Commentary on Rosefeldt: Should Metaphysics Care About Ontological Commitment from Casual Utterances?

Tobias Rosefeldt argues that in order to reconcile a physics-based fundamental ontology with the ontological implications of our everyday utterances, philosophers should pursue a ‘linguistics-based conciliatory’ strategy: They should refer to the results of linguistic research in order to avoid ontological commitment to problematic entities. Whereas Rosefeldt is not an advocate of radical forms of naturalized metaphysics, his argument is driven by the motivation behind pleas for a naturalization of the discipline. I claim that although there is a need for reconciliation, Rosefeldt’s favored account falls short of this goal. More generally, I argue that so-called ‘conciliatory accounts’ fail to do justice to the motivation that necessitated them in the first place, as the role they assign to analyses of everyday speech in search of ontological commitments is at odds with said motivation. ‘Conciliatory accounts’, hence, sit uneasily between radically naturalistic and traditional armchair approaches to metaphysics.     

Normative Objectivity Without Ontological Commitments?

Several non-naturalist philosophers look for ways to maintain the objectivity of morals without making any (robust) ontological commitments. Recently Derek Parfit proposed an account of non-ontologically existing irreducible moral properties. My first aim in this paper is to outline that such an account is doomed to fail. My second aim in this paper is to argue that irreducible moral properties can be integrated with adaptions into an ontological framework such as E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology. If it can be shown that irreducible moral properties have a proper place in such an ontology, then there is no need to distinguish between an ontological and non-ontological mode of existence, which, in turn helps to eschew the obscurities that this distinction brings in its wake.     

When Do Personality and Emotion Predict Destructive Behavior During Relationship Conflict? The Role of Perceived Commitment Asymmetry

The current research examined whether perceived asymmetries in relationship commitment moderate the associations of personality traits and emotional states with enactment of hostile behavior during relationship conflicts. Participants included both members of 53 heterosexual romantic couples (M_age = 25.5 years). Participants completed questionnaire measures assessing personality traits, emotional states, relationship commitment, and perceptions of their partner's commitment. Participants then had an observed conflict discussion with their partner, which was rated by a panel of objective observers for hostile behavior. When participants perceived that they were less committed than their partners, their enactment of hostile behavior was predicted by traits and states that are associated with antisocial and pro‐social orientations (i.e., agreeableness, trait anger, chronic jealousy, and state negative emotion). In contrast, participants who perceived that they were more committed than their partners tended to refrain from hostile behavior, despite traits or states that may suggest hostile inclinations. These results suggest that perceiving that one is less committed than one's partner promotes behavioral expression of interpersonal dispositions and emotions, whereas perceiving that one is more committed than one's partner motivates inhibition of hostile behavior.     

Is Shame an Ugly Emotion? Four Discourses—Two Contrasting Interpretations for Moral Education

This paper offers a sustained philosophical meditation on contrasting interpretations of the emotion of shame within four academic discourses—social psychology, psychological anthropology, educational psychology and Aristotelian scholarship—in order to elicit their implications for moral education. It turns out that within each of these discourses there is a mainstream interpretation which emphasises shame’s expendability or moral ugliness (and where shame is typically described as guilt’s ugly sister), but also a heterodox interpretation which seeks to retrieve and defend shame. As the heterodox interpretation seems to offer a more realistic picture of shame’s role in moral education, the provenance of the mainstream interpretation merits scrutiny. I argue that social scientific studies of the concept of shame, based on its supposed phenomenology, incorporate biases in favour of excessive, rather than medial, forms of the emotion. I suggest ways forward for more balanced analyses of the nature, moral justification and educative role of shame.     

Ontological Parity and/or Ordinality?

The principles of ontological parity and ordinality have distinct functions in Buchler's ontology. Ontological parity could be independently subscribed to, whereas ordinality signals the positive conception of the nature of reality as irreducibly complex or indefinitely related, which Buchler's metaphysical system seeks to articulate. Both principles inform Buchler's system, but each has a distinctive function. They are not, I suggest, necessarily at odds with one another, as some critics claim. I do identify several difficulties that follow from (1) the level of generality claimed by Buchler and (2) the claim of irreducible complexity or indefinite relatedness.     

Can Truthmaker Theorists Claim Ontological Free Lunches?

Truthmaker theorists hold that propositions about higher‐level entities (e.g. the proposition that there is a heap of sand) are often made true by lower‐level entities (e.g. by facts about the configuration of fundamental particles). This generates a problem: what should we say about these higher‐level entities? On the one hand, they must exist (since there are true propositions about them), on the other hand, it seems that they are completely superfluous and should be banished for reasons of ontological parsimony. Some truthmaker theorists—most prominently David Armstrong—have tried to solve this puzzle by arguing that these entities are ‘an ontological free lunch’, i.e. real existents that are still ‘no addition of being’. This answer is prima facie attractive, but I argue in this paper that the standard approaches to truthmaking—modal theories and grounding theories—are unable to vindicate the doctrine of the ontological free lunch, and thus fail to solve the problem of higher‐level entities. Fortunately, there is a non‐standard account of truthmaking available, the reductive explanation account, which succeeds where the standard approaches fail.     

