Control of impulsive emotional behaviour through implementation intentions

Past research has established that people can strategically enhance or override impulsive emotional behaviour with implementation intentions (Eder, Rothermund, & Proctor, 2010). However, it is unclear whether emotional action tendencies change by intentional processes or by habit formation processes due to repeated enactment of the intention (or both). The present study shows that forming implementation intentions is sufficient to modulate emotional action tendencies. Participants received instructions about how to respond to positive and negative stimuli on evaluation trials but no such trials were actually presented. Results showed that merely intending to approach and avoid affective stimuli influenced emotional action tendencies in a modified affective Simon task in which affective valence was irrelevant. An affective Simon effect (i.e., faster reactions when the valence of the stimulus corresponded with the valence of the movement) was observed when participants intended evaluations with affectively congruent responses (i.e., positive-approach, negative-avoid); in contrast, the effect was reversed in direction when participants planned evaluations with incongruent responses (i.e., positive-avoid, negative-approach). Thus, implementation intentions can regulate implicit emotional responses even in the absence of possible habit formation processes. Implications for dual-system accounts of emotion regulation are discussed.     

Control of impulsive emotional behaviour through implementation intentions

Past research has established that people can strategically enhance or override impulsive emotional behaviour with implementation intentions (Eder, Rothermund, & Proctor, 2010). However, it is unclear whether emotional action tendencies change by intentional processes or by habit formation processes due to repeated enactment of the intention (or both). The present study shows that forming implementation intentions is sufficient to modulate emotional action tendencies. Participants received instructions about how to respond to positive and negative stimuli on evaluation trials but no such trials were actually presented. Results showed that merely intending to approach and avoid affective stimuli influenced emotional action tendencies in a modified affective Simon task in which affective valence was irrelevant. An affective Simon effect (i.e., faster reactions when the valence of the stimulus corresponded with the valence of the movement) was observed when participants intended evaluations with affectively congruent responses (i.e., positive–approach, negative–avoid); in contrast, the effect was reversed in direction when participants planned evaluations with incongruent responses (i.e., positive–avoid, negative–approach). Thus, implementation intentions can regulate implicit emotional responses even in the absence of possible habit formation processes. Implications for dual-system accounts of emotion regulation are discussed.     

Real and imagined body movement primes metaphor comprehension

We demonstrate in two experiments that real and imagined body movements appropriate to metaphorical phrases facilitate people's immediate comprehension of these phrases. Participants first learned to make different body movements given specific cues. In two reading time studies, people were faster to understand a metaphorical phrase, such as push the argument, when they had previously just made an appropriate body action (e.g., a push movement) (Experiment 1), or imagined making a specific body movement (Experiment 2), than when they first made a mismatching body action (e.g., a chewing movement) or no movement. These findings support the idea that appropriate body action, or even imagined action, enhances people's embodied, metaphorical construal of abstract concepts that are referred to in metaphorical phrases.     

How the brain understands intention: different neural circuits identify the componential features of motor and prior intentions

In this paper we present theoretical and experimental evidence for a set of mechanisms by which intention is understood. We propose that three basic aspects are involved in the understanding of intention. The first aspect to consider is intention recognition, i.e., the process by which we recognize other people's intentions, distinguishing among different types. The second aspect concerns the attribution of intention to its author: the existence of shared neural representations provides a parsimonious explanation of how we recognize other people's intentions (what they are doing), but in and of itself, is not sufficient to determine who the agent is. Once the intention has been recognized and attributed to an agent, the reasons for, and the aim of, the intention are to be considered. Hence, the third aspect concerns the aim-intention motivating the execution of a certain action. We discuss the neural basis of these three theoretical aspects suggesting a conceptual synthesis.     

