共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Enactive appraisal 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Giovanna Colombetti 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(4):527-546
Emotion theorists tend to separate “arousal” and other bodily events such as “actions” from the evaluative component of emotion
known as “appraisal.” This separation, I argue, implies phenomenologically implausible accounts of emotion elicitation and
personhood. As an alternative, I attempt a reconceptualization of the notion of appraisal within the so-called “enactive approach.”
I argue that appraisal is constituted by arousal and action, and I show how this view relates to an embodied and affective
notion of personhood.
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Giovanna ColombettiEmail: |
2.
Alexander A. Guerrero 《Philosophical Studies》2007,136(1):59-97
This paper takes on several distinct but related tasks. First, I present and discuss what I will call the “Ignorance Thesis,”
which states that whenever an agent acts from ignorance, whether factual or moral, she is culpable for the act only if she
is culpable for the ignorance from which she acts. Second, I offer a counterexample to the Ignorance Thesis, an example that
applies most directly to the part I call the “Moral Ignorance Thesis.” Third, I argue for a principle—Don’t Know, Don’t Kill—that
supports the view that the purported counterexample actually is a counterexample. Finally, I suggest that my arguments in
this direction can supply a novel sort of argument against many instances of killing and eating certain sorts of animals.
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Alexander A. GuerreroEmail: |
3.
Daphna Erdinast-Vulcan 《Human Studies》2007,30(4):395-409
In this paper I address some related aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s unfinished texts, The Visible and the Invisible and The Prose of the World. The point of departure for my reading of these works is the sense of philosophical disillusionment which underlies and motivates
them, and which, I argue, leads Merleau-Ponty towards an engagement with art in general and with literature in particular.
I suggest that Merleau-Ponty’s emerging conception of ethics—premised on the paradox of a “universal singularity” and concerned
with the concrete experience of the individual subject, rather than with abstractions and formal categories—can best be articulated
through the formalist concept of “defamiliarization,” the fundamental performativity of all literature, and the dialogic relations
which, though inherent in all discourse, become most powerfully evident in the dynamics of reading.
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Daphna Erdinast-VulcanEmail: |
4.
Jason Kawall 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):153-156
In my “Promising and Supererogation” I argue that one cannot fulfill promises to perform supererogatory actions (such as “I hereby promise to perform one supererogatory action every month”). In a response to my paper, David Heyd argues that there is an alternative solution to the problem I raise. While I agree with much that Heyd says about the examples he discusses, his proposed solution involves a crucial alteration of the problem; his proposed solution does not solve the problem I present.
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Jason KawallEmail: |
5.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Sophia》2009,48(1):1-14
In this paper, I expose a conundrum regarding divine creation as Leibniz conceives of such creation. What energizes the conundrum
is that the concept of omnibenevolence—“consequential omnibenevolence”—that the Leibnizian argument for the view that the
actual world is the best of all possible worlds presupposes, appears to sanction the conclusion that God has no practical
reasons to create the actual world.
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Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
6.
Phillip Montague 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):125-131
This paper is a rejoinder to Thaddeus Metz’s article “Censure Theory Still Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply
to Montague.” In his article, Metz attempts to answer objections to censure theory that I had raised previously. I argue in
my rejoinder that Metz’s defense of censure theory remains seriously problematic despite what he says in his reply.
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Phillip MontagueEmail: |
7.
Wolfgang Fasching 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(2):131-148
In this paper I discuss the nature of the “I” (or “self”) and whether it is presupposed by the very existence of conscious experiences (as that which “has” them) or whether it is, instead, in some way constituted by them. I argue for the former view and try to show that the very nature of experience implies a non-constituted synchronic
and diachronic transcendence of the experiencing “I” with regard to its experiences, an “I” which defies any objective characterization.
Finally I suggest that the self, though irreducible to inter-experiential relations, is not a “separately existing entity”,
but should be conceived of as a dimension, namely the dimension of first-personal manifestation of the experiences.
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Wolfgang FaschingEmail: |
8.
Social Externalism and First-Person Authority 总被引:3,自引:2,他引:1
Lynne Rudder Baker 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):287-300
Social Externalism is the thesis that many of our thoughts are individuated in part by the linguistic and social practices
of the thinker’s community. After defending Social Externalism and arguing for its broad application, I turn to the kind of
defeasible first-person authority that we have over our own thoughts. Then, I present and refute an argument that uses first-person
authority to disprove Social Externalism. Finally, I argue briefly that Social Externalism—far from being incompatible with
first-person authority—provides a check on first-personal pronouncements and thus saves first-person authority from being
simply a matter of social convention and from collapsing into the subjectivity of “what seems right is right.”
相似文献
Lynne Rudder BakerEmail: |
9.
Anti-Autonomism Defended: A Reply to Hill 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Stephen Maitzen 《Philosophia》2008,36(4):567-574
In the current issue of this journal, Scott Hill critiques some of my work on the “is”-“ought” controversy, the Hume-inspired
debate over whether an ethical conclusion can be soundly, or even validly, derived from only non-ethical premises. I’ve argued
that it can be; Hill is unconvinced. I reply to Hill’s critique, focusing on four key questions to which he and I give different
answers.
相似文献
Stephen MaitzenEmail: |
10.
