论罗尔斯的契约论选择

罗尔斯的正义论试图复兴西方政治思想中的契约论传统,但是,罗尔斯的复兴和继承是有选择性的承继。本文首先分析了西方政治思想中的功利主义传统之悖谬和契约论传统的基本内涵,并在此基础上论述了罗尔斯对契约论传统本身的扬弃之实质所在。另外,本文驳斥了单纯认为契约论对罗尔斯思想建构仅有“论证方式”之意义的观点,同时为罗尔斯这一论证方式提供了一种经验性辩护。     

重新理解罗尔斯的契约论

提起罗尔斯的契约论,人们通常会想起那个著名的原初状态论证.然而,在罗尔斯的契约论框架中,具有根本意义的是良序社会而非原初状态的观念.原初状态是对良序社会的模拟和表征,原初状态的证成力量依赖于良序社会观念的吸引力.说罗尔斯的证成方式是契约论的,主要是因为他将良序社会中合理而理性的公民的同意,当作制度证成的标准;而制度证成的两个维度:正义和稳定,通过公民的两个视角先后得到检验.通过良序社会的观念重构契约论证,有助于我们消除对于罗尔斯理论的一些误解.     

在个人与群体之间:同意论对道德义务的重塑

现代实践吁求道德义务的解释新论,过往的经验论、超验论、神令论、功利论、边际约束论的解释方式皆存在一定的缺陷。借助挖掘隐伏在西方思想史中的同意论,为重塑西方道德义务观的内在生成机理确立了一个新的解释框架。在回溯霍布斯及洛克的"契约论"、康德的"德性论"和罗尔斯的"正义论"的基础上,发现同意论视角下的道德义务观既具有契约主义的理性,又兼具责任伦理的底色。洛克提出的"自愿同意"假设作为道德义务的确认程序完成了对个体意愿的观照,同时依据罗尔斯主张的正义制度的规制作用,保障了群体意志的在场。在技术加剧伦理冲突的当代社会,同意论的重拾和完善对于道德义务理论重塑以及马克思主义伦理视域下的伦理秩序建构皆彰显了一定的积极意义。     

罗尔斯道德哲学的方法论浅论

罗尔斯《正义论》可以说是其道德哲学方法论的成就。他用实质性理论的规范伦理学的研究方法研究正义问题 ,摆脱了纯形式主义的元伦理学的研究方式 ;用抽象的、思辨的契约论的方法来论证他的两个正义原则的正义性 ,抛弃西方近代传统的功利主义的论证方式 ;他的独特的“反思的平衡”的思维方法在当代道德与政治哲学中成为一种研究纲领     

从实体正义到程序正义:卢梭与罗尔斯契约正义观之比较

卢梭的契约正义观与罗尔斯的契约正义观在形式上有其相似之处。但由于他们各自所处的时代背景不同,其正义观的价值内核、论证方式及其实现途径都存在着重大的差别。从卢梭的契约正义观到罗尔斯的契约正义观的嬗变代表了西方正义论从实体正义向程序正义的转变,把握这一转变的趋向及其内在精神实质,对于丰富和完善当代中国和谐社会建设的理论和实践是大有裨益的。     

自主性与罗尔斯对正义与善的“契合论证”

罗尔斯对个人善以及正义感的说明,和个人自主性以及道德自主性的观念是正相对应的。而如果要充分回应某些理论家对契合问题是否必要的质疑进而把契合问题确立起来,罗尔斯必须承诺对一种个人自主性的尊重。但这种意义上的个人自主性,却并不支持罗尔斯对契合问题所作的康德式的论证。     

论罗尔斯的政治义务理论

政治义务是政治哲学的核心问题。哈特首先用“相互限制原则”来解释政治义务,这一原则为罗尔斯所继承并加以修正。鉴于该原则存在的诸多问题,罗尔斯在《正义论》中削减了它在政治义务的道德证明中的作用,而诉诸正义的自然责任原则。这个原则仍然受到来自多方面的批评,许多罗尔斯的追随者对这些批评作了回应。罗尔斯从公平游戏原则到自然责任原则的转变反映了他对契约论不同的态度。     

资本主义经济自由是基本自由吗?

