Event boundaries and anaphoric reference

The current study explored the finding that parsing a narrative into separate events impairs anaphor resolution. According to the Event Horizon Model, when a narrative event boundary is encountered, a new event model is created. Information associated with the prior event model is removed from working memory. So long as the event model containing the anaphor referent is currently being processed, this information should still be available when there is no narrative event boundary, even if reading has been disrupted by a working-memory-clearing distractor task. In those cases, readers may reactivate their prior event model, and anaphor resolution would not be affected. Alternatively, comprehension may not be as event oriented as this account suggests. Instead, any disruption of the contents of working memory during comprehension, event related or not, may be sufficient to disrupt anaphor resolution. In this case, reading comprehension would be more strongly guided by other, more basic language processing mechanisms and the event structure of the described events would play a more minor role. In the current experiments, participants were given stories to read in which we included, between the anaphor and its referent, either the presence of a narrative event boundary (Experiment 1) or a narrative event boundary along with a working-memory-clearing distractor task (Experiment 2). The results showed that anaphor resolution was affected by narrative event boundaries but not by a working-memory-clearing distractor task. This is interpreted as being consistent with the Event Horizon Model of event cognition.     

Effects of specificity on the interpretation of anaphoric noun phrases

Reading-time experiments on anaphor resolution have produced conflicting results. Some studies have been taken to support a schema-based theory of text comprehension, which claims that the ease of interpreting an anaphor depends on the schemata that are currently activated. Other studies suggest that more specific factors, such as the amount of new information carried by an anaphor, affect the amount of time needed to understand it. This paper reports an experiment designed to confirm the importance of an anaphor's information content in determining how much processing it requires. The experiment also investigates the role of schemata in anaphor resolution. It provides no evidence for schema-based processing. However, it is difficult to decide whether the materials used in the experiment should produce schematic effects. It is argued that this is a fault of schema theory, and unless this fault is rectified the theory cannot be regarded as a serious contender for an account of anaphor resolution.     

The development of discourse mapping processes: the on-line interpretation of anaphoric expressions

The present research focuses on how children integrate the antecedent of different kinds of anaphor into their on-going interpretation of an utterance, and on the kinds of cues they use to help them to do this. These issues were studied by examining the on-line processing of three types of anaphoric devices—repeated noun phrases, general terms and pronoun anaphors. The data showed that by the age of five, anaphoric mapping processes in general are well-mastered, although all age-groups (5, 7, 10 year olds and adults) found general term anaphors more difficult to interpret. The major developmental differences concerned the processing of anaphoric pronouns. For five year olds, pronouns were primarily interpreted as devices which maintained the thematic subject of the discourse, but when there was no thematic subject they relied primarily on pragmatic plausibility in their assignment of pronominal co-reference. As children get older, they are able to take advantage of the lexical properties of pronouns and all three sources of information—lexical, pragmatic inference and the thematic structure of the discourse—play contributory roles in the assignment of reference to a pronoun.     

Category representation for classification and feature inference

This research's purpose was to contrast the representations resulting from learning of the same categories by either classifying instances or inferring instance features. Prior inference learning research, particularly T. Yamauchi and A. B. Markman (1998), has suggested that feature inference learning fosters prototype representation, whereas classification learning encourages exemplar representation. Experiment 1 supported this hypothesis. Averaged and individual participant data from transfer after inference training were better fit by a prototype than by an exemplar model. However, Experiment 2, with contrasting inference learning conditions, indicated that the prototype model was mimicking a set of label-based bidirectional rules, as determined by the inference learning task demands in Experiment 1. Only the set of rules model accounted for all the inference learning conditions in these experiments.     

Levels of sensorimotor representation

Problems of planning coordinated sensorimotor actions are examined within a cohesive framework based on seven levels of movement representation (conceptual, environmental spatial, effector, body spatial, joint motion, joint torque, and muscle) and the relationships existing among these levels. Emphasis is placed on discussions of the spatial motion, joint motion, and joint torque levels in the context of mathematical treatments of the degrees of freedom problem in motor control and the incorporation of environmentally supplied forces into movement planning procedures. Implications of this approach for understanding the nature of skilled actions are discussed, and applications of the mathematical treatments for simulation and experimental studies of coordinated movement are suggested.     

