The self in Kierkegaard's pseudonyms

Conclusion This is essentially what I take to be Kierkegaard's ontological foundation of human existence. It is the structure which both makes possible and unifies the different modes of existing which he so fully describes in his pseudonyms. The further task is one of demonstrating concretely the relation of these modes (stages) of existing to his ontology.This essay will appear in my book, Being and Existence in Kierkegaard's Pseudonyms, to be published by Princeton University Press in 1975. I would like to thank the Princeton University Pres for permission to publish a portion of the book in this journal. I would also like to acknowledge my colleagues' helpful criticisms of the original draft of this paper which I read in a departmental seminar at Iowa State University last fall. Some of their suggestions were incorporated in the final draft.     

Control of movement patterns in animals

As a more junior Fellow of the same college in Cambridge as Sir Frederic Bartlett, I am especially glad of this opportunity to join with members of the Experimental Psychology Society in honouring him. It would be superfluous for me to speak here of Sir Frederic's academic achievements: so many of our members are engaged in research on problems which sprung from his pioneering work, and his influence on the development of psychology as a science certainly needs no elaboration by me. But I would like to make one personal remark. I suppose all younger men feel that there are just a very few members of the preceding generation who have achieved a stature which will always be beyond the reach of any of their own contemporaries. Sir Frederic has always been one of those for me. I am speaking here not only of his academic achievements, but of his kindness as a man; and I would like to tell him how much I valued his willingness to share some of the benefits of his experience when I was blundering about on the borders of his subject.     

Time and modality in the logic of agency

Recent theories of agency (sees to it that) of Nuel Belnap and Michael Perloff are examined, particularly in the context of an early proposal of the author.Elements of this paper formed the contents of lectures I gave in New Zealand and Australia in 1989. I would like again to thank Graham Oddie at Massey University, in Palmerston North, Jack Copeland at the University of Canterbury, in Christchurch, John Bacon at the University of Sydney, and Graham Priest at the University of Queensland for their kindness and the gracious receptions they and their colleagues gave me. My thanks go to Graham Oddie and Krister Segerberg, who organized a workshop on Events, Processes, Actions at Lake Taupo, New Zealand, in November 1989, and invited me to participate with a preliminary version of this paper. In June 1990, I presented a fuller specimen at the annual meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy, in Wakulla Springs, Florida. Bob Beard at Florida State University organized that splendid gathering, and I am grateful to him for the opportunity to speak at it.For the past several years, Nuel Belnap has sent me copies and updates of his and Michael Perloff's papers. I would like to record my gratitude to him for this and also, especially, for extended comments on the penultimate draft of the present paper. With a few exceptions, I have not tried to take these into account here; I hope that discussions of points on which we disagree will find their way into print in due course.I would also like to acknowledge and thank a referee for a number of helpful suggestions.My largest debt is to Krister Segerberg, who as professor and head of the philosophy department at the University of Auckland invited me to spend a sabbatical autumn (antipodal spring) with him in 1989. It was he who suggested — and then insisted — that I contribute to his seminar on modal logic and agency a session or two on Belnap and Perloff's theories, and then he encouraged me to write this paper. I would like to express my deep gratitude as well to Krister and Anita Segerberg for their hospitality and companionship during my stay in New Zealand.     

Extending Compatibilism: Control,Responsibility, And Blame

In this paper, I argue that ‹moral responsibility’ refers to two concepts, not to one. In the first place, we are not ultimately morally responsible or, therefore, unqualifiedly blameworthy, due to the fact that we lack ultimate forms of control. But, second, it is legitimate to consider us to be morally responsible in another sense, and therefore qualifiedly blameworthy, once we have certain forms of control. Consequently, I argue that our normal practice of blaming is unjust, since it requires that we are ultimately morally responsible. I contend that this practice must, on grounds of justice, be tempered by adequate consideration of the fact that we are not ultimately morally responsible. My proposal in this regard is that blaming be replaced by admonishment. I would like to thank Dr. Cara Nine and Dr. David Hemp (University College Cork), and the two anonymous referees at Res Publica for their helpful comments on this paper.     

