Too much information: the perils of nondiagnostic information in negotiations

Two studies showed that possessing information about a negotiation counterpart that is irrelevant to the negotiation task can impair negotiators' effectiveness because such knowledge impedes effective information exchange. In Study 1, negotiators who possessed diagnostic and nondiagnostic forms of information were each less likely to exchange information about their preferences within the negotiation. However, only those negotiators who possessed nondiagnostic information achieved inferior negotiation outcomes as a result. In Study 2, negotiators possessing nondiagnostic information about their counterparts in electronically mediated negotiations were more likely to terminate the search for mutually beneficial outcomes prematurely and declare impasses. They were also less able to use diagnostic forms of information to make mutually beneficial trade-offs. As a result, negotiators in these dyads achieved inferior outcomes.     

From self-prediction to self-defeat: behavioral forecasting, self-fulfilling prophecies, and the effect of competitive expectations

Four studies explored behavioral forecasting and the effect of competitive expectations in the context of negotiations. Study 1 examined negotiators' forecasts of how they would behave when faced with a very competitive versus a less competitive opponent and found that negotiators believed they would become more competitive. Studies 2 and 3 examined actual behaviors during a negotiation and found that negotiators who expected a very competitive opponent actually became less competitive, as evidenced by setting lower, less aggressive reservation prices, making less demanding counteroffers, and ultimately agreeing to lower negotiated outcomes. Finally, Study 4 provided a direct test of the disconnection between negotiators' forecasts for their behavior and their actual behaviors within the same sample and found systematic errors in behavioral forecasting as well as evidence for the self-fulfilling effects of possessing a competitive expectation.     

Implicit negotiation beliefs and performance: experimental and longitudinal evidence

The authors argue that implicit negotiation beliefs, which speak to the expected malleability of negotiating ability, affect performance in dyadic negotiations. They expected negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are malleable (incremental theorists) to outperform negotiators who believe negotiating attributes are fixed (entity theorists). In Study 1, they gathered evidence of convergent and discriminant validity for the implicit negotiation belief construct. In Study 2, they examined the impact of implicit beliefs on the achievement goals that negotiators pursue. In Study 3, they explored the causal role of implicit beliefs on negotiation performance by manipulating negotiators' implicit beliefs within dyads. They also identified perceived ability as a moderator of the link between implicit negotiation beliefs and performance. In Study 4, they measured negotiators' beliefs in a classroom setting and examined how these beliefs affected negotiation performance and overall performance in the course 15 weeks later. Across all performance measures, incremental theorists outperformed entity theorists. Consistent with the authors' hypotheses, incremental theorists captured more of the bargaining surplus and were more integrative than their entity theorist counterparts, suggesting implicit theories are important determinants of how negotiators perform. Implications and future directions are discussed.     

Early words that work: When and how virtual linguistic mimicry facilitates negotiation outcomes

We hypothesized that in online, virtual formats, negotiators receive better outcomes when mimicking their counterpart's language; furthermore, we predicted that this strategy would be more effective when occurring early in the negotiation rather than at the end, and should also be effective across both independent and interdependent cultures. Results from two experiments supported these hypotheses. Experiment 1 was conducted in Thailand and demonstrated that negotiators who actively mimicked their counterpart's language in the first 10 min of the negotiation obtained higher individual gain compared to those mimicking during the last 10 min, as well as compared to control participants. Experiment 2 replicated this effect in the United States (with Dutch and American negotiators) and also showed that trust mediated the effect of virtual linguistic mimicry on individual negotiation outcomes. Implications for virtual communication, strategic mimicry, and negotiations are discussed.     

回报谨慎对谈判过程和谈判结果的影响

回报谨慎是人们害怕在人际关系中被他人利用的一种信念。研究考察了回报谨慎对谈判者的动机倾向、谈判行为及谈判结果的影响。184人组成92个两人小组参加了一项模拟商业谈判,谈判前研究者成功地进行了回报谨慎的操纵,谈判结束后,参加谈判的人完成谈判协议和谈判后问卷。研究者假设,低回报谨慎的谈判者比高回报谨慎的谈判者在谈判中更可能持有合作倾向、更多地与谈判对手分享信息,研究者还预测回报谨慎与谈判双方的联合收益以及谈判后对谈判对手的看法都有关系。研究结果支持了上述假设。研究对从事商业谈判的人具有实际意义。     