Levels of representation in word processing

Abstract

Four experiments are described examining the effects of words frequency, orthographic structure, and letter spacing on a range of tasks designed to tap different levels of representation in word processing. In Experiment 1, the task was lexical decision. Effects of both frequency (high-frequency words were recognized faster than low-frequency words) and orthographic regularity (illegal non-words were rejected faster than legal non-words) were found. In Experiment 2 subjects had to detect a rotated letter within the letter strings. Effects of orthographic structure emerged, with a marked disadvantage for illegal non-words with respect to the other types of string. No difference was found among high-frequency words, lowfrequency words and legal non-words. In Experiment 3, subjects had to detect a letter elevated above the horizontal plan with respect to the rest of the string. Effects of both spatial arrangement of letters and number of letters were found (spaced strings were responded to less accurately than non-spaced strings and seven-letter extra-spaced strings were responded to slower than the other strings). Neither lexical nor orthograpic variables affected this task. In Experiment 4 subjects had to detect the presence of a bold segment contained in one of the letters in the strings. Performance was unaffected by both lexical and spatial variables. The pattern of results is discussed with reference to a multi-stage model of word recognition in which lexical and spatial variables affect processing at different stages. At a feature map level, in which features are extracted from the discontinuities of light intensities, processing is independent of both spatial and lexical factors. At a letter-shape map level, in which spatial relationships between features are coded, spacing between letters affects encoding. At a graphemic map level, in which letter identities and their relative positions within strings are coded, orthographic variables have an effect. Lexicality and frequency affect only subsequent stages of processing, when stored lexical information is retrieved (e.g. for lexical decision).     

Levels of representation in the electrophysiology of speech perception

Mapping from acoustic signals to lexical representations is a complex process mediated by a number of different levels of representation. This paper reviews properties of the phonetic and phonological levels, and hypotheses about how category structure is represented at each of these levels, and evaluates these hypotheses in light of relevant electrophysiological studies of phonetics and phonology. The paper examines evidence for two alternative views of how infant phonetic representations develop into adult representations, a structure-changing view and a structure-adding view, and suggests that each may be better suited to different kinds of phonetic categories. Electrophysiological results are beginning to provide information about phonological representations, but less is known about how the more abstract representations at this level could be coded in the brain.     

Using logic programming for theory representation and scientific inference

The aim of this paper is to show that logic programming is a powerful tool for representing scientific theories and for scientific inference. In a logic program it is possible to encode the qualitative and quantitative components of a theory in first order predicate logic, which is a highly expressive formal language. A theory program can then be handed to an algorithm that reasons about the theory. We discuss the advantages of logic programming with regard to building formal theories and present a novel software package for scientific inference: Theory Toolbox. Theory Toolbox can derive any conclusions that are entailed by a theory, explain why a certain conclusion follows from a theory, and evaluate a theory with regard to its internal coherence and generalizability. Because logic is, or should be, a cornerstone of scientific practice, we believe that our paper can make an important contribution to scientific psychology.     

Evidence for an anaphoric mechanism within syntactic processing: Some reference relations defy semantic and pragmatic constraints

In three experiments, we examined an interaction between the pronounthey and syntactic analysis. Experiment 1 demonstrates thatthey can slow reading times tois when this verb is visually presented immediately after a sentence fragment ending with an ambiguous expression such asflying kites. This effect seems to involve a coreference assignment linkingthey and the ambiguous expression that influences the syntactic analysis of the latter. Experiments 2 and 3 show that this effect can operate even when coreference betweenthey and the ambiguous expression is implausible. These results support a modular theory of comprehension that includes structurally oriented reference processes with access to some, but not all, of the listener’s knowledge relevant to coreference.     

Teaching inference in personality test interpretation: verbal abstract reasoning and the TAT

Instructors of personality assessment are challenged with teaching students how to execute the tacit thinking skills necessary to make sound test interpretations. The author provides a concrete tool for teaching students how to make interpretive inferences from verbal personality test data utilizing the construct of verbal abstract reasoning. Applied specifically to Thematic Apperception Test interpretation, the author discusses how the construct of verbal abstract reasoning can be utilized: as a model for providing explicit instruction on the implicit process of drawing inferences in test interpretation; for grounding students in data when constructing interpretations and avoiding making overpersonalized interpretations; as a means of basing interpretations on a convergence of data; as a means of gauging the level of confidence one can place in interpretations; and for understanding inferences drawn from other tests, such as the Rorschach.     

Evidence for a central representation of instrument timbre

An information processing account of perception seeks to delineate the stages of processing through which a stimulus passes and determine the properties of the representation at each stage. Research in phonetic perception has identified two stages, the second of which is thought to encode abstract acoustic attributes of sounds. The present study provided a further test of this proposal by assessing whether nonphonetic stimuli could yield results similar to those obtained with phonetic stimuli. Five selective adaptation experiments were carried out with a trumpet—piano timbre continuum. Two manipulations were used to measure abstract encoding: cross-ear presentation of adaptor and test series, and the use of adaptors that were acoustically different from the continuum endpoints. The results provide evidence for an abstract representation of timbre. The similarity of the findings to those in the phonetic adaptation literature is discussed.     

