jump heights) and non-sports-relevant (maximum sitting height) affordances for self and other. Basketball players were more accurate at perceiving maximum reach-with-jump for another person than were nonbasketball players, but were no better at perceiving maximum reach or sitting heights. Experiment 2 investigated the informational basis for this enhanced perceptual ability of basketball players by evaluating whether kinematics inform perceivers about action-scaled (e.g., force-production dependent), but not body-scaled (i.e., geometrically determined), affordances for others, and whether basketball experience enhances sensitivity to kinematic information. Only basketball players improved at perceiving an action-scaled affordance (maximum reach-with-jump), but not body-scaled affordances (maximum standing-reach and sit) with exposure to kinematic information, suggesting that action-scaled affordances may be specified by kinematic information to which athletes are already attuned by virtue of their sport experience.     

Social Affordances and the Possibility of Ecological Linguistics

This paper includes an effort to extend the notion of affordance from a philosophical point of view the importance of ecological approach for social psychology, ethics, and linguistics. Affordances are not always merely physical but also interpersonal and social. I will conceptualize affordance in general and social affordance in particular, and will elucidate the relation between intentional action and affordances, and that between affordances and free will. I will also focus on the relation between social institution and affordance. An extended theory of affordances can provide a way to analyze in concrete ways how social institution works as an implicit background of interpersonal interactions. Ecological approach considers social institution as the producer and maintainer of affordances. Social institutions construct the niches for human beings. Finally, I will argue the possibility of the ecological linguistics. Language is a social institution. The system of signs is the way to articulate and differentiate interpersonal affordances. Language acquires its meaning, i.e. communicative power in the interpersonal interactions, and interpersonal interactions, in turn, develop and are elaborated through the usage of signs. Communication is seen as never aimed to transmit inner ideas to others, but to guide and adjust the behaviors of others thorough articulating the affordance of responsible-ness.     

Social Affordances and Interaction I: Introduction

Recent extensions of the affordance concept to fundamental problems in the study of social knowing and interaction were the focus of one of the symposia at the Fifth International Conference on Event Perception and Action, at Miami University, Oxford, OH in July 1989. This article traces the history of ecological social psychology and reviews recent attempts to extend the application of the concept of affordance to the topics of social knowing and social interaction. Themes arising within three domains of contemporary ecological research are examined: (a) social perception research has stressed the direct perception of what other people afford the self and the perception of what other people are afforded in their transactions with the shared environment of surfaces, objects, places, and other persons; (b) in the study of social interaction, the emphasis recently has been on the processes of the perceiving and the assembling of social coordination, and also on the functions of social interaction in the acquisition of knowledge and behavioral competence; and (c) cultural practices, such as those involved in caregiver-infant interactions, appear to play a central role in organizing the shared focus of attention and in revealing and creating affordances for action and interaction. Some of the work described in this article appears in the current and subsequent issues of Ecological Psychology.     

Effects of Affordance Perception on the Initiation and Actualization of Action

Studies have shown information specifying some affordances may be faster or easier to perceive than others. This article investigates the effect of affordance perception on the time taken to initiate and perform an action. In particular it focuses on how action timing varies as a function of a continuum of afforded action, that is, around an action-boundary. In Experiment 1, participants made judgments regarding whether they could fit a small ball through a series of different size apertures. Judgments were quick and accurate at the extremes of the affordance scale; however, at the perceived action-boundary longer, more variable initiation times (ITs) were observed. Trials repeated over 3 consecutive days revealed a systematic change in the IT distribution and demonstrated that IT is highly sensitive to changes in location of the perceived action-boundary. In Experiment 2 effects of action-scaling were observed on IT and movement time of afforded actions: around the perceived action-boundary the afforded action took longer to be both perceived and acted upon. The results highlight that affordance perception influences not only action selection and preparation but also the action itself. The findings are discussed in terms of the informational basis of action responses.     

Extending the notion of affordance

Post-Gibson attempts to set out a definition of affordance generally agree that this notion can be understood as a property of the environment with salience for an organism’s behavior. According to this view, some scholars advocate the idea that affordances are dispositional properties of physical objects that, given suitable circumstances, necessarily actualize related actions. This paper aims at assessing this statement in light of a theory of affordance perception. After years of discontinuity between strands of empirical and theoretical research, the time is ripe for addressing the question of whether the dispositional interpretation of affordance is in accordance with some recent evidence from cognitive science and neuroscience. Following this line, I clarify that there are some cases of affordance-related effects that neither require the actualization of an action, nor the presence of an action-related property bearer in the environment, and that the identification of affordance with physical properties provides only a partial explanation of the wide range of affordance-related effects. Accordingly, I argue in favor of a more general account of affordance perception based on the ability to directly detect perceptual patterns in the environment.