Motivated information processing, strategic choice, and the quality of negotiated agreement

The authors tested a motivated information-processing model of negotiation: To reach high joint outcomes, negotiators need a deep understanding of the task, which requires them to exchange information and to process new information systematically. All this depends on social motivation, epistemic motivation (EM), and their interaction. Indeed, when EM (manipulated by holding negotiators process accountability or not) was high rather than low and prosocial rather than proself, negotiators recall more cooperative than competitive tactics (Experiment 1), had more trust, and reached higher joint outcomes (Experiment 2). Experiment 3 showed that under high EM, negotiators who received cooperative, rather than competitive, tactics reached higher joint outcomes because they engaged in more problem solving. Under low EM, negotiators made more concessions and reached low joint outcomes. Implications for negotiation theory and for future work in this area are discussed.     

Negotiator cognitions: A descriptive approach to negotiators' understanding of their opponents

Substantial evidence exists that negotiators frequently fail to attain readily available and mutually beneficial outcomes. This paper provides a preliminary model of why these failures occur. We assume that negotiators are decision makers, and that their errors derive from cognitive processes ignored by utility-maximization theories. We focus on one part of the model: the systematic tendency to ignore the cognitions of opponent negotiators. Empirical evidence clarifying negotiators' cognitive processes is generated using verbal protocol techniques in a controlled negotiation task. The results show that subjects simplify the negotiation task, in part by ignoring contingencies introduced by the knowledge possessed by their opponents. The discussion focuses on how subjects simplify the task and how the decision-making perspective helps redirect the negotiation literature.     

The mind and heart (literally) of the negotiator: personality and contextual determinants of experiential reactions and economic outcomes in negotiation

The authors developed and tested a model proposing that negotiator personality interacts with the negotiation situation to influence negotiation processes and outcomes. In 2 studies, the authors found that negotiators high in agreeableness were best suited to integrative negotiations and that negotiators low in agreeableness were best suited to distributive negotiations. Consistent with this person-situation fit argument, in Study 1 the authors found that negotiators whose dispositions were a good fit to their negotiation context had higher levels of physiological (cardiac) arousal at the end of the negotiation compared with negotiators who were "misplaced" in situations inconsistent with their level of agreeableness, and this arousal was in turn related to increased economic outcomes. Study 2 replicated and extended the findings of Study 1, finding that person-situation fit was related to physiological (heart rate), psychological (positive affect), and behavioral activation (persistence) demonstrated during the negotiation, and these measures in turn were related to the economic outcomes achieved by participants.     

Conflicting social motives in negotiating groups

Negotiators' social motives (cooperative vs. individualistic) influence their strategic behaviors. In this study, the authors used multilevel modeling and analyses of strategy sequences to test hypotheses regarding how negotiators' social motives and the composition of the group influence group members' negotiation strategies. Four-person groups negotiating a 5-issue mixed-motive decision-making task were videotaped, and the tapes were transcribed and coded. Group composition included 2 homogeneous conditions (all cooperators and all individualists) and 3 heterogeneous conditions (3 cooperators and 1 individualist, 2 cooperators and 2 individualists, 1 cooperator and 3 individualists). Results showed that cooperative negotiators adjusted their use of integrative and distributive strategies in response to the social-motive composition of the group, but individualistic negotiators did not. Results from analyses of strategy sequences showed that cooperators responded more systematically to others' behaviors than did individualists. They also redirected the negotiation depending on group composition.     

It's a bet! A problem-solving approach promotes the construction of contingent agreements

Negotiators often have different expectations about the future. A contingent agreement, or a bet that makes the ultimate outcome dependent on some future event, builds on negotiators' differences. The authors argue that a problem-solving approach, in which negotiators thoroughly explore options to build on their differences, is most likely to construct contingent agreements. The authors explore two factors expected to influence this problem-solving approach, namely, negotiators' relational and accountability concerns. The authors argue when these considerations are imbalanced, negotiators are less likely to adopt a problem-solving style and construct a contingent agreement. To test this hypothesis, negotiators' relationships and accountability pressures were manipulated in two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants engaged in an integrative negotiation, allowing the authors to examine whether a contingent agreement was constructed and joint gain. Experiment 2 sought to replicate and extend the findings of Experiment 1 using a scenario study. Results across the two experiments support the authors' hypotheses.     

