Multicultural counseling competencies: an analysis of research on clients' perceptions: comment on Owen, Leach, Wampold, and Rodolfa (2011)

J. Owen, M. M. Leach, B. Wampold, and E. Rodolfa (see record 2010-24976-001) tested the hypotheses that (a) some therapists express more multicultural competencies (MCCs) more than other therapists and (b) clients' perceptions of their therapists' MCCs are a function of specific client or therapeutic factors. In the present analysis, the authors critiqued 3 major components of the study: conceptual and methodological underpinnings, interpretation of research findings, and implications for future research. Although the authors agree with the importance of this line of research, the authors also believe that some of the researchers' underlying assumptions are worthy of examination; alternate interpretations of the findings are possible, and several recommendations for future research are imperative.     

The validity and appropriateness of methods, analyses, and conclusions in Rind et al. (1998): A rebuttal of victimological critique from Ondersma et al. (2001) and Dallam et al. (2001).

The authors respond to 2 victimological critiques of their 1998 meta-analysis on child sexual abuse (CSA). S. J. Dallam et al. (2001) claimed that B. Rind, P. Tromovitch, and R. Bauserman (1998) committed numerous methodological and statistical errors, and often miscoded and misinterpreted data. The authors show all these claims to be invalid. To the contrary, they demonstrate frequent bias in Dallam et al.'s criticisms. S. J. Ondersma et al. (2001) claimed that Rind et al.'s study is part of a backlash against psychotherapists, that its suggestions regarding CSA definitions were extrascientific, and that the moral standard is needed to understand CSA scientifically. The authors show their suggestions to have been scientific and argue that it is Ondersma et al.'s issue-framing and moral standard that are extrascientific. This reply supports the original methods, analyses, recommendations, and conclusions of Rind et al.     

Constraining accommodative homunculi in evolutionary explorations of jealousy: a reply to Barrett et al. (2006)

This article responds to a critique by H. C. Barrett, D. A. Frederick, M. G. Haselton, and R. Kurzban, wherein it is argued that manipulations of cognitive constraints cannot be used to test general evolutionary hypotheses regarding the architecture of mind. In making this argument, Barrett et al. focus on what they believe to be faulty logic in D. DeSteno, M. Y. Bartlett, J. Braverman, and P. Salovey's use of such techniques to examine proposed sex differences in jealousy. In presenting their argument, however, Barrett et al. appear to disregard central findings presented in DeSteno et al. (2002) and, in so doing, fail to grasp the interrelations among findings that might readily address their concerns. Here, the authors present arguments for why and when manipulations of cognitive resources may prove useful in investigating evolved psychological mechanisms and, in so doing, situate their use within the ongoing debate concerning evolved sex differences in jealousy.     

Score Metric Equivalence of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) across criminal offenders in North America and the United Kingdom: a critique of Cooke, Michie, Hart, and Clark (2005) and new analyses

David Cooke and colleagues have published a series of item response theory (IRT) studies investigating the equivalence of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) for European versus North American (NA) male criminal offenders. They have consistently concluded that PCL-R scores are not equivalent, with European offenders receiving scores up to five points lower than those in NA when matched according to the latent trait. In this article, the authors critique the Cooke et al. analyses and demonstrate how their anchor item selection method is responsible for their final conclusions concerning the apparent lack of equivalence. The authors provide a competing IRT analysis using an iterative purification strategy for anchor item selection and show how this more justifiable approach leads to very different conclusions regarding the equivalence of the PCL-R. More generally, it is argued that strong interpretations of IRT analyses in the presence of uncorroborated anchor items can be highly misleading when evaluating score metric equivalence.     

Partial support from a non-replication: comment on Roma, Silberberg, Ruggiero, and Suomi (2006)

A purported replication by P. G. Roma, A. Silberberg, A. M. Ruggiero, and S. J. Suomi of the authors' previous study claims to contradict their finding that capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) refuse to exchange with an experimenter if their partner receives a superior reward. Roma et al. used no exchange task, however, or any other task. Roma et al. offered frustration as explanation of their findings, yet failed to statistically prove that the effect of frustration is stronger than that of inequity. They also misrepresented the dependent measure of the authors' study. Reanalysis of the authors' own data indicated no role of frustration, that is, no effect of previous experience with a superior reward. The authors conclude that Roma et al.'s study is not a replication and does not disprove the authors' findings.     

Pancultural self-enhancement reloaded: a meta-analytic reply to Heine (2005)

C. Sedikides, L. Gaertner, and Y. Toguchi (2003) reported findings favoring the universality of self-enhancement. S. J. Heine (2005) challenged the authors' research on evidential and logical grounds. In response, the authors carried out 2 meta-analytic investigations. The results backed the C. Sedikides et al. (2003) theory and findings. Both Westerners and Easterners self-enhanced tactically. Westerners self-enhanced on attributes relevant to the cultural ideal of individualism, whereas Easterners self-enhanced on attributes relevant to the cultural ideal of collectivism (in both cases, because of the personal importance of the ideal). Self-enhancement motivation is universal, although its manifestations are strategically sensitive to cultural context. The authors respond to other aspects of Heine's critique by discussing why researchers should empirically validate the comparison dimension (individualistic vs. collectivistic) and defending why the better-than-average effect is a valid measure of self-enhancement.     

