Why do we help? World change orientation as an antecedent of prosocial action

World change orientation refers to the extent to which one individual attributes his or her prosocial action to the function of making the world a better place. In Study 1, we developed a scale to measure this world change orientation [world change scale (WCS)] and to analyze its theoretical structure as a distinctive motivational orientation. In Study 2, participants were presented with a situation of need and subsequently given an unexpected opportunity to get involved in prosocial behavior. We then tested the hypothesis that degree of involvement is predicted by WCS when the situation is framed in terms of improving the welfare of the world, but by empathic concern when the situation is framed in terms of improving the welfare of a concrete victim. The results of both studies suggest that WCS refers to a distinct motivational orientation, which affects prosocial behavior above and beyond other motives. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why do we need perceptual content?

Most representationalists argue that perceptual experience has to be representational because phenomenal looks are, by themselves, representational. Charles Travis (2004 Travis, C. (2004). The silence of the senses. Mind, 113, 57–94.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) argues that looks cannot represent. I argue that perceptual experience has to be representational due to the way the visual system works.     

Egocentrism over e-mail: can we communicate as well as we think?

Without the benefit of paralinguistic cues such as gesture, emphasis, and intonation, it can be difficult to convey emotion and tone over electronic mail (e-mail). Five experiments suggest that this limitation is often underappreciated, such that people tend to believe that they can communicate over e-mail more effectively than they actually can. Studies 4 and 5 further suggest that this overconfidence is born of egocentrism, the inherent difficulty of detaching oneself from one's own perspective when evaluating the perspective of someone else. Because e-mail communicators "hear" a statement differently depending on whether they intend to be, say, sarcastic or funny, it can be difficult to appreciate that their electronic audience may not.     

Consciousness and identity: who do we think we are?

This article proposes that the epistemological concerns raised by the inherent incoherence of thought requires a dialogical approach to understanding consciousness and identity. It is argued that such an approach leads to (a) a fundamentally spiritual view of self, (b) a radical view of consciousness as a non-local field that shapes the limits of our perception, and (c) a determination of the degree of gap between reality and thought's representation of it. A method of measuring this kind of consciousness is examined, and examples of insights gained through this methodology are provided. Implications of this perspective are explored, and conclusions arising from this inquiry are presented.     

Why do we punish? Deterrence and just deserts as motives for punishment

One popular justification for punishment is the just deserts rationale: A person deserves punishment proportionate to the moral wrong committed. A competing justification is the deterrence rationale: Punishing an offender reduces the frequency and likelihood of future offenses. The authors examined the motivation underlying laypeople's use of punishment for prototypical wrongs. Study 1 (N = 336) revealed high sensitivity to factors uniquely associated with the just deserts perspective (e.g., offense seriousness, moral trespass) and insensitivity to factors associated with deterrence (e.g., likelihood of detection, offense frequency). Study 2 (N = 329) confirmed the proposed model through structural equation modeling (SEM). Study 3 (N = 351) revealed that despite strongly stated preferences for deterrence theory, individual sentencing decisions seemed driven exclusively by just deserts concerns.     

We talk,therefore we think? A cultural analysis of the effect of talking on thinking

The Western assumption that talking is connected to thinking is not shared in the East. The research examines how the actual psychology of individuals reflects these different cultural assumptions. In Study 1, Asian Americans and European Americans thought aloud while solving reasoning problems. Talking impaired Asian Americans' performance but not that of European Americans. Study 2 showed that participants' beliefs about talking and thinking are correlated with how talking affects performance, and suggested that cultural difference in modes of thinking can explain the difference in the effect of talking. Study 3 showed that talking impaired Asian Americans' performance because they tend to use internal speech less than European Americans. Results illuminate the importance of cultural understanding of psychology for a multicultural society.     

Why do close partners snoop? Predictors of intrusive behavior in newlywed couples

Existing research shows that intrusive behavior has detrimental consequences for relationships. Surprisingly, little is known about why close relationship partners snoop. This study examined why romantic partners engage in intrusive behavior among newlywed couples in the Netherlands. As predicted, the results showed that perceiving a lack of partner disclosure is linked to intrusive behavior, and importantly, that trust moderates this link. Only when people did not trust their partner were their perceptions of partners' low disclosure associated with intrusive behavior. When people trusted their partner, perceived partner disclosure was not associated with intrusive behavior. These results help to explain why people snoop and highlight the importance of trust as a powerful protective buffer against intrusive behavior in close relationships.     

Why do we eat? Children's and adults' understanding of why we eat different meals

In this study the author examined why children and adults think they need to eat. Preschoolers through adults were provided with physiological, social, psychological, and routine causes for eating breakfast, lunch, snack, and dinner, and were asked to either agree or disagree with the causal responses provided. A 4 Reason x 4 Meal repeated measures analysis of variance revealed significant main effects for meals and reasons, as well as significant Meal x Reason and Meal x Reason x Grade interactions. The effect sizes ranged from 0.1 to 0.7. Across all age groups, participants acknowledged physiological needs and desires (fulfilling hunger and needs to stay healthy) and routine (e.g., it is dinner time) as the primary causes for eating breakfast, lunch, and dinner. However, for snack physiological needs were the primary reason. Second-grade students onward spontaneously produced biological justifications such as the need for energy and nutrition as important reasons for food consumption. These results lend support to the developmental model that children's and adults' understanding of eating changes in middle childhood.     

