Children's understanding of ambiguous idioms and conversational perspective-taking

The aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that conversational perspective-taking is a determinant of unfamiliar ambiguous idiom comprehension. We investigated two types of ambiguous idiom, decomposable and nondecomposable expressions, which differ in the degree to which the literal meanings of the individual words contribute to the overall idiomatic meaning. We designed an experiment to assess the relationship between the acquisition of figurative comprehension and conversational perspective-taking. Our sample of children aged 5-7 years performed three conversational perspective-taking tasks (language acts, shared/unshared information, and conversational maxims). They then listened to decomposable and nondecomposable idiomatic expressions presented in context before performing a multiple-choice task (figurative, literal, and contextual responses). Results indicated that decomposable idiom comprehension was predicted by conversational perspective-taking scores and language skills, whereas nondecomposable idiom comprehension was predicted solely by language skills. We discuss our findings with respect to verbal and pragmatic skills.     

Kill the Song—Steal the Show: What Does Distinguish Predicative Metaphors From Decomposable Idioms?

This study examined the semantic processing difference between decomposable idioms and novel predicative metaphors. It was hypothesized that idiom comprehension results from the retrieval of a figurative meaning stored in memory, that metaphor comprehension requires a sense creation process and that this process difference affects the processing time of idiomatic and metaphoric expressions. In the first experiment, participants read sentences containing decomposable idioms, predicative metaphors or control expressions and performed a lexical decision task on figurative targets presented 0, 350, and 500 ms, or 750 after reading. Results demonstrated that idiomatic expressions were processed sooner than metaphoric ones. In the second experiment, participants were asked to assess the meaningfulness of idiomatic, metaphoric and literal expressions after reading a verb prime that belongs to the target phrase (identity priming). The results showed that verb identity priming was stronger for idiomatic expressions than for metaphor ones, indicating different mental representations.     

Why are idioms recognized fast?

It is an established fact that idiomatic expressions are fast to process. However, the explanation of the phenomenon is controversial. Using a semantic judgment paradigm, where people decide whether a string is meaningful or not, the present experiment tested the predictions deriving from the three main theories of idiom recognition—the lexical representation hypothesis, the idiom decomposition hypothesis, and the configuration hypothesis. Participants were faster at judging decomposable idioms, nondecomposable idioms, and clichés than at judging their matched controls. The effect was comparable for all conventional expressions. The results were interpreted as suggesting that, as posited by the configuration hypothesis, the fact that they are known expressions, rather than idiomaticity, explains their fast recognition.     

Idiom literality judgments in younger and older adults: age-related effects in resolving semantic interference

To study age effects in the resolution of idiomatic semantic ambiguity, we focus on decomposability, the extent to which a literal reading of an idiom's words shares meaning with its figurative interpretation. Younger and older adults judged whether decomposable and nondecomposable idioms and nonidioms had a literal interpretation. Older adults were slower at making literality judgments and more sensitive to conflicts between literal and figurative meanings. The results support claims of decompositional analysis of idioms during later processing stages and of obligatory activation of figurative meanings. They also lend support to research that has shown age-related effects in ambiguity resolution.     

儿童理解误信念的心理机制假设

儿童心理理论是近20年来发展心理学研究热点,对其研究主要是在误信念实验范式之下进行的。儿童理解误信念的心理机制问题是误信念研究的核心问题之一,研究者从不同的角度出发,采用不同的方法,提出了儿童如何理解误信念的几个重要假设,包括：元表征假设、事实掩盖假设、心理理论机制假设、计算资源假设。此文综述了这些假设,以期借鉴使用。     

Do Nonnative Language Speakers Chew the Fat and Spill the Beans with Different Brain Hemispheres? Investigating Idiom Decomposability with the Divided Visual Field Paradigm

The purpose of this study was to explore possible cerebral asymmetries in the processing of decomposable and nondecomposable idioms by fluent nonnative speakers of English. In the study, native language (Polish) and foreign language (English) decomposable and nondecomposable idioms were embedded in ambiguous (neutral) and unambiguous (biasing figurative meaning) context and presented centrally, followed by laterally presented target words related to the figurative meaning of the idiom or literal meaning of the last word of the idiom. The target appeared either immediately at sentence offset (Experiment 1), or 400 ms (Experiment 2) after sentence offset. Results are inconsistent with the Idiom Decomposition Hypothesis (Gibbs et al. in Mem Cogn 17:58–68, 1989a; J Mem Lang 28:576–593, 1989b) and only partially consistent with the idea of the differential cerebral involvement in processing (non)decomposable idioms [the Fine/Coarse Coding Theory, Beeman (Right hemisphere language comprehension: perspectives from cognitive neuroscience, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ, 1998)]. A number of factors, rather than compositionality per se, emerge as crucial in determining idiom processing, such as language status (native vs. nonnative), salience, or context.     

