Incomplete Information, Inferences, and Individual Differences: The Case of Environmental Judgments

A model for inference of missing information is explicated and tested in two studies (Ns = 74, 76) of judgments about two environmental issues (endangered species reintroduction and the siting of a waste processing facility). Participants made judgments of scenarios in which information relevant to the judgment was varied orthogonally and, in some cases, relevant information was missing. The results showed individual differences-as well as intraindividual differences-in the assumptions participants made about missing information and in the tendency to infer missing cues. Reported assumptions about missing information predicted some aspects of the judgments. The data for only a small minority (15%) of the participants were consistent with the inferred values model. Participants may use different methods for dealing with missing information at different times or may not generally follow either an inference or averaging model in such contexts. Less favorable judgments were given for scenarios with incomplete information (the "penalty" effect), and this effect showed individual and intraindividual variation that was related to reported assumptions about missing information. We discuss the implications of these results for societal conflicts over controversial issues and for understanding the sources of individual differences in judgments. Copyright 2000 Academic Press.     

Age-Correlated Incremental Consideration of Velocity Information in Relative Time-to-Arrival Judgments

One hundred fifty-one children and 43 adults judged which of 2 cartoon birds would be the first to arrive at a common finish line. Objects moved unidirectionally along parallel trajectories, either at the same or different speeds, and disappeared at different distances from the goal. Overall, 9–10-year-old children performed as well as adults, but 4–5- and 6–8-year-olds erred significantly more often. On trials for which distance to goal at disappearance was a valid cue, 4–5-year-olds scored 80% correct, and no differences were seen between 6–10-year-olds and adults. On the opposite type of trials, where the trailing bird would win the race, only adults retained their level of performance, and all age groups differed markedly. Findings suggest a gradual developmental transition from a distance-based to a time-based understanding of the task.     

Inferences from disclosures about the truth and falsity of expert testimony

Participants acting as mock jurors made inferences about whether a person was a suspect in a murder based on an expert's testimony about the presence of objects at the crime scene and the disclosure that the testimony was true or false. Experiment 1 showed that participants made more correct inferences, and made inferences more quickly, when the truth or falsity of the expert's testimony was disclosed immediately after the testimony rather than when the disclosure was delayed. Experiment 2 showed no advantage for prior disclosure over immediate disclosure. Experiment 3 showed that the pattern of inferences when there was no disclosure mirrored the pattern when it was disclosed that the expert's testimony was true rather than false. Participants made more correct inferences from true conjunctions than disjunctions, and from false disjunctions than conjunctions. We discuss the implications for theories of the mental representations and cognitive processes that underlie human reasoning.     

Victim Impact Testimony and Juror Judgments: The Effects of Harm Information and Witness Demeanor1

Victim impact testimony (i.e., testimony concerning the harmful consequences on the victim's surviving family) was examined to determine its effect on the sentencing judgments of mock jurors. Undergraduate students (N= 293) watched a videotaped murder trial simulation, rendered verdicts, and made sentencing judgments. During the penalty phase of the trial, participants were either given no victim impact testimony, or they were given victim impact testimony that varied both the severity of the harm information (mild harm/ severe harm) and the demeanor of the witness (low affect/high affect). The results indicate that information concerning the harm experienced by the victim's relatives, not the affective demeanor of the witness, influenced sentencing judgments. Implications for the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Payne v. Tennessee (1991) are discussed.     

Action Perception and Outcome Valence: Effects on Children's Inferences of Intentionality and Moral and Liking Judgments

The influences of different action-outcome scenarios on children's evaluative judgments and inferences of outcome intentionality were assessed. One hundred forty-five kindergartners, 2nd graders, and 4th graders heard 4 stories about child actors who engaged in 1 action or 3 equifinal actions and caused a positive or negative outcome. The stories made no mention of the actors' anticipated outcome so that we could assess the children's inferences of whether the actors wanted and had tried to cause the outcome. Children also rated their liking for the actors and the actors' morality. Children's moral and liking judgments were not significantly differentiated by action condition. However, actors who caused positive outcomes received favorable liking and moral judgments, and actors who caused negative outcomes received neutral liking and moral judgments. Children's intentionality inferences varied by the actors' actions and were moderated by outcome valence. The authors discuss children's apparent use of the valence rule when inferring intentionality and their reluctance to judge harshly actors who cause negative outcomes when not privy to the actors' intentions.     

Consensus and Self-Other Agreement for Trait Inferences from Minimal Information

ABSTRACT Following a general model of consensus in interpersonal perception (Kenny, 1991), we report evidence on four sources of consensus and self-other agreement: (a) meaning systems shared by observers, (b) extent of information on target behavior, (c) consistency of target behavior, and (d) non-behavioral information. We argue that these factors can be disentangled more precisely by analyzing ratings by strangers instead of ratings by acquaintances. We then focus on first impressions as a source of self-other agreement, and we report evidence that first impressions of actual persons are quite accurate for Extraversion and Conscientiousness.     