Coping with the Angry Patient

This patient is enacting two chronic maladaptive patterns. In one he alternates between the role of victim and abuser while inducing the therapist to play the counterrole. He tries to master the abuse he suffered passively as a child by becoming abusive with the therapist and having her experience what it feels like to be mistreated. My effort would be to interpret this pattern even while acknowledging and absorbing some degree of his anger. In a second pattern he acts like an angry, demanding child in an effort to extract nurturance and special treatment from the therapist. I would help him explore this posture in terms of his deprived background and its maladaptiveness in his current life. Finally, I present vignettes from my own practice to demonstrate how I work with patients' anger when it is expressed indirectly rather than in Mr. P's very direct manner.     

The context principle and Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's theory of types

In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.I would like to thank Michael Wrigley (UNICAMP) and Gottfried Gabriel (Universität Konstanz) as well as an anonymous journal referee for their valuable comments on a previous version of this paper.     

Persistence,change, and explanation

I would like to express my deepest gratitude to George Myro for his wonderful insight, advice, and support, in writing this paper. I would also like to thank Ermanno Bencivenga, John Broome, Janet Broughton, Alan Code, Paul Grice, Mark Johnston, David Lewis, Paul Kube, Dugald Owen, Steve Yablo, and Colloquium participants at University of Virginia and Ohio State University for their very helpful discussions.     

Kierkegaard's ironic ladder to authentic faith

I would like to express my gratitude to Jonathan Rée for his valuable comments on the first draft of this paper, which is a shorter version of a chapter of myA Search for Authenticity, to be published by Routledge, London.     

The wall and the shield K-K reconsidered

With apologies to Professor Sosa. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Eastern Division Meetings of the APA held in Washington, D.C., December 27 through December 30, 1988. I would like to thank my commentator Professor Gary Gleb of Rutgers University for his thoughtful comments, I also wish to thank Glenn Ross, Steven Davis and Arthur Ripstein for their sound advice.     

The sense of smell: Morality and rhetoric in the Bramhall-Hobbes controversy

Olfactoric imagery is abundantly employed in the Bramhall-Hobbes controversy. I survey some examples and then turn to the possible significance of this. I argue that by forcing Hobbes into the figurative exchange Bramhall scores points in terms of moving the controversy into ground that is not covered by the limited view of rationality that Hobbes is committed to according to his rhetoric (at least as Bramhall perceives it). Bramhall clearly wants to move from cool argument to a more affluent rhetorical appeal. I argue that choosing such a richer epistemology coheres with Bramhall’s deeper anxieties regarding the moral method used in the Leviathan. This essay thus deviates from other form-content analysis of Hobbes, in attempting to examine his rhetoric in practice, under the pressure of controversy. My more general concern is in relating seemingly formal polemical choices to moral concerns. A previous version of this paper was read before a meeting of a German-Israeli controversy research group (headed by M. Dascal and G. Fritz) dedicated to the study of early modern controversies (Giessen, 2000). I am indebted to participants of that meeting for excellent comments and suggestion. I would also like to acknowledge the way by which Dascal’s pioneering work on the philosophical and historical importance of studying controversies has inspired this particular essay.     

Aristotle on the Homonymy of Being

A number of philosophers endorse, without argument, the view that there's something it's like consciously to think that p , which is distinct from what it's like consciously to think that q . This thesis, if true, would have important consequences for philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I offer two arguments for it.
The first argument claims it would be impossible introspectively to distinguish conscious thoughts with respect to their content if there weren't something it's like to think them. This argument is defended against several objections.
The second argument uses what I call "minimal pair" experiences—sentences read without and with understanding—to induce in the reader an experience of the kind I claim exists. Further objections are considered and rebutted.     

Reichenbach on the relative a priori and the context of discovery/justification distinction

Hans Reichenbach introduced two seemingly separate sets of distinctions in his epistemology at different times. One is between the axioms of coordination and the axioms of connections. The other distinction is between the context of discovery and the context of justification. The status and nature of each of these distinctions have been subject-matter of an ongoing debate among philosophers of science. Thus, there is a significant amount of works considering both distinctions separately. However, the relevance of Reichenbach’s two distinctions to each other does not seem to have enjoyed the same amount of interest so far. This is what I would like to consider in this paper. In other words, I am concerned with the question: what kind of relationship is there between his two distinctions, if there is any?     

A significance test for multisample sphericity

The paper obtains a maximum likelihood criterion test for multisample sphericity. The test contains Mauchly's sphericity test as a special case.I would like to thank Professor R. E. Bargmann for his most valuable help.     