基于成本最小化信息的社会性意图识别：来自脑电和行为的证据

与已有研究着重考察如何识别客体导向性意图(动作以物理对象为目标, 而不涉及其他人)不同, 本研究对人们如何识别社会性意图(动作以指向社会主体为目标以影响对方的交互行为)进行了探讨。基于两交互主体在整体层面应遵循效用最大化的分析, 提出当A协助B达成目标状态所需要的成本小于B单独实现该目标状态所需要的成本时(简称为成本最小化信息), 其可被识别为具有社会性意图。通过在B面前设置栅栏的方法操纵成本最小化信息, 以指示不同意图类型的脑电μ抑制程度、对不同变化的敏感性(辨别力)为指标, 对该假设进行了检验。结果显示, 相比客体导向性意图的控制条件(即A将目标物苹果放置在石头前), 当A将目标物苹果放置在被栅栏挡住的B前, 其动作可减少B单独获取该苹果的动作成本, 即符合成本最小化条件时, μ的抑制程度更高(实验1), 且对结构改变(某两个动画中充当相同角色的智能体互换)的辨别力更强, 但对角色交换(某个动画中两个智能体的角色交换)的辨别力更弱(实验3a); 而当栅栏不存在时, 虽然A的运动路径与实验1相同, 但A将苹果放置在B前的成本大于B自身获取苹果的成本, 即不符合成本最小化条件, 条件间μ抑制的差异消失(实验2), 且对不同动作模式中变化的辨别相当(实验3b)。鉴于已有研究表明社会性意图所诱发的μ抑制强于客体导向性意图, 且人们对存在社会性意图的两个智能体间的结构改变更容易辨别, 而对角色交换不敏感, 故上述结果揭示, 两个个体的行为是否满足成本最小化影响人们对动作意图的识别, 支持成本最小化信息是社会性意图识别线索的观点。     

Cues to intention: the role of movement information

Body movement provides a rich source of cues about other people’s goals and intentions. In the present research, we investigate how well people can distinguish between different social intentions on the basis of movement information. Participants observed a model reaching toward and grasping a wooden block with the intent to cooperate with a partner, compete against an opponent, or perform an individual action. In Experiment 1, a temporal occlusion procedure was used as to determine whether advance information gained during the viewing of the initial phase of an action allowed the observers to discriminate across movements performed with different intentions. In Experiment 2, we examined what kind of cues observers relied upon for the discrimination of intentions by masking selected spatial areas of the model (i.e., the arm or the face) maintaining the same temporal occlusion as for Experiment 1. Results revealed that observers could readily judge whether the object was grasped with the intent to cooperate, compete, or perform an individual action. Seeing the arm was better than seeing the face for discriminating individual movements performed at different speeds (natural-speed vs. fast-speed individual movements). By contrast, seeing the face was better than seeing the arm for discriminating social from individual movements performed at a comparable speed (cooperative vs. natural-speed individual movements, competitive vs. fast-speed individual movements). These results demonstrate that observers are attuned to advance movement information from different cues and that they can use such kind of information to anticipate the future course of an action.     

The Action-Sentence Compatibility Effect: It's All in the Timing

When participants are asked to make sensibility judgments on sentences that describe action toward the body (i.e., "Mark dealt the cards to you") or away from the body (i.e., "You dealt the cards to Mark"), they are faster to respond when the response requires an arm movement in the same direction as the action described by the sentence. This congruence effect is known as the Action–Sentence Compatibility Effect (ACE). This study reports 4 experiments that extend our understanding of the ACE by exploring how the time at which one prepares the motor response required for the sensibility judgment affects the magnitude of the ACE. Results show that the ACE arises only when participants have the opportunity to plan their motor response while they are processing the sentence.     

Compatibility between tones, head movements, and facial expressions

The study tests the hypothesis of an embodied associative triangle among relative tone pitch (i.e., high or low tones), vertical movement, and facial emotion. In particular, it is tested whether relative pitch automatically activates facial expressions of happiness and anger as well as vertical head movements. Results show robust congruency effects: happiness expressions and upward head tilts are imitated faster when paired with high rather than low tones, while anger expressions and downward head tilts are imitated faster when paired with low rather than high tones. The results add to the growing evidence favoring an embodiment account that emphasizes multimodal representations as the basis of cognition, emotion, and action.     

