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1.
The standard way of representing an epistemic state in formal philosophy is in terms of a set of sentences, corresponding to the agent’s beliefs, and an ordering of those sentences, reflecting how well entrenched they are in the agent’s epistemic state. We argue that this wide-spread representational view – a view that we identify as a “Quinean dogma” – is incapable of making certain crucial distinctions. We propose, as a remedy, that any adequate representation of epistemic states must also include the agent’s research agenda, i.e., the list of question that are open or closed at any given point in time. If the argument of the paper is sound, a person’s questions and practical interests, on the one hand, and her beliefs and theoretical values, on the other, are more tightly interwoven than has previously been assumed to be the case in formal epistemology. 相似文献
2.
Christopher Lepock 《Philosophical Studies》2006,129(2):377-391
Ernest Sosa’s virtue perspectivism goes beyond standard reliabilism by requiring that agents with justified beliefs not only
derive their beliefs from virtuous cognitive faculties but have an epistemic perspective that explains the origin of the beliefs
and makes their belief-set coherent. I argue that Sosa’s account of the epistemic perspective does not ensure that the perspective
will confer justification. An adequate epistemic perspective must establish a non-accidental connection between an agent’s
use of a faculty in certain circumstances and its reliability in those circumstances. An agent who is capable of judging the
reliability of her faculties in different situations will have a perspective that meets this requirement. Revising virtue
perspectivism in this way also permits a stronger response to doxastic ascent arguments against the theory. 相似文献
3.
Thor Grunbaum 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2008,7(2):243-261
This article is about how to describe an agent’s awareness of her bodily movements when she is aware of executing an action
for a reason. Against current orthodoxy, I want to defend the claim that the agent’s experience of moving has an epistemic
place in the agent’s awareness of her own intentional action. In “The problem,” I describe why this should be thought to be
problematic. In “Motives for denying epistemic role,” I state some of the main motives for denying that bodily awareness has
any epistemic role to play in the content of the agent’s awareness of her own action. In “Kinaesthetic awareness and control,”
I sketch how I think the experience of moving and the bodily sense of agency or control are best described. On this background,
I move on to present, in “Arguments for epistemic role,” three arguments in favour of the claim that normally the experience
of moving is epistemically important to one’s awareness of acting intentionally. In the final “Concluding remarks,” I round
off by raising some of the worries that motivated the denial of my claim in the first place.
相似文献
Thor GrunbaumEmail: |
4.
Sebastian Enqvist 《Erkenntnis》2010,72(3):315-335
In the paper “On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change”, Olsson and Westlund have suggested that the notion
of epistemic state employed in the standard framework of belief revision (Alchourrón et al. 1985; G?rdenfors 1988) should be extended to include a representation of the agent’s research agenda (Olsson and Westlund 2006). The resulting framework will here be referred to as interrogative belief revision. In this paper, I attempt to deal with the problem of how research agendas should change in contraction, a problem largely left open by Olsson and Westlund. Two desiderata of an appropriate solution are suggested: one is a principle of continuity, stating that changes in the research agenda should somehow reflect that certain long term research interests are kept fixed. The other desideratum, which is based on part of Olsson and Westlund’s motivation for
adding research agendas to the epistemic states, is that we should be able to account for how contraction may serve to open
up new, fruitful hypotheses for investigation. In order to achieve these desiderata, I base my solution on a revised version of Olsson and Westlund’s notion of epistemic state. 相似文献
5.
Uljana Feest 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(3):391-411
This paper provides an interpretation of Hans-J?rg Rheinberger’s notions of epistemic things and historical epistemology. I argue that Rheinberger’s approach articulates a unique contribution to current debates about integrated HPS, and I propose
some modifications and extensions of this contribution. Drawing on examples from memory research, I show that Rheinberger
is right to highlight a particular feature of many objects of empirical research (“epistemic things”)—especially in the contexts
of exploratory experimentation—namely our lack of knowledge about them. I argue that this analysis needs to be supplemented
with an account of what scientists do know, and in particular, how they are able to attribute rudimentary empirical contours to objects of research. These contours
are closely connected to paradigmatic research designs, which in turn are tied to basic methodological rules for the exploration
of the purported phenomena. I suggest that we engage with such rules in order to develop our own normative (epistemological)
categories, and I tie this proposal to the idea of a methodological naturalism in philosophy of science. 相似文献
6.
