Power and perspectives not taken

Four experiments and a correlational study explored the relationship between power and perspective taking. In Experiment 1, participants primed with high power were more likely than those primed with low power to draw an E on their forehead in a self-oriented direction, demonstrating less of an inclination to spontaneously adopt another person's visual perspective. In Experiments 2a and 2b, high-power participants were less likely than low-power participants to take into account that other people did not possess their privileged knowledge, a result suggesting that power leads individuals to anchor too heavily on their own vantage point, insufficiently adjusting to others' perspectives. In Experiment 3, high-power participants were less accurate than control participants in determining other people's emotion expressions; these results suggest a power-induced impediment to experiencing empathy. An additional study found a negative relationship between individual difference measures of power and perspective taking. Across these studies, power was associated with a reduced tendency to comprehend how other people see, think, and feel.     

Changing views: the effect of explicit perception-focus instructions on perspective-taking

In two experiments, we examined whether explicit attention to another’s perspective fosters perspective-taking. In the first experiment, we attempted to replicate previous findings showing that a mind-set focusing on self-other differences incites speakers to adopt another’s viewpoint in a subsequent task. However, our results showed that speakers focusing on self-other differences were just as likely to describe an object’s location from their egocentric perspective as speakers focusing on self-other similarities. In the second experiment, we intensified speakers’ awareness of perspectives by explicitly instructing them to regard their own (self-focus) or another’s (other-focus) viewpoint during the perspective-taking task. Participants allocated to the baseline did not receive explicit focus instructions. Findings revealed that other-focused speakers were more likely to adopt another’s perspective than self-focused speakers. However, compared to the baseline, an explicit other-focus did not foster perspective-taking. We conclude that an explicit awareness of perspective differences does not attenuate speakers’ egocentricity bias.     

Self and other obedience estimates: biases and moderators

The authors conducted 2 studies regarding behavior perceptions of "self" and "typical other" in hypothetical replications of S. Milgram's (1963) obedience experiment. In Study 1, participants' knowledge about Milgram's actual results was manipulated. Regardless of knowledge, results demonstrated several specific social and perceptual biases (e.g., the self-other bias; J. D. Brown, 1986), in addition to several general, fundamental lessons of social psychology (e.g., the perseverance of lay dispositionism). Study 2 was designed to explore the possibility that participants' own academic interests and worldview could influence the biases explicated in Study 1. The authors assessed perceptions of both criminal-justice majors and non-criminal-justice majors regarding their perceptions of behaviors of self and typical other. The criminal-justice students' self-other obedience estimates were significantly higher than those of the non-criminal-justice students. Further, the self-other discrepancy for criminal-justice students was significantly smaller than the difference reported by non-criminal-justice majors, suggesting that the criminal-justice students demonstrated the self-other bias significantly less than non-criminal-justice students in this context. The findings indicate that specific social-perceptual biases may have been moderated by career interest and worldview.     

Behavioral confirmation in social interaction: From social perception to social reality

A perceiver's actions, although based upon initially erroneous beliefs about a target individual may channel social interaction in ways that cause the behavior of the target to confirm the perceiver's beliefs. To chart this process of behavioral confirmation, we observed successive interactions between one target and two perceivers. In the first interaction, targets who interacted with perceivers who anticipated hostile partners displayed greater behavioral hostility than targets whose perceivers expected nonhostile partners. Only when targets regarded their actions as reflections of personal dispositions did these behavioral differences in hostility persevere into their subsequent interactions with naive perceivers who had no prior knowledge about them. Theoretical implications of the behavioral confirmation construct for social perception processes are discussed.     