在当代自由主义思潮内部,资本主义经济自由是否属于基本自由,已经成为众说纷纭的棘手问题。高级自由主义的代表人物约翰·罗尔斯持有单薄的经济自由观,他只将择业自由和个人财产权视作基本经济自由,认为古典自由主义者所珍视的契约自由和生产资料私人所有权这两种资本主义经济自由实际上并非基本自由。然而,罗尔斯对单薄的经济自由观的辩护并没有说服力。新古典自由主义的代表人物约翰·托马西认为,罗尔斯本应支持厚重的经济自由观,应将资本主义经济自由列入他的基本自由清单。但是,托马西证明罗尔斯应该支持厚重的经济自由观的决定性善观念论证和不合理的例外论论证都是失败的,因此未能借助罗尔斯的理论证成资本主义经济自由是基本自由。     

罗尔斯《正义论》中的反至善论及其效应

在《正义论》中,罗尔斯基于善观念的多样性和不确定性,根据平等的要求而将至善论排除在政治原则之外。这种反至善论的立场在自由主义内外引起了不同的反应。一方面,与罗尔斯处于同一阵营的德沃金基于平等这一理想明确提出国家中立性原则,然而中立性本身又是一种需要辩护的立场;另一方面,由于罗尔斯的反至善论论证关涉正当的优先性,而正当的优先性也是充满争议的,它一开始就受到了社群主义的强烈反对。于是,基于对中立性及其可能性的怀疑,又鉴于社群主义的重要挑战,至善论者试图超越两者并基于至善论为自由主义辩护,从而使至善论在当代政治哲学中得以复兴。     

政治义务与正义的自然责任

在《正义论》中 ,罗尔斯把功能上与政治义务 (ｐｏｌｉｔｉｃａｌｏｂｌｉｇａｔｉｏｎ)相当的道德要求建基于“正义的自然责任” (ｎａｔｕｒａｌｄｕｔｙｏｆｊｕｓｔｉｃｅ) ,尤其是“支持与推进正义制度”的自然责任。① 他对这一观点的论证是粗略的 ,并且是不令人满意的 ,我将揭示这一点。尽管在表面上具有直觉上的明显性 ,但自然的政治责任并不能支持政府最重要的方面。对罗尔斯的这种批评对他下述整个观点提出了质疑 ,即我们之所以具有作为道德要求的政治义务 ,仅仅因为我们是人 ,而不是因为我们与特定政府的关系。在《正义论》中 ,…     

RESTRAINT ON REASONS AND REASONS FOR RESTRAINT: A PROBLEM FOR RAWLS' IDEAL OF PUBLIC REASON

Abstract:  It appears that one of the aims of John Rawls' ideal of public reason is to provide people with good reason for exercising restraint on their nonpublic reasons when they are acting in the public political arena. I will argue, however, that in certain cases Rawls' ideal of public reason is unable to provide a person with good reason for exercising such restraint, even if the person is already committed to Rawls' ideal of public reason. Because it is plausible to believe that such cases are widespread, the issue I am raising represents a serious problem for Rawls' account of public reason. After posing this problem, I consider potential responses on behalf of Rawls' view, and I reply to those responses. The moral of this story, as I see it, is that the kind of duty an ideal of public reason aims to place on citizens must be more modest than Rawls supposes.     

