共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Neil Levy 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(1):137-146
In a series of articles, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have argued that Richard Boyd’s defence of moral realism, utilizing
a causal theory of reference, fails. Horgan and Timmons construct a twin Earth-style thought experiment which, they claim,
generates intuitions inconsistent with the realist account. In their thought experiment, the use of (allegedly) moral terms
at a world is causally regulated by some property distinct from that regulating their use here on Earth; nevertheless, Horgan
and Timmons claim, it is intuitive that the inhabitants of this world disagree with us in their moral claims. Since any disagreement
would be merely verbal were the alleged moral facts identical to or constituted by different natural facts, the identity or
constitution claim must be false. I argue that their argument fails. Horgan and Timmons’ thought experiment is underdescribed;
when we fill out the details, I claim, we shall see that the challenge to moral realism fades away. I sketch two possible
interpretations of the (apparently) moral claims of the inhabitants of moral Twin Earth. On one interpretation, they fail
to disagree with us because they actually agree with us; on the other, they fail to disagree with us because they are not
moralizers at all. Which interpretation is true, I argue, will depend on the facts that explain the differences between us
and the inhabitants of moral twin Earth. 相似文献
2.
Hagit Benbaji 《Pacific Philosophical Quarterly》2018,99(Z1):137-150
A crucial disanalogy between Twin Earth and Inverted Earth undermines qualia‐internalism. A recent transplant to Inverted Earth has been equipped with color‐inverting contact lenses, so that she is unable to see the colors of objects whereas a recent transplant to Twin Earth can see twater. It is implausible to think that time alone could rectify this perceptual shortcoming – that the passage of time could alter the contents of her visual perceptions or the meaning of her color terms. Thus, the thought experiment does not refute the close tie between phenomenology and representation in the case of color. 相似文献
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A popular form of virtue epistemology—defended by such figures as Ernest Sosa, Linda Zagzebski and John Greco—holds that knowledge can be exclusively understood in virtue‐theoretic terms. In particular, it holds that there isn't any need for an additional epistemic condition to deal with the problem posed by knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck. It is argued that the sustainability of such a proposal is called into question by the possibility of epistemic twin earth cases. In particular, it is argued that such cases demonstrate the need for virtue‐theoretic accounts of knowledge to appeal to an independent epistemic condition which excludes knowledge‐undermining epistemic luck. 相似文献
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Andrea Viggiano 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(2):213-224
In order to rebut G. E. Moore’s open question argument, ethical naturalists adopt a theory of direct reference for our moral
terms. T. Horgan and M. Timmons have argued that this theory cannot be applied to moral terms, on the ground that it clashes
with competent speakers’ linguistic intuitions. While Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment shows that our linguistic intuitions
confirm the theory of direct reference, as applied to ‘water’, Horgan and Timmons devise a parallel thought experiment about
moral terms, in order to show that this theory runs against our linguistic intuitions about such terms. My claim is that the
Horgan–Timmons argument does not work. I concede that their thought experiment is a good way to test the applicability of
the theory of direct reference to moral terms, and argue that the upshot of their experiment is not what they claim it is:
our linguistic intuitions about Moral Twin Earth are parallel to, not different from, our intuitions about Twin Earth.
相似文献
Andrea ViggianoEmail: |
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Michael Rubin 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(3):307-327
A number of philosophers defend naturalistic moral realism by appeal to an externalist semantics for moral predicates. The
application of semantic externalism to moral predicates has been attacked by Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons in a series of
papers that make use of their “Moral Twin Earth” thought experiment. In response, several defenders of naturalistic moral
realism have claimed that the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment is misleading and yields distorted and inaccurate semantic
intuitions. If they are right, the intuitions generated by Moral Twin Earth cannot be appealed to in arguments against externalist
moral semantics. The most developed case against the Moral Twin Earth argument that follows this strategy is found in a paper
by Stephen Laurence, Eric Margolis and Angus Dawson. Here I argue that their attack on the Moral Twin Earth thought experiment
fails. Laurence, Margolis and Dawson have not shown that we have reason to distrust the semantic intuitions it generates
相似文献
Michael RubinEmail: |
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Angeline Lillard 《Developmental Review》2001,21(4):495
Pretend play appears to be important to a theory of mind, but exactly how or why has been controversial. One widely entertained hypothesis about why pretense is important to understanding minds is termed the Metarepresentational Model. According to this model, children knowingly consider and manipulate mental representations during pretense. Children appreciate these mental representations as such and later come to apply their understanding of mental representation outside of pretense domains. This article reviews evidence relevant to the metarepresentational model, and it is concluded that the evidence does not support it. Alternative models of the relationship between pretense and theory of mind are reviewed, culminating in a proposed developmental model of the relation. The Twin Earth model proposes specific relations between pretend play and understanding minds, from the ontogenesis of pretense to the later emergence of role play and mental representational understandings of pretense. Central to the proposal is the supposition that pretend play functions for children in much the way that Twin Earth functions for philosophers—by allowing for participation in and reasoning about nonactual situations. 相似文献
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《Philosophical Papers》2012,41(2):285-309
AbstractTerence Horgan and Mark Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth thought experiment shows that realist ethical naturalism entails a kind of conceptual relativism about moral predicates. This conceptual relativism implies, further, that Earthlings and Twin Earthlings do not express substantive disagreement with one another. Because this latter implication clashes with considered linguistic intuitions, Horgan and Timmons conclude that we should reject realist ethical naturalism. Against this, several critics recommend that realists ‘bite the bullet’ with respect to Moral Twin Earth: despite our intuitions, we should accept that the speakers do not disagree. These critics argue that the intuitions elicited by the thought experiment are either the result of a failure on the part of readers to appreciate hidden details of the Moral Twin Earth case, or else they are mere artifacts of readers’ epistemic limitations. In this paper, I show that the Moral Twin Earth argument prevails against this line of attack. 相似文献
9.
