Perfectionism, anger, and anger rumination

Anger and anger rumination are considered to be detrimental to both physical and psychological well being. Furthermore, perfectionism, as a personality construct, seems to be related to various types of maladjustment. Whereas perfectionism has been characterized as being positive when an individual derives pleasure from striving for excellence yet recognizes and accepts individual limitations, it is deemed negative when the individual has unrealistic expectations and is never satisfied with his or her performance. The present study examined whether positive and negative perfectionism was associated with anger and anger rumination. The Farsi version of the Positive and Negative Perfectionism Scale and the Farsi version of the Anger Rumination Scale, as well as Spielberger's State-Trait Anger Scale were completed by 384 Iranian students. Results showed that anger and anger rumination were, as expected, associated negatively with positive perfectionism and associated positively with negative perfectionism. Positive perfectionism enables individuals to strive for success in a flexible manner and, thus, to experience satisfaction and pleasure rather than dissatisfaction, frustration, and anger. Conversely, negative perfectionism makes individuals vulnerable to emotional distress such as predisposition to experience anger and anger rumination through setting high standards for performance, overgeneralization of perceived failures, negative self-evaluation, self-blame, and measuring self-worth in terms of unachievable goals of accomplishment and productivity. Hence, perfectionism may be regarded as having both adaptive and maladaptive aspects with regard to health.     

Irrationality profiles for anger and anxiety

A fundamental position in Rational-Emotive Therapy (RET) is that irrational belief systems cause emotional disturbance. This study adds to the body of recent research substantiating this position by showing significantly different profiles on the Jones Irrational Beliefs Test (IBT) (1968/1969) for a nonclinical population (N=446) differentiated according to low, medium, and high anxiety and low, medium, and high anger. The profile differences not only support the above fundamental position, but also offer some further evidence for the validity of the IBT.Paul J. Woods, Ph.D., co-editor of this journal, is an associate fellow of the Institute for Rational-Emotive Therapy, a professor of psychology at Hollins College, and is engaged in private practice in Roanoke, Virginia.Samuel K. Coggin is completing his Master's work at Hollins College and is employed as a psychologist at the Central Virginia Training Center, Lynchburg, Virginia.     

Potential for hostility and dimensions of anger

Recent reviews have linked Potential for Hostility derived from the Structured Interview (SI) to coronary artery disease, independent of the global Type A pattern. The present study examined the construct validity of Potential for Hostility ratings by correlating Potential for Hostility with 21 scales from four widely used anger/hostility measures: 7 scales from the Anger Self-Report, 8 scales from the Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory, the total score from the Novaco Anger Inventory, and 5 scales from the Multidimensional Anger Inventory. The pattern of correlations revealed that Potential for Hostility was significantly related to scales reflecting awareness and arousal of anger, particularly the verbal expression of anger. To identify underlying anger dimensions, the 21 scales were factor-analyzed. Examination of two and three rotated principal components confirmed previous solutions. The first component, representing anger-arousing and -eliciting situations and anger awareness, was labeled Experience of Anger. The second component, consisting of scales dealing with either physical assault or verbal expression of anger, was labeled Expression of Anger. When a third factor was retained, it contained scales of suspicion, mistrust-suspicion, and guilt: It was therefore labeled Suspicion-Guilt. Potential for Hostility was correlated only with the Expression of Anger factor in the two-factor solution; in the three-factor solution, Potential for Hostility was correlated equally with the Experience of Anger and Expression of Anger factors but was not correlated with the Suspicion-Guilt factor. The implications of these results for the assessment of hostility are discussed.     