Groups and Solos in Context: The Effects of Accountability on Team Negotiation

This study examines whether and how accountability to constituents affects the cognitions, performance, and outcomes of team and solo negotiators. Previous findings for solos were replicated here: solo negotiators respond competitively when they are accountable to constituents. For teams, however, accountability pressures were distributed across the members resulting in each team member experiencing little responsibility for outcomes. As a consequence, teams did not respond to accountability pressures by behaving contentiously as solos did. Analysis of negotiators' perceptions of advantage reveals that solos who negotiate under conditions of high accountability consider themselves to be at a disadvantage in the negotiation even before the negotiation begins. These perceptions may underlie the accountability/competitive relation that characterizes solo negotiation. Implications for negotiation research as well as the study of groups in organizations are discussed.     

Sabotaging the deal: The way relational concerns undermine negotiators

We addressed the questions of how and to what end negotiators sacrifice their economic outcomes in exchange for hoped-for relationship gains with the other party. We predicted that negotiators' chronic belongingness needs–fundamental to human beings–would undercut the economic value of their deals. Moreover, we tested two mechanisms by which this occurs. Belongingness needs encouraged negotiators to reduce their economic ambitions ahead of time, and they interfered with negotiators' attention to the substantive issues on the table. Rather than finding that partners were able to exploit negotiators' belongingness needs for their own economic gains, we found that their partners were left worse off. If negotiators were making a calculation initially to trade economic gains for relationship gains, we did not find evidence that this paid off with a partner who especially wanted to work with the focal negotiator in the future. We conclude that belongingness needs lead negotiators to sabotage their economic outcomes without any clear benefits to the relationships these negotiators are keen to build.     

Perspective taking as a means to overcome motivational barriers in negotiations: when putting oneself into the opponent's shoes helps to walk toward agreements

Previous negotiation research predominantly focused on psychological factors that lead to suboptimal compromises as opposed to integrative agreements. Few studies systematically analyzed factors that impact the emergence of hurtful partial impasses (i.e., nonagreements on part of the issues). The present research investigates negotiators' egoistic motivation as a determinant for the emergence of partial impasses. In addition, the authors seek to demonstrate that perspective taking serves as a powerful tool to avoid impasses and to overcome egoistic impediments. Specifically, it was predicted that within an integrative context perspective-takers succeed to exchange concessions on low- versus high-preference issues (i.e., logroll), thereby increasing their individual profits without inflicting hurtful losses upon their counterparts. Three studies were conducted to test these predictions. Study 1 reveals that whereas negotiators' egoistic motivation increases the risk of partial impasses, perspective taking alleviates this risk. Study 2 demonstrates that this beneficial effect of a perspective-taking mindset is limited to integrative negotiations and does not emerge in a distributive context, in which negotiators are constrained to achieve selfish goals by inflicting hurtful losses on their counterparts. Study 3 confirms the assumption that in an integrative context egoistic perspective-takers overcome the risk of impasses by means of logrolling. The findings of the present studies are discussed with respect to their contribution to research on negotiations, social motivation, and perspective taking.     

Face threat sensitivity in negotiation: Roadblock to agreement and joint gain

Negotiation scholars and practitioners have long noted the impact of face, or social image, concerns on negotiation outcomes. When face is threatened, negotiators are less likely to reach agreement and to create joint gain. In this paper, we explore individual differences in face threat sensitivity (FTS), and how a negotiator's role moderates the relationship of his or her FTS to negotiation outcomes. Study 1 describes a measure of FTS. Study 2 finds that buyers and sellers are less likely to reach an agreement that is in both parties' interests when the seller has high FTS. Study 3 finds that job candidates and recruiters negotiate an employment contract with less joint gain when the candidate has high FTS, and that this relationship is mediated by increased competitiveness on the part of the high FTS candidates. The results support Deutsch's (1961) application of face theory ( Goffman, 1967) to negotiation.     