Joshua Gert 《Synthese》2006,150(2):171-183
Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently presented a series of papers in which they argue against what has come to be called
the ‘new wave’ moral realism and moral semantics of David Brink, Richard Boyd, Peter Railton, and a number of other philosophers.
The central idea behind Horgan and Timmons’s criticism of these ‘new wave’ theories has been extended by Sean Holland to include
the sort of realism that drops out of response-dependent accounts that make use of an analogy between moral properties and
secondary qualities. This paper argues that Holland’s extension depends crucially on the fact that his target is a direct response-dependent account of moral value. His argument does not work against such accounts of more basic normative notions such as ‘harm’ or ‘benefit’. And
these more basic notions may then serve as the basic normative building blocks for an indirectly response-dependent moral
theory.
* Thanks to Mark Timmons for helpful and friendly comments on an earlier version of this paper, and also to an audience at
the 2003 Pacific APA, and to the reviewers
for this journal. 相似文献
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Some necessary truths are a posteriori. That’s widely agreed and is presumed here. Their existence might appear to show that discoveries about how things are in fact—about how things actually are—can lead to discoveries about all the ways things might be, about the nature of logical space. I detail one way of resisting this conclusion for a number of examples, and the implications of Twin Earth for the issue. Central is the notion of a Cambridge discovery.
相似文献12.
Carleton B. Christensen 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(2):123-150
Many still seem confident that the kind of semantic theory Putnam once proposed for natural kind terms is right. This paper seeks to show that this confidence is misplaced because the general idea underlying the theory is incoherent. Consequently, the theory must be rejected prior to any consideration of its epistemological, ontological or metaphysical acceptability. Part I sets the stage by showing that falsehoods, indeed absurdities, follow from the theory when one deliberately suspends certain devices Putnam built into it , presumably in order to block such entailments. Part II then raises the decisive issue of at what cost these devices do the job they need to do. It argues that - apart from possessing no other motivation than their capacity to block the consequences derived in Part I - they only fulfil this blocking function if they render the theory unable to deal with fiction and related 'make-believe' activities. Part III indicates the affinity Putnam's account has with the classically 'denotative' view of meaning, and thus how its weaknesses may be seen as a variant of the classical weakness of 'denotative' approaches. It concludes that the theory is a conceptual muddle. 相似文献
13.
According to many philosophers, the notion of belief is constitutively normative (Boghossian ( 2003 , 2005 ); Shah ( 2003 , 2006 ); Shah and Velleman ( 2005 ); Gibbard ( 2005 ); Wedgwood ( 2002 , 2007 )). In a series of widely discussed papers ( 1990 , 1992a , 1992b ), Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons have developed an ingenious ‘Moral Twin Earth’ argument against ‘Cornell Realist’ metaethical views which hold that moral terms have synthetic natural definitions in the manner of natural kind terms. In this paper we shall suggest that an adaptation of the Moral Twin Earth argument to the doxastic case – Doxastic Twin Earth – provides new evidence for the normativity of belief. 相似文献
14.
David Mokriski 《Metaphilosophy》2020,51(5):702-726
The Moral Twin Earth challenge to ethical naturalism threatens to undermine an otherwise promising metaethical view by showing that typical, naturalist-friendly theories of reference determination predict diverging reference in Twin Earth scenarios, making it difficult to account for substantive moral disagreement. Several theorists have recently invoked David Lewis’s doctrine of reference magnetism as a solution, claiming that a highly elite moral property—a moral “joint in nature”—could secure shared reference between ourselves and our twins on Twin Earth, despite our diverging usages of moral terms. This paper argues that this move has significant methodological implications: namely, it entails that a certain sort of simplicity is truth-conducive. Consequently, when applied to moral theories, this gives certain views, specifically monist ones like utilitarianism and contractualism, an advantage over their more complicated rivals, forms of pluralism and particularism. Thus, ethical naturalists cannot invoke reference magnetism without a substantial impact on first-order theorizing. 相似文献
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Guillemine Chaudoye Marine Strauss‐Kahn Rafika Zebdi 《The International journal of psycho-analysis》2017,98(4):985-997
‘I want to erase him from my memory,’ she said, ‘his eyes, his eyes staring at me … they are there every night, his hand … every night it hits me again and again …’. On the basis of these few words taken from the therapeutic work with Keltoum, the author reflects theoretically and clinically on the place of memory in a traumatism: a fixed memory, a ‘frozen image’, the signs of a traumatic compulsion to repeat, are the expressions of a process of psychic disorganization but also of a ‘symbolized and symbolizing’ memory anticipating a possible historicization of this memory, of a path, therefore, towards a resolution of the trauma resulting from a process of psychic integration and reorganization. 相似文献
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