Trait anger and anger expression style in children's risky decisions

In this study, 104 children completed a task, measuring risk decision-making, and the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory for Children and Adolescents. Subjects were also asked to evaluate the degree of danger, benefit, fun and fear perceived for each risky choice. Analyses indicated that (a) risk decision-making was predicted by both trait anger and outward expression of anger; (b) appraisal of danger fully mediated the relationship between trait anger and risk; (c) perceptions of benefit, scare and fun partially mediated the relationship between trait anger and risk; and (d) appraisal of danger partially mediated the relationship between outward expression of anger and risk decision-making. The results provide evidence for a relationship between dispositional anger and risk decision-making during childhood, suggesting a possible explanation of the mechanisms below. In particular, risk decision-making can be viewed as the output of cognitive and emotive processes, linked to dispositional anger that leads children to be amused, optimistic and fearless in potentially risky situations. These findings substantiate the importance of incorporating cognitive and emotive factors in theories that seek to explain the relationship between personality traits and risk decision-making across a broad age range.     

Verbalized anger and accusatory "you" messages as cues for anger and antagonism among adolescents.

This study investigated the impact of communications of negative feelings between adolescents in close relationships. High school boys and girls were asked to imagine discussing a relationship problem with a personally close partner and to rate likely reactions to four kinds of statements: assertively expressed distress, assertively expressed anger, aggressively expressed distress, and aggressively expressed anger. Accusatory "you" statements were rated as more aversive and evoked stronger antagonistic response inclinations than assertive "I" statements. Statements depicting anger were rated as more aversive and evoked stronger antagonistic response inclinations than statements depicting distress. Results were similar for boys and girls. Implications of the findings and directions for further research are discussed.     

High and low trait anger, and the recognition of anger problems

This study compared three groups of people: (a) high trait anger individuals who recognized personal anger problems (HR); (b) high trait anger individuals who did not recognize personal anger problems (HNR); and (c) low trait anger individuals not reporting personal anger problems (LNR). Compared to LNR participants, HR and HNR groups reported more anger-out (i.e., outward negative expression of anger such as arguing with others), anger-in (i.e., anger suppression and harboring grudges), greater desire to use and actual use of physically aggressive anger expression (e.g., pushing or shoving someone), and less anger control-in (i.e., emotionally focused strategies to lower anger such as relaxation) and anger control-out (i.e., behaviorally focused strategies such as being patient with others). HR individuals reported more trait anger (i.e., higher propensity to experience anger) and less anger control-out than the HNR group. Gender did not relate to the recognition of anger problems. Findings were discussed with regard to theory and clinical implications.     

Driving anger in Germany: Validation of the driving anger scale for German drivers

In 1994, Deffenbacher et al. published the Driving Anger Scale (DAS), a tool for assessing a driver’s propensity to experience anger in road traffic. Since then, much research has used this scale to measure the driving anger experienced in various countries around the world. This study examines the scale’s validity for German drivers. It also relates their experiences of anger while driving to their experiences and expressions of anger in general, as well as to certain demographic variables. In addition, it compares German drivers’ experiences of driving anger to those reported by drivers from other countries. We distributed a German version of the DAS and the State-Trait Anger Expression Inventory (STAXI) to a sample of 1136 German drivers. Results showed that a 22-items version of the DAS with six factors produced good fit indices for German drivers. Furthermore, data analysis revealed small to moderate significant relationships between German drivers’ driving anger experiences and their experiences and expressions of anger in general, underlining the idea that driving anger is a personality characteristic that is related to one's general experience and expression of anger. Finally, German drivers' driving anger experiences differed from those of drivers from other countries in that German drivers reported less driving anger than drivers from Spain and New Zealand, comparable levels to those from Turkey, Malaysia, and the United States, and more driving anger than drivers from France, Australia, China, and the United Kingdom. In addition, discourteous driver actions and hostile gestures consistently triggered highest driving anger ratings whereas police presence was rated lowest. Given these results, we conclude that the DAS can be applied to German drivers in its modified version.     