Richard M. Glatz 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):257-272
Harry Frankfurt has famously criticized the principle of alternate possibilities—the principle that an agent is morally responsible
for performing some action only if able to have done otherwise than to perform it—on the grounds that it is possible for an
agent to be morally responsible for performing an action that is inevitable for the agent when the reasons for which the agent
lacks alternate possibilities are not the reasons for which the agent has acted. I argue that an incompatibilist about determinism
and moral responsibility can safely ignore so-called “Frakfurt-style cases” and continue to argue for incompatibilism on the
grounds that determinism rules out the ability to do otherwise. My argument relies on a simple—indeed, simplistic—weakening
of the principle of alternate possibilities that is explicitly designed to be immune to Frankfurt-style criticism. This alternative
to the principle of alternate possibilities is so simplistic that it will no doubt strike many readers as philosophically
fallow. I argue that it is not. I argue that the addition of one highly plausible premise allows for the modified principle
to be employed in an argument for incompatibilism that begins with the observation that determinism rules out the ability
to do otherwise. On the merits of this argument I conclude that deterministic moral responsibility is impossible and that
Frankfurt’s criticism of the principle of alternate possibilities—even if successful to that end—may be safely ignored.
相似文献
Richard M. GlatzEmail: |
11.
Frank Hofmann 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):173-182
Sydney Shoemaker has attempted to save mental causation by a new account of realization. As Brian McLaughlin argues convincingly,
the account has to face two major problems. First, realization does not guarantee entailment. So even if mental properties
are realized by physical properties, they need not be entailed by them. This is the first, rather general metaphysical problem.
A second problem, which relates more directly to mental causation is that Shoemaker must appeal to some kind of proportionality
as a constraint on causation in order to avoid redundant mental causation. I argue that, in addition, a “piling problem” arises,
since causal powers seem to be bestowed twice. Then, I try to sketch an alternative view of the relation between causal powers
and properties—a reductionist view—which fares better on some accounts. But it may have to face another and, perhaps, serious
problem, the “problem of the natural unity of properties”. Finally, I will pose a question about the relation between causal
powers and causation.
相似文献
Frank HofmannEmail: |
12.
13.
Daniel D. Novotny 《Axiomathes》2007,17(1):41-51
According to mentalism some existing things are endowed with (subjectively) conscious minds. According to physicalism all existing things consist entirely of physical particles in fields of force. Searle holds that mentalism and physicalism are
compatible and true—“the world is one”. The aim of this paper is to show that Searle fails to make the compatibility between
mentalism and physicalism intelligible. The paper has three parts: first, I criticize drawing an analogy between solidity
and consciousness as macro-features of systems with micro-features. Second, I argue that Searle’s defence of the ontological
irreducibility of consciousness is terminologically confused and that his argument for the trivial nature of that irreducibility
is unsuccessful. Third, I defend Nagel’s argument for the causal irreducibility of conscious minds by answering some of Searle’s
objections to it.
相似文献
Daniel D. NovotnyEmail: |
14.
David Braun 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):243-262
I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.”
King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.
相似文献
David BraunEmail: |
15.
Edmund Wall 《Philosophia》2008,36(2):237-249
16.
R. Lanier Anderson 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):91-108
Martin offers an intriguing account of nineteenth century challenges to the traditional theory of judgment as a synthesis
of subject and predicate (the synthesis theory)—criticisms motivated largely by the problem posed by existential judgments,
which need not have two terms at all. Such judgments led to a theory of “thetic” judgments, whose essential feature is to
“posit” something, rather than to combine terms (as in synthetic judgment). I argue, however, that Kant’s official definition
of judgment already implicitly recognizes the importance of positing, and that its (otherwise confusing) abstract generality
actually affords Kant’s own logic an adequate way to accommodate existential judgments within the traditional synthesis theory.
Preservation of a synthetic account of judgment is also found to be independently important for Kant’s larger aims in the
theory of cognition.
相似文献
R. Lanier AndersonEmail: |
17.
The Problem of Moral Spontaneity in the Guodian Corpus 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
Edward Slingerland 《Dao》2008,7(3):237-256
This paper discusses certain conceptual tensions in a set of archeological texts from the Warring States period, the Guodian
corpus. One of the central themes of the Guodian corpus is the disanalogy between spontaneous, natural familial relationships
and artificial political relationships. This is problematic because, like many early Chinese texts, the Guodian corpus believes
that political relationships must come to be characterized by unselfconsciousness and spontaneity if social order is to prevail.
This tension will be compared to my earlier work on the “paradox of wu-wei (effortless action),” and the Guodian corpus’ “solution”
to the problem of teaching spontaneity—drawing upon the transformative power of music—will be placed within the landscape
of early “Confucian” and “Daoist” theories concerning human nature and self-cultivation.
相似文献
Edward SlingerlandEmail: |
18.
John Martin Fischer 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):15-20
I explore a key feature of Robert Kane’s libertarianism (about which I have been puzzled for some time). Kane claims that
we should separate issues of alternative possibilities from issues of ultimacy, but he further argues that they are connected
in a certain way. I call into question this connection, and I continue to argue for a strict separation of considerations
pertaining to alternative possibilities and “actual-sequence” considerations.
相似文献
John Martin FischerEmail: |
19.
Igor Douven 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(3):361-375
It is widely believed that the so-called knowledge account of assertion best explains why sentences such as “It’s raining
in Paris but I don’t believe it” and “It’s raining in Paris but I don’t know it” appear odd to us. I argue that the rival
rational credibility account of assertion explains that fact just as well. I do so by providing a broadly Bayesian analysis
of the said type of sentences which shows that such sentences cannot express rationally held beliefs. As an interesting aside,
it will be seen that these sentences also harbor a lesson for Bayesian epistemology itself.
相似文献
Igor DouvenEmail: |
20.
Jeff Wisdom 《Philosophical Studies》2008,138(3):429-434
In this essay I distinguish between a synchronic view of base property exemplification and a diachronic one. I argue that
only a diachronic view of base property exemplification can substantiate a ban on morally mixed worlds. I then argue that
one of Robert Mabrito’s recent criticisms of Russ Shafer-Landau’s moral realism fails on either a synchronic or a diachronic
view.
相似文献
Jeff WisdomEmail: |