Comparing perceptual and preferential decision making

Perceptual and preferential decision making have been studied largely in isolation. Perceptual decisions are considered to be at a non–deliberative cognitive level and have an outside criterion that defines the quality of decisions. Preferential decisions are considered to be at a higher cognitive level and the quality of decisions depend on the decision maker’s subjective goals. Besides these crucial differences, both types of decisions also have in common that uncertain information about the choice situation has to be processed before a decision can be made. The present work aims to acknowledge the commonalities of both types of decision making to lay bare the crucial differences. For this aim we examine perceptual and preferential decisions with a novel choice paradigm that uses the identical stimulus material for both types of decisions. This paradigm allows us to model the decisions and response times of both types of decisions with the same sequential sampling model, the drift diffusion model. The results illustrate that the different incentive structure in both types of tasks changes people’s behavior so that they process information more efficiently and respond more cautiously in the perceptual as compared to the preferential task. These findings set out a perspective for further integration of perceptual and preferential decision making in a single ramework.     

Stimulus and response conflict processing during perceptual decision making

Encoding and dealing with conflicting information is essential for successful decision making in a complex environment. In the present fMRI study, stimulus conflict and response conflict are contrasted in the context of a perceptual decision-making dot-motion discrimination task. Stimulus conflict was manipulated by varying dot-motion coherence along task-relevant and task-irrelevant dimensions. Response conflict was manipulated by varying whether or not competing stimulus dimensions provided evidence for the same or different responses. The right inferior frontal gyrus was involved specifically in the resolution of stimulus conflict, whereas the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex was shown to be sensitive to response conflict. Additionally, two regions that have been linked to perceptual decision making with dot-motion stimuli in monkey physiology studies were differentially engaged by stimulus conflict and response conflict. The middle temporal area, previously linked to processing of motion, was strongly affected by the presence of stimulus conflict. On the other hand, the superior parietal lobe, previously associated with accumulation of evidence for a response, was affected by the presence of response conflict. These results shed light on the neural mechanisms that support decision making in the presence of conflict, a cognitive operation fundamental to both basic survival and high-level cognition.     

Game relativity: how context influences strategic decision making

Existing models of strategic decision making typically assume that only the attributes of the currently played game need be considered when reaching a decision. The results presented in this article demonstrate that the so-called "co-operativeness" of the previously played prisoner's dilemma games influence choices and predictions in the current prisoner's dilemma game, which suggests that games are not considered independently. These effects involved reinforcement-based assimilation to the previous choices and also a perceptual contrast of the present game with preceding games, depending on the range and the rank of their co-operativeness. A. Parducci's (1965) range frequency theory and H. Helson's (1964) adaptation level theory are plausible theories of relative judgment of magnitude information, which could provide an account of these context effects.     

Affective biasing of choices in gambling task decision making

The proponents of the somatic marker hypothesis presume that rational decision making is guided by emotional reactions that are developed from prior experience. Supporting evidence for the hypothesis comes almost exclusively from the short-term affective reactions that are learned during the course of a hypothetical decision-making task—the gambling task (GT). We examined GT performance and affective reactions to choices when those choices were biased by words that had preexisting affective value. In one experiment, affectively valued words directly signaled good and bad choices. A congruent relation between affective value of word and choice outcome improved GT performance, whereas an incongruent relation greatly interfered with performance. In another experiment, affectively valued words were maintained as a working memory (WM) load between GT choices. A WM load with affectively positive words somewhat improved GT performance, whereas affectively negative words interfered with performance. Somatic markers—indicated by differential anticipatory skin conductance response (SCR ) amplitude for good and bad choices—appeared at a point in the GT session when choice performance was superior. However, differential SCR developed during the session after good choice performance was already established. These results indicate that preexisting affective biases can influence GT decision making. In addition, the somatic markers that are regular accompaniments of GT decision making appeared to be temporally lagging indicators of choice performance. 2006 Psychonomic Society, Inc.     