Cosmopolitan anger and shame

ABSTRACT

Sentimental cosmopolitans argue that cultivating empathy for distant others is necessary in order to motivate action to address global injustices. This paper accepts the basic premises of the sentimental cosmopolitan project but argues that it ought to be extended to include cultivating other cosmopolitan emotions, particularly anger and shame. There is a tendency to think of anger and shame as unworthy, or as base motives to be overcome; but I argue that, in fact, they constitute an important resource for motivating action to address global injustices. The argument proceeds in three parts. Section 1 outlines sentimental cosmopolitanism and explicates the relationship between empathy, and anger and shame. Section 2 examines the link between anger and shame and responsibility, arguing that anger and shame are well-suited to capturing notions of responsibility for injustice, something lacking in an empathy-based account of sentimental cosmopolitanism. Section 3 provides two further arguments in favour of anger and shame: (i) anger represents a powerful source of energy for political action, and (ii) shame can motivate cosmopolitan action where empathy is absent.     

Type A behavior,anger expression,and reactions to anger imagery

The experiment investigated the effects of Type A behavior, anger expression, and gender on perceptions of control and heart rate. Jenkins Activity Survey defined Type A and B subjects, categorized as either high or low in anger expression, were asked to recall, image, and generate self-referent statements about angry situations. State anger and heart rate were measured during all of the anger induction conditions, and ratings of imagery vividness and perceptions of control for self and others were taken following the recalled and imaged anger conditions. The results, with both the heart rate and self-report measures, indicated that the effects of the independent variables were interactive and situationally dependent. Type A behavior was associated with increased heart rate in two experimental conditions (mood anger and recalled anger), and, in one instance, this effect was amplified in male subjects (recalled anger). The self-report results yielded interactional effects that most commonly took the form of high anger expression, with male Type A's providing higher ratings of state anger, more vivid anger imagery, and lower perceived self-control ratings than did other categories of subjects. Taken together, these results suggest that anger expressiveness, particularly among males, amplifies the usual reactions attributed to Type A's, and that such effects are mediated by the threat of loss of control. Further, the observed interactive relationships limit the generalizability of A/B differences and raise definitional questions about Type A behavior.     

Social anxiety and anger regulation

Based on the assumption that social anxiety is associated with less assertive behaviour and that effective anger regulation is influenced by social anxiety, two studies were conducted to examine the relationship between social anxiety and anger regulation. In Study 1, questionnaires measuring social anxiety, assertiveness, and six habitual anger‐related responses were administered to 115 adults. Social anxiety had an independent effect on rumination and submission, whereas assertiveness was independently related to the use of humour and feedback. In Study 2 (N = 136 adults) self‐ and observer ratings of anger‐related behaviour were obtained after anger was experimentally induced. Social anxiety was related to self‐ratings of submission and rumination. However, independent observer ratings based on videotapes revealed no significant influence of social anxiety on anger‐related behaviour. Taken together, the results provide evidence that social anxiety is associated with the self‐perception of less assertive behaviour and the tendency to evaluate one's behaviour more negatively. These results are consistent with prior studies showing that socially anxious persons tend to underestimate their social performance relative to the ratings of independent observers. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Undergraduate marijuana use and anger

The Anger Expression Scale and a questionnaire regarding marijuana usage were administered to 497 undergraduate college students enrolled at a rural university in the midwestern United States. Four levels of marijuana use were defined by the questionnaire: nonuser, occasional user, frequent user, and daily user. No significant main effect was found on the Anger-In or Total Anger Expression scales, but differences among the four levels of use were noted on the Anger-Out scale. The trend analysis showed a significant linear trend for the Anger-Out and Total Anger Expression scales. Implications of these findings are discussed.     

Infant characteristics and anger reduction

Konrad Lorenz first suggested in 1943 that certain physical and behavioral characteristics common to infants (babyishness) serve as cues to attract adult attention and care as well as to decrease the likelihood of aggression. The present study was designed to determine whether the visual stimuli of a baby's face alone are sufficient to reduce anger. The subjects were 60 female students between 18 and 30 years of age. Anger was evoked by setting unsolvable tasks and by noise and maintained by adequate instructions and by continuing noise. Three procedures of measurement (heart rate, retrospective self-report, and interpretation of facial affect by two observers) were designed to show the reactions of the subjects viewing photos of babies and adults. We found a slight increase in heart rate to be an expression of happiness and a massive acceleration to be an expression of anger. The self-report measures and interpretation of facial affect supported the hypothesis that there is a more positive response to infants than to adults, and to cute babies also a more positive one than to less attractive infants. We found weak evidence that babyishness reduces anger. As a consequence of the length of the experiment, subjects who should not be aroused became angry. Thus, it was possible to register a reduction of anger as reaction to cute infants.     

