Parameters in the theory of sentence processing: Minimal Commitment theory goes east

This paper introduces the Minimal Commitment theory. This theory is a subspecies of deterministic parsers. The theory builds representations where immediate dominance and precedence relations are unspecified. Justification that this approach is psycholinguistically justified comes from its ability to provide a cross-linguistically valid theory of Garden path sentences in English and Japanese.I would lide to thank audiences at CUNY (1990) and (1991) for valuable comments and the chance to present this work. Parts of this paper were also presented at the Duke Symposium on Natural Language Processing, and at the Workshop on Japanese Sentence Processing held at Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. I thank these audiences for valuable comments as well. Robert Berwick, Janet Fodor, Ted Gibson, Paul Gorrell, Norbert Hornstein, David Lightfoot, and Juan Uriagereka along with the University of Maryland NLP working group provided valuable assistance on this and earlier drafts.This work was supported by BNS902154-02 from the NSF.     

Explanation: Pragmatics and asymmetry

This paper derives from an NEH Summer Seminar for College Teachers on scientific explanation directed by Paul Humphreys at the University of Virginia in the summer of 1991. I am indebted to Professor Humphreys for his comments on many drafts. A previous version was presented at the Pacific Division Meetings of the APA in March 1992. For encouragement regarding, comments on, and criticisms of prior versions, I'd also like to thank Eric Barnes, Carol Cleland, Gary Ebbs, Geoffrey Gorham, Geoffrey Hellman, Elizabeth Lloyd, Larry Shapiro, Alison Simmons, and David Stump. Special thanks to Bas van Fraassen for correspondence on these issues, and to Philip Kitcher for encouragement. I am responsible for all remaining errors.     

Vagueness and incoherence: A reply to Burns

I would like to thank Terence Horgan, William Throop and especially my wife, Diane Schwartz, for helpful suggestions for improving this paper and for valuable and insightful discussions on the topic of vagueness. I would also like to thank Ithaca College for generously supporting the work on this paper with a Summer Research Grant.     

Linked arguments and the validity requirement

In this paper I demonstrate that most textbook accounts of the linked/convergent distinction fail to conform to the widespread intuition that all valid arguments ought to be classified as linked arguments. I also show that standard textbook accounts of linkage and convergence cannot provide a satisfactory treatment of fallacies of irrelevance and, due to their general insensitivity to the epistemic context in which arguments are offered, must be supplemented by subjective accounts of linkage and convergence which appeal exclusively to authorial beliefs and intentions.Drafts of this paper were read at the Ontario Philosophical Society meeting held at Trent University in October 1990 and the Central Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association held in Chicago in April 1991. I thank Trudy Govier, Hans Hansen and an anonymous referee for helpful and encouraging comments on various drafts.     

Constitution and ontology: Some remarks on Husserl's ontological position in the Logical Investigations

This paper is based on studies made during a stay at the University in Wuppertal, Germany. I thank Professor Klaus Held and Dr. Dieter Lohmar for their various comments upon my initial research.     

Is space-time discrete or continuous? — An empirical question

In this paper I present the Discrete Space-Time Thesis, in a way which enables me to defend it against various well-known objections, and which extends to the discrete versions of Special and General Relativity with only minor difficulties. The point of this presentation is not to convince readers that space-time really is discrete but rather to convince them that we do not yet know whether or not it is. Having argued that it is an open question whether or not space-time is discrete, I then turn to some possible empirical evidence, which we do not yet have. This evidence is based on some slight differences between commonly occurring differential equations and their discrete analogs.I would like to express my thanks to John McKie with whom I have had several inspiring conversations about discrete space. I would also like to thank the audience of a paper on this topic which I read in October 1991 at the College Park campus of the University of Maryland. Finally I would like to thank the referees ofSynthese for their comments. One of them, in particular, should be thanked especially for help in improving Appendix Two.     

Hierarchical semantics for relevant logics

This paper was presented to the 1990 meeting of the Australasian Association for Logic held at the University of Sydney, and I thank those present for helpful comments made.     

Prototypes and conceptual analysis

In this paper, I explore the implications of recent empirical research on concept representation for the philosophical enterprise of conceptual analysis. I argue that conceptual analysis, as it is commonly practiced, is committed to certain assumptions about the nature of our intuitive categorization judgments. I then try to show how these assumptions clash with contemporary accounts of concept representation in cognitive psychology. After entertaining an objection to my argument, I close by considering ways in which conceptual analysis might be altered to accord better with the empirical work.Thanks are due to John Bickle, Marian David, Terence Horgan, Stephen Stich, John Tienson, Paul Weithman and an anonymous referee for several helpful comments and suggestions. Earlier versions of this paper were presented at Central Michigan University, The University of Memphis, The University of Mississipi and The Second International Conference on Cognitive Science at San Sebastian, Spain. A great deal of useful feedback was provided by these audiences.     

The wall and the shield K-K reconsidered

With apologies to Professor Sosa. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Eastern Division Meetings of the APA held in Washington, D.C., December 27 through December 30, 1988. I would like to thank my commentator Professor Gary Gleb of Rutgers University for his thoughtful comments, I also wish to thank Glenn Ross, Steven Davis and Arthur Ripstein for their sound advice.     

Skepticism and legal interpretation

For comments and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article, I would like to thank Kendall Walton, Edward Averill, Marcia Baron, Richard Brandt, and Walter Schaller. This paper was first developed while in residence as a visiting scholar at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. I wish to thank both that institution for making its resources available to me during the 1986–87 academic year, and my home institution for granting me the Developmental Leave that permitted me to pursue my research. Finally, I wish to thank Thomas W. Pogge for helping me to make several substantive clarifications in the final version of this paper.     

