共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 78 毫秒
1.
Jonathan Schaffer 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):7-19
On the truthmaker view of ontological commitment [Heil (From an ontological point of view, 2003); Armstrong (Truth and truthmakers, 2004); Cameron (Philosophical Studies, 2008)], a theory is committed to the entities needed in the world for the theory to be made true. I argue that this view
puts truthmaking to the wrong task. None of the leading accounts of truthmaking—via necessitation, supervenience, or grounding—can
provide a viable measure of ontological commitment. But the grounding account does provide a needed constraint on what is
fundamental. So I conclude that truthmaker commitments are not a rival to quantifier commitments, but a needed complement.
The quantifier commitments are what a theory says exists, while the truthmaker commitments are what a theory says is fundamental.
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Jonathan SchafferEmail: |
2.
Kantian non-conceptualism 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Robert Hanna 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):41-64
There are perceptual states whose representational content cannot even in principle be conceptual. If that claim is true,
then at least some perceptual states have content whose semantic structure and psychological function are essentially distinct
from the structure and function of conceptual content. Furthermore the intrinsically “orientable” spatial character of essentially
non-conceptual content entails not only that all perceptual states contain non-conceptual content in this essentially distinct sense, but also that consciousness goes all the way down into so-called unconscious or subpersonal mental states. Both my argument for the existence of essentially non-conceptual
content and my theory of its structure and function have a Kantian provenance.
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Robert HannaEmail: |
3.
Jiri Benovsky 《Axiomathes》2009,19(1):51-71
The eternalist endurantist and perdurantist theories of persistence through time come in various versions, namely the two
versions of perdurantism: the worm view and the stage view, and the two versions of endurantism: indexicalism and adverbialism. Using as a starting point the instructive case of what is depicted by photographs, I will examine these four views, and
compare them, with some interesting results. Notably, we will see that two traditional enemies—the perdurantist worm view
and the endurantist theories—are more like allies: they are much less different than what is usually thought, and some alleged points of central disagreement fall prey to
closer scrutiny. The aim of this paper is to examine carefully all those points, and to call attention to the places where
the real differences between these views lie. I will then turn to the perdurantist stage view, and claim that with respect
to some central issues it is the view that is the most different from the other three, but that in some places the reason
why it different is also the reason why it is less satisfactory.
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Jiri BenovskyEmail: |
4.
Baron Reed 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):91-104
The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario:
because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is
in fact a relevant difference—the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is
another sort of comparison available—one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true—that
makes possible a new argument for skepticism. Unlike the traditional form of skeptical argument, this new argument applies
equally well to both internalist and externalist theories of knowledge.
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Baron ReedEmail: |
5.
Jennifer Lackey 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(1):27-42
A widely accepted view in recent work in epistemology is that knowledge is a cognitive achievement that is properly creditable
to those subjects who possess it. More precisely, according to the Credit View of Knowledge, if S knows that p, then S deserves credit for truly believing that p. In spite of its intuitive appeal and explanatory power, I have elsewhere argued that the Credit View is false. Various responses
have been offered to my argument and I here consider each of these objections in turn. I show that none succeeds in undermining
my argument and, thus, my original conclusion stands—the Credit View of Knowledge is false.
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Jennifer LackeyEmail: |
6.
7.
Jens Johansson 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2009,12(3):247-256
Chris Heathwood has recently put forward a novel and ingenious argument against the view that intrinsic value is analyzable
in terms of fitting attitudes. According to Heathwood, this view holds water only if the related but distinct concept of welfare—intrinsic
value for a person—can be analyzed in terms of fitting attitudes too. Moreover, he argues against such an analysis of welfare by appealing to
the rationality of our bias towards the future. In this paper, I argue that so long as we keep the tenses and the intrinsic/extrinsic
distinction right, the fitting-attitudes analysis of welfare can be shown to survive Heathwood’s criticism.
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Jens JohanssonEmail: Email: |
8.
9.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Sophia》2009,48(1):1-14
In this paper, I expose a conundrum regarding divine creation as Leibniz conceives of such creation. What energizes the conundrum
is that the concept of omnibenevolence—“consequential omnibenevolence”—that the Leibnizian argument for the view that the
actual world is the best of all possible worlds presupposes, appears to sanction the conclusion that God has no practical
reasons to create the actual world.
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Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
10.
Isabela Ieţcu-Fairclough 《Argumentation》2008,22(3):399-417
This article combines a pragma-dialectical conception of argumentation, a sociological conception of legitimacy and a sociological
theory of the political field. In particular, it draws on the theorization of the political field developed by Pierre Bourdieu
and tries to determine what new insights into the concept of strategic maneuvering might be offered by a sociological analysis
of the political field. I analyze a speech made by the President of Romania, Traian Băsescu, following his suspension by Parliament
in April 2007. I suggest that the argument developed in this speech can be regarded as an example of adjudication and I discuss
its specificity as an adjudication in the political field in an electoral campaign. I also try to relate legitimation as political
strategy to strategic maneuvering oriented to meeting the contradictory demands of the political field, which I see—following
Bourdieu—as involving a double political game, a game of democratic representation and a game of power.
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Isabela Ieţcu-FaircloughEmail: |
11.