Tooley's solution to the inference problem

Conclusion Tooley's speculative theory, I have tried to show, is beset with difficulties. I warned that this theory threatens to fail in its goal of illuminating the possible nature of a necessitation relation if it employs radical principles about parts and wholes and universals. Secondly, I argued that regardless of how we interpret the crucial phrase existing only as a part of, the speculative theory cannot solve the inference problem without appealing to such radical principles. Finally, I considered and rejected a version of Tooley's speculative theory that attempts to solve the inference problem using the Indiscernibility of Identicals.I conclude that the speculative theory fails. Tooley must fall back to the stipulative theory and live with the lack of an illuminating solution to the inference problem. But this is not to admit defeat. While it would be nice to have a more complete account of its workings, we may view the introduction of the necessitation relation as a theoretical posit, analogous to the positing of subatomic particles in physics to account for various data.I would like to thank Phillip Bricker for his persistent help with this paper. I would also like to thank David Lewis and an anonymous referee for Philosophical Studies for their comments.     

Family resemblances and criteria

In §66 ofPhilosophical Investigations Wittgenstein looks for something common to various games and finds only an interconnecting network of resemblances. These are family resemblances. Sympathetic as well as unsympathetic readers have interpreted him as claiming that games form a family in virtue of these resemblances. This assumes Wittgenstein inverted the relation between being a member of a family and bearing family resemblances to others of that family. (The Churchills bear family resemblances to one another because they belong to the same family, they don't belong to the same family because they resemble one another.) A close reading ofInvestigations gives no evidence that Wittgenstein made this mistake. Rather, family resemblances may play a role like the one criteria play for psychological terms. They give excellent but fallible evidence for membership in the extensions of some terms.Don't look only for similarities in order to justify a concept, but also for connexions. The father transmits his name to his son even if the latter is quite unlike him.¹ I would like to thank Felicia Ackerman, Donna Summerfield, and the Texas A+M Reading Group for comments on earlier drafts of this paper. And, most of all, I would like to thank Bernard Gert for his help and encouragement.     

Commentary for special issue of Applied Cognitive Psychology in honor of Alan Scoboria

The world would be a better place if there were more people like Alan. What an extraordinary convergence of kindness, reflectiveness, persistence, ethics, breadth of knowledge, and raw smarts! He positively and substantially contributed to cognitive, clinical, and social psychology, and to the lives of his students and collaborators. This collection carries that legacy forward. Alan would have relished reading every one of these articles. I am honored by the opportunity to comment. I hope to do so in a way that Alan would approve. I begin with a brief reflection on one of the “big picture” ideas in Alan's work. Then I discuss several issues that I know were near and dear to Alan and that have also occupied my own thinking for years. In addition to scientific accounts of true and false beliefs and memories, my comments are informed by the methodological reform movement. As an oldster, I also take this opportunity to mention a few earlier issues/findings that relate to current controversies.     

Einstein,Ethics and Science

In celebration of Einstein's remarkable achievements in 1905, this essay examines some of his views on the role of “intellectuals” in developing and advocating socio-economic and political positions and policies, the historical roots of his ethical views and certain aspects of his philosophy of science. As an outstanding academic and public citizen, his life and ideas continue to provide good examples of a life well-used and worth remembering.*An earlier version of this paper was presented at a regional meeting of the Royal Society of Canada, held at the University of Guelph, Ontario, May 2, 2005. I would like to thank O.P. Dwivedi for inviting me to write the paper and Deborah C. Poff for helping me clarify some ideas in it.     

Causality and things in themselves

In this paper I examine Kant's use of causal language to characterize things in themselves. Following Nicholas Rescher, I contend that Kant's use of such causal language can only be understood by first coming to grips with the relation of things in themselves to appearances. Unlike Rescher, however, I argue that things in themselves and appearances are not numerically distinct entities. Rather, I claim that it is things in themselves that we are intentionally related to in veridical experience, though of course we know them only as they appear to us via our subjective experiential faculties. In light of this account of the role of things in themselves in Kant's account of experience, I argue that his use of causal locutions to describe things in themselves is simply his attempt to capture the fact that as the objects that we are related to in experience, the existence of things in themselves is presupposed by any account of the nature of our experienceof them.Substantial work on this paper was done while I attended the National Endowment for the Humanities 1986 Summer Seminar given by Hector-Neri Castañeda at Indiana University. I would like to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities for their support, and Professor Castañeda and the other members of the seminar for their many invaluable comments, suggestions, and criticisms.