自动观点采择：内隐心智化与潜心智化的争议

自动观点采择现象已有很多研究证实, 但其产生机制还存在争议。目前存在内隐心智化与潜心智化两种观点：前者认为自动观点采择是自发采择他人视角的领域特殊加工; 而后者提出自动观点采择实质为反射性注意定向、位置的空间编码等领域一般加工, 模拟了心智化在社会环境中的作用。在内隐心智化和潜心智化可独立或共同运行的基础上, 提出了内隐心智化和潜心智化协同作用模型。未来研究应借助先进的技术手段研究多样的被试群体, 探索自动观点采择的作用机制。     

Ain't misbehavin': the effects of age and intentionality on judgments about misconduct

In 2 person perception experiments, young and older perceivers read a scenario about a young or old female target who leaves a store without paying for a hat. In Experiment 1, the target claims she forgot she was wearing the hat when questioned by the manager. Perceivers thought the manager would have greater sympathy, less anger, and would recommend less punishment when the target was old. In Experiment 2, the target clearly forgot to pay for the hat, clearly stole it, or had ambiguous intentions. In the ambiguous condition, perceivers attributed the young target's behavior more to stealing and the old target's behavior more to forgetting. In the forget condition, young perceivers had equal sympathy for the young and old targets and held them similarly responsible, but older perceivers had greater sympathy for the forgetful old target and held her less responsible than they did the forgetful young target.     

The "frozen in time" effect in evaluations of the dead

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that evaluations of the dead are more resistant to change than are evaluations of the living. In Experiment 1, perceivers formed an impression of a target person who performed either a moral or an immoral action and then either died or remained alive. Perceivers were later given new inconsistent information about the target's morality. The results revealed that perceivers' original impressions of the target were significantly less likely to change in response to the inconsistent information when the target was believed to be dead than when she was believed to be alive. Experiment 2 replicated the effect in impressions of real-world targets. The implications of these findings for research on posthumous impression processes are discussed.     

The implications of counterfactual mind-sets for the functioning of implementation intentions

Two experiments explored how counterfactual mind-sets interact with implementation intentions and affect their flexibility. Participants engaged in a subtractive mind-set, an additive mind-set, or a control condition and were subsequently given either goal intentions or implementation intentions that facilitated cue detection (Experiment 1) or the goal-directed response (Experiment 2). Dependent variables were the number of targets specified in the intentions and the legitimate alternatives to the targets (flexibility measure). In Experiment 1, the implementation intention (versus goal intention) group were better at detecting specified cues, but worse on alternatives, regardless of mind-set. In Experiment 2, an interaction emerged. For both specified and alternative responses, the subtractive mind-set paired with an implementation intention versus goal intention performed better. This pattern was reversed for additive mind-set conditions. Hence, how counterfactual mind-sets affect the flexibility of planning is dependent on the particular mind-set used and the specific operations of plan.     

"How long will I suffer?" versus "How long will you suffer?" A self-other effect in affective forecasting

This research presents evidence that people predict longer durations of negative affect for others than for themselves. It is argued that this self-other effect is based on the asymmetric availability of knowledge about psychological strategies that reduce negative affective experiences. Specifically, because people have available knowledge about their own coping strategies, they use this information when making predictions about their affect. The lack of information about others' coping strategies leads to longer predictions of affect duration for others, creating the self-other effect. A series of studies demonstrated this self-other effect, its source, and its boundary conditions. Specifically, the self-other effect occurred for negative but not for positive events, it was stronger when participants predicted affect duration for unfamiliar others than when participants predicted affect duration for familiar others, and the impact of the self versus other focus on affective forecasts was mediated by the availability of knowledge about coping strategies. In addition, alternative explanations for the self-other effect were ruled out. The implications for biases in affective forecasting are discussed.     

Mood-congruent perceptions of success depend on self-other framing

Research on self-other framing suggests that self-judgements typically neglect information about others and instead use an ambiguous intrapersonal standard, making these judgements susceptible to the influence of mood as predicted by the affect infusion model (Forgas, 1995). Two experiments tested the hypothesis that mood-congruent judgements of personal success occur when these judgements are framed to maintain self-focus but are eliminated when participants first focus on other individuals. In Experiment 1, self-other framing moderated the influence of mood on perceived success for an ambiguous object identification task. Happy participants reported greater perceived success, compared to sad participants, after judging their own success relative to others (self-focused frame) but not after directly judging the success of others (other-focused frame). Experiment 2 replicated these results with students' perceptions of their academic success. These findings suggest that the open, constructive processing accompanying most self-judgements is critical in producing mood-congruent perceptions of personal success.     