Response inhibition during perceptual decision making in humans and macaques

Response inhibition in stop signal tasks has been explained as the outcome of a race between GO and STOP processes (e.g., Logan, 1981). Response choice in two-alternative perceptual categorization tasks has been explained as the outcome of an accumulation of evidence for the alternative responses. To begin unifying these two powerful investigation frameworks, we obtained data from humans and macaque monkeys performing a stop signal task with responses guided by perceptual categorization and variable degrees of difficulty, ranging from low to high accuracy. Comparable results across species reinforced the validity of this animal model. Response times and errors increased with categorization difficulty. The probability of failing to inhibit responses on stop signal trials increased with stop signal delay, and the response times for failed stop signal trials were shorter than those for trials with no stop signal. Thus, the Logan race model could be applied to estimate the duration of the stopping process. We found that the duration of the STOP process did not vary across a wide range of discrimination accuracies. This is consistent with the functional, and possibly mechanistic, independence of choice and inhibition mechanisms.     

Motivated decision making: effects of activation and self-centrality of values on choices and behavior

Six studies examined the value-behavior relation and focused on motivational properties of values, the self, and value activation. Priming environmental values enhanced attention to and the weight of information related to those values, which resulted in environmentally friendly consumer choices. This only occurred if these values were central to the self-concept. Value-congruent choices were also found in response to countervalue behavior in an unrelated context. Donating behavior congruent with central altruistic values was found as a result of enhanced self-focus, thus demonstrating the importance of the self in the value-behavior relation. The external validity of the value-centrality measure and its distinction from attitudes were demonstrated in the prediction of voting. Values were thus found to give meaning to, energize, and regulate value-congruent behavior, but only if values were cognitively activated and central to the self.     

Brief body-scan meditation practice improves somatosensory perceptual decision making

We have previously found that attention to internal somatic sensations (interoceptive attention) during a heart beat perception task increases the misperception of external touch on a somatic signal detection task (SSDT), during which healthy participants erroneously report feeling near-threshold vibrations presented to their fingertip in the absence of a stimulus. However, it has been suggested that mindful interoceptive attention should result in more accurate somatic perception, due to its non-evaluative and controlled nature. To investigate this possibility, 62 participants completed the SSDT before and after a period of brief body-scan mindfulness meditation training, or a control intervention (listening to a recorded story). The meditation intervention reduced tactile misperception and increased sensitivity during the SSDT. This finding suggests that the perceptual effects of interoceptive attention depend on its particular nature, and raises the possibility that body-scan meditation could reduce the misperception of physical symptoms in individuals with medically unexplained symptoms.     

Gradual growth versus shape invariance in perceptual decision making

A dominant theme in modeling human perceptual judgments is that sensory neural activity is summed or integrated until a critical bound is reached. Such models predict that, in general, the shape of response time distributions change across conditions, although in practice, this shape change may be subtle. An alternative view is that response time distributions are shape invariant across conditions or groups. Shape invariance is predicted by some race models in which the first of several parallel fibers to communicate the signal determines the response. We competitively assess a specific gradual growth model, the one-bound diffusion model, against a natural shape-invariant competitor: shape invariance in an inverse Gaussian distribution. Assessment of subtle shape change versus shape invariance of response time distributions is aided by a Bayesian approach that allows the pooling of information across multiple participants. We find, conditional on reasonable distributional assumptions, subtle shape changes in response time that are highly concordant with a simple diffusion gradual growth model and discordant with shape invariance.     

Cortico-limbic-striatal circuits subserving different forms of cost-benefit decision making

Research on the neural basis that underlies decision making in humans has revealed that these processes are mediated by distributed neural networks that incorporate different regions of the frontal lobes, the amygdala, the ventral striatum, and the dopamine system. In the present article, we review recent studies in rodents investigating the contribution of these systems to different forms of cost-benefit decision making and focus on evaluations related to delays, effort, or risks associated with certain rewards. Anatomically distinct regions of the medial and orbital prefrontal cortex make dissociable contributions to different forms of decision making, although lesions of these regions can induce variable effects, depending on the type of tasks used to assess these functions. The basolateral amygdala and the nucleus accumbens play a more fundamental role in these evaluations, helping an organism overcome different costs to obtain better rewards. Dopamine activity biases behavior toward more costly yet larger rewards, although abnormal increases in dopamine transmission can exert opposing actions on different types of decision making. The fact that similar neural circuits are recruited to solve these types of problems in both humans and animals suggests that animal models of decision making will prove useful in elucidating the mechanisms mediating these processes.     

