A test of whether attributions provide for self-enhancement or self-defense

It is well known that people often make attributions in a way that is favorable to their self-concepts (see R. L. Collins, 1996, for a review). However, it is less clear whether the primary effect is to enhance self-esteem or to defend against the possible loss of self-esteem. The authors performed an experiment to test these possibilities against each other. In a completely between-participants design, participants recalled either a positive behavior or a negative behavior that was performed by themselves or others. They then judged the positivity or negativity of the behavior and made trait attributions about the actor (i.e., himself, herself, or others). The results indicated that although judgments and trait attributions for positive behaviors were similar for the self and for others, judgments and trait attributions for negative behaviors were less negative for the self than they were for others. The authors interpreted these and other findings as supporting a defensive strategy rather than an enhancive strategy.     

Determining whether attentional control settings are inclusive or exclusive

The aim of the present study was to determine whether attentional control settings operate with an inclusive rule (orient attention to stimuli that share a task-relevant feature with the target) or an exclusive rule (do not orient attention to stimuli that do not share a task-relevant feature with the target). All three experiments used a variation of the Folk and Remington (e.g., Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992) paradigm. In Experiment 1, cuing effects were found for combination cues (cues containing an onset feature and a color feature) with both onset and color targets. Experiment 2, using a delay between cue and target, revealed inhibition of return (IOR) for combination cues with onset and color targets. Unexpectedly, IOR was also found for onset cues with color targets, and this finding was confirmed in Experiment 3. These findings indicate that attentional control settings use an inclusive rule. Moreover, the presence of IOR with onset cues and color targets suggests that onset cues may automatically capture attention, but attention control settings allow for rapid disengagement when the onset cue does not contain a task-relevant feature.     

A Puzzle about Knowing Conditionals

We present a puzzle about knowledge, probability and conditionals. We show that in certain cases some basic and plausible principles governing our reasoning come into conflict. In particular, we show that there is a simple argument that a person may be in a position to know a conditional the consequent of which has a low probability conditional on its antecedent, contra Adams’ Thesis. We suggest that the puzzle motivates a very strong restriction on the inference of a conditional from a disjunction.     

A Priori Knowledge of the World: Knowing the World by Knowing our Minds

Philosophical Studies -     

Knowing The World By Knowing One's Mind

This paper addresses the question whetherintrospection plus externalism about mental contentwarrant an a priori refutation of external-worldskepticism and ontological solipsism. The suggestionis that if thought content is partly determined byaffairs in the environment and if we can havenon-empirical knowledge of our current thoughtcontents, we can, just by reflection, know about theworld around us – we can know that our environment ispopulated with content-determining entities. Afterexamining this type of transcendental argument anddiscussing various objections found in the literature,I argue that the notion of privileged self-knowledgeunderlying this argument presupposes that we canlearn, via introspection, that our so-called thoughtsare propositional attitudes rather than contentlessstates. If, however, externalism is correct andthought content consists in the systematic dependencyof internal states on relational properties, we cannotknow non-empirically whether or not we havepropositional attitudes. Self-knowledge (apropositional attitude) is consistent with us lackingthe ability to rule out, via introspection, thepossibility that we don't have any propositionalattitudes. Self-knowledge provides us with knowledgeof what is in our minds, but not that we haveminds. Hence, the combination of externalism with thedoctrine of privileged self-knowledge does not allowfor an a priori refutation of skepticism and istherefore unproblematic.     

A Sound and Complete Tableau Calculus for Reasoning about only Knowing and Knowing at Most

We define a tableau calculus for the logic of only knowing and knowing at most ON, which is an extension of Levesque's logic of only knowing O. The method is based on the possible-world semantics of the logic ON, and can be considered as an extension of known tableau calculi for modal logic K45. From the technical viewpoint, the main features of such an extension are the explicit representation of "unreachable" worlds in the tableau, and an additional branch closure condition implementing the property that each world must be either reachable or unreachable. The calculus allows for establishing the computational complexity of reasoning about only knowing and knowing at most. Moreover, we prove that the method matches the worst-case complexity lower bound of the satisfiability problem for both ON and O. With respect to [22], in which the tableau calculus was originally presented, in this paper we both provide a formal proof of soundness and completeness of the calculus, and prove the complexity results for the logic ON.     