On reducing an empathy gap: the impact of self-construal and order of judgment

Empathy gaps, in which individuals exaggerate self-other similarities or differences, generate errors in social judgments. We investigated whether changing individuals' self-construal may reduce one specific empathy gap: the illusion of courage. Participants primed with independent or interdependent self-construal made judgments about their own and other people's willingness to dance in public. Participants in the interdependence condition showed a reduction of the empathy gap, but only when judging the other first. This finding highlights that simple contextual manipulations have the potential to reduce egocentric biases in social judgments.     

Reading between the minds: the use of stereotypes in empathic accuracy

An ideal empathizer may attend to another person's behavior in order to understand that person, but it is also possible that accurately understanding other people involves top-down strategies. We hypothesized that perceivers draw on stereotypes to infer other people's thoughts and that stereotype use increases perceivers' accuracy. In this study, perceivers (N = 161) inferred the thoughts of multiple targets. Inferences consistent with stereotypes for the targets' group (new mothers) more accurately captured targets' thoughts, particularly when actual thought content was also stereotypic. We also decomposed variance in empathic accuracy into thought, target, and perceiver variance. Although past research has frequently focused on variance between perceivers or targets (which assumes individual differences in the ability to understand other people or be understood, respectively), the current study showed that the most substantial variance was found within targets because of differences among thoughts.     

Thanks for asking: Self-affirming questions reduce backlash when stigmatized targets confront prejudice

Two experiments tested the prediction that stigmatized individuals can avoid backlash when they confront others about bias if they first ask questions designed to activate self-affirmation processes. Experiment 1 showed that compared to a no-strategy control condition, highly prejudiced perceivers tended to express less desire to meet an Arab-American when he asked them to take his perspective on prejudice, but they expressed more desire to meet him when he asked self-affirming questions prior to making the perspective-taking request. Experiment 2 replicated this effect with a different affirmation and revealed that asking self-affirming questions reduced perceptions that the target was being confrontational when asking others to take his perspective. Together, these studies show that stigmatized targets can effectively challenge prejudiced individuals to reduce their biases if they first use a subtle strategy that reduces defensiveness.     

Six-year-olds' difficulties handling intensional contexts

Previous research shows that children have difficulties handling intensional contexts even when they can pass a test of false belief (e.g. Cognition 67 (1998) 287; Cognition 25 (1987) 289). Some authors (Perner, J. (1991). Understanding the representational mind. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; Cognition 25 (1987) 289) place these difficulties in the linguistic and not the mental representational domain. The experiments reported here examined whether 6-year-old children could answer questions in an intensional context that did not require the explicit verbal characterization of a belief. We replicated previous findings and found that children answered according to their own knowledge in an intensional context. This occurred even though they responded by choosing a picture to insert into a protagonist's thought bubble rather than report the belief verbally. Children could correctly answer questions about the knowledge state of the protagonist and pass a test of false belief. Further experiments ruled out methodological explanations. Experiment 2 showed that the difference in answering according to own knowledge between the false belief and intensional stories is not accounted for by procedural factors in the two types of test. Experiment 3 revealed that children did not answer according to their own knowledge by default. Experiment 4 suggested that answering according to own knowledge was not a result of pictorial salience. Results are discussed in relation to the simulation-theory debate.     

Memory for in-group and out-group information in a minimal group context: the self as an informational base

The authors argue that persons derive in-group expectancies from self-knowledge. This implies that perceivers process information about novel in-groups on the basis of the self-congruency of this information and not simply its valence. In Experiment 1, participants recalled more negative self-discrepant behaviors about an in-group than about an out-group. Experiment 2 replicated this effect under low cognitive load but not under high load. Experiment 3 replicated the effect using an idiographic procedure. These findings suggest that perceivers engage in elaborative inconsistency processing when they encounter negative self-discrepant information about an in-group but not when they encounter negative self-congruent information. Participants were also more likely to attribute self-congruent information to the in-group than to the out-group, regardless of information valence. Implications for models of social memory and self-categorization theory are discussed.     