Does Organizational Commitment Fully Mediate Constituent Commitment Effects? A Reassessment and Clarification

Research suggests that employees can be committed to constituents of an organization, distinct from commitment to the organization itself. However, 2 key studies came to different conclusions on whether constituent commitments have independent effects on outcomes. This study improves on earlier methodology to clarify this contradiction. Specifically, nested-model comparisons test a partially mediated model versus a fully mediated model (through organizational commitment). The results refute the main conclusion of Hunt & Morgan (1994), supporting a partially mediated model with direct constituent commitment effects on turnover intentions and citizenship behaviors (i.e., Becker, 1992). Effects of commitment to work group on turnover intentions and non-idleness were in the opposite direction from those of organizational commitment. Implications for commitment research are discussed.     

How is Recalcitrant Emotion Possible?

A recalcitrant emotion is an emotion that we experience despite a judgment that seems to conflict with it. Having been bitten by a dog in her childhood, Jane cannot shake her fear of dogs, including Fido, the cute little puppy that she knows to be in no way dangerous. There is something puzzling about recalcitrant emotions, which appear to defy the putatively robust connection between emotions and judgments. If Jane really believes that Fido cannot harm her, what is she afraid of? This article seeks to show how recalcitrant emotion is possible. I argue that reductive theories that identify emotions with judgments, desires, or some combination thereof, cannot explain the possibility of emotional irrationality without contradiction. I then show that the appeal to sui generis attitudes also fails to solve the puzzle of recalcitrant emotions, and diagnose this failure as stemming from a misleading analogy between emotions and perceptions, and in particular, between recalcitrant emotions and perceptual illusions. The solution can be found in a different analogy: between emotions and actions; more specifically, between recalcitrant emotions and weakness of the will, akrasia. Like akratic actions, recalcitrant emotions entail responding to reasons, but to inferior reasons. Irrational but non-contradictory emotions are possible just as weakness of will is possible.     

Is Disgust a Homogeneous Emotion?

Many theoretical accounts consider disgust to be a unitary emotion, although others have challenged this notion. We predict that if core disgust and socio-moral disgust are different constructs, then their co-associated elicited emotions are likely to be different, and time as well as gender are likely to differentially affect their intensity (via a greater reliance of socio-moral disgust on cognitive appraisal). To test these predictions, participants were shown photographs of core and socio-moral disgust elicitors and asked to provide a wide ranging rating of their emotional response to each at 3 time points. Each elicitor generated a significantly different emotional response. Furthermore, the disgust response to core elicitors weakened over time whereas socio-moral responses intensified. Males and females showed similar levels of disgust to socio-moral elicitors, but females showed higher levels to core elicitors. Overall, the results suggest that a different emotional construct was activated by each type of elicitor.     

Is Emotion Perception Relative? Evaluating Sleep Effects on Relativity of Emotion Perception

The present study examines whether valence strength causes relativistic shifts in emotion perception form faces across sleep (filled vs deprived) nights. A group of twelve volunteers participated twice (sleep/no-sleep) with fourteen days gap between participation. Subjects evaluated low valenced facial expressions (targets) in the presence on high valence facial expressions (anchors) before sleep/no sleep nights and again the following morning. Analysis of results using 2?×?2?×?2 (groups, anchor, sessions) split plot analysis of variance suggest that larger relativistic shifts were apparent in the no-sleep group. Also post sleep relativistic shifts in emotion perception were the least (p?相似文献   

Discrimination without awareness?

The fate of the unattended message in dichotic listening experiments is a much disputed issue. Moray (1969) proposes that there is no processing of the unattended message, whereas Norman (1969) has suggested that it is analyzed to the level of meaning. In order to test these alternative hypotheses an experiment was performed in which galvanic skin responses (GSR) were conditioned to a word (CS) by pairing it with shock. The word was then included in passages of prose presented to subjects as the attended and unattended messages in a dichotic listening task. GSR's were obtained to the occurrence of CS in the unattended message and also to words acoustically similar to CS and to synonyms of CS. The probability of obtaining a GSR to the occurrence of an accoustically similar word was increased by placing that word in a context appropriate to CS. These results suggest that the unattended message can be processed to a level at which semantic information is extracted without the subject's reported awareness.     

Doing without representing?

Connectionism and classicism, it generally appears, have at least this much in common: both place some notion of internal representation at the heart of a scientific study of mind. In recent years, however, a much more radical view has gained increasing popularity. This view calls into question the commitment to internal representation itself. More strikingly still, this new wave of anti-representationalism is rooted not in armchair theorizing but in practical attempts to model and understand intelligent, adaptive behavior. In this paper we first present, and then critically assess, a variety of recent anti-representationalist treatments. We suggest that so far, at least, the sceptical rhetoric outpaces both evidence and argument. Some probable causes of this premature scepticism are isolated. Nonetheless, the anti-representationalist challenge is shown to be both important and progressive insofar as it forces us to see beyond the bare representational/non-representational dichotomy and to recognize instead a rich continuum of degrees and types of representationality.     