Market forces,negotiator frames and transaction outcomes

Although implicit framing differences have been advanced as an explanation of the buyers advantage, two necessary preconditions must be met to sustain this model: a demonstration that negatively-framed negotiators are advantaged in negotiations and that buyer role labels invoke a negative frame. A modification of Neale, Northcraft, Magliozzi and Bazerman s (1986) simulation created a role-neutral setting in which positively-framed negotiators bargained against negatively-framed negotiators, thus testing the first of these preconditions. Experiment 1 found no differences in the outcomes of positively- and negatively-framed negotiators, a finding that could be attributed to relatively low market competitiveness. A second experiment, by creating power imbalanced negotiation markets, sought to increase market distributiveness and strengthen framing effects. Results showed that both high power and negatively-framed negotiators were significantly advantaged, providing conditional support for the implicit framing model, However unlike role, frame interacted with power suggesting that the two variables are not functionally equivalent. These findings are interpreted to suggest that factors other than implicit framing differences account for the buyers advantage. More generally these results suggest that frame is responsive to situational variables and that such variables, by influencing negotiation processes, mediate the relationship between negotiator frames and negotiation outcomes.     

Impact of Frame-of-Reference and Behavioral Observation Training on Alternative Training Effectiveness Criteria in a Canadian Military Sample

Past research suggests that specific, challenging goals lead to higher perfor- mance than do-your-best goals or easy goals in a variety of tasks, including negotiations. In the two studies reported here, we explored how seemingly appropriate goals may inhibit rather than facilitate performance. In Study 1, negotiators with challenging, specific goals failed to appropriately incorporate new information presented during a negotiation and consequently achieved poorer outcomes than negotiators with do-your-best goals. In Study 2, support was found for specific, challenging subordinate goals (separate goals for each issue) detrimentally focusing negotiators on the distributive dimension of nego- tiations, unlike their counterparts with superordinate goals (one goal encom- passing all issues). The implications of these findings for goal-setting theory are discussed.     

Tactical anger in negotiation: The expresser's perspective

Presenting programmed angry messages to a negotiator has increased concession rates in a series of recent experiments. But observing responses to a computer or confederate counterpart cannot yield insight into the perceptions, reactions, and negotiation outcomes experienced by those who actually deploy anger as a tactic. We report five studies examining the anger expression decision using a range of different methods. In the fully interactive two-person integrative negotiation in Study 1, expressed anger generally degraded trust while damaging implementation of deals. That ultimately diminished value actually claimed by anger expressers. In the discrete choice experiment of Study 2, sending angry messages proved costly for expressers, who registered very high levels of measured disutility from using this tactic. In Study 3, survey respondents reported widespread unwillingness to misrepresent anger during negotiation. Recalling a past negotiation, anger correlated negatively with experienced success, indicating that disutility from expressing anger generalizes widely across different contexts. Study 4 revealed that negotiators generally consider the tactic to be unethical. More than just specific beliefs about the lack of efficacy, Study 5 revealed that the source of tactical disutility lies in generalized discomfort with the misrepresentation of anger. Implications for research, practice, and training are considered.     

The influence of power on the information search, impression formation, and demands in negotiation

Based on work by Fiske (1992), we argue that power differences influence information search strategies during negotiation. Experiment 1 showed that negotiators with less power ask more diagnostic than leading questions, and more belief-congruent than incongruent questions, when facing a competitive rather than cooperative partner. Experiment 2 suggested that this result was caused by stronger accuracy and impression motivation among less powerful negotiators. Experiment 3 showed that belief-congruent rather than incongruent questions produce more positive impressions during negotiation. And when less powerful negotiators are asked leading questions about their willingness to cooperate (compete), they responded with lower (higher) demands. The results are discussed in terms of a motivated information-processing model of negotiation.     

Motivated by guilt and low felt trust: The impact of negotiators' anger expressions on the implementation of negotiated agreements

Prior research has identified benefits from certain emotion tactics in negotiation, particularly expressing anger to achieve short‐term gains. We demonstrate that such tactics can be strategically problematic due to their impact on an actor's emotions and felt trust. Through five studies, we find that negotiators' use of anger tactics during a negotiation increased their feelings of guilt and reduced the extent to which they felt trusted by their counterpart following the negotiation. We found this guilt to be the result of their aggressive tone and how they treated their counterpart. The guilt and diminished felt trust in turn motivated negotiators to engage in greater cooperative behaviors during the deal implementation process that benefited their counterpart, even if doing so was costly to the negotiator. Our results demonstrate that negotiator guilt and felt trust resulting from anger tactics influence the dynamic relationship between negotiators and their counterparts. This in turn has strategic implications for negotiators, who attempt to mitigate these negative feelings during the crucial implementation phase of a negotiated agreement.