Why You Can't Kick the Bucket as You Slowly Die: Verbs in Idiom Comprehension

Idiomatic phrases differ in their degree of analyzability. Some idioms are highly decomposable with their parts independently contributing to their overall figurative meaning (e.g. pop the question) while other idioms are nondecomposable with parts that do not contribute to their idiomatic meaning (e.g. kick the bucket). Nonetheless, even the parts of nondecomposable idioms might have a role in determining what they specifically mean. For example, the verb kick, in kick the bucket implies a quickness or suddenness to the death such that kick the bucket means to die suddenly rather than to die slowly. We report the findings of three experiments showing, in different ways, how the action of the verb contributes to the overall figurative meaning for some nondecomposable idioms. Together, these studies suggest that even nondecomposable idioms are not truly frozen as, at least, part of their overall figurative meanings are shaped by the particular verbs used in these phrases.     

The Weird World of Cross-Cultural False-Belief Research: A True- and False-Belief Study Among Samoan Children Based on Commands

Previous cross-cultural research using false-belief tasks has explored whether children's theory of mind develops synchronously across cultures. Success on false-belief tasks is usually interpreted as an important indicator of children's mental state understanding, but inconsistent findings have led to questions regarding the interpretation of children's success and failure. Based on the assumptions of perceptual access reasoning (Hedger & Fabricius, 2011 Hedger, J. A., & Fabricius, W. V. (2011). True belief belies false belief: Recent findings of competence in infants and limitations in 5-year-olds, and implications for theory of mind development. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2, 429–447.[Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) and reflecting on inconsistencies in cross-cultural false-belief research, we argue for the advantages of the additional use of true-belief tasks, which can help to differentiate between different levels of children's reasoning. Consequently, a false-belief task and a true-belief task were derived from typical Samoan adult–child interactions. The performance of 40 Samoan children aged 5 to 7 years old was compared to the performance of 40 age-matched German children. While German children passed both tasks, Samoan children failed the false-belief task and did not reply above chance level in the true-belief task. According to our knowledge, this is the first study using both a false-belief task and true-belief task in a cross-cultural setting. Our results reveal additional patterns of reasoning that are neither in line with perceptual access reasoning nor with a representational understanding of false beliefs. The study is discussed in terms of a more general problem of experimental research in non-Western settings.     

That’s the way the cookie bounces: Syntactic and semantic components of experimentally elicited idiom blendsß

Idioms are sometimes viewed as unitized phrases with interpretations that are independent of the literal meanings of their individual words. In three experiments, the nature of idiom representation was explored with a speech-error elicitation task. In the task, speakers briefly viewed paired idioms. After a short delay they were probed to produce one of the two idioms, and their production latencies and blend errors were assessed. The first experiment showed greater interference between idioms with the same syntactic structure, demonstrating that idiom representations contain syntactic information. The second experiment indicated that the literal meaning of an idiom is active during production. These syntactic and literal-semantic effects on idiom errors argue against a representation of idioms as noncomponential lexicalized phrases. In the final experiment, no differences were found between decomposable and nondecomposable idioms, suggesting that the lexical representation of these two types of idioms is the same.     

Are Infants’ Theory-of-Mind Abilities Well Integrated? Implicit Understanding of Intentions,Desires, and Beliefs

The development of theory of mind (ToM) in infancy has been mainly documented through studies conducted on a single age group with a single task. Very few studies have examined ToM abilities other than false belief, and very few studies have used a within-subjects design. During 2 testing sessions, infants aged 14 and 18 months old were administered ToM tasks based on the violation-of-expectation paradigm which measured intention, true belief, desire, and false-belief understanding. Infants’ looking times at the congruent and incongruent test trials of each task were compared, and results revealed that both groups of infants looked significantly longer at the incongruent trial on the intention and true-belief tasks. In contrast, only 18-month-olds looked significantly longer at the incongruent trial of the desire task and neither age group looked significantly longer at the incongruent trial on the false-belief task. Additionally, intertask comparisons revealed only a significant relation between performance on the false-belief and intention task. These findings suggest that implicit intention and true-belief understanding emerge earlier than desire and false-belief understanding and that ToM constructs do not appear to be integrated, as is the case for explicit ToM.     