Joseph Shieber 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):169-181
In this paper, I take up an argument advanced by Keith DeRose (Philosophical Review, 111:167–203, 2002) that suggests that the knowledge account of assertion provides the basis of an argument in favor of contextualism. I discuss
the knowledge account as the conjunction of two theses—a thesis claiming that knowledge is sufficient to license assertion
KA and one claiming that knowledge is necessary to license assertion AK. Adducing evidence from Stalnaker’s account of assertion,
from conversational practice, and from arguments often raised in favor of the knowledge account, I suggest that neither the
AK nor the KA theses are plausible. That is, I argue that the knowledge account of assertion to which DeRose appeals is in
fact not suitable as an account of assertion. Given that DeRose’s argument stands and falls with the knowledge account, I
claim that the argument therefore fails.
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Joseph ShieberEmail: |
12.
Theories of mind draw on processes that represent mental states and their computational connections; simulation, in addition, draws on processes that replicate (Heal 1986) a sequence of mental states. Moreover, mental simulation can be triggered by input from imagination instead of real perceptions.
To avoid confusion between mental states concerning reality and those created in simulation, imagined contents must be quarantined.
Goldman bypasses this problem by giving pretend states a special role to play in simulation (Goldman 2006). We argue that this path leads to the resurgence of the threat of collapse (Davies 1994), diluting the principled distinction between simulation and theory use. Exploration of a related method of real-mental states
operating in a pretend mode leads to a factually untenable model. Our main goal here is to raise this problem as a challenge
for Goldman’s reconfigured simulation theory. Only at the end we will briefly sketch a possible alternative way of quarantine
that preserves the replicative element of simulation and avoids collapse. Figure 1 provides a guide to our argument.
Fig. 1 Structure of argument
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Josef PernerEmail: |
13.
Jacob Busch 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):55-65
The underdetermination of theory by data argument (UD) is traditionally construed as an argument that tells us that we ought
to favour an anti-realist position over a realist position. I argue that when UD is constructed as an argument saying that
theory choice is to proceed between theories that are empirically equivalent and adequate to the phenomena up until now, the
argument will not favour constructive empiricism over realism. A constructive empiricist cannot account for why scientists
are reasonable in expecting one theory to be empirically adequate rather than another, given the criteria he suggests for
theory choice.
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Jacob BuschEmail: |
14.
Alexander A. Guerrero 《Philosophical Studies》2007,136(1):59-97
This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,”
which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she
is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that
applies most directly to the part I call the “Moral Ignorance Thesis.” Third, I argue for a principle—Don’t Know, Don’t Kill—that
supports the view that the purported counterexample actually is a counterexample. Finally, I suggest that my arguments in
this direction can supply a novel sort of argument against many instances of killing and eating certain sorts of animals.
相似文献
Alexander A. GuerreroEmail: |
15.
Social Externalism and First-Person Authority 总被引:3,自引:2,他引:1
Lynne Rudder Baker 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):287-300
Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices
of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of
defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person
authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with
first-person authority—provides a check on first-personal pronouncements and thus saves first-person authority from being
simply a matter of social convention and from collapsing into the subjectivity of “what seems right is right.”
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Lynne Rudder BakerEmail: |
16.
Richard Dagger 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):259-275
This article defends the fair-play theory of legal punishment against three objections. The first, the irrelevance objection, is the long-standing complaint that fair play fails to capture what it is about crimes that makes criminals deserving of
punishment; the others are the recently raised false-equivalence and lacks-integration objections. In response, I sketch an account of fair-play theory that is grounded in a conception of the political order
as a meta-cooperative practice—a conception that falls somewhere between contractual and communitarian conceptions—and draw on this
account to show how the theory can overcome the objections.
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Richard DaggerEmail: |
17.
Daniel D. Novotny 《Axiomathes》2007,17(1):41-51
According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are
compatible and true—“the world is one”. The aim of this paper is to show that Searle fails to make the compatibility between
mentalism and physicalism intelligible. The paper has three parts: first, I criticize drawing an analogy between solidity
and consciousness as macro-features of systems with micro-features. Second, I argue that Searle’s defence of the ontological
irreducibility of consciousness is terminologically confused and that his argument for the trivial nature of that irreducibility
is unsuccessful. Third, I defend Nagel’s argument for the causal irreducibility of conscious minds by answering some of Searle’s
objections to it.
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Daniel D. NovotnyEmail: |
18.
David Liggins 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):113-127
Much recent discussion in the philosophy of mathematics has concerned the indispensability argument—an argument which aims
to establish the existence of abstract mathematical objects through appealing to the role that mathematics plays in empirical
science. The indispensability argument is standardly attributed to W. V. Quine and Hilary Putnam. In this paper, I show that
this attribution is mistaken. Quine’s argument for the existence of abstract mathematical objects differs from the argument
which many philosophers of mathematics ascribe to him. Contrary to appearances, Putnam did not argue for the existence of
abstract mathematical objects at all. I close by suggesting that attention to Quine and Putnam’s writings reveals some neglected
arguments for platonism which may be superior to the indispensability argument.
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David LigginsEmail: |
19.
20.
Noreen E. Johnson 《Sophia》2007,46(1):69-73
In Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, Michael Martin argues that to posit a God that is both omnipotent and omniscient is philosophically incoherent. I challenge
this argument by proposing that a God who is necessarily omniscient is more powerful than a God who is contingently omniscient.
I then argue that being omnipotent entails being omniscient by showing that for an all-powerful being to be all-powerful in
any meaningful way, it must possess complete knowledge about all states of affairs and thus must be understood to be omniscient.
相似文献
Noreen E. JohnsonEmail: |