Mind,consciousness, and cognition: Phenomenology vs. cognitive science

I would like to thank Steven Crowell from Rice University (Philosophy Department) for helpful comments and suggestions about my discussion of Husserl and other phenomenologists, and Edouard Philippe, also from Rice University (Electrical Engineering Department), for offering me the opportunity to formulate my views on cognitive science and artificial intelligence.     

Vacuous truth

Special thanks go to Paul Humphreys for his criticisms and helpful comments. Also Richard Gale, Gerald Massey, Nicholas Rescher, David Blumenfeld, James Humber, Richard Ketchum, and Wolfgang Dietel made helpful comments on an earlier version. Each found something in need of repair. Finally, I would like to thank the Hambidge Center and the Center for the Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh for providing in 1988 the setting and the resources that made this paper possible.     

Empiricism,fideism and the nature of religious belief

Earlier versions of this paper were read to the Departments of Philosophy at the University of New Brunswick and at Saint Francis Xavier University and to the Canadian Societh for the Study of Religion at Queen’s University, Kingston. The authors wish to thank the participants for their comments.     

Women,men, and aggression in an egalitarian society

Vanatinai, a small island society off New Guinea, is egalitarian, with no indigenous formal systems of rank or authority. Assertiveness and autonomy are highly valued as personal qualities and equivalent for males and females. Overt aggression is condemned and violence is rare. Women were the aggressors in four out of five incidents over ten years. Sexual jealousy was the dominant motif in all five cases. This article considers, in historical contexts, indigenous concepts of the gendered person and their relations to anger, violence, and the supernatural aggression of sorcery and witchcraft. The Vanatinai case is evidence that the rarity of intragroup violence, especially of attacks by men on women, is a characteristic of egalitarian societies.An earlier version of this paper was read at the Session on Female Aggression at the American Anthropological Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, in November 1991. I would like to thank session participants, Douglas Fry, Victoria Burbank, Robert Lepowsky, Florence Lepowsky, and the anonymous reviewers forSex Roles for their helpful comments at various points. The fieldwork in Papua New Guinea on which this paper is based was carried out over a total of eighteen months in 1977–1979, 1981, and 1987. I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation, Chancellor's Patent Fund and Department of Anthropology of the University of California, Berkeley, the Papua New Guinea Institute of Applied Social and Economic Research, the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development of the National Institutes of Health, the Wenner-Gren Foundation, and the Graduate School of the University of Wisconsin, Madison.     

Intuition and the socratic method: Two opposed ways of knowing?

Socratic method and intuition are two ways of knowing commonly thought as opposed. The author shows how both ways of knowing can be linked in an education that has philosophy as its armature.An earlier version of this paper was presented at theWays of Knowing conference at Appalachian State University, and published in the proceedings of that conference. Lee S. Shulman's helpful comments at that time led to this revised version. I would like to thank Jim Garrison for comments and conversation on this topic. Any errors remain my own.     

Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief

In this paper I argue that we can give a plausible account of how to compare pragmatic and evidential normative reasons for belief. The account I offer is given in the form of a ‘defeasing function’. This function allows for a sophisticated comparison of the two types of reasons without assigning complex features to the logical structures of either type of reason. I would like to thank John Broome, Stewart Cohen, Roger Crisp, Jonathan Dancy, Brie Gertler, and Iwao Hirose for their comments on earlier versions of this material. A number of revisions have also been made as a result of helpful questions raised during presentations of this paper at Arizona State University, McGill University, and the University of Virginia.     

Perception,meaning, and mind

Earlier versions of this paper were read in the Philosophy department at the University of Helsinki, in the Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities at the University of Edinburgh, at Vanderbilt University, at the Indiana Philosophical Association, and at the Institute for Logic and Cognitive Science at the University of Houston. I am grateful for very helpful comments on each of these occasions, and I am especially appreciative to John Haugeland, Mark Johnson, and George McClure for their comments and suggestions. Thanks, too, to Robert Solomon who urged me to amplify my claims about perceptual meaning.     

Extensionality, underdetermination and indeterminacy

I am grateful to Burton Dreben, Warren Goldfarb, Don Gustafson, Jim Higginbotham, Jerrold Katz, Joe Levine, Ted Morris, Nick Pappas, Hilary Putnam, Georges Rey and Bob Richardson for helpful discussions and comments on the issues discussed in this paper. Also I thank an anonymous reviewer for Erkenntnis for helpful comments.     

Semantics and supervenience

I have presented much of this research in talks at the University of Costa Rica and the University of Texas at Austin. I am grateful to my audiences for their comments and advice. I would like especially to thank Luis Camacho, Nicholas Asher, and Robert Koons. Many of the ideas in the paper stem from an informal seminar on type-free theories held at the University of Texas's Center for Cognitive Science from 1984 to 1987. I am grateful to the participants in that seminar — Ignacio Angelelli, Nicholas Asher, Herbert Hochberg, Hans Kamp, Frederick Kronz, Per Lindström and Mark Sainsbury — for their many insights into type-free semantics, and to the Center for Cognitive Science for providing such a hospitable environment for this work. I have also profited from the criticisms of two anonymous referees. Finally, I am indebted to the University of Texas's University Research Institute and to the National Science Foundation's Information Science and History and Philosophy of Science programs for grant support.