The Study of Perspective-Taking: Contributions from Mainstream Psychology and Behavior Analysis

The Psychological Record - The key purpose of this article is to provide a comprehensive overview of the literature on perspective-taking from within mainstream psychology and behavior analysis....     

Subject Matter Expert Judgments Regarding the Relative Importance of Competencies are not Useful for Choosing the Test Batteries that Best Predict Performance

Several recent articles have suggested that assessments of the relative importance of different abilities or competencies to a job have little bearing on the criterion‐related validity of these selection tests that measure those abilities. We hypothesize that selection test batteries chosen to maximize the judged importance of knowledge, skills, and abilities will not predict performance better than batteries of tests chosen at random. The results in two independent samples consistently show that the validity of test batteries chosen based on subject matter expert judgments of importance is not different from the validity of batteries of a comparable number of tests chosen at random from a set of intercorrelated tests, or even those chosen to provide the worst possible match between test content and job content.     

Judgments about the duration of brief stimuli

Visual duration discrimination data for durations between 70 and 1,020 msec are presented. A model for duration discrimination proposed by Allan, Kristofferson, and Wiens (1972) is elaborated, and the data are discussed in terms of the model. The data axe in agreement with the basic assumptions of the model. Differences between our data and duration discrimination data presented by others are discussed.     

Distinguishing between emotion and nonemotion: Judgments about experience

The conceptual distinction between emotion and nonemotion subjective states was investigated in a series of three studies. Three questions were addressed. First, is there high agreement among people in identifying labels for subjective states as either emotion or nonemotion? Second, in judgments of the similarity of subjective states is the emotion-nonemotion distinction more or less salient than other properties of experience? Third, what criteria are used to distinguish conceptually between emotion and nonemotion states? Results indicated that, for many feeling states, there is no substantial agreement as to whether the state should be considered emotion or nonemotion, that the affective dimension of experience is not as salient as are other specific properties of experience (physiological arousal, activity level, valence), and that, in general, people express their individual judgment of emotion-nonemotion on the basis of some nonspecific combination of physiological arousal and character of cognitive state.     

Self and Social Judgments of Ability: Beyond Distributional Information

ABSTRACT

In a given domain, low-skill individuals typically evaluate the ability level of other people more favorably than high-skill individuals. The current study tests whether this tendency continues to occur even when people have unambiguous distributional information available through which to judge others. Students received distributional information detailing their percentile rank in a statistics course and the percentile rank of another student in the course. Then, students were asked to evaluate their own and the other students' statistics ability. Students evaluated the other person's ability more favorably when their own rank in the course was low rather than high. Therefore, people may use themselves as a standard of comparison when they judge others even when more diagnostic sources of information are available.     

Worry in Adults and Children: Developmental Differences in the Importance of Probability and Cost Judgments

This study investigated developmental differences in the relationship of probability and cost estimates to worrying. Adults, younger children (M age = 8.67 years) and older children (M age = 11.06 years) rated the extent to which they worry about a list of negative social and physical outcomes and provided subjective probability and cost estimates for the same outcomes. Adults reported worrying more about social outcomes and rated them as less ‘bad’ (or costly) but more likely to occur than physical outcomes. Unlike adults, children in both age groups reported worrying more about physical outcomes. However, similar to adults, they also rated social outcomes as less ‘bad’ but more likely to occur than physical outcomes. Regression analyses showed that probability ratings were the best predictors of worry in adults, both probability and cost ratings equally predicted worry in older children, but only cost ratings predicted worry in younger children.

Inferences about the morality of an aggressor: the role of perceived motive

The research investigated perceivers' inferences about the morality of target persons who engaged in aggressive behavior. Across several experiments, inferences about the morality of an aggressor were based more on the perceived motives of the target than on the presence of facilitating situational forces. For example, when a target's aggression was facilitated by personal rewards for aggression (instrumental aggression), perceivers inferred more negative motives and attributed lower morality to the target than when the target's aggression was facilitated by situational provocation (reactive aggression). The results suggest that perceived motives play an important role in dispositional inference and pose a problem for models that focus primarily on perceived causality, assumptions about base rates (consensus), or diagnosticity.     

Judgments about judgments: the dissociation of consideration price and transaction commitment judgments

There are many contexts in which people make judgments about prior judgments. For example, Internet shopping bots (e.g., NexTag.com) allow consumers to search for products and, if the price is too high, list a price at which they would consider making the purchase (i.e., base judgment). If the price drops to this level, the vendor generates an e-mail inviting the consumer to execute the transaction at the reduced price (i.e., contingent judgment). The authors show that the consideration price depends on the content of retrieved information, whereas the willingness to execute the transaction at the consideration price depends on the ease-of-retrieving the information. The authors use different offer prices to encourage the consumer to retrieve information consistent with different product quality levels. The authors also select offer prices so that information retrieval is more difficult at moderate offer prices than at high or low offer prices. Accordingly, the authors show that the consideration price increases as the offer price increases, but the willingness to execute the transaction at the consideration price is greater when there are high and low, as opposed to moderate, offer prices.     