Effects of saccades and response type on the Simon effect: If you look at the stimulus,the Simon effect may be gone

The Simon effect has most often been investigated with key-press responses and eye fixation. In the present study, we asked how the type of eye movement and the type of manual response affect response selection in a Simon task. We investigated three eye movement instructions (spontaneous, saccade, and fixation) while participants performed goal-directed (i.e., reaching) or symbolic (i.e., finger-lift) responses. Initially, no oculomotor constraints were imposed, and a Simon effect was present for both response types. Next, eye movements were constrained. Participants had to either make a saccade toward the stimulus or maintain gaze fixed in the screen centre. While a congruency effect was always observed in reaching responses, it disappeared in finger-lift responses. We suggest that the redirection of saccades from the stimulus to the correct response location in noncorresponding trials contributes to the Simon effect. Because of eye–hand coupling, this occurred in a mandatory manner with reaching responses but not with finger-lift responses. Thus, the Simon effect with key-presses disappears when participants do what they typically do—look at the stimulus.     

Precision and power grip priming by observed grasping

The coupling of hand grasping stimuli and the subsequent grasp execution was explored in normal participants. Participants were asked to respond with their right- or left-hand to the accuracy of an observed (dynamic) grasp while they were holding precision or power grasp response devices in their hands (e.g., precision device/right-hand; power device/left-hand). The observed hand was making either accurate or inaccurate precision or power grasps and participants signalled the accuracy of the observed grip by making one or other response depending on instructions. Responses were made faster when they matched the observed grip type. The two grasp types differed in their sensitivity to the end-state (i.e., accuracy) of the observed grip. The end-state influenced the power grasp congruency effect more than the precision grasp effect when the observed hand was performing the grasp without any goal object (Experiments 1 and 2). However, the end-state also influenced the precision grip congruency effect (Experiment 3) when the action was object-directed. The data are interpreted as behavioural evidence of the automatic imitation coding of the observed actions. The study suggests that, in goal-oriented imitation coding, the context of an action (e.g., being object-directed) is more important factor in coding precision grips than power grips.     

The difficulty of letting go: moderators of the deactivation of completed intentions

Recent studies showed that prospective memory (PM) intentions might not be deactivated directly after completion. The residual activation leads to aftereffects which are reflected as interference in performance when former PM cues of old intentions are interspersed in the new task (i.e., intention deactivation failure, Walser et al., J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn 38(4):1030–1044, 2012). In the present study, we investigated potential mechanisms that might support the deactivation process of completed intentions by manipulating the task demands (e.g., working memory load) between intention completion and measurement of aftereffects. Aftereffects on repeated PM-cue trials were found when working memory load was low (control condition), but were reduced when available resources were sparse (working memory load condition). When participants were asked to reflect upon the to-be-deactivated PM cue, subsequent aftereffects were increased. Further, overall aftereffects were larger for participants low in self-reported action control. Results show that the nature of the filler-task activity determines whether the representation of the completed intention is destabilized (working memory load) or strengthened (intention reflection). The (at least partial) overwriting of completed intention representations by new working memory task representations seems therefore to reflect a supporting factor for the deactivation of completed intentions.     