Do you think I’m as kind as I do? The relation of adolescent narcissism with self- and peer-perceptions of prosocial and aggressive behavior

The association between narcissism and aggression has been empirically supported in adults and adolescents, but it is unclear whether narcissism might also be related to prosocial behavior. The present study investigated this issue using self- and peer-informants. Participants were 183 adolescents ages 16–19 (159 males, 24 females; 64.5% Caucasian). Of these participants, 126 (104 males, 22 females) also had peer-reported data available. Self-reported pathological narcissism was positively correlated with self-reports of both prosocial behavior and aggression, but it was not associated with peer nominations of either type of behavior. These findings indicate that adolescents with high levels of narcissism may attempt to bolster their social status by reporting engagement in both prosocial behavior and aggression. However, it appears that such individuals are ineffective at being perceived as prosocial by peers.     

Why do we do what we do? The Attention–Readiness–Motivation framework

According to many theories of motivation, the principal driver of human behavior is the affectively driven valuation of actions. Actions are valued by maximizing the difference between stimulus value (the benefits and costs inherent in the stimulus outcome that is the expected result of a given action) and action costs (the effort required to perform that action). However, such accounts have difficulty explaining why individuals act inconsistently in what appear to be comparable situations and often act in ways that seem inconsistent with relevant action values. In particular, we highlight several seemingly anomalous default effects which cannot be explained via traditional valuation‐based factors. In this article, we present the Attention–Readiness–Motivation framework, according to which such behavioral anomalies occur because stimulus value and action costs are respectively influenced by endogenous attention and action readiness—cognitive variables that are typically not considered as a part of the valuation calculus.     

Why do women underperform under stereotype threat? Evidence for the role of negative thinking

This study investigated the role of negative thinking as a potential mediator of performance deficits under stereotype threat. After being assigned to a stereotype-threat or a no-threat condition, 60 female participants were asked to complete a difficult math task. Using the thought-listing technique, women under stereotype threat reported a higher number of negative thoughts specifically related to the test and to mathematics compared with women in the no-threat condition. Moreover, women under stereotype threat also showed a sharp decrease in performance that (a) was most pronounced in the second half of the test and (b) was mediated by the increase in negative thinking.     

(Why) do I think what you think? Epistemic social tuning and implicit prejudice

This research examines whether people who experience epistemic motivation (i.e., a desire to acquire knowledge) came to have implicit attitudes consistent with the apparent beliefs of another person. People had lower implicit prejudice when they experienced epistemic motivation and interacted with a person who ostensibly held egalitarian beliefs (Experiments 1 and 2). Implicit prejudice was not affected when people did not experience epistemic motivation. Further evidence shows that this tuning of implicit attitudes occurs when beliefs are endorsed by another person, but not when they are brought to mind via means that do not imply that person's endorsement (Experiment 3). Results suggest that implicit attitudes of epistemically motivated people tune to the apparent beliefs of others to achieve shared reality.     

Are we more moral than we think? Exploring the role of affect in moral behavior and moral forecasting

Can people accurately predict how they will act in a moral dilemma? Our research suggests that in some situations, they cannot, and that emotions play a pivotal role in this dissociation between behavior and forecasting. In the current experiment, individuals in a moral action condition cheated significantly less on a math task than participants in a forecasting condition predicted they themselves would cheat. Furthermore, we found that participants in the action condition displayed significantly more physiological arousal, as measured by preejection period, skin conductance response (SCR), and respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA), and that the underestimation effect was mediated by SCR and RSA together. This research suggests that the affective arousal present during real-life moral dilemmas may not be fully engaged during moral forecasting, and that this may account for the moral forecasting errors that individuals make. This research has the potential to inform past work in the field of moral psychology, which has largely ignored actual behavior.     

Utility blindness: Why do we fall for deals?

Utility blindness occurs under limited information processing when consumers base their purchase decisions solely on transaction utility (gains from the deal) rather than on total utility. When the deal is attractive enough, consumers will buy a product even though the total utility is little or negative; on the other hand, an unattractive deal might decrease consumers' purchase likelihood even when the total utility is unaffected by the promotion. In this paper, three experiments provide evidence for the existence of utility blindness and demonstrate that information processing limitation is the underlying process. Transaction utility salience and cognitive load are identified as the moderating factors. Theoretical contributions, managerial implications, limitations, and future areas of the current research are also discussed. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How do my students think about ME as an English-language teacher?

The concepts of student-centered classrooms, empowering students with communicative competences to be able to voice their ideas in the surrounding community, powerless and marginalized strata, are conspicuous and prevalent in recent research articles. Teachers are well-acquainted with pertinent underpinnings and theories of teaching methodologies; and some research is also conducted to see how those learned theories in pre-service and in-service programs are implemented in their real-life classrooms. But, the teachers’ reflection on implementation of their teaching practices in classrooms is still a venue which needs further investigation within an international scope. Here, my own teaching practice within a period of two semesters is reflected through the 61 male and female students’ sharp and meticulous eyes, which is reflected in their written responses to the posed question at the end of their final exams, and some of my notes from their comments in each of their classes. The Constant Comparative method was then used to unearth students’ comments and feedback on both my personality as an English-language teacher, and my teaching practice respectively.