Interoceptive and exteroceptive attention have opposite effects on subsequent somatosensory perceptual decision making

Evidence suggests that interoceptive and exteroceptive attention might have different perceptual effects. However, the effects of these different types of body-focused attention have never been directly compared. The current research investigated how interoceptive and exteroceptive attention affect subsequent performance on the somatic signal detection task (SSDT). In Experiment 1, 37 participants completed the SSDT under usual testing conditions and after performing an interoceptive heartbeat perception task. This task led to a more liberal response criterion, leading to increased touch reports in the presence and absence of a target vibration. This finding is consistent with suggestions that attending internally contributes to physical symptom reporting in patients with medically unexplained symptoms (MUS). In Experiment 2, 40 participants completed the SSDT before and after an exteroceptive grating orientation task. This task led to a more stringent response criterion, leading to decreased touch reports in the presence and absence of the target, possibly via a reduction in sensory noise. This work demonstrates that internal and external body-focused attention can have opposite effects on subsequent somatic perceptual decision making and suggests that attentional training could be useful for patients reporting MUS.     

Interoceptive and exteroceptive attention have opposite effects on subsequent somatosensory perceptual decision making

Evidence suggests that interoceptive and exteroceptive attention might have different perceptual effects. However, the effects of these different types of body-focused attention have never been directly compared. The current research investigated how interoceptive and exteroceptive attention affect subsequent performance on the somatic signal detection task (SSDT). In Experiment 1, 37 participants completed the SSDT under usual testing conditions and after performing an interoceptive heartbeat perception task. This task led to a more liberal response criterion, leading to increased touch reports in the presence and absence of a target vibration. This finding is consistent with suggestions that attending internally contributes to physical symptom reporting in patients with medically unexplained symptoms (MUS). In Experiment 2, 40 participants completed the SSDT before and after an exteroceptive grating orientation task. This task led to a more stringent response criterion, leading to decreased touch reports in the presence and absence of the target, possibly via a reduction in sensory noise. This work demonstrates that internal and external body-focused attention can have opposite effects on subsequent somatic perceptual decision making and suggests that attentional training could be useful for patients reporting MUS.     

Making choices impairs subsequent self-control: a limited-resource account of decision making, self-regulation, and active initiative

The current research tested the hypothesis that making many choices impairs subsequent self-control. Drawing from a limited-resource model of self-regulation and executive function, the authors hypothesized that decision making depletes the same resource used for self-control and active responding. In 4 laboratory studies, some participants made choices among consumer goods or college course options, whereas others thought about the same options without making choices. Making choices led to reduced self-control (i.e., less physical stamina, reduced persistence in the face of failure, more procrastination, and less quality and quantity of arithmetic calculations). A field study then found that reduced self-control was predicted by shoppers' self-reported degree of previous active decision making. Further studies suggested that choosing is more depleting than merely deliberating and forming preferences about options and more depleting than implementing choices made by someone else and that anticipating the choice task as enjoyable can reduce the depleting effect for the first choices but not for many choices.     

Social motives and strategic misrepresentation in social decision making

In 4 experiments, the authors studied the influence of social motives on deception and strategic misrepresentation. In a newly developed information provision game, individuals faced a decision maker whose decision would affect both own and other's outcomes. By withholding information or by giving (in)accurate information about payoffs, participants could try to influence other's decision making. Less accurate and more inaccurate information was given when the decision maker was competitive rather than cooperative (Experiment 1), especially when participants had a prosocial rather than selfish value orientation (Experiments 3 and 4). Accurate information was withheld because of fear of exploitation and greed, and inaccurate information was given because of greed (Experiment 2). Finally, participants engaged in strategic misrepresentation that may trick competitive others into damaging their own and increasing the participant's outcomes.     