Disintegrated Persons and Distributive Principles

In this paper I consider Derek Parfit's attempt to respond to Rawls' charge that utilitarianism ignores the distinction between persons. I proceed by arguing that there is a moderate form of reductionism about persons, one stressing the importance of what Parfit calls psychological connectedness, which can hold in different degrees both within one person and between distinct persons. In terms of this form of reductionism, against which Parfit's arguments are ineffective, it is possible to resuscitate the Rawlsian charge that the utilitarian maximizing approach to matters of distribution ignores something that is of moral relevance, viz., the difference between the degrees of connectedness that hold between different stages of the same person, and between that person and his nearest and dearest, and the lack of connectedness between that person and distant others who may be benefitted at his cost. To Parfit's charge that reductionism sees the differences between persons as being 'less deep', I reply that the sense in which they are less deep is not at odds with their retaining their original moral importance, perhaps now better understood.     

Rawlsian Justice and non-Human Animals

ABSTRACT In his book, A Theory of Justice , John Rawls argues against the inclusion of non-human animals within the scope of the principles of justice developed therein. However, the reasons Rawls, and certain commentators, have advanced in support of this view do not adequately support it. Against Rawls' view that 'we are not required to give strict justice' to creatures lacking the capacity for a sense of justice, it is initially argued that (i) de facto inclusion should be accorded non-human animals since their exclusion strains just institutions, and (ii) Rawls' account of the sense of justice has implicit and undefended human chauvinist elements. Two further counter-arguments are then developed in more detail. First, the suggestion that some non-human animals do have a capacity for a sense of justice is explored. Second, the suggestion that the capacity for a sense of justice is unrealised in so many human beings that Rawls' basis for marking out a special place for them is undermined is explored. Attention is next given to Rawls' characterisation of the participants in the original position. It is claimed that there are no good reasons for disallowing the possibility that these individuals turn out to be non-human animals in the real world. If sound, this claim brings non-human animals directly within the scope of Rawlsian principles of justice. The claim is defended against three objections.     

Liberal Exclusions and Foundationalism

Certain versions of liberalism exclude from public political discussions the reasons some citizens regard as most fundamental, reasons having to do with their deepest religious, philosophical, moral or political views. This liberal exclusion of deep and deeply held reasons from political discussions has been controversial. In this article I will point out a way in which the discussion seems to presuppose a foundationalist conception of human reasoning. This is rather surprising, inasmuch as one of the foremost advocates of liberalism, John Rawls, is also known for being one of the first advocates of reflective equilibrium, which is clearly a coherentist approach to theory construction and justification. I will begin in Park I by making my charge against an almost embarrassingly crude presentation of the liberal position. Then in Part II I will leap to Rawls' version of liberalism, obviously by far the most sophisticated working out of the position, and try to see whether anything remains of my criticism.     

THE BEGINNING OF COMMUNITY: POLITICS IN THE FACE OF DISAGREEMENT

Rawls' requirement that citizens of liberal democracies support only policies which they believe can be justified in 'public reason' depends on a certain ideal for the relationships between citizens. This is a valuable ideal, and thus citizens have reasons to try to achieve it. But it is not always possible to find the common ground that we would need in order to do so, and thus we should reject Rawls' strong claim that we have an obligation to defend our views in public reason. Because I recognize that we have strong reasons to conduct our political enquiry within the guidelines of political liberalism, but deny that we always have an obligation to do so, one might call my view 'permissive political liberalism'.     

Empathy and justice motivation

Empathic distress is defined as an aversive feeling contingent on another's physical, emotional, or economic distress. The paper (1) summarizes a developmental scheme consisting of four stages of empathic distress; (2) suggests that causal attributions may partly transform empathic distress into sympathy, empathic anger, feeling of injustice, and guilt feeling; (3) notes the evidence that these empathic affects often serve to motivate moral behavior, and therefore that they qualify as moral motives; (4) points up limitations of these affects/motives and the need to embed them in justice principles; (5) discusses links between empathic affects/motives and principles of distributive justice/ (6) argues that Rawls' theory of justice, which excludes empathy, may nevertheless require it for the difference principle to influence behavior in real life; (7) hypothesizes a functional equivalence between empathy and the veil of ignorance; and (8) speculates that the conjunction of empathic affect and justice-principle thinking — in life and in abstract didactic contexts like Rawls' original position — may produce a principle having the motivational and stabilizing properties of a hot cognition.     

