Is this happiness I see? Biases in the identification of emotional facial expressions in depression and social phobia

The present study was designed to examine the operation of depression-specific biases in the identification or labeling of facial expression of emotions. Participants diagnosed with major depression and social phobia and control participants were presented with faces that expressed increasing degrees of emotional intensity, slowly changing from a neutral to a full-intensity happy, sad, or angry expression. The authors assessed individual differences in the intensity of facial expression of emotion that was required for the participants to accurately identify the emotion being expressed. The depressed participants required significantly greater intensity of emotion than did the social phobic and the control participants to correctly identify happy expressions and less intensity to identify sad than angry expressions. In contrast, social phobic participants needed less intensity to correctly identify the angry expressions than did the depressed and control participants and less intensity to identify angry than sad expressions. Implications of these results for interpersonal functioning in depression and social phobia are discussed.     

Mood-congruent memory in depression: emotional priming or elaboration?

We investigated whether mood-congruent memory (MCM) bias in depression is a function of implicit or explicit memory. Implicit memory is taken as a measure of ease of activation, whereas explicit memory also taps elaboration. As expected, MCM bias was found in the explicit memory task but not in the implicit memory task. We believe this finding supports the involvement of elaborative mechanisms in MCM. In addition, memory bias was found with words related to depression but not with words denoting physical threat. Thus, the MCM bias in explicit memory was found to be specific to information that was congruent with depression rather than to all negative information.     

Thought suppression: specificity in agoraphobia versus broad impairment in social phobia?

The paradoxical effects of intended thought suppression have been linked to psychological disorders, specifically anxiety disorders. So far, the evidence for thought suppression playing a major role in the disorder is mixed. One important issue is whether thought suppression is impaired only for thoughts related to the disorder, or if the ability for mental control is generally impaired in anxiety patients. This study compared groups of agoraphobics and social phobics with a healthy control group. All subjects were asked to suppress two topics related to the respective central fear of the two disorders and one nonspecific topic. We found a rather specific deficit in thought suppression for the agoraphobics; that is, when compared with the control group, we found the biggest differences for the agoraphobic fear. The social phobics seem to be characterized by a general impairment of mental control, affecting specific and nonspecific stimuli. In addition, among several psychopathological variables, social anxiety proved to be the strongest predictor for problems with thