Measurement Invariance of the Wong and Law Emotional Intelligence Scale Scores: Does the Measurement Structure Hold across Far Eastern and European Countries?

In recent years, emotional intelligence and emotional intelligence measures have been used in a plethora of countries and cultures. This is also the case for the Wong and Law Emotional Intelligence Scale (WLEIS), highlighting the importance of examining whether the WLEIS is invariant across regions other than the Far Eastern region (China) where it was originally developed. This study investigated the measurement invariance (MI) of the WLEIS scores across two countries, namely Singapore (N= 505) and Belgium (N= 339). Apart from items measuring the factor “use of emotion”, the measurement structure underlying the WLEIS ratings was generally invariant across both countries as there was no departure from MI in terms of factor form and factor loadings. The scalar invariance model (imposing an identical threshold structure) was partially supported. Factor intercorrelations (not involving the factor “use of emotion”) were also identical across countries. These results show promise for the invariance of the WLEIS scores across different countries, yet warn of the non‐invariance of the dimension “use of emotion”. Reducing the motivation‐oriented nature of these items is in order to come to an exact model fit in cross‐cultural comparisons.     

Dispositional mindfulness and perceived stress: The role of emotional intelligence

The present study examined the relationships between dispositional mindfulness, emotional intelligence and perceived stress using self-report measures. We administered the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS), the Wong Law Emotional Intelligence Scale (WLEIS), and the Perceive Stress Scale (PPS) to a non-clinical sample of Chinese adults (n = 380). The results showed that mindfulness was positively associated with four components of WLEIS, and negatively associated with perceived stress. Mediation analysis indicated that only the regulation and use of emotion components of WLEIS acted as mediators of the association between mindfulness and perceived stress. Effect contrasts showed no significant difference between the specific indirect effects through these two mediators. Implications and suggestions for future research are discussed.     

有偿献血HIV感染者的情绪障碍

考察有偿献血HIV感染者的情绪状况,探讨他们面临的艾滋病压力和对感染HIV的认知评价对其情绪的影响。方法：采用Beck抑郁量表、焦虑自评量表、艾滋病压力量表、认知评价量表作为测查工具,测查了185名有偿献血HIV感染者,并收集了人口学资料、症状资料和其它信息。结果：（1）92%的有偿献血HIV感染者有中、重度抑郁障碍,他们的焦虑程度高于神经衰弱者和焦虑症者;（2）艾滋病压力不仅通过认知评价而且会直接对情绪障碍产生影响;（3）认知评价在艾滋病压力和情绪障碍之间起部分中介作用。结论：有偿献血HIV感染者抑郁、焦虑情绪障碍严重,艾滋病压力和认知评价对情绪障碍的产生都有直接或间接的影响     

Another Search for the “Hot” Cognitions: Appraisal, Irrational Beliefs, Attributions, and Their Relation to Emotion

One study examined the hypothesized status of appraisal and irrational beliefs relative to attributions, as proximal antecedents of emotion. In our study, which looked at 4 pairs of functional and dysfunctional negative emotions (i.e., concern/anxiety, sadness/depression, remorse/guilt, annoyance/anger), undergraduates (N = 120) reported on their attributions, appraisal, irrational beliefs, and emotions during past encounters associated with various negative events. Congruent with both Smith and Lazarus' (1993) appraisal theory and Ellis' (1994) cognitive theory of emotion, the results of this study indicate that the emotions (both functional and dysfunctional negative emotions) were more directly associated with appraisal and with irrational beliefs (dysfunctional negative emotions only) than they were with attributions. Also, irrational beliefs were strongly associated with appraisal; while demandingness (DEM) was associated more with primary appraisal, awfulizing/catastrophizing, low frustration tolerance, and global evaluation of human worth (including self-downing) were associated more with secondary appraisal. Dysfunctional emotions seem to involve primary appraisal associated with DEM while functional emotions involve primary appraisal associated with preferences. These findings lend to support the status of appraisal and irrational beliefs as the proximal cognitive antecedents of emotion and the status of irrational beliefs as a differencing factor between functional and dysfunctional emotions.     

A computational unification of cognitive behavior and emotion

Existing models that integrate emotion and cognition generally do not fully specify why cognition needs emotion and conversely why emotion needs cognition. In this paper, we present a unified computational model that combines an abstract cognitive theory of behavior control (PEACTIDM) and a detailed theory of emotion (based on an appraisal theory), integrated in a theory of cognitive architecture (Soar). The theory of cognitive control specifies a set of required computational functions and their abstract inputs and outputs, while the appraisal theory specifies in more detail the nature of these inputs and outputs and an ontology for their representation. We argue that there is a surprising functional symbiosis between these two independently motivated theories that leads to a deeper theoretical integration than has been previously obtained in other computational treatments of cognition and emotion. We use an implemented model in Soar to test the feasibility of the resulting integrated theory, and explore its implications and predictive power in several task domains.     

EMA: A process model of appraisal dynamics

A computational model of emotion must explain both the rapid dynamics of some emotional reactions as well as the slower responses that follow deliberation. This is often addressed by positing multiple levels of appraisal processes such as fast pattern directed vs. slower deliberative appraisals. In our view, this confuses appraisal with inference. Rather, we argue for a single and automatic appraisal process that operates over a person’s interpretation of their relationship to the environment. Dynamics arise from perceptual and inferential processes operating on this interpretation (including deliberative and reactive processes). This article discusses current developments in a computational model of emotion processes and illustrates how a single-level model of appraisal obviates a multi-level approach within the context of modeling a naturalistic emotional situation.     

Better together: a unified perspective on appraisal and emotion regulation

ABSTRACT

Advances in our understanding of appraisal processes and emotion regulation have been two of the most important contributions of research on cognition and emotion in recent decades. Interestingly, however, progress in these two areas has been less mutually informative than one might expect or desire. To help remedy this situation, we provide an integration of appraisal theory and the process model of emotion regulation by describing parallel, interacting and iterative systems for emotion generation and emotion regulation. Outputs of the emotion generation system are perceived by the emotion regulation system, and emotion regulation strategies then modulate emotion by intervening at specific stages of the emotion generation system, ultimately changing appraisal dimensions. We hope that our unified perspective will encourage and guide future research at the interface of cognition and emotion.     

Toward Computational Model of Emotion from Individual Difference in Perceiving Facial Expressions

We propose a computational model for identifying emotional state of a facial expression from appraisal scores given by human observers utilizing their differences in perception. The appraisal model of human emotion is adopted as the basis of this evaluation process with appraisal variables as output. We investigated the performance for both categorical and continuous representation of the variables appraised by human observers. Analysis of the data exhibits higher degree of agreement between estimated Indian ratings and the available reference when these are rated through continuous domain. We also observed that emotional state with negative valence are influential in the perception of hybrid emotional state like ‘Surprise’, only when appraisal variables are labeled through categories of emotions. Thus, the proposed method has implications in developing software to detect emotion using appraisal variables in continuous domain, perceived from facial expression of an agent (or human subject). Further, this model can be customized to include cultural variability in recognizing emotions.     

Social appraisal influences recognition of emotions

The notion of social appraisal emphasizes the importance of a social dimension in appraisal theories of emotion by proposing that the way an individual appraises an event is influenced by the way other individuals appraise and feel about the same event. This study directly tested this proposal by asking participants to recognize dynamic facial expressions of emotion (fear, happiness, or anger in Experiment 1; fear, happiness, anger, or neutral in Experiment 2) in a target face presented at the center of a screen while a contextual face, which appeared simultaneously in the periphery of the screen, expressed an emotion (fear, happiness, anger) or not (neutral) and either looked at the target face or not. We manipulated gaze direction to be able to distinguish between a mere contextual effect (gaze away from both the target face and the participant) and a specific social appraisal effect (gaze toward the target face). Results of both experiments provided evidence for a social appraisal effect in emotion recognition, which differed from the mere effect of contextual information: Whereas facial expressions were identical in both conditions, the direction of the gaze of the contextual face influenced emotion recognition. Social appraisal facilitated the recognition of anger, happiness, and fear when the contextual face expressed the same emotion. This facilitation was stronger than the mere contextual effect. Social appraisal also allowed better recognition of fear when the contextual face expressed anger and better recognition of anger when the contextual face expressed fear.     

A multiple‐method analysis of appraisal–emotion relationships: The case of the prosocial intergroup emotions

Despite its status as a prominent set of theories for explaining the elicitation and differentiation of emotions, much appraisal theory and research offer little indication of the nature of the relationship expected between appraisals and emotions. Here, we present a three‐study, multiple‐method analysis in which we examine numerous ways of testing appraisal–emotion relationships using the “prosocial” intergroup emotions—sympathy, anger, and guilt—as an example. Results show that the set of appraisal dimensions that appears strongly characteristic of an emotion varies depending on the kind of appraisal—emotion relationship hypothesised and the experimental methodology/statistical analysis used. These findings demonstrate the utility of explicit theorising about the nature of the relationship between emotions and appraisals, and show how the hypothesised appraisal–emotion relationship and choice of methodology can affect the structure of appraisal theories. We recommend an analysis across multiple methods to provide a more complete picture of a given set of appraisal–emotion relationships.     

Expression without recognition: contributions of the human amygdala to emotional communication

A growing body of evidence from humans and other animals suggests the amygdala may be a critical neural substrate for emotional processing. In particular, recent studies have shown that damage to the human amygdala impairs the normal appraisal of social signals of emotion, primarily those of fear. However, effective social communication depends on both the ability to receive (emotional appraisal) and the ability to send (emotional expression) signals of emotional state. Although the role of the amygdala in the appraisal of emotion is well established, its importance for the production of emotional expressions is unknown. We report a case study of a patient with bilateral amygdaloid damage who, despite a severe deficit in interpreting facial expressions of emotion including fear, exhibits an intact ability to express this and other basic emotions. This dissociation suggests that a single neural module does not support all aspects of the social communication of emotional state.     