Cognitive influences on perceptual processing

These experiments investigate the influence of frequency of occurrence of a visual stimulus (stimulus probability) on encoding processes, in an attempt to discover what sorts of mechanisms allow cognitive processes to modify perceptual processes. Experiments 1 and 2 show that frequently occurring visual letters do not facilitate encoding of visually similar letters. This implies that stimulus probability does not directly affect the feature detectors used in encoding the letters. Four more experiments provide evidence that stimulus probability has its effect on the availability of an abstract code that is generated by the encoding process from the visual input. Results from the experiments with letter stimuli could be interpreted using a model similar to the logogen model of Morton. Experiments with nonsense forms suggest that subjects use abstract codes in dealing with the forms only when the stimuli are constructed from a set of orthogonal features. A secondary finding was that visual quality has an effect that extends past the feature analysis stage and into a stage in which the visual input activities an abstract code. This result calls into question the common practice of interpreting the interaction of a factor with visual quality as evidence that the factor affects visual feature analysis.     

Top-down influences on perceptual grouping

Observers are faster to find and discriminate a target pair of adjacent, same-shaped objects that are within the same perceptual group (within group) versus within adjacent perceptual groups. Manipulating the probability of a within-group pair modulated this grouping effect such that it increased as the percentage of within-group trials (25%, 50%, or 75%) increased. This probability effect was stronger for extrinsic grouping factors (common region and connectedness) than for intrinsic factors (proximity and color similarity). Further experiments, however, suggested that this extrinsic-intrinsic difference was due to differences in overall speed with which the target pair was found. The results are interpreted as indicating that grouping is sensitive to top-down influences as long as there is sufficient time for feedback to operate.     

Late influences on perceptual grouping: illusory figures

Two experiments demonstrate that grouping can be strongly influenced by the presence of figures defined by illusory contours. Rectangular arrays were constructed in which a central column of figures could group either with those on one side, on the basis of perception of figures defined by illusory contours, or with those on the other side, on the basis of physically present inducing elements. In all displays, subjects grouped according to the illusory figures significantly more often than for control displays that contained the same inducing elements, but rearranged so that illusory contours were degraded or eliminated. A second experiment showed that in objectively defined grouping tasks, subjects grouped faster by illusory figures than by inducing elements. These results indicate that grouping can occur after illusory contours have been perceived.     

Late influences on perceptual grouping: Amodal completion

Perceptual grouping is generally assumed to be an early visual process that operates on a previously unorganized image-based representation. The present experiment shows that elements perceived as occluded by a closer surface tend to be grouped with elements having the same shape as the amodally completed percept rather than with those having the same retinal shape as the incomplete stimulus. It is therefore concluded that perceptual grouping by shape similarity either occurs after amodal completion or is a temporally extended process that occurs both before and after it.     

Emotion,cognition, and decision making

We examine two explanations of the subliminal affective priming effect. The feelings-as-information model (Schwarz &; Clore, 1988) holds that judgements are based on perceptible feelings. Hence, affective influences depend on the source to which feelings are (mis)attributed. In contrast, the affective primary hypothesis (Zajonc, 1980) suggests that affective influences should resist attributional interventions. This is because the affective system responsible for preferences is separate from the cognitive system responsible for inferences; because early affective processes are automatic and therefore inaccessible to higher-order interventions; and because early affective responses are not represented as conscious feelings. We tested these explanations in two experiments that crossed subliminal affective priming with (mis)attribution manipulations. Both studies found reliable shifts in judgements of neutral stimuli as a result of primes even when subjects were aware that their feelings might not be diagnostic for the judgement at hand. Subjects did not report experiencing any feelings in response to the primes. The obtained affective priming effect was independent of response times and subjective reports of engaging in judgemental corrections. However, the priming effect did prove sensitive to the experimental instructions. We discuss the implications of these findings for the affective primacy hypothesis and the feelings-as-information model.     

Adolescent sexuality: values, morality and decision making

The first section of this paper presents a theoretical basis of morality and value formation which provides the background for an examination of adolescent sexual and cognitive development. Data from a study of influences on the sexual decisions of five hundred 13- to 19-year-olds are analyzed in the remainder of the article. Relationships between individual characteristics and the importance of various influences are interpreted in light of the structure of values and moral development.