Engaging a listener’s trust imposes moral demands upon a presenter in respect of truthtelling and completeness. An agent lies
by an utterance that satisfies what are herein defined as signal and mendacity conditions; an agent deceives when, in satisfaction
of those conditions, the agent’s utterances contribute to a false belief or thwart a true one. I advert to how we may fool
ourselves in observation and in the perception of our originality. Communication with others depends upon a convention or
practice of presumed nonuniversal truthfulness. In support of an asserted duty of nondeceptiveness, I offer a reconciliation
of pertinent Kantian passages, a sketch of arguments within utilitarianism, contractarianism, and other views, and an account
arguing for application of that duty to assertions, implicatures, omissions, equivocation, prevarication, and sophistry insofar
as they affect listeners’ doxastic states. For scholarship, this duty is exceptionless. I describe the kernel of intellectual
honesty as a virtuous disposition such that when presented with an incentive to deceive, the agent will not deceive. Intellectual
honesty delivers candor when it counts. I contrast this with complementary virtues and the surpassing virtue of ingenuousness.
An account is given of the connection between intellectual honesty and an influential physical model of integrity. 相似文献
7.
8.
Ian Kidd 《Philosophia》2012,40(2):365-377
This paper explores the influence of the fifth-century Christian Neoplatonist Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite (Denys) on the
twentieth-century philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend. I argue that the later Feyerabend took from Denys a metaphysical
claim—the ‘doctrine of ineffability’—intended to support epistemic pluralism. The paper has five parts. Part one introduces
Denys and Feyerabend’s common epistemological concern to deny the possibility of human knowledge of ultimate reality. Part
two examines Denys’ arguments for the ‘ineffability’ of God as presented in On the Divine Names. Part three then explores how Feyerabend imported Denys’ account of divine ineffability into his own metaphysics to provide
a novel argument for epistemic pluralism. Part four explains the significance of an appreciation of Dionyius’ influence for
our understanding of Feyerabend. I conclude that Denys was a significant and neglected influence upon the later Feyerabend. 相似文献
9.
Ezio Di Nucci 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2010,13(2):207-213
In this paper I refute an apparently obvious objection to Frankfurt-type counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities
according to which if in the counterfactual scenario the agent does not act, then the agent could have avoided acting in the
actual scenario. And because what happens in the counterfactual scenario cannot count as the relevant agent’s actions given
the sort of external control that agent is under, then we can ground responsibility on that agent having been able to avoid acting. I illustrate how this objection to Frankfurt’s famous counterexample is motivated
by Frankfurt’s own ‘guidance’ view of agency. My argument consists in showing that even if we concede that the agent does
not act in the counterfactual scenario, that does not show that the agent could have avoided acting in the actual scenario.
This depends on the crucial distinction between ‘not φ-ing’ and ‘avoiding φ-ing’. 相似文献
10.
Steffen Ducheyne 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2009,40(2):227-258
In this essay, I attempt to assess Henk de Regt and Dennis Dieks recent pragmatic and contextual account of scientific understanding
on the basis of an important historical case-study: understanding in Newton’s theory of universal gravitation and Huygens’
reception of universal gravitation. It will be shown that de Regt and Dieks’ Criterion for the Intelligibility of a Theory
(CIT), which stipulates that the appropriate combination of scientists’ skills and intelligibility-enhancing theoretical virtues is a condition for scientific understanding, is too strong. On the basis of
this case-study, it will be shown that scientists can understand each others’ positions qualitatively and quantitatively,
despite their endorsement of different worldviews and despite their convictions as what counts as a proper explanation. 相似文献
11.
Jochen Apel 《Synthese》2011,182(1):23-38
In this paper I offer an appraisal of James Bogen and James Woodward’s distinction between data and phenomena which pursues
two objectives. First, I aim to clarify the notion of a scientific phenomenon. Such a clarification is required because despite
its intuitive plausibility it is not exactly clear how Bogen and Woodward’s distinction has to be understood. I reject one
common interpretation of the distinction, endorsed for example by James McAllister and Bruce Glymour, which identifies phenomena
with patterns in data sets. Furthermore, I point out that other interpretations of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction do not
specify the relationship between phenomena and theories in a satisfying manner. In order to avoid this problem I propose a
contextual understanding of scientific phenomena according to which phenomena are states of affairs which play specific roles
in scientific practice and to which we adopt a special epistemic attitude. Second, I evaluate the epistemological significance
of Bogen and Woodward’s distinction with respect to the debate between scientific realists and constructive empiricists. Contrary
to what Bogen and Woodward claim, I argue that the distinction does not provide a convincing argument against constructive
empiricism. 相似文献
12.