The influence of spatial representation on valence judgements: An event-related potential study

The present study used event-related potentials (ERPs) to explore the nature of space-valence congruency effects. We presented participants with up or down arrows at the centre of the screen and then asked participants to identify whether the following target words had the emotional valence. The target words included positive emotional words (e.g., “happy” and “delight”), negative emotional words (e.g., “sad” and “depressive”) and neutral words (e.g., “history” and “country”). Behavioural data showed that the positive targets were identified faster when they are primed by up arrows than when primed by down arrows, whereas the negative targets were identified faster when they are primed by down arrows than when primed by up arrows. The ERP analysis showed larger P2 amplitudes were found in the congruent condition (i.e., the positive targets following up arrows or the negative targets following down arrows) than in the incongruent condition (i.e., the positive targets following down arrows or the negative targets following up arrows). Furthermore, larger N400 amplitudes were found in the incongruent condition compared with the congruent condition. Moreover, larger LPC amplitudes were found in the congruent condition compared with the incongruent condition. Therefore, in addition to replicating the space-valence congruency effects in a neutral/emotional judgement task, our study also extended previous studies by showing that spatial information modulates the processing of the emotional words at multiple stages.     

Action embellishment: an intention bias in the perception of success

Na?ve theories of behavior hold that actions are caused by an agent's intentions, and the subsequent success of an action is measured by the satisfaction of those intentions. However, when an action is not as successful as intended, the expected causal link between intention and action may distort perception of the action itself. Four studies found evidence of an intention bias in perceptions of action. Actors perceived actions to be more successful when given a prior choice (e.g., choose between 2 words to type) and also when they felt greater motivation for the action (e.g., hitting pictures of disliked people). When the intent was to fail (e.g., singing poorly), choice led to worse estimates of performance. A final experiment suggested that intention bias works independent from self-enhancement motives. In observing another actor hit pictures of Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, shots were distorted to match the actor's intentions, even when it opposed personal wishes. Together these studies indicate that judgments of action may be automatically distorted and that these inferences arise from the expected consistency between intention and action in agency.     

Shaping of Reach-to-Grasp Kinematics by Intentions: A Meta-Analysis

When we reach to grasp something, we need to take into account both the properties of the object we are grasping and the intention we have in mind. Previous research has found these constraints to be visible in the reach-to-grasp kinematics, but there is no consensus on which kinematic parameters are the most sensitive. To examine this, a systematic literature search and meta-analyses were performed. The search identified studies assessing how changes in either an object property or a prior intention affect reach-to-grasp kinematics in healthy participants. Hereafter, meta-analyses were conducted using a restricted maximum likelihood random effect model. The meta-analyses showed that changes in both object properties and prior intentions affected reach-to-grasp kinematics. Based on these results, the authors argue for a tripartition of the reach-to-grasp movement in which the accelerating part of the reach is primarily associated with transporting the hand to the object (i.e., extrinsic object properties), the decelerating part of the reach is used as a preparation for object manipulation (i.e., prepare the grasp or the subsequent action), and the grasp is associated with manipulating the object's intrinsic properties, especially object size.     

Automatic activation of spatial-numerical association in a primed parity judgement task: Evidence from the number-line congruency effect

Using a forward masked priming paradigm, the present parity judgement experiment examines how the automatic activation of spatial-numerical associations of single-digit primes and targets has an effect on the primed Spatial-Numerical Association Response Code (SNARC) effect. Both the parity priming effect (i.e., faster and more accurate responses when the prime and target are matched in parity) and the repetition-primed SNARC effect (i.e., responses to large numbers are faster when made by right hand than when made by left hand and the reverse is true for small numbers) are replicated. The nonrepetition-primed SNARC effect is stronger when the response (e.g., made by the left hand) to the target (e.g., 4) is congruent with the position of the prime on a mental number line (e.g., 6) than when it is incongruent (e.g., 1). This number-line congruency effect reflects the notion that the coactivation of spatial-numerical association of prime and target occurs even when the prime is masked and presented so rapidly that it cannot be processed via participants’ use of strategies.     