Does working memory load lead to greater impulsivity? Commentary on Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney (2003)

Previous research by J. M. Hinson, T. L. Jameson, and P. Whitney (2003) demonstrated that a secondary task in a delayed discounting paradigm increased subjects' preference for the immediate reward. J. M. Hinson et al. interpreted their findings as evidence that working memory load results in greater impulsivity. The present authors conducted a reanalysis of the data from J. M. Hinson et al.'s Experiment 1 at the individual-subject level. Difference scores were calculated by subtracting the digit memory load condition from the control condition for k (discounting parameter) and a measure of "erroneous" responses. The results indicated that the secondary task increased random responding, which in turn can account for the increased mean estimates of k. Thus, the data do not support the claim that cognitive load affects impulsivity per se.     

Establishing consciousness in non-communicative patients: a modern-day version of the Turing test

In a recent study of a patient in a persistent vegetative state, [Owen, A. M., Coleman, M. R., Boly, M., Davis, M. H., Laureys, S., & Pickard, J. D. (2006). Detecting awareness in the vegetative state. Science, 313, 1402] claimed that they had demonstrated the presence of consciousness in this patient. This bold conclusion was based on the isomorphy between brain activity in this patient and a set of conscious control subjects, obtained in various imagery tasks. However, establishing consciousness in unresponsive patients is fraught with methodological and conceptual difficulties. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the current debate surrounding consciousness in VS patients has parallels in the artificial intelligence (AI) debate as to whether machines can think. Basically, (Owen et al., 2006) used a method analogous to the Turing test to reveal the presence of consciousness, whereas their adversaries adopted a line of reasoning akin to Searle's Chinese room argument. Highlighting the correspondence between these two debates can help to clarify the issues surrounding consciousness in non-communicative agents.     

Incremental validity of the frame-of-reference effect in personality scale scores: a replication and extension

Context-specific personality items provide respondents with a common frame of reference unlike more traditional, noncontextual personality items. The common frame of reference standardizes item interpretation and has been shown to reduce measurement error while increasing validity in comparison to noncontextual items (M. J. Schmit, A. M. Ryan. S. L. Stierwalt. & S. L. Powell, 1995). Although the frame-of-reference effect on personality scales scores has been well investigated (e.g., M. J. Schmit et al., 1995), the ability of this innovation to obtain incremental validity above and beyond the well-established, noncontextual personality scale scores has yet to be examined. The current study replicates and extends work by M. J. Schmit et al. (1995) to determine the incremental validity of the frame-of-reference effect. The results indicate that context-specific personality items do indeed obtain incremental validity above and beyond both noncontextual items and cognitive ability, and in spite of socially desirable responding induced by applicant instructions. The implications of these findings for personnel selection are discussed.     

Dual-process morality and the personal/impersonal distinction: A reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie

A substantial body of research supports a dual-process theory of moral judgment, according to which characteristically deontological judgments are driven by automatic emotional responses, while characteristically utilitarian judgments are driven by controlled cognitive processes. This theory was initially supported by neuroimaging and reaction time (RT) data. McGuire et al. have reanalyzed these initial RT data and claim that, in light of their findings, the dual-process theory of moral judgment and the personal/impersonal distinction now lack support. While McGuire and colleagues have convincingly overturned Greene et al.’s interpretation of their original RT data, their claim that the dual-process theory now lacks support overstates the implications of their findings. McGuire and colleagues ignore the results of several more recent behavioral studies, including the study that bears most directly on their critique. They dismiss without adequate justification the results of a more recent neuroimaging study, three more recent patient studies, and an emotion-induction study. Their broader critique is based largely on their conflation of the dual-process theory with the personal/impersonal distinction, which are independent.     

Accessing situation model information: memory-based processing versus here-and-now accounts

The focus of the present research was to compare the memory-based processing and here-and-now accounts of situation model updating during reading. The authors conducted two experiments as a follow-up on work by R. A. Zwaan and C. J. Madden (2004), who disputed the conclusions of E. J. O'Brien, M. L. Rizzella, J. E. Albrecht, and J. G. Halleran (1998). The latter researchers found support for the memory-based processing view by showing that readers experienced reading difficulty on a sentence that was consistent with an updated model of the story's protagonist but was inconsistent with initially stated information about the protagonist. In contrast, Zwaan and Madden eliminated what they argued were confounds in the items used by O'Brien et al. and found support for the here-and-now view. In the present article, data from 2 experiments seem to eliminate weaknesses inherent in both previous authors' work. Although the present results are consistent with the here-and-now account, they do not completely discredit the memory-based processing view.     