We begin by asking what fallibilism about knowledge is, distinguishing several conceptions of fallibilism and giving reason
to accept what we call strong epistemic fallibilism, the view that one can know that something is the case even if there remains
an epistemic chance, for one, that it is not the case. The task of the paper, then, concerns how best to defend this sort
of fallibilism from the objection that it is “mad,” that it licenses absurd claims such as “I know that p but there’s a chance that not p” and “p but it there’s a chance that not p.” We argue that the best defense of fallibilism against this objection—a “pragmatist” defense—makes the following claims.
First, while knowledge that p is compatible with an epistemic chance that not-p, it is compatible only with an insignificant such chance. Second, the insignificance of the chance that not-p is plausibly understood in terms of the irrelevance of that chance to p’s serving as a ‘justifier’, for action as well as belief. In other words, if you know that p, then any chance for you that not p doesn’t stand in the way of p’s being properly put to work as a basis for action and belief.
相似文献
Matthew McGrathEmail: |
13.
Steven L. Reynolds 《Erkenntnis》2011,75(1):19-35
Control of our own beliefs is allegedly required for the truth of epistemic evaluations, such as “S ought to believe that p”, or “S ought to suspend judgment (and so refrain from any belief) whether p”. However, we cannot usually believe or refrain from believing at will. I agree with a number of recent authors in thinking
that this apparent conflict is to be resolved by distinguishing reasons for believing that give evidence that p from reasons
that make it desirable to believe that p whether or not p is true. I argue however that there is a different problem, one that becomes clearer in light of this solution to the first
problem. Someone’s approval of our beliefs is at least often a non-evidential reason to believe, and as such cannot change
our beliefs. Ought judgments aim to change the world. But ‘ought to believe’ judgments can’t do that by changing the belief,
if they don’t give evidence. So I argue that we should instead regard epistemic ought judgments as aimed mainly at influencing
assertions that express the belief and other actions based on the belief, in accord with recent philosophical claims that
we have epistemic norms for assertion and action. 相似文献
14.
Eddy Nahmias 《Philosophical Studies》2006,131(3):627-667
Two intuitions lie at the heart of our conception of free will. One intuition locates free will in our ability to deliberate
effectively and control our actions accordingly: the ‘Deliberation and Control’ (DC) condition. The other intuition is that
free will requires the existence of alternative possibilities for choice: the AP condition. These intuitions seem to conflict
when, for instance, we deliberate well to decide what to do, and we do not want it to be possible to act in some other way.
I suggest that intuitions about the AP condition arise when we face ‘close calls,’ situations in which, after deliberating,
we still do not know what we really want to do. Indeed, several incompatibilists suggest such close calls are necessary for
free will. I challenge this suggestion by describing a ‘confident agent’ who, after deliberating, always feels confident about
what to do (and can then control her actions accordingly). Because she maximally satisfies the DC condition, she does not
face close calls, and the intuition that the AP condition is essential for free will does not seem to apply to her. I conclude
that intuitions about the importance of the AP condition rest on our experiences of close calls and arise precisely to the
extent that our deliberations fail to arrive at a clear decision. I then raise and respond to several objections to this thought
experiment and its relevance to the free will debate. 相似文献
15.
Anders Schinkel 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):267-277
Whom I call ‘epistemic reductionists’ in this article are critics of the notion of ‘moral luck’ that maintain that all supposed
cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only
difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue
that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of character from judgements concerning acts,
and they assume a conception of character that is untenable both from a common sense perspective and with a view to findings
from social psychology. I use especially the example of Scobie, the protagonist of Graham Greene’s novel The Heart of the Matter, to show that moral luck is real—that there are cases of moral luck that cannot be reduced to epistemic luck. The reality
of moral luck, in this example at least, lies in its impact on character and personal and moral identity.