Beliefless Knowing

Orthodox epistemology tells us that knowledge requires belief. While there has been resistance to orthodoxy on this point, the orthodox position has been ably defended and continues to be widely endorsed. In what follows, I aim to undermine the belief requirement on knowledge. I first show that awareness does not require belief. Next, I turn my attention to the relation between knowledge and awareness, showing that awareness entails knowledge in a certain range of cases and thus that the cases of awareness without belief that I discuss are also cases of knowledge without belief. Throughout I draw attention to the fact that these are not isolated cases and that beliefless knowledge is a rather common phenomenon. I conclude by arguing that beliefless knowledge is consistent with the idea that all knowledge is grounded in belief and the idea that knowledge is essentially a representational state.     

Data versus Spock: lay theories about whether emotion helps or hinders

The android Data from Star Trek admired human emotion whereas Spock viewed emotion as irrational and maladaptive. The theory that emotions fulfil adaptive functions is widely accepted in academic psychology but little is known about laypeople’s theories. The present study assessed the extent to which laypeople share Data’s view of emotion as helpful or Spock’s view of emotion as a hindrance. We also assessed how help and hinder theory endorsement were related to reasoning, emotion regulation, and well-being. Undergraduates (N?=?630) completed a stressful timed reasoning task and questionnaires that assessed their theories of emotion, emotion regulation strategies, happiness, and social support. Overall, participants viewed emotion more as a help than a hindrance. The more they endorsed the view that emotion helps, the better their reasoning scores. Endorsing a help theory also predicted the use of reappraisal which, in turn, predicted greater happiness and social support. In contrast, endorsing the view that emotion hinders was associated with emotion suppression and less social support. Thus, people’s theories about the functionality of emotion may have important implications for their reasoning and emotional well-being.     

Non-Accidental Knowing

Knowledge excludes luck. According to the received view, this intuition reveals that knowing is essentially modal in character. This paper demurs. Either knowledge does not exclude luck, or the entailment reveals nothing about its conceptual character. It is argued that knowledge excludes accidentality, and that this notion is not modal but causal-explanatory. There are three central tasks. The first is to explicate the concept of accident. The second is to argue that the concepts of luck and accident are “intensionally distinct,” which is to say that no member of the intension of either holds on both. The third is to argue that an anti-accident requirement on knowledge is preferable to an anti-luck analogue on abductive grounds.     

Knowing not

Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, 252 Bloor Street, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M5S 1V6 People often know rapidly and reliably that they do not know something. A review of contemporary theory reveals that the issue has not received much attention; moreover, the accounts available assume that recognition that one does not know something is achieved only by failure to establish that one does know it. A reaction time experiment assessed two aspects of knowing not, by asking people whether they knew common nouns well enough to use them in sentences and whether they had visited certain cities. The findings were that affirmations of negation were often more rapid than positive reports; hence, the account of knowing not as the complement of knowing that something is the case is not necessarily correct. We suggest that knowing not may be attained as rapidly as positive knowledge on the basis of ability to carry out analytical procedures.     

Predictability influences whether outcomes are processed in terms of original or relative values

Previous studies have provided insights into the representations of original and relative values and the influence of predictability on decision making. However, whether the predictability of outcomes can influence the processing manner of outcomes (i.e. whether the outcomes are processed in terms of original or relative values) is still unknown. To investigate this issue, we had participants perform a monetary decision task which resulted in two outcomes with the same relative values but different original values in either a predictable or unpredictable condition, while recording event-related potentials (ERP). ERP results showed that the outcome processing in the unpredictable condition elicited more positive deflections in the time window of 300–500 ms (P300) than did those in the predictable condition. More importantly, the outcome with high original value elicited a greater P300 component than did that with low original value in the unpredictable condition even though these two outcomes had the same relative values, while in the predictable condition no significant difference was observed between ERPs elicited by the two outcomes even though their original values were different. These results suggest that the outcomes might be processed in terms of relative values in the predictable condition but original values in the unpredictable condition.