Models as signs: extending Kralemann and Lattman’s proposal on modeling models within Peirce’s theory of signs

Synthese - In recent decades, philosophers of science have devoted considerable efforts to understand what models represent. One popular position is that models represent fictional situations....     

Metaphysics as modeling: the handmaiden’s tale

Critics of contemporary metaphysics argue that it attempts to do the hard work of science from the ease of the armchair. Physics, not metaphysics, tells us about the fundamental facts of the world, and empirical psychology is best placed to reveal the content of our concepts about the world. Exploring and understanding the world through metaphysical reflection is obsolete. In this paper, I will show why this critique of metaphysics fails, arguing that metaphysical methods used to make claims about the world are similar to scientific methods used to make claims about the world, but that the subjects of metaphysics are not the subjects of science. Those who argue that metaphysics uses a problematic methodology to make claims about subjects better covered by natural science get the situation exactly the wrong way around: metaphysics has a distinctive subject matter, not a distinctive methodology. The questions metaphysicians address are different from those of scientists, but the methods employed to develop and select theories are similar. In the first section of the paper, I will describe the sort of subject matter that metaphysics tends to engage with. In the second section of the paper, I will show how metaphysical theories are classes of models and discuss the roles of experience, common sense and thought experiments in the construction and evaluation of such models. Finally, in the last section I will discuss the way these methodological points help us to understand the metaphysical project. Getting the right account of the metaphysical method allows us to better understand the relationship between science and metaphysics, to explain why doing metaphysics successfully involves having a range of different theories (instead of consensus on a single theory), to understand the role of thought experiments involving fictional worlds, and to situate metaphysical realism in a scientifically realist context.     

Peirce on Education: Pragmatism and Peirce’s Definition of the Purpose of a University

Drawing on Peirce’s later as well as his early formulation of pragmatism, I show in this article how Peirce’s definition of the purpose of a university can be reformulated in terms of his semiotic pragmatism. The abstract educational principles appealed to in the definition may thus be rephrased in terms of our pre-spesialized capacities for learning and communication.     

Peirce on Education: Discussion of Peirce’s Definition of a University

I write this short essay in response to Peirce, as a feminist, pragmatist, and cultural studies scholar, in the hope that it will help to bring feminism and pragmatism together. I suggest that Peirce offers marginalized and colonized people a way to argue for the importance of their input, with his theory of fallibilism, even if he still claims a position of privilege. He also offers assistance through his concept of “a community of inquirers.” It is curious that Peirce’s definition of a university argues for a split between theory and practice that his earlier work sought to heal. Peirce opened a door to help diverse scholars be able to enter the university, and find a way to address issues of power, with his youthful connecting of theory to practice, that his more senior position draws our attention away from and seeks to hold off. Fortunately, it is too late. Peirce’s youthful pragmatism has been developed in important ways by other scholars and now serves as an example of a way to do philosophy that does connect theory to practice and does seek to address real problems in diverse peoples lives, and help to find solutions that effect change.     

Peirce’s ‘Prescision’ as a Transcendental Method

Abstract

In this Paper I interpret Charles S. Peirce’s method of prescision as a transcendental method. In order to do so, I argue that Peirce’s pragmatism can be interpreted in a transcendental light only if we use a non‐justificatory understanding of transcendental philosophy. I show how Peirce’s prescision is similar to some abstracting procedure that Immanuel Kant used in his Critique of Pure Reason. Prescision abstracts from experience and thought in general those elements without which such experience and thought would be unaccountable. Similarly, in the Aesthetics, Kant isolated the a priori forms of intuition by showing how they could be abstracted from experience in general, while experience in general cannot be thought without them. However, if Peirce’s and Kant’s methods are similar in this respect, they reached very different conclusions.     

Artificial organisms as tools for the development of psychological theory: Tolman’s lesson

In the 1930s and 1940s, Edward Tolman developed a psychological theory of spatial orientation in rats and humans. He expressed his theory as an automaton (the "schematic sowbug") or what today we would call an "artificial organism." With the technology of the day, he could not implement his model. Nonetheless, he used it to develop empirical predictions which tested with animals in the laboratory. This way of proceeding was in line with scientific practice dating back to Galileo. The way psychologists use artificial organisms in their work today breaks with this tradition. Modern "artificial organisms" are constructed a posteriori, working from experimental or ethological observations. As a result, researchers can use them to confirm a theoretical model or to simulate its operation. But they make no contribution to the actual building of models. In this paper, we try to return to Tolman's original strategy: implementing his theory of "vicarious trial and error" in a simulated robot, forecasting the robot's behavior and conducting experiments that verify or falsify these predictions.     

Resilience in the context of Erikson’s theory of human development

The article calls back classical Erikson’s theory of psychosocial development to understand current findings of resilience research; we tested the claim that outcomes of developmental crises and resilience are closely related concepts. Participants (310 emerging adults, 64 % women) completed two measures of resilience and a measure of developmental outcomes. We tested two models of developmental psychosocial outcomes predicting both general and multidimensional measures of resilience. The analyses supported our assumption that developmental outcomes and resilience are highly related concepts. Theoretical and practical implications of these findings are discussed.     

Lifshits’ ontognoseology as a version of Lenin’s theory of reflection

In Soviet philosophy, two versions of Lenin’s theory of reflection are represented respectively by Mikhail Lifshits and Todor Pavlov. They both isolate and juxtapose two dialectical elements: reflection and creativity. Within this methodological dilemma, Lifshits’s ontognoseology is an original doctrine of our “mirror” attitude to the world whereby material being is the true subject, while man is a tool of its self-reflection.     