学前儿童心理理论及欺骗发展的关系研究

本文采用两种标准心理理论任务和两种欺骗任务,以3~6岁儿童为被试,探讨了学前儿童心理理论与欺骗发展的关系,得出如下结论:(1)在不同的误信念任务中,学前儿童的表现不一致;但仍存在一般发展趋势:3岁儿童不能通过误信念任务,4、5岁是儿童误信念发展的关键时期.(2)3岁儿童不能拥有隐藏意图的欺骗能力,4岁儿童拥有隐藏意图的欺骗能力.(3)3岁儿童能说谎,但假装无知的欺骗直到6岁才出现.(4)误信念理解与隐藏意图的欺骗存在相关,但与说谎和假装无知不存在相关.     

Theory of mind and executive function: working-memory capacity and inhibitory control as predictors of false-belief task performance

This study of the relationship between theory of mind and executive function examined whether on the false-belief task age differences between 3 and 5 ears of age are related to development of working-memory capacity and inhibitory processes. 72 children completed tasks measuring false belief, working memory, and inhibition. Significant age effects were observed for false-belief and working-memory performance, as well as for the false-alarm and perseveration measures of inhibition. A simultaneous multiple linear regression specified the contribution of age, inhibition, and working memory to the prediction of false-belief performance. This model was significant, explaining a total of 36% of the variance. To examine the independent contributions of the working-memory and inhibition variables, after controlling for age, two hierarchical multiple linear regressions were conducted. These multiple regression analyses indicate that working memory and inhibition make small, overlapping contributions to false-belief performance after accounting for age, but that working memory, as measured in this study, is a somewhat better predictor of false-belief understanding than is inhibition.     

Fonctions exécutives et théorie de l’esprit chez le jeune enfant : une relation réciproque ?

The aim of this study was to assess the specific relation between 18-month-olds’ performance on tasks measuring language skills, executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM). The ToM tasks included measures of intention and false-belief understanding whereas working memory and inhibitory control were assessed with three EF tasks. Expressive vocabulary was assessed with the MacArthur Communicative Development Inventory. The main findings showed that both aspects of ToM are strongly linked at this age to inhibitory control, but not to working memory abilities. Language skills were not associated with either ToM or EF abilities. With regard to inter-tasks coherence within EF and ToM, we replicated previous findings with no consistency across EF tasks but an association between false-belief and intention understanding. Overall, these findings provide evidence for a link between executive function and theory of mind at the youngest age ever tested. They also challenge the view that EF is not required to succeed on the false-belief task based on spontaneous responses.     

Belief-desire reasoning as a process of selection

Human learning may depend upon domain specialized mechanisms. A plausible example is rapid, early learning about the thoughts and feelings of other people. A major achievement in this domain, at about age four in the typically developing child, is the ability to solve problems in which the child attributes false beliefs to other people and predicts their actions. The main focus of theorizing has been why 3-year-olds fail, and only recently have there been any models of how success is achieved in false-belief tasks. Leslie and Polizzi (Inhibitory processing in the false-belief task: Two conjectures. Developmental Science, 1, 247-254, 1998) proposed two competing models of success, which are the focus of the current paper. The models assume that belief-desire reasoning is a process which selects a content for an agent's belief and an action for the agent's desire. In false belief tasks, the theory of mind mechanism (ToMM) provides plausible candidate belief contents, among which will be a 'true-belief.' A second process reviews these candidates and by default will select the true-belief content for attribution. To succeed in a false-belief task, the default content must be inhibited so that attention shifts to another candidate belief. In traditional false-belief tasks, the protagonist's desire is to approach an object. Here we make use of tasks in which the protagonist has a desire to avoid an object, about which she has a false-belief. Children find such tasks much more difficult than traditional tasks. Our models explain the additional difficulty by assuming that predicting action from an avoidance desire also requires an inhibition. The two processing models differ in the way that belief and desire inhibitory processes combine to achieve successful action prediction. In six experiments we obtain evidence favoring one model, in which parallel inhibitory processes cancel out, over the other model, in which serial inhibitions force attention to a previously inhibited location. These results are discussed in terms of a set of simple proposals for the modus operandi of a domain specific learning mechanism. The learning mechanism is in part modular--the ToMM--and in part penetrable--the Selection Processor (SP). We show how ToMM-SP can account both for competence and for successful and unsuccessful performance on a wide range of belief-desire tasks across the preschool period. Together, ToMM and SP attend to and learn about mental states.     

Sensitivity to criticism and theory of mind: A cross cultural study on Japanese and Italian children

Although recent studies have shown cross-cultural differences in theory of mind (ToM) between children in Western and Eastern cultures, little is known about cross-cultural differences pertaining to social correlates. The present research investigated cultural variations in the relationship between sensitivity to criticism and ToM. Japanese (n = 76) and Italian (n = 76) 6-year-olds completed a sensitivity-to-criticism task (either the teacher condition or the peer condition), second-order false-belief tasks, and a verbal ability test. The results replicated previous findings of an association between ability rating after teacher criticism and ToM in both countries. Cultural variation was found in emotional response and motivation after teacher, but nor peer, criticism. Japanese children responded to teacher criticism more positively than did Italian children. Moreover, Japanese children who failed the second-order false-belief task were more motivated after teacher criticism than were Italian children. These results are discussed in relation to differences in cultural factors.     