Positive illusion in close relationships

The literature regarding self-other comparisons suggests that self-enhancing perceptions are prevalent, including forms of “illusion” such as excessively positive self-evaluation, unrealistic optimism, and exaggerated perceptions of control. Concepts from optimal distinctiveness theory served as the basis for two experiments examining whether illusion functions similarly when the context of evaluation involves a relationship. In both experiments participants rated themselves, the best friend, and the average other—or their own romantic relationships, the best friend's relationship, and the relationship of the average other–using scales measuring positivity of evaluation, optimism regarding the future, and perceptions of control. In both experiments, participants exhibited centrality-based differentiation, rating targets more favorably to the degree that the target was more central to their social identity. Patterns of differentiation differed for the two contexts: In the individual context, participants differentiated themselves and their friends from the average other. In the relationship context, participants differentiated their own relationships from the relationships of friends and average others. Also, participants rated individuals as more controllable than relationships. Participants in Experiment 2 provided information regarding potential predictors of illusion. Analyses of these data suggest that favorable centrality-based differentiation may be partially accounted for by impression management, global self-esteem (particularly in the individual context), and commitment level (particularly in the relationship context).     

Own-other differences in the realism of some metacognitive judgments

The present study investigated differences in judgments of one's own and others' knowledge (the own-other difference). Consistent with the below-average effect (e.g., Kruger, 1999), our main results showed that the participants gave lower knowledge ratings of their own extent of knowledge than of another person's extent of knowledge (Experiment 1). Furthermore, lower and more realistic judgments were found when the participants judged their own as compared with when judging another person's overall accuracy (frequency judgments) of answering knowledge questions correctly (Experiment 1 and 2). On the basis of these results it is argued that judgmental anchoring may be important also in the context of indirect comparisons, and that previous conclusions of cross-cultural psychology regarding the above-average effect may be oversimplified.     

Target adjustment and self-other agreement: utilizing trait observability to disentangle judgeability and self-knowledge

Are well-adjusted individuals good targets or accurate self-judges? Across two round-robin studies, the current research first demonstrates that well-adjusted individuals' personalities are viewed with greater distinctive self-other agreement by new acquaintances. Is this enhanced self-other agreement a function of greater judgeability, improving others' ability to form an accurate impression? Or is it a function of greater self-knowledge, having a more accurate impression about oneself? By examining the relationship between psychological adjustment and self-other agreement as a function of trait observability, it becomes clear that psychological adjustment fosters self-other agreement through judgeability more so than through self-knowledge. Specifically, well-adjusted individuals provide new acquaintances with greater information regarding their less observable traits, enhancing others' knowledge and thus distinctive self-other agreement. This effect was replicated with close informant-other agreement, indicating that the well-adjusted individual's tendency to make his or her less visible traits more accessible to others allows those who just met the target to agree better with people who know the target well. In sum, although well-adjusted individuals are in part good self-judges, it is their greater judgeability that seems most critical in enhancing self-other agreement in first impressions.     

Perceiving individuals and groups: expectancies, dispositional inferences, and causal attributions

Two experiments investigated differences in forming impressions of individual and group targets. Experiment 1 showed that when forming an impression of an individual, perceivers made more extreme trait judgments, made those judgments more quickly and with greater confidence, and recalled more information than when the impression target was a group. Experiment 2 showed that when participants were forming an impression of an individual, expectancy-inconsistent behaviors spontaneously triggered causal attributions to resolve the inconsistency; this was not the case when the impression target was a group. Results are interpreted as reflecting perceivers' a priori assumptions of unity and coherence in individual versus group targets.     

What's "up" with God? Vertical space as a representation of the divine

"God" and "Devil" are abstract concepts often linked to vertical metaphors (e.g., "glory to God in the highest," "the Devil lives down in hell"). It is unknown, however, whether these metaphors simply aid communication or implicate a deeper mode of concept representation. In 6 experiments, the authors examined the extent to which the vertical dimension is used in noncommunication contexts involving God and the Devil. Experiment 1 established that people have implicit associations between God-Devil and up-down. Experiment 2 revealed that people encode God-related concepts faster if presented in a high (vs. low) vertical position. Experiment 3 found that people's memory for the vertical location of God- and Devil-like images showed a metaphor-consistent bias (up for God; down for Devil). Experiments 4, 5a, and 5b revealed that people rated strangers as more likely to believe in God when their images appeared in a high versus low vertical position, and this effect was independent of inferences related to power and likability. These robust results reveal that vertical perceptions are invoked when people access divinity-related cognitions.