On (not) listening for theory: the trainee’s use of theory as defence against the stress of beginning psychodynamic practice

This paper offers reflections on the trainee’s relationship with, and use of, theory in the early stages of psychodynamic practice. It addresses the issues of ‘listening for theory’ in the face of the unsettling, yet inevitable, stress and insecurity of beginning psychodynamic practice and the daunting awareness of the work being assessed by the training institution. While theory makes psychodynamic work possible and applying theory is explicitly welcomed in psychodynamic training, the paper argues that the unexamined use of theory is problematic as it, albeit unconsciously, is used by the trainee as a defensive retreat into a private mental sanctuary from the intimate, relational space of the consulting room and from the felt incompetence and inexperience aroused in the immediate encounter with the client. Exemplified through accounts of working with a particular client during my training, the paper examines the trainee’s evolving relationship with theory, in the light of what impedes and promotes therapeutic progress, as a significant marker of the trainee’s development to work psychodynamically.     

Pavlov’s conceptualization of unconditional reflexes,or instincts,within the framework of the theory of higher nervous activity

According to I. P. Pavlov’s theory of higher nervous activity, the establishment and dissolution of conditional reflexes enhances the higher organism’s adaptation to the external environment. Pavlov asserted that, ontogenetically, conditional reflexes are based upon innate, unconditional reflexes (UR) or instincts. Pavlov did not distinguish between URs and instincts, but he preferred the former term. Phylogenetically the URs emerged out of well-established conditional reflexes during the development of higher organisms. An outgrowth of the experimental conditioning procedure, developed during the second decade of this century, was the observation and delineation of new URs. While studying human nervous and psychiatric disorders in the 1930s, Pavlov elucidated other URs. Pavlov identified 13 major URs, but he failed to formulate an exhaustive classification scheme of URs.     

Kant’s coherent theory of the highest good

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion - In the second Critique, Kant argues that for the highest good to be possible we need to postulate the existence of God and the...     

Children’s models of division

Young children find it much easier to solve concrete partitive division problems when the objects to be shared are grouped by the divisor rather than by the quotient, but the reverse is true in quotitive division problems [J. Exp. Child Psychol. 81 (2002a) 1; Dev. Sci. 5 (2002b) 452]. In previous research, the objects to be shared were grouped and the perceptual display was slightly different in the Grouping-by-Divisor and Grouping-by-Quotient conditions and this may have contributed to the difference between the conditions. In the study reported here, partitive and quotitive division problems were presented to 5–8-year-olds. The objects to be shared were presented in a grid and the “groups” were created by verbal instruction; the perceptual arrangement was identical in both conditions. The Grouping-by-Divisor condition remained significantly easier than the Grouping-by-Quotient condition in the partitive problems but the reverse was true in the quotitive problems. This shows that the perceptual arrangement of objects cannot fully explain the difference in difficulty between the Grouping-by-Divisor and Grouping-by-Quotient conditions and also provides support for the notion that young children rely on models that are based on restricted concrete representations when solving division problems. The results are discussed in terms of theories about the development of executive function, children’s attentional focus and the development of an integrated understanding of division.     

Johannes Kepler’s computer simulation of the universe: Some remarks about theory in psychology

Computer simulation may be an overly seductive way of formulating theory in the social sciences. The capability of constructing complex computer simulation models may remove some of the incentive for finding simple laws. This point is illustrated via a fantasy in which the sixteenth century astronomical theorist, Johannes Kepler, uses Ms computer instead of his mind to account for extant data on stellar and planetary motion. Similarities between sixteenth century cosmology and twentieth century psychology are discussed.     

Sosa’s theory of knowledge

Synthese - This paper is a critical discussion of Ernest Sosa’s recent analysis of reflective knowledge.     

Beyond sympathy: Smith’s rejection of Hume’s moral theory

Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS) has long been recognized as importantly influenced by, and in part responding to, David Hume’s earlier ethical theory. With regard to Smith’s account of the foundations of morals in particular, recent scholarly attention has focused on Smith’s differences with Hume over the question of sympathy. Whilst this is certainly important, disagreement over sympathy in fact represents only the starting point of Smith’s engagement with – and eventual attempted rejection of – Hume’s core moral theory. We can see this by recognizing the TMS’s account of moral foundations as predicated upon a rejection of Hume’s distinction between the natural and artificial virtues. Smith is in turn revealed as generating a major break with Hume – a break which, if based on a superior theory of moral foundations (as Smith thought it to be) has important consequences for how we treat Smith and Hume in both the history of philosophy and contemporary moral theory.     

Counting distinctions: on the conceptual foundations of Shannon’s information theory

Categorical logic has shown that modern logic is essentially the logic of subsets (or “subobjects”). In “subset logic,” predicates are modeled as subsets of a universe and a predicate applies to an individual if the individual is in the subset. Partitions are dual to subsets so there is a dual logic of partitions where a “distinction” [an ordered pair of distinct elements (u, u′) from the universe U] is dual to an “element”. A predicate modeled by a partition π on U would apply to a distinction if the pair of elements was distinguished by the partition π, i.e., if u and u′ were in different blocks of π. Subset logic leads to finite probability theory by taking the (Laplacian) probability as the normalized size of each subset-event of a finite universe. The analogous step in the logic of partitions is to assign to a partition the number of distinctions made by a partition normalized by the total number of ordered |U|² pairs from the finite universe. That yields a notion of “logical entropy” for partitions and a “logical information theory.” The logical theory directly counts the (normalized) number of distinctions in a partition while Shannon’s theory gives the average number of binary partitions needed to make those same distinctions. Thus the logical theory is seen as providing a conceptual underpinning for Shannon’s theory based on the logical notion of “distinctions.” This paper is dedicated to the memory of Gian-Carlo Rota—mathematician, philosopher, mentor, and friend.