Early antecedents of emotion differentiation and regulation: Experience tunes the appraisal thresholds of emotional development in infancy

In this review, we synthesize evidence to highlight cognitive appraisal as an important developmental antecedent of individual differences in emotion differentiation and adept emotion regulation. Emotion differentiation is the degree to which emotions are experienced in a nuanced or “granular” way—as specific and separable phenomena. More extensive differentiation is related to positive wellbeing and has emerged as a correlate of emotion regulation skill among adults. We argue that the cognitive appraisal processes that underlie these facets of emotional development are instantiated early in the first year of life and tuned by environmental input and experience. Powerful socializing input in the form of caregivers’ contingent and selective responding to infants’ emotional signals carves and calibrates the infant’s appraisal thresholds for what in their world ought to be noticed, deemed as important or personally meaningful, and responded to (whether and how). These appraisal thresholds are thus unique to the individual child despite the ubiquity of the appraisal process in emotional responding. This appraisal infrastructure, while plastic and continually informed by experience across the lifespan, likely tunes subsequent emotion differentiation, with implications for children’s emotion regulatory choices and skills. We end with recommendations for future research in this area, including the urgent need for developmental emotion science to investigate the diverse sociocultural contexts in which children’s cognitive appraisals, differentiation of emotions, and regulatory responses are being built across childhood.     

Appraisal,computational models,and scherer's expert system

Abstract

This paper discusses computational models of the mechanism of emotion elicitation according to appraisal theories of emotion. Following a brief review of earlier models, the general affordances of computational models are discussed. Scherer's (1993) recent “expert system” for predicting emotions is then examined in some detail, followed by an exploration of several alternative algorithms for computing an elicited emotion based on an appraisal specification.     

The place of appraisal in emotion

Abstract

The concept of “appraisal” has been used in the literature in a dual way: to refer to the content of emotional experience, as well as to the cognitive antecedents of emotions. I argue that appraisal in the former sense is what is contained in information in self-reports and that this information is of limited use for making inferences on emotion antecedents. This is so because emotional experience may contain appraisals that are part of the emotional response rather than belonging to its causes. They often result from elaboration of the experience after it has begun to be generated. Although in most or all emotions some cognitive appraisal processes are essential antecedents, these processes may be much simpler than self-reports (and the semantics of emotion words) may suggest. The appraisal processes that account for emotion elicitation can be assumed to be of a quite elementary kind.     

Exploring the dynamics of the appraisal–emotion relationship: A constraint satisfaction model of the appraisal process

This paper presents a computational model of emotions that is based in an appraisal theoretical framework. The model explores the dynamics of the appraisal–emotion relationship using parallel constraint satisfaction. It proposes belief coherence, desire coherence and belief–desire coherence as basic principles and specifies how these principles can be realised in a parallel constraint satisfaction system. The model shows that the very same mechanisms that account for the formation of coherence or consistency are also pivotal for the emergence and alteration of emotional states and for the dynamics of the cognition–emotion relationship. Concrete simulation examples show how discrete emotions such as anger, pride, sadness, shame, surprise, relief and disappointment emerge out of these principles.     

Effects of achievement contexts on the meaning structure of emotion words

Little is known about the impact of context on the meaning of emotion words. In the present study, we used a semantic profiling instrument (GRID) to investigate features representing five emotion components (appraisal, bodily reaction, expression, action tendencies, and feeling) of 11 emotion words in situational contexts involving success or failure. We compared these to the data from an earlier study in which participants evaluated the typicality of features out of context. Profile analyses identified features for which typicality changed as a function of context for all emotion words, except contentment, with appraisal features being most frequently affected. Those context effects occurred for both hypothesised basic and non-basic emotion words. Moreover, both data sets revealed a four-dimensional structure. The four dimensions were largely similar (valence, power, arousal, and novelty). The results suggest that context may not change the underlying dimensionality but affects facets of the meaning of emotion words.     

Emotional Intelligence as a Moderator of Affectivity/Emotional Labor and Emotional Labor/Psychological Distress Relationships

Emotional labor refers to effort, planning, and control required to display organizationally desired emotions during interpersonal transactions and performed by individuals either through deep acting or surface acting. Deep acting refers to the modification of inner feeling in order to express the organizationally desired emotions, whereas surface acting refers to the change of emotional expression without facilitating the change of inner emotional state. The authors examined the moderating role of emotional intelligence dimensions (self-emotional appraisal; others’ emotional appraisal, use of emotion, and regulation of emotion) in the affectivity (a general positive or negative tendency to experience a particular mood)-emotional labor and emotional labor-psychological distress relationships among 210 university teachers. Specifically, we found that (a) regulation of emotion was a particularly important emotional intelligence dimension in influencing the use of deep acting, both directly and indirectly through the interaction with negative affectivity; (b) positive affectivity emerged as an important affectivity dimension in influencing the use of deep acting both directly and indirectly through the interaction with self-emotional appraisal; (c) negative affectivity was a particularly important affectivity dimension in influencing the use of surface acting, both directly and indirectly through its interaction with emotional intelligence dimensions of self-emotional appraisal and use of emotion; and finally (d) regulation of emotion interacted with deep acting to influence the psychological distress arising from EL requirements.