The body as laboratory: Prediction-error minimization,embodiment, and representation

In his (2014) paper, Jakob Hohwy outlines a theory of the brain as an organ for prediction-error minimization (PEM), which he claims has the potential to profoundly alter our understanding of mind and cognition. One manner in which our understanding of the mind is altered, according to PEM, stems from the neurocentric conception of the mind that falls out of the framework, which portrays the mind as “inferentially-secluded” from its environment. This in turn leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. Focusing on this aspect of Hohwy’s argument, we first outline the key components of the PEM framework such as the “evidentiary boundary,” before looking at why this leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. We will argue that although Hohwy may be correct to reject specific theses of embodied cognition, others are in fact implied by the PEM framework and may contribute to its development. We present the metaphor of the “body as a laboratory” in order to highlight what we believe is a more significant role for the body than Hohwy suggests. In detailing these claims, we will expose some of the challenges that PEM raises for providing an account of representation.     

Waves,streams, states,and self: An outline of an integral psychology 1

Abstract

Although far from unanimous, there seems to be a general consensus that neither mind nor brain can be reduced without remainder to the other. This essay argues that indeed both mind and brain need to be included in a nonreductionistic way in any genuinely integral theory of consciousness. In order to facilitate such integration, this essay presents the results of an extensive cross‐cultural literature search on the “mind” side of the equation, suggesting that the mental phenomena that need to be considered in any integral theory include developmental levels or waves of consciousness, developmental lines or streams of consciousness, states of consciousness, and the self (or self‐system). A “master template” of these various phenomena, culled from over one‐hundred psychological systems East and West, is presented. It is suggested that this master template represents a general summary of the “mind” side of the brain‐mind integration. The essay concludes with reflections on the “hard problem,” or how the mind‐side can be integrated with the brain‐side to generate a more integral theory of consciousness.     

Reply to Mr. D⊘⊘r

Certain facts about subjective successions support, I hold, a theory of mind‐dependent sensory data. Suppose that no such theory is true and, furthermore, that as one experiences a visual subjective succession, that of which one is visually aware consists typically in a static physical array. Nevertheless one will, I hold, experience a certain change taking place within one's visual field; and under the imagined conditions, it is hard to fathom what this change could be. Various seemingly plausible and helpful suggestions are examined and rejected. I conclude that neither a common‐sense realism nor, in fact, any view which rejects mind‐dependent sensory data can deal satisfactorily with subjective successions.     

Polger on the Illusion of Contingent Identity

Abstract

Thomas Polger has argued in favour of the mind–brain type‐identity theory, the view that mental states or processes are type‐identical to states of the central nervous system. Acknowledging that the type‐materialist must respond to Kripke’s modal anti‐materialist argument, Polger insists that Kripke’s argument rests on dubious assumptions concerning the identity conditions of brain states. In brief, Polger claims that one knows that x and y are non‐identical when one knows the identity conditions for both x and y. Replace x and y with ‘brain states’ and ‘sensations’ and it follows that one can know that brain states and sensations are non‐identical only if one knows the identity conditions for brain states. But according to Polger, we do not know the identity conditions for brain states. Hence, we should not be so confident that brain states and sensations are non‐identical after all. But Polger’s account is terribly flawed. Ironically, if Polger’s scepticism is warranted, then Polger himself has no good reasons to be a type‐materialist. But more importantly, Polger’s scepticism regarding the identity conditions of brain states is deeply defective. We do, I submit, understand the identity conditions of brain states. In the end, I submit, Kripke is safe from Polger.     

When a Skeptical Hypothesis Is Live

I’m going to argue for a set of restricted skeptical results: roughly put, we don’t know that fire engines are red, we don’t know that we sometimes have pains in our lower backs, we don’t know that John Rawls was kind, and we don’t even know that we believe any of those truths. However, people unfamiliar with philosophy and cognitive science do know all those things. The skeptical argument is traditional in form: here's a skeptical hypothesis; you can’t epistemically neutralize it, you have to be able to neutralize it to know P; so you don’t know P. But the skeptical hypotheses I plug into it are “real, live” scientific‐philosophical hypotheses often thought to be actually true, unlike any of the outrageous traditional skeptical hypotheses (e.g., ‘You’re a brain in a vat’). So I call the resulting skepticism Live Skepticism. Notably, the Live Skeptic's argument goes through even if we adopt the clever anti‐skeptical fixes thought up in recent years such as reliabilism, relevant alternatives theory, contextualism, and the rejection of epistemic closure. Furthermore, the scope of Live Skepticism is bizarre: although we don’t know the simple facts noted above, many of us do know that there are black holes and other amazing facts.     