Equity as an Economic Objective

ABSTRACT Following Rawls' seminal work, political philosophers and economists have recently shown great interest in different conceptions of equity or justice. Apart from Rawls' own principles, these have included utilitarianism, need and desert, horizontal and vertical equity and envy-free distributions. None of these conceptions, however, seem to command general consensus; and this paper is an attempt to find out why. The conclusion is reached that they all fail because they do not take account of an essential element of equity: its relationship to the existence or otherwise of choice. An alternative conception is offered, based explicitly on that relationship; it is argued that this conception comes closer to capturing the essence of what is generally meant by the term equity than any of the others considered.     

阿马蒂亚·森的分配正义观

阿马蒂亚·森的分配正义见解 ,以主体为中心 ,一方面强调分配上的能力本位 ,主张源头的产出保证 ;另一方面 ,注意分配是外部条件 ,提倡分配过程中的权利平等。这是对罗尔斯正义论的具体化 ,是从经济伦理学的视野对分配正义的新认识。但是对能力及其与效用关系的解释上 ,需要进一步完善。     

Defending a Law of Peoples: Political Liberalism and Decent Peoples

In this paper I reconstruct and defend John Rawls' The Law of Peoples, including the distinction between liberal and decent peoples. A “decent people” is defined as a people who possesses a comprehensive doctrine and uses that doctrine as the ground of political legitimacy, while liberal peoples do not possess a comprehensive doctrine. I argue that liberal and decent peoples are bound by the same normative requirements with the qualification that decent peoples accept the same normative demands when they are reasonably interpreted and from their comprehensive doctrine, not from political liberalism. Normative standards for peoples appear in a law of peoples in two places: as internal constraints carried forward from political liberalism which regulate domestic affairs and as principles derived from a second original position that provide the normative ground for a society of peoples. This first source of normative standards was unfortunately obscured in Rawls' account. I use this model to defeat the claim that Rawls has accommodated decent peoples without sufficient warrant and to argue that all reasonable citizens of both liberal and decent peoples would accept the political authority of the state as legitimate. Although my reconstruction differs from Rawls on key points, such as modifying the idea of decency and rejecting a place for decent peoples within a second original position, overall I defend the theoretical completeness of political liberalism and show how a law of peoples provides reasonable principles of international justice. This paper explores theoretical ideas I introduced in embryonic form in a paper presented at the International Conference on Human Rights: Theoretical Foundations of Human Rights, 17–18 May, 2003, Mofid University (Qom, Iran). That paper, “Political Liberalism and Religious Freedom: Asymmetrical Tolerance for Minority Comprehensive Doctrines” (forthcoming in the Proceedings of the conference), addressed specific issues related to religious toleration, but left unexplored theoretical questions regarding the status of decent peoples. I wish to thank participants in the conference for their helpful feedback on my interpretation of Rawls' international political theory, especially Jack Donnelly, Michael Freeman, Stephen Macedo, Samuel Fleishacker, Omar Dahbour, Yasien Ali Mohamed, and Saladin Meckled-Garcia. In addition, I wish to offer my sincere appreciation to the Executive Committee of the Conference and especially to Sayyed Masoud Moosavi Karimi, Nasser Elahi, and Mohammad Habibi Modjandeh.     

Equality, Envy, and the Sense of Injustice

This paper attempts to defend the value of equality against the accusation that it is an expression of irrational and disreputable feelings of envy of those who are better off. It draws on Rawls' account of the sense of justice to suggest that resentment of inequalities may be a proper resentment of injustice. The case of resentment of 'free riders' is taken as one plausible example of a justified resentment of those who benefit unfairly from a scheme of cooperation. Further examples then link the case of the free rider to other cases of unjust inequalities which are the appropriate objects of resentment and indignation.