Matched false-belief performance during verbal and nonverbal interference

Language has been shown to play a key role in the development of a child's theory of mind, but its role in adult belief reasoning remains unclear. One recent study used verbal and nonverbal interference during a false-belief task to show that accurate belief reasoning in adults necessarily requires language (Newton & de Villiers, 2007). The strength of this inference depends on the cognitive processes that are matched between the verbal and nonverbal inference tasks. Here, we matched the two interference tasks in terms of their effects on spatial working memory. We found equal success on false-belief reasoning during both verbal and nonverbal interference, suggesting that language is not specifically necessary for adult theory of mind.     

A longitudinal study of the relation between language and theory-of-mind development.

Fifty-nine 3-year-olds were tested 3 times over a period of 7 months in order to assess the contribution of theory of mind to language development and of language to theory-of-mind development (including the independent contributions of syntax and semantics). Language competence was assessed with a standardized measure of reception and production of syntax and semantics (the Test of Early Language Development). Theory of mind was assessed with false-belief tasks and appearance-reality tasks. Earlier language abilities predicted later theory-of-mind test performance (controlling for earlier theory of mind), but earlier theory of mind did not predict later language test performance (controlling for earlier language). These findings are consistent with the argument that language is fundamental to theory-of-mind development.     

Spilling the beans on understanding and memory for idioms in conversation

Three experiments examine people's understanding and memory for idioms. Experiment 1 indicates that in a conversational context, subjects take less time to comprehend conventional uses of idiomatic expression than unconventional, literal uses. Paraphrase judgment errors show that there is a strong bias to interpret idiomatic expressions conventionally when there is no preceding context; however, subjects interpret literal uses of these expressions correctly when there is appropriate context. Experiment 2 showed that in a free recall task, literal uses of idioms are remembered better than conventional uses of these utterances. Experiment 3 indicated that in conversation, literal and idiomatic recall prompts facilitate memory for literal uses of idioms equally well. The results from these experiments suggest that memory for conventional utterances is not as good as for unconventional uses of the same utterances and that subjects understanding unconventional uses of idioms tend to analyze the idiomatic meaning of these expressions before deriving the literal, unconventional interpretation. It is argued that the traditional distinction between literal and metaphoric language is better characterized as a continuum between conventional and unconventional utterances.     

语义分解性在惯用语理解中的作用

惯用语是比喻性语言的一种。语义分解性的作用是惯用语理解机制争论的焦点。通过语义启动任务, 探究了汉语动宾结构的惯用语和偏正结构的惯用语的意义理解模式, 揭示语义分解性在短的SOA (300 ms)和长的SOA (800 ms)下的作用。结果发现, 语义分解性独立地影响惯用语的意义激活：当SOA短时, 语义高分解的两类惯用语均表现出显著的字面义激活效应; 当SOA长时, 语义低分解的偏正结构的惯用语的意义激活的正确率优势明显。同时, 两类惯用语的语义分解性不同导致了语义激活启动效应的差异：当SOA短时, 语义低分解的动宾结构的惯用语存在两种意义的激活效应, 语义高分解的动宾结构的惯用语和偏正结构的惯用语存在字面义的激活效应; 当SOA长时, 语义低分解的动宾结构的惯用语存在两种意义的激活效应, 语义高分解的偏正结构的惯用语存在比喻义的激活效应。研究证实语义分解性在惯用语加工早期即发挥作用, 在加工晚期, 语义高分解的动宾结构的惯用语的多种意义同时激活削弱了两种意义的启动优势。整个研究结果支持惯用语理解的混合表征模型和层级显性意义假说。     

Relationship between implicit false belief understanding and role play: Longitudinal study

Pretend play is one of the earliest forms of children’s imagination. While social pretend play (role play) may facilitate the development of theory of mind – including false belief understanding – theoretically, the reverse may be true; theory of mind may facilitate the development of role play. To clarify this relationship, the present longitudinal study examined whether toddler’s implicit understanding of false beliefs predicted their role play during preschool years. We examined 18-month-old toddlers’ looking time in an implicit false-belief task (Time 1). When the children were 4/5 years old (Time 2), children’s parents answered a questionnaire on their child’s engagement in role play, such as playing with an imaginary companion and impersonating an imagined character. Toddlers’ looking time in the false-belief task at Time 1 predicted impersonation scores at Time 2. The results suggest that early theory of mind skills can facilitate children’s role play.