A frequentist interpretation of probability for model-based inductive inference

The main objective of the paper is to propose a frequentist interpretation of probability in the context of model-based induction, anchored on the Strong Law of Large Numbers (SLLN) and justifiable on empirical grounds. It is argued that the prevailing views in philosophy of science concerning induction and the frequentist interpretation of probability are unduly influenced by enumerative induction, and the von Mises rendering, both of which are at odds with frequentist model-based induction that dominates current practice. The differences between the two perspectives are brought out with a view to defend the model-based frequentist interpretation of probability against certain well-known charges, including [i] the circularity of its definition, [ii] its inability to assign ‘single event’ probabilities, and [iii] its reliance on ‘random samples’. It is argued that charges [i]–[ii] stem from misidentifying the frequentist ‘long-run’ with the von Mises collective. In contrast, the defining characteristic of the long-run metaphor associated with model-based induction is neither its temporal nor its physical dimension, but its repeatability (in principle); an attribute that renders it operational in practice. It is also argued that the notion of a statistical model can easily accommodate non-IID samples, rendering charge [iii] simply misinformed.     

Five-year-olds' handling of reference and description in the domains of language and mental representation

Children's concurrent success on false belief tasks and their handling of two labels for one object (e.g., bunny/rabbit) has been interpreted as demonstrating understanding about the essential features of representation. Three experiments reveal the limitations in 5-year-olds' understanding for both mental and linguistic representations. We report relatively poor performance on a task involving two labels for one object (e.g., dice/eraser) which required children to treat another's knowledge as representing only some of the feature of its real referent: Dice but not eraser. Five year olds who made errors also had difficulty handling the fact that a written word 'dice' referring to such a dice/eraser, can also be applied to a standard dice but not to a standard eraser. These children lacked metalinguistic awareness of words as entities that both refer and describe.     

Levels of interpersonal complementarity: a simplex representation

The relations among different measures of interpersonal behavior and complementarity across level were examined in one session of a sample of therapy dyads (N = 26) and in an interaction between college students (N = 108). Four levels of complementarity, trait, aggregate situation, behavioral interchanges, and behavioral interchanges with base rates removed were examined as they covaried among themselves and with interaction evaluations. The four levels of complementarity were found to be fit by a simplex structure, and this structure was related to interaction evaluation in both samples. The complementarity-evaluation relation was mediated by base-rate-corrected complementarity. Implications relative to the operationalization of complementarity are discussed.     

The initial representation in reasoning towards an interpretation of conditional sentences

All accounts of human reasoning (whether presented at the symbolic or subsymbolic level) have to reckon with the temporal organization of the human processing systems and the ephemeral nature of the representations it uses. We present three new empirical tests for the hypothesis that people commence the interpretational process by constructing a minimal initial representation. In the case of if A then C the initial representation captures the occurrence of the consequent, C, within the context of the antecedent, A. Conditional inference problems are created by a categorical premise that affirms or denies A or C. The initial representation allows an inference when the explicitly represented information matches (e.g., the categorical premise A affirms the antecedent "A") but not when it mismatches (e.g., "not-A" denies A). Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed that people tend to accept the conclusion that "nothing follows" for the denial problems, as indeed they do not have a determinate initial-model conclusion. Experiment 3 demonstrated the other way round that the effect of problem type (affirmation versus denial) is reduced when we impede the possibility of inferring a determinate conclusion on the basis of the initial representation of both the affirmation and the denial problems.     

The initial representation in reasoning towards an interpretation of conditional sentences

All accounts of human reasoning (whether presented at the symbolic or subsymbolic level) have to reckon with the temporal organization of the human processing systems and the ephemeral nature of the representations it uses. We present three new empirical tests for the hypothesis that people commence the interpretational process by constructing a minimal initial representation. In the case of if A then C the initial representation captures the occurrence of the consequent, C, within the context of the antecedent, A. Conditional inference problems are created by a categorical premise that affirms or denies A or C. The initial representation allows an inference when the explicitly represented information matches (e.g., the categorical premise A affirms the antecedent “A”) but not when it mismatches (e.g., “not-A” denies A). Experiments 1 and 2 confirmed that people tend to accept the conclusion that “nothing follows” for the denial problems, as indeed they do not have a determinate initial-model conclusion. Experiment 3 demonstrated the other way round that the effect of problem type (affirmation versus denial) is reduced when we impede the possibility of inferring a determinate conclusion on the basis of the initial representation of both the affirmation and the denial problems.