Prima facie obligation

This paper presents a nonmonotonic deontic logic based on commonsense entailment. It establishes criteria a successful account of obligation should satisfy, and develops a theory that satisfies them. The theory includes two conditional notions of prima facie obligation. One is constitutive; the other is epistemic, and follows nonmonotonically from the constitutive notion. The paper defines unconditional notions of prima facie obligation in terms of the conditional notions.     

Prima facie and seeming duties

Sir David Ross introduced prima facie duties, or acts with a tendency to be duties proper. He also spoke of general prima facie principles, wwhich attribute to acts having some feature the tendency to be a duty proper. Like Utilitarians from Mill to Hare, he saw a role for such principles in the epistemology of duty: in the process by means of which, in any given situation, a moral code can help us to find out what we ought to do.After formalizing general prima facie principles as universally quantified conditionals I will show how seeming duties can be detached from them. There will be examples involving lies, burnt offerings and the question of whether to have a napkin on your lap while eating asparagus. They will illustrate the defeasibility of this detachment, how it can lead into dilemmas, and how general prima facie principles are overridden by more specific ones.I've been lucky to discuss parts of this project with among others Jeff Horty, Paul McNamara, Alasdair MacIntyre, Wlodek Rabinowicz and Michael Slote. Thanks, too, to Henry Prakken and the reviewers for Studia Logica     

Obligation,Responsibility, and History

I argue that, each of the following, appropriately clarified to yield a noteworthy thesis, is true. (1) Moral obligation can affect moral responsibility. (2) Obligation succumbs to changes in responsibility. (3) Obligation is immune from changes in responsibility.     

Frankfurt-Type Examples, Obligation, and Responsibility

I examine John Martin Fischer's attempt to block an argument for the conclusion that without alternative possibilities, morally deontic judgments (judgments of moral right, wrong, and obligation) cannot be true. I then criticize a recent attempt to sustain the principle that an agent is morally blameworthy for performing an action only if this action is morally wrong. I conclude with discussing Fisher's view that even if causal determinism undermines morally deontic judgments, it still leaves room for other significant moral assessments including assessments of moral blameworthiness.     

Ability,Frankfurt Examples,and Obligation

Frankfurt examples invite controversy over whether the pertinent agent in these examples lacks the specific (as opposed to the general) ability to do otherwise, and whether what she does can be obligatory or permissible. We develop an account of ability that implies that this agent does not have the specific ability to refrain from performing the germane action. The account also undergirds a view of obligation that entails that it is morally required or prohibited for an agent to perform an action only if she has the specific ability to do, and to do otherwise than, perform it. Therefore, in Frankfurt examples, it is neither obligatory nor impermissible for the relevant agent to do what she does.     

Right, Equality, and the Fairness Obligation

The principle of fairness holds that individuals (beneficiaries) who benefit from a cooperative scheme of others (cooperators) have an obligation to do their share in return for their benefit. The original proponent of this principle, H. L. A. Hart suggests ‘mutuality of restrictions’ as a moral basis because it is fair to mutually restrict the freedom of both beneficiaries and cooperators; so called the fairness obligation. This paper explores ‘mutuality of restrictions’, which is interpreted as a right-based and an equality-based justification of the fairness obligation. It is not argued whether both ways of justifying the obligation makes a success, but that they are in need of presupposing that there is a duty for beneficiaries to do their share in return for their benefit. This suggests turning to a duty-based justification of the fairness obligation.     

Professions, Trades, and the Obligation to Inform

ABSTRACT The concept of a 'professional', as distinguished from that of a 'tradesman', encompasses both white collar workers and those who produce excellent work in any occupation. These divergent meanings have a common philosophical source in the way workers justify their work. A worker becomes a professonal by professing reasons for doing his work in a certain way. A worker is a tradesman if the value of his work in trade is the sole justification for the way it is done. Workers can be both professionals and tradesmen, unless what the consumer will buy and what is proper are different, placing 'reason value'and 'trade value'into conflict. Value conflicts are most likely in occupations involving a high level of theoretical knowledge, where the consumer has trouble judging what is proper. Thus, we say that professional persons work in white collar occupations, but that is misleading, for 'professional'is a way of handling value conflicts, not a kind of work. In value conflicts the worker has an obligation to inform the consumer—to profess reasons—about what is proper work.     

The Obligation Dilemma

I motivate a dilemma to show that nothing can be obligatory for anyone regardless of whether determinism or indeterminism (the falsity of determinism) is true. The deterministic horn, to which prime attention is directed, exploits the thesis that obligation requires freedom to do otherwise. Since determinism precludes such freedom, it precludes obligation too. The indeterministic horn allows for freedom to do otherwise but assumes the burden of addressing whether indeterministically caused choices or actions are too much of a matter of luck to be obligatory for anyone. I critically discuss a response to the deterministic horn that invokes the distinction between alternatives compatible with determinism (weak alternatives) and those incompatible with determinism (strong alternatives).     

责任的误读与责任理性的恢复

当前,"责任政府"不仅是国民心中热切的政治期待,而且也正式成为政府的政治承诺.然而,为什么目前会出现"责任政府"的提法?责任在我国是否已经构成为问题?何谓责任?责任的重要意义是什么?责任与价值观之间的内在联系是什么?建立"责任政府"的具体含义是什么?……正是在提出上述问题并希望予以合理回答的过程中,我们发现,在有关责任的问题上,我们原有的认识是远远不够的,而且更为甚者,我们已在不自觉中陷入到因误读而形成的预设性责任幻觉之中.本文并不打算探讨一般的责任理性问题,而仅想在追问责任的内涵、意义、价值观特征等方面为责任理性的恢复做些概念上的准备.     

Procreation,Adoption and the Contours of Obligation

The goal of this article is to evaluate the defensibility of wide‐spread beliefs concerning the moral value of procreating. Very many of us are ‘pro‐natal’ — that is, we have a positive moral view of making more people — but pro‐natalism is under serious threat. In particular, I argue that combining several arguments in procreative ethics generates a powerful case for the Anti‐Natal Pro‐Adoption View (ANPA), or the view that we are obligated not to procreate, but instead to satisfy any parenting desires through adoption. Although this article ultimately serves as a defence against ANPA, it does so in a very limited way: while it is false that we are obligated to adopt‐rather‐than‐procreate, I contend, this does not mean that we are off the moral hook altogether. Failing in our obligations is only one way to fail morality. Our procreative acts may yet be bad, dishonourable, selfish, and open to multiple other criticisms. And indeed, I'm afraid many of them are.