On the inability to ignore touch when responding to vision in the crossmodal congruency task

We investigated the extent to which people can selectively ignore distracting vibrotactile information when performing a visual task. In Experiment 1, participants made speeded elevation discrimination responses (up vs. down) to a series of visual targets presented from one of two eccentricities on either side of central fixation, while simultaneously trying to ignore task-irrelevant vibrotactile distractors presented independently to the finger (up) vs. thumb (down) of either hand. Participants responded significantly more slowly, and somewhat less accurately, when the elevation of the vibrotactile distractor was incongruent with that of the visual target than when they were presented from the same (i.e., congruent) elevation. This crossmodal congruency effect was significantly larger when the visual and tactile stimuli appeared on the same side of space than when they appeared on different sides, although the relative eccentricity of the two stimuli within the hemifield (i.e., same vs. different) had little effect on performance. In Experiment 2, participants who crossed their hands over the midline showed a very different pattern of crossmodal congruency effects to participants who adopted an uncrossed hands posture. Our results suggest that both the relative external location and the initial hemispheric projection of the target and distractor stimuli contribute jointly to determining the magnitude of the crossmodal congruency effect when participants have to respond to vision and ignore touch.     

Who's calling the shots? Intentional content and feelings of control

Based on Pacherie’s dynamic theory of intentions, this study investigated how the way an intention is formed and sustained affects action performance and the experience of control during acting. In Experiment 1, task-irrelevant verbal commands were given while participants responded to stimuli in a two-choice reaction time (RT) task. The commands referred to an action goal congruent or incongruent with the actor’s current intention, or ordered the initiation or abortion of the action. In Experiment 2, the same commands were given as participants freely chose between two actions. The distractors affected performance in the reactive task only. In both experiments, feelings of control were based on movement parameters as well as perceived (mis)matches between distractors and intended actions. These findings suggest that the way an intention is implemented affects how well it can be shielded against external perturbations and how much one feels in control.     

Retrospective construction of the judgement of free choice

The problem of free will lies at the heart of modern scientific studies of consciousness. Some authors propose that actions are unconsciously initiated and awareness of intention is referred retrospectively to the action after it has been performed [e.g. Aarts, H., Custers, R., & Wegner, D. M. (2005). On the inference of personal authorship: Enhancing experienced agency by priming effect information. Consciousness & Cognition, 14, 439-458]. This contrasts with the common impression that our intentions cause those actions. By combining a stop signal paradigm and an intentional action paradigm we show that participants sometimes indicate to have intentionally initiated an action while reaction time data strongly suggest that they in fact failed to stop the action. In a second experiment we demonstrate that the number of trials in which participants misattributed their awareness of intention varied with the intentional involvement during action planning. Our data support the retrospective account of intentional action. Furthermore, we introduce an experimental approach that objectifies introspective judgments of awareness of intention.     

Self‐regulation of consumer decision making and behavior: The role of implementation intentions

People may use the self-regulatory strategy of forming implementation intentions (i.e., if-then plans) to make better consumer decisions and facilitate the translation of those decisions into action. First, research on the mechanisms and effects of implementation intentions is reviewed. Second, we discuss how implementation intentions can be used to improve consumer decision making by promoting attention control and information elaboration, and overcoming disruptive influences. Third, we consider the various problems that militate against the enactment of one's decisions, and evidence is presented to show that implementation intentions are still effective even when goal attainment does not seem to be amenable to self-regulation. Finally, potential moderators of implementation intention effects are discussed.     

The Compensatory Role of Implementation Intentions for Young Adults with Low Working Memory Capacity

Many factors improve prospective memory performance both inside and outside of the laboratory, including the detailed planning of the situational cue and intended action (i.e., implementation intentions). In the current study, we obtained measures of working memory capacity and laboratory event‐based prospective memory performance in college‐aged adults. Half of our participants formed an implementation intention in the prospective memory task. Because of evidence that implementation intentions increase the encoding/retrieval efficiency of the prospective memory, it was predicted that forming an implementation intention would serve as a compensatory strategy for those with low working memory ability. Our results supported this hypothesis in that working memory capacity no longer correlated with prospective memory performance when participants employed an implementation intention encoding strategy. These findings suggest that implementation intentions may be an effective way for individuals with low working memory capacity to improve their performance in an attentionally demanding prospective memory task. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.