Thinking about Others versus Another: Three Reasons Judgments about Collectives and Individuals Differ

In this article, we review evidence that people are more positive in assessments of specific individuals than they are about collectives of others, even when people have essentially no information about the individual or collective they are judging. We offer three explanations for this difference. First, evaluative “attacks” on individuals are more aversive than similar attacks on collectives. Second, to encourage or smooth interaction, people sometimes “assume the best” about individuals until proven wrong. Social interaction occurs between specific individuals, so such optimism does not extend to people in general. Third, in making judgments of individuals versus collectives, people naturally focus on different types of information. For an individual, people spontaneously consider influences that operate inside an individual (e.g., one's will, one's moral conscience). But for collectives, people instead contemplate influences that operate at a social level (e.g., social influence, social norms). We explore how these three proposals help predict when judgments of individuals and collectives do or do not differ.     

Relative and Absolute Judgments of Speech Rate from Masked and Content-Standard Stimuli The Influence of Vocal Frequency and Intensity

In two previous studies, the perception of speech rate was found to be positively related to the vocal frequency and intensity of speech. In those studies, a single sample of spontaneous, content-masked speech was used to produce nine stimuli by factorially varying three levels of each vocal frequency and intensity, while controlling the actual speech rate of the stimuli. Participants were asked to judge each stimulus, preceded by a standard, “anchoring,” stimulus as to its speech rate, pitch, loudness, and duration. The purpose of the three studies reported here was to examine the generalizability of the previous findings by using stimuli that were nonmasked and/or were not preceded by an anchoring stimulus. In each study, nine speech stimuli were prepared, as described above, and participants were asked to make judgments about the rate, pitch, loudness, and duration of each stimulus. In the first study, the stimuli were masked but were not preceded by an anchoring stimulus. In the second study, participants listened to content-standard speech stimuli preceded by an anchoring stimulus. Finally, in the third study, content-standard stimuli without an anchoring stimulus were used. In addition, studies two and three used speech segments of a male and a female speaker. The findings from the three studies replicated the central findings of the previous studies. They suggest, in other words, that rate perception of speech is indeed influenced by vocal frequency and, to some extent, by intensity, and that these relationships are not materially altered by the speakers'gender.     

Inferences about the femininity of competent women and their implications for likability

Male (N=59) and female (N=60) college students were given a written protocol describing a competent, achievement-oriented female stimulus person (SP) with either a masculine or feminine pattern of vocational and avocational interests. Three groups were given a masculine-pattern protocol and one group was given a feminine-pattern one. They were then asked to rate the SP on likability in work and social settings, femininity, and a number of other personal attributes. Two groups given the masculine-pattern protocol were also supplied with the SP's responses to items from a “personality” test answered in a predominantly feminine (Masculine—Feminine SP) or masculine (Masculine-Masculine SP) direction. The remaining groups (Masculine-Neutral and Feminine-Neutral SPs) were given no additional information. In agreement with previous findings, the Masculine-Neutral SP was liked more in social settings than was the Feminine-Neutral one. It was hypothesized and confirmed that the Masculine-Neutral SP would be perceived as similar to the Masculine-Feminine SP in femininity and likability and that both these SPs would be judged to be higher on these characteristics than the Masculine-Masculine. Complex results were obtained from the ratings of other attributes. Overall, they indicated that the Masculine-Feminine SP, in whom femininity was explicitly suggested, received the weakest ratings on a series of achievement-related attributes and the Masculine-Neutral SP the strongest.     

Predictability and Variability of a Dynamic Environment Impact Affordance Judgments

Abstract

A crucial component of locomotion and mobility is the successful navigation of apertures (e.g., doorways, lanes, corridors). While much research has studied perceptions of action capabilities in a static environment, far less work has considered how action capabilities change in a dynamic environment, particularly when the environment moves in unpredictable ways. The current experiment assessed actors’ perceptions of aperture passability for a dynamically moving gap. In an immersive virtual environment, participants were seated in a wheelchair rolling toward a sliding door while the door oscillated to various widths. The patterns of oscillation were manipulated in terms of their amplitude (sequence standard deviation), predictability (sequence sample entropy), and base width (sequence mean) in a within-participants design. Participants gave judgments of passability within a temporal occlusion paradigm. Results showed that both the amplitude and predictability of the oscillating door impacted the reliability of passability judgments. We suggest that these variables act to alter the salience of optical constraints (e.g., attractors and repellors) within a dynamical systems framework.