相似文献
Anders SchinkelEmail: |
16.
Brandon Carey 《Philosophical Studies》2011,155(3):371-381
Conciliatory views about disagreement with one’s epistemic peers lead to a somewhat troubling skeptical conclusion: that often,
when we know others disagree, we ought to be (perhaps much) less sure of our beliefs than we typically are. One might attempt
to extend this skeptical conclusion by arguing that disagreement with merely possible epistemic agents should be epistemically
significant to the same degree as disagreement with actual agents, and that, since for any belief we have, it is possible
that someone should disagree in the appropriate way, we ought to be much less sure of all of our beliefs than we typically
are. In this paper, I identify what I take to be the main motivation for thinking that actual disagreement is epistemically
significant and argue that it does not also motivate the epistemic significance of merely possible disagreement. 相似文献
17.
Aaron Rizzieri 《International Journal for Philosophy of Religion》2011,70(3):217-229
It is commonly held that epistemic standards for S’s knowledge that p are affected by practical considerations, such as what is at stake in decisions that are guided by that p. I defend a particular view as to why this is, that is referred to as “pragmatic encroachment.” I then discuss a “new argument
against miracles” that uses stakes considerations in order to explore the conditions under which stakes affect the level of
epistemic support that is required for knowledge. Finally, I generalize my results to include other religiously significant
propositions such as “God exists” and “God does not exist.” 相似文献
18.
Jeffrey Seidman 《Philosophical Studies》2010,147(2):301-322
This essay seeks to explain a morally important class of psychological incapacity—the class of what Bernard Williams has called
“incapacities of character.” I argue for two main claims: (1) Caring is the underlying psychological disposition that gives
rise to incapacities of character. (2) In competent, rational adults, caring is, in part, a cognitive and deliberative disposition. Caring is a mental state which disposes an agent to believe certain considerations to be good reasons for deliberation
and action. And caring is a mental state which structures an agent’s practical deliberation, by establishing presumptive boundaries on the landscape of possibilities over which her deliberative imagination ranges. Incapacities of character are a consequence
of the structure which these presumptive boundaries give to an agent’s deliberation. 相似文献
19.
Michelle Ciurria 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2012,15(2):259-269
In A New Form of Agent-Based Virtue Ethics, Daniel Doviak develops a novel agent-based theory of right action that treats the rightness (or deontic status) of an action
as a matter of the action’s net intrinsic virtue value (net-IVV)—that is, its balance of virtue over vice. This view is designed
to accommodate three basic tenets of commonsense morality: (i) the maxim that “ought” implies “can,” (ii) the idea that a
person can do the right thing for the wrong reason, and (iii) the idea that a virtuous person can have “mixed motives.” In
this paper, I argue that Doviak’s account makes an important contribution to agent-based virtue ethics, but it needs to be
supplemented with a consequentialist account of the efficacy of well-motivated actions—that is, it should be transformed into a mixed (motives-consequences) account, while retaining
its net-IVV calculus. This is because I believe that there are right-making properties external to an agent’s psychology which it is important to take into account, especially when an agent’s actions negatively affect
other people. To incorporate this intuition, I add to Doviak’s net-IVV calculus a scale for outcomes. The result is a mixed view which accommodates tenets (ii) and (iii) above, but allows for (i) to fail in certain cases.
I argue that, rather than being a defect, this allowance is an asset because our intuitions about ought-implies-can break
down in cases where an agent is grossly misguided, and our theory should track these intuitions. 相似文献
20.
Paul James Crittenden 《Sophia》2009,48(4):469-478
Charles Taylor in A Secular Age describes the modern secular age as one in which ‘the eclipse of all goals beyond human flourishing … falls within the range
of an imaginable life for masses of people’. This article reflects on his historico-analytic investigation of the emergence
of modern secularity and his account of how it shapes the current conditions of belief. Taylor challenges the widespread presumption
against belief mainly on ethical considerations, especially what counts as human fulfilment. The article argues that he fails
to deal adequately with epistemic considerations bearing on belief and unbelief. Furthermore, his argument is weakened by
a surprising absence of attention to the primary account of human fulfilment in Greek philosophy as a central element in the
Christian tradition. 相似文献