The politics of mental illness

What is needed today is a biologically grounded explanation of behavior, one that moves beyond the so‐called mind‐body problem. Yet no solution will be found by philosophers who refuse to learn about how brains and bodies work, or by neuroscientists pursuing experimental research based on outmoded or blatantly anti‐biological theories. Churchland's book proposes a solution: to come by a unified theory of the mind‐brain philosophers have to work together with neuroscientists. Yet Churchland's vision of a unified theory is based on an assumption that, while widely held, may not adequately reflect brain functioning in the production of behavior, namely, the assumption that brain processes represent. The present paper proposes an alternative view, suggesting that patterns of neural activity do not ‘represent’ anything, that brains do not ‘read’ or ‘transform’ representations, and that brains do not require representations to produce goal‐directed behavior. Representations are replaced by self‐organizing neural processes that achieve a certain end‐state of interaction between the organism and its environment in a flexible and adaptive manner. Some of the implications of this view for neuroscientific research and the philosophy of mind are outlined.     

Theory of mind selectively predicts preschoolers’ knowledge‐based selective word learning

Children can selectively attend to various attributes of a model, such as past accuracy or physical strength, to guide their social learning. There is a debate regarding whether a relation exists between theory‐of‐mind skills and selective learning. We hypothesized that high performance on theory‐of‐mind tasks would predict preference for learning new words from accurate informants (an epistemic attribute), but not from physically strong informants (a non‐epistemic attribute). Three‐ and 4‐year‐olds (N = 65) completed two selective learning tasks, and their theory‐of‐mind abilities were assessed. As expected, performance on a theory‐of‐mind battery predicted children's preference to learn from more accurate informants but not from physically stronger informants. Results thus suggest that preschoolers with more advanced theory of mind have a better understanding of knowledge and apply that understanding to guide their selection of informants. This work has important implications for research on children's developing social cognition and early learning.     

Sub-Abstract Bodies: The Epistemic and Ethical Role of the Body-Mind Relationship in Adorno’s Philosophy

Abstract

The aim of this paper is threefold. In the first place, I should like to show that Adorno’s philosophy is dependent, to a degree perhaps not always directly recognized in the literature, on a deeply contentious view on the relationship between the mind and the body. In order to show this, I explore and bring out the epistemic and ethical stakes for Adorno’s theory of the relationship between mind and body. Secondly, I move to better articulate precisely what Adorno’s view on the nature of this relationship is. I hold that his position revolves around positing a porous boundary between the domains of the somatic and the cognitive. In closing, I show that Adorno’s account relies on this domain boundary being unidirectionally porous, in that determination of somatic impulses by cognitive content does not seem a live option for Adorno. I go on to note that this smuggles in a dubious position which does a lot of unearned work. The stakes which his implicit account of the body and mind relationship served to secure thereby come once more to look highly vulnerable.     

CAUSALITY, INTENSIONALITY AND IDENTITY: MIND BODY INTERACTION IN SPINOZA

According to Spinoza mental events and physical events are identical. What makes Spinoza's identity theory tempting is that it solves the problem of mind body interaction rather elegantly: mental events and physical events can be causally related to each other because mental events are physical events. However, Spinoza seems to deny that there is any causal interaction between mental and physical events. My aim is to show that Spinoza's apparent denial of mind body interaction can be reconciled with the identity theory. I argue that Spinoza had both an extensional and an intensional concept of cause and when Spinoza seems to deny mind body interaction he is having in mind the intensional concept of cause. This intensional concept of cause corresponds to that of causal explanation. I will argue that Spinoza anticipated Donald Davidson's view that even though mental events cannot be explained by referring to physical events and vice versa, mental and physical events are causally related to each other.     

On the mathematical representation of phenomena of emergence

This paper is a philosophical enquiry into the role that mathematics play in the articulation of science. It is conducted, in its essentials, in the spirit of Wittgenstein's views on the nature and function of philosophy, which are to lay bare, as it were, the manner in which we do whatever it is that we do, and then to examine the claims that we make for the deed. My conclusions should be easily accessible to those familiar with his thinking on the subject of science.

The case that has inspired the writing of this paper is not that of biology, nor is it the biological theory of evolution; rather, the case I have kept in mind while writing this paper is that of cognitive science, sometimes presented as a “science of mind” by its practitioners. It is primarily a computational theory characterized by two distinct approaches, one internal, the gist of which is that the brain/mind distinction is definitely passé; the other external, based on the view that the mark of human mentation is to be found in the ordinary use of old expressions to convey new meanings, i.e. in the Cartesian test for the existence of other minds, and its simpler computational version, the Turing test. Two intuitions underlie the paper: one, that language is obviously an adaptive characteristic of human organisms: one learns one's own mother's tongue, and feral children cannot conceptualize if first exposed to language after reaching puberty; two, empirical evidence supports the view that the “knowing brain” is different architecturally from the “untutored” one. These intuitions warrant regarding man's cognitive apparatus as an evolutionary system, and the “mind” as an emergent property.     

A Buddhist Take on Gilbert Ryle’s Theory of Mind

Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind (1949/2002. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press) is generally considered a landmark in the quest to refute Cartesian dualism. The work contains many inspirational ideas and mainly posits behavioral disposition as the referent of mind in order to refute mind–body dualism. In this article, I show that the Buddhist theory of ‘non-self’ is also at odds with the belief that a substantial soul exists distinct from the physical body and further point out similarities between the Buddhist outlook and Ryle’s ideas in three parts. First, I illustrate that Ryle’s ‘category mistake’ has certain points in common with the Buddhist refutation of ‘self’. Within the Buddhist framework, referents such as ‘mind’ and ‘self’ are merely imputed terms. The presumed existence of an independent substance such as a ‘soul’, when considered in isolation from the expedient usage of the term ‘mind’, can therefore also be viewed as a ‘category mistake’. Second, attempting to solve the questions of ‘what mind is’ and ‘how mind operates’ are two entirely different approaches to the study of mind. I argue that it is necessary to focus on ‘knowing-how’ rather than ‘knowing-that’, if we are to gain a more comprehensive understanding of mind and avoid any kind of category mistake such as those that follow from isolating the physical properties of brain or drawing inferences from a mystical soul. Third, I aim to show why investigating mind from the perspective of ‘dispositions’ of behavior is a valid approach. The Buddhist concept of karma-vāsanā elucidates the habitual tendency to act or not act in various situations. Based on this theory, I argue that the workings of the human mind bears strong links to the formation of karma and as such have important axiological implications that cannot be ignored. I conclude by pointing out that Ryle’s insightful ideas could in certain ways be complemented by the Buddhist theory of mind. In my view, his philosophy is not only a mediator between Analytic Philosophy and Phenomenology, but could perhaps also be seen as a mediator between traditional Eastern systems of thought and contemporary philosophies of mind.     

Brain‐mind philosophy

The remarkable advances in continuing elucidation of the anatomy, physiology, and pathology of the central nervous system in recent experimental animal and clinical studies have provided new contexts for evaluating earlier historical and current controversies on human brain‐structure‐function and brain‐mind relationships. Churchland's Neurophilosophy reviews and critically evaluates the implications of the recent advances in the various neurosciences for formulation of a comprehensive concept of the nature of the mind and the historical controversies on human structure‐function and brain‐mind relationships. Although uneven, it is a monumental effort and a remarkable achievement that will provide new, broader, and deeper contexts for philosophers as well as for those engaged in the various neurosciences.     

Rethinking Neuroethics in the Light of the Extended Mind Thesis

The extended mind thesis is the claim that mental states extend beyond the skulls of the agents whose states they are. This seemingly obscure and bizarre claim has far-reaching implications for neuroethics, I argue. In the first half of this article, I sketch the extended mind thesis and defend it against criticisms. In the second half, I turn to its neuroethical implications. I argue that the extended mind thesis entails the falsity of the claim that interventions into the brain are especially problematic just because they are internal interventions, but that many objections to such interventions rely, at least in part, on this claim. Further, I argue that the thesis alters the focus of neuroethics, away from the question of whether we ought to allow interventions into the mind, and toward the question of which interventions we ought to allow and under what conditions. The extended mind thesis dramatically expands the scope of neuroethics: because interventions into the environment of agents can count as interventions into their minds, decisions concerning such interventions become questions for neuroethics.     

Transgenerational transmission of indigestible facts: from trauma,deadly ghosts and mental voids to meaning‐making interpretations

Abstract: In this paper¹ I will discuss clinical material and make some hypotheses on how to work with patients for whom trans‐generational transmission of trauma is an issue. Basing my hypothesis on two clinical cases, I will propose a way of dealing with undigested facts, the fabric of trauma, which generate deadly ghosts and mental voids that are transmitted from one generation to the next. I will propose a way of formulating interpretations for the unthinkable to become thinkable and find a representation in the mind of patients who suffer from transgenerationally transmitted trauma. Some thoughts will be given to the maternal and the paternal transmitters of trauma in relation to child development issues.     

An Ultra‐Realist Theory of Perception

In this paper I argue for a theory of perception distinct both from classical sense‐datum theories and from intentionalist theories, that is theories according to which one perceives external objects by dint of a relation with a propositional content. The alternative I propose completely rejects any representational element in perception. When one sees that an object has a property, the situation or state of affairs of its having that property is one's perception, so that the object and property are literally part of one's mind. The most obvious objection to this view is that it embodies a rampant form of idealism. It is argued to the contrary, via consideration of the metaphysics of situations, that the theory is entirely consistent with a robustly realist view of the world.     

A PARTIAL DEFENSE OF EXTENDED KNOWLEDGE

The paper starts out by distinguishing two closely related hypotheses about extended cognition. According to the strong hypothesis, there are no intrinsic representations in the brain. This is a version of the extended‐mind view defended by Andy Clark and Richard Menary. On the weak hypothesis, there are intrinsic representations in the brain but some types of cognition, knowledge or memory are constituted by particular types of external devices or environmental factors that extend beyond the skull and perhaps beyond the skin. This type of view was defended, for example, by Andy Clark and David Chalmers. After drawing this distinction and clarifying the notions of causal influence and constitution, I defend the second weaker hypothesis with respect to procedural knowledge and knowledge of action and show why this sort of view supports what we might call a ‘situationist‐friendly virtue epistemology’.     

The “death of freud”; and the rebirth of free psychoanalytic inquiry

The relevance of Grunbaum's recent critique of psychoanalytic theory is explored as it relates to relational/interpersonal theories. Griinbaum finds no scientific evidence for repression, the cornerstone of psychoanalysis. I argue that studies demonstrating the effects of motivated, unconscious processes are beginning to emerge in psychological research. This research, as well as interpersonal theory, refers to these processes as dissociated, not “repressed.”; I agree with Griinbaum that scientific validation of psychoanalytic theories of the mind, personality, and change cannot be gleaned from case studies alone. In relational theories the analytic situation is admittedly “contaminated”; with the analyst's participation by its very nature. There is beginning to be support for some relational hypotheses, but measures to validate these hypotheses are only now being developed. Grunbaum's criticisms have come at a time when the convergence between relational theories and theories in social/clinical psychology makes it more likely that relational hypotheses will be articulated in a more precise manner by researchers, if not by analysts.

The issues of the difficulty of measuring unconscious processes and the quest for knowledge seemingly beyond human limitations are addressed. Psychoanalysis is not only less than scientific, but more encompassing, in that it is also a creative activity that cannot be understood through science alone.

Science is not enough, nor art: In this work patience plays a part [Goethe].

The most beautiful and deepest experience a man can have is the sense of the mysterious.... To me it suffices to wonder at these secrets and to attempt humbly to grasp with my mind a mere image of the lofty structure of all that there is [Albert Einstein, quoted in Pagels, 1985].     

Materialism and ‘the soft substance of the brain’: Diderot and plasticity

ABSTRACT

Materialism is the view that everything that is real is material or is the product of material processes. It tends to take either a ‘cosmological’ form, as a claim about the ultimate nature of the world, or a more specific ‘psychological’ form, detailing how mental processes are brain processes. I focus on the second, psychological or cerebral form of materialism. In the mid-to-late eighteenth century, the French materialist philosopher Denis Diderot was one of the first to notice that any self-respecting materialist had to address the question of the status and functional role of the brain, and its relation to our mental life. After this the topic grew stale, with knee-jerk reiterations of ‘psychophysical identity’ in the nineteenth-century, and equally rigid assertions of anti-materialism. In 1960s philosophy of mind, brain–mind materialism reemerged as ‘identity theory’, focusing on the identity between mental processes and cerebral processes. In contrast, Diderot’s cerebral materialism allows for a more culturally sedimented sense of the brain, which he described in his late Elements of Physiology as a ‘book – except it is a book which reads itself’. Diderot thus provides a lesson for materialism as it reflects on the status of the brain, science and culture.