The regulation effects of anger rumination on different foci of anger

Previous studies have shown that anger rumination plays a critical role in increasing anger. The present study examined whether these effects were different with respect to different foci of anger. In Study 1, 96 participants were asked to ruminate about their shame-related or shame-unrelated anger experiences either in an analytical or an experiential way after recalling an autobiographical anger memory. In Study 2, either shame-related or shame-unrelated anger was evoked in participants (n = 176) by an accomplice, and then the participants were instructed to ruminate in one of the following ways: self-distanced analytical, self-distanced experiential, self-immersed analytical, and self-immersed experiential rumination. Study 1 showed significant interaction effects between the foci of anger and the mode of processing. Study 2 showed significant three-way interaction effects among the foci of anger, the mode of processing and the vantage perspective of rumination. Specifically, the results indicated that self-immersed analytical rumination was more useful than the other types of rumination in reducing shame-unrelated anger, while no difference was found regarding shame-related anger. These findings indicated that the effects of anger rumination are different regarding the foci of anger.     

Duress and Responsibility for Action

ABSTRACT Not all crimes require mens rea, but all serious ones do. Crudely the requirement is that the defendant be able to take responsibility for the actus reus of which he is accused. What must be implied by this is essentially that the agent retain control of his actions. It is unjust to punish actions which are outside of the agent's control since such punishment cannot deter and is, arguably, pointless.
Duress does not remove an agent's control of his actions. This does not mean that actions performed under duress should be viewed as fully intentional. For though the agent foresees and wishes for the result of his action performed under duress, it is wished for as the best option out of a range of alternatives manipulated by the one who makes the threats which constitute the duress. The agent is responsible for his choice, but not for what is available for him to choose. He has an obligation to do what is best in the circumstances and should not be blamed if that would, in other circumstances, be accounted criminal.     

Sensitivity and Responsibility for Consequences

Philosophical Studies -     

Individual differences in anger and displaced aggression: The role of metacognitive beliefs and anger rumination

Metacognitive model is a theoretical approach aimed to explain emotion dysregulation and others emotion-related issues, such anger, and aggressive behavior. From this model, people having higher maladaptive metacognitive beliefs (e.g., “I can't control my thoughts”) are more likely to activate and maintain anger rumination and, in turn, to experience higher levels of anger and to act aggressively. Preliminary evidence shows the role of metacognitive beliefs on anger rumination and anger levels, whereas no studies have examined its association with aggressive behavior. This study first examined the associations between metacognitive beliefs, anger rumination, anger levels, and the propensity to engage in displaced aggression, and second, the mediation role of anger rumination in the relations among metacognitive beliefs and anger and displaced aggression. Participants were 947 students and non-students from general population recruited in two different countries (Australia and Spain). Correlational analyses revealed a similar pattern of results in the Australian and Spanish sample, with participants having dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs also showing higher anger rumination, higher levels of anger and a higher tendency to act aggressively. Structural equation analyses revealed the associations of metacognitive beliefs with anger levels and displaced aggression was fully mediated by anger rumination in both samples. These results suggest that metacognitive beliefs should be considered in comprehensive models and in the therapy of anger problems and aggression.     

Self-Deception and Responsibility for Addiction

ABSTRACT We frequently accuse heavy drinkers and drug users of self‐deception if they refuse to admit that they are addicted. However, given the ways in which we usually conceptualize it, acknowledging addiction merely involves swapping one form of self‐deception for another. We ask addicts to see themselves as in the grip of an irresistible desire, and to accept that addiction is an essentially physiological process. To the extent this is so, we, as much as the addicts, suffer from self‐deception, and the responsibility for their state is in part ours. Conversely, since addicts are compelled to accept a self‐deceptive image of themselves, they are at least partially excused from blame for their self‐deception.