Mental models and the suppositional account of conditionals

The mental model theory of conditional reasoning presented by P. N. Johnson-Laird and R. M. J. Byrne (2002) has recently been the subject of criticisms (e.g., J. St. B. T. Evans, D. E. Over, & S. J. Handley, 2005). The authors argue that the theoretical conflict can be resolved by differentiating 2 kinds of reasoning, reasoning about possibilities given the truth of assertions and reasoning about the truth of assertions given possibilities. The standard mental model theory accounts for the former kind of reasoning but does not adequately account for the latter, contrary to the suppositional approach favored by J. St. B. T. Evans et al. (2005). The authors thus propose a modified mental model theory of conditionals that reconciles the 2 theoretical approaches. It is demonstrated that this theory is able to explain the key findings that have been opposed to the standard theory by J. St. B. T. Evans et al. and makes new predictions that are empirically verified.     

Temporal overlap in the linguistic processing of successive words in reading: reply to Pollatsek, Reichle, and Rayner (2006a)

A. Pollatsek, E. D. Reichle, and K. Rayner argue that the critical findings in A. W. Inhoff, B. M. Eiter, and R. Radach are in general agreement with core assumptions of sequential attention shift models if additional assumptions and facts are considered. The current authors critically discuss the hypothesized time line of processing and indicate that the success of Pollatsek et al.'s simulation is predicated on a gross underestimation of the pretarget word's viewing duration in Inhoff et al. and that the actual data are difficult to reconcile with the strictly serial attention shift assumption. The authors also discuss attention shifting and saccade programming assumptions in the E-Z Reader model and conclude that these are not in harmony with research in related domains of study.     

Detecting small taxa using simulated comparison data: A reanalysis of Beach, Amir, and Bau's (2005) data

On the basis of taxometric analyses of data sets that they created to pose interpretive challenges, S. R. H. Beach, N. Amir, and J. J. Bau (2005) cautioned that using comparison data simulated by J. Ruscio's programs can lead to inaccurate conclusions. Careful examination of S. R. H. Beach et al.'s methods and results plus reanalysis of their data fails to substantiate this concern: Using comparison data identified the taxonic structure of S. R. H. Beach et al.'s data sets, even when the taxon base rate was very low. The authors show that J. Ruscio's simulation programs generate comparison data appropriately and that analyzing these data provides a useful interpretive aid. Additionally, the authors discuss and illustrate the effective use of the inchworm consistency test to disambiguate taxometric results for small taxa and dimensional constructs with positively skewed indicators.     

Accounting for belief bias in a mental model framework: comment on Klauer, Musch, and Naumer (2000)

K. C. Klauer, J. Musch, and B. Naumer (2000; see record 2000-02818-008) presented a general multinomial model of belief bias effects in syllogistic reasoning. They claimed to map a particular mental model account of belief bias (J. V. Oakhill, P. N. Johnson-Laird, & A. Garnham, 1989; see record 1989-38845-001)) onto this model and to show empirically that it is incorrect. The authors argue that this mental model account does not map onto the multinomial model and that it can account for the data presented by Klauer et al. (Experiments 1-4). The authors further argue that additional data Klauer et al. presented in support of a new model of their own (Experiments 5-8) are explained by this mental model account. The mental model account is, therefore, refuted neither by Klauer et al.'s theoretical analysis nor by any of the results they presented. Furthermore, the account can accommodate more recent findings on belief bias in a more satisfactory way than can alternative models that have been proposed.     

The growing significance of hot intelligences

Comments on the original article, "Intelligence: New findings and theoretical developments," by R. E. Nisbett, J. Aronson, C. Blair, W. Dickens, J. Flynn, D. F. Halpern, and E. Turkheimer (see record 2011-30298-001). The present authors note that Nisbett et al's review focuses on intelligences that have been topics of research through the 20th century. Since then, however, attention to a new group of intelligences that the present authors refer to as "hot intelligences" has been growing (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2004). Although Nisbett et al (2012) mentioned potential newcomers to the group of intelligences, such as practical intelligence, the present authors feel that future reviews should consider the burgeoning research in new conceptions of intelligence. Here the authors express a rationale for including a consideration of these newly described intelligences. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Jousting with straw men: comment on Westen, Novotny, and Thompson-Brenner (2004)

Empirically supported treatments (ESTs) do not cure every patient, and the randomized trial is not a flawless methodology. Upon these often-noted and widely accepted points, D. Westen, C. M. Novotny, and H. Thompson-Brenner (2004a; see record 2004-15935-005) built a critique of ESTs and EST research. However, important work developing effective, clinically relevant treatments for serious problems was omitted from the Westen et al. (2004a) review. Little documentation was offered for the purported "assumptions" of EST methodology that Westen et al. (2004a) criticized; and different review standards were applied to studies supporting versus those disagreeing with Westen et al.'s (2004a) views. Finally, the correlational research designs proposed as a remedy by Westen et al. (2004a) have far more serious weaknesses than randomized trials, thoughtfully applied to real-world clinical care.