Warrant without truth?

This paper advances the debate over the question whether false beliefs may nevertheless have warrant, the property that yields knowledge when conjoined with true belief. The paper’s first main part—which spans Sections 2–4—assesses the best argument for Warrant Infallibilism, the view that only true beliefs can have warrant. I show that this argument’s key premise conflicts with an extremely plausible claim about warrant. Sections 5–6 constitute the paper’s second main part. Section 5 presents an overlooked puzzle about warrant, and uses that puzzle to generate a new argument for Warrant Fallibilism, the view that false beliefs can have warrant. Section 6 evaluates this pro-Fallibilism argument, finding ultimately that it defeats itself in a surprising way. I conclude that neither Infallibilism nor Fallibilism should now constrain theorizing about warrant.     

Response-dependence without reduction?

I will discuss those epistemic accounts of truth that say, roughly and at least, that the truth is what all ideally rational people, with maximum evidence, would in the long run come to believe. They have been defended on the grounds that they can solve sceptical problems that traditional accounts cannot surmount, and that they explain the value of truth in ways that traditional (and particularly, minimal) accounts cannot; they have been attacked on the grounds that they collapse into idealism.

I show that all these claims are mistaken. The system of statements accepted by an adherent of an epistemic account who also accepts the equivalence scheme is the same as that accepted by an adherent of a traditional account who also accepts a remarkably strong thesis of epistemic optimism. The singling out of one rather than another claim within this system as defining ‘true’ cannot make as much difference as to imply idealism or refute scepticism.

However, it can make all the difference when it is a matter of explaining the value of truth. For a crucial point in such explanation depends on what can be soundly substituted for what in intensional contexts; above all those governed by such verbs as ‘know’, ‘hope’, ‘believe’, ‘value’. That is, it depends on what expressions are intensionally equivalent. And one point of singling out one formulation as definitional can be to settle just this.

But though some epistemic theorists have deemed ability to explain the value of truth a merit of their account (and lack of this ability a fatal defect of traditional accounts, of minimal accounts in particular), it turns out that minimal accounts of ‘true’ fit a sound account of our valuing of truth in a way that epistemic accounts do not.

In the course of this argument I rebut related positions: e.g. Dummett's, that minimal definitions fail because they cannot account for the point of having a notion of truth, and that an account of the practice of assertion is what would fill this lacuna. I argue to the contrary that if the point of the notion could not be explained on the basis of a traditional definition, it could not be explained at all.     

Colors without circles?

Realists about color, be they dispositionalists or physicalists, agree on the truth of the following claim: (R) x is red iff x is disposed to look red under standard conditions. The disagreement is only about whether to identify the colors with the relevant dispositions, or with their categorical bases. This is a question about the representational content of color experience: What kind of properties do color experiences ascribe to objects? It has been argued (for instance by Boghossian and Velleman, 1991) that truths like (R) cannot be used in an account of the colors as they would result in ‚circular’, and therefore empty, contents. It has also been argued (for instance by Harman, 1996) that switching to an account of color in terms of a functional account of color sensations would result in a circular, and therefore empty, account. In this paper, I defend a realist account of color in terms of a (non-reductive) functional account of color sensations. Such an account of sensations has been suggested by Pagin (2000), and it can be applied to color sensations without the resulting account of the colors themselves being circular or empty. I argue that the so-called transparency of experience does not provide any argument against such an account. I also argue that on such an account, the issue of physicalism vs. dispositionalism boils down to the question of the modal profile of the color concepts.     

Dis-ease or Disease? Ontological Rarefaction in the Medical-Industrial Complex

Recent scholarship in medical humanities has expressed strong concern over the ability of pharmaceuticals companies to medicalize discomfort and subsequently invent diseases. In this article, I explore the clinical debates over the ontology of the sinus headache as a possible counter-case. Extending Foucault's concept of principles or rarefaction, this paper documents the efforts of clinicians to resist the pharmaceutically-provided understanding of the sinus headache. In so doing, it offers institutions of rarefaction and rarefactive assemblages as useful heuristics for the exploration of disease legitimization discourse.     

Values Congruence and Organisational Commitment: P—O Fit in Higher Education Institutions

This study examines business students’ individual values and their perception of their university’s values and the relationship between these values and affective organisational commitment. Findings indicate that both groups of business students rated their personal values as consistent with the rankings of the major pan—cultural values with strong ethical orientation and self—development and learning values. In both educational institutions organisational vision values and individual conservatism values predicted affective commitment. Findings also indicate statistically significant differences between the students’ personal values and their perception of their university’s values, suggesting a degree of lack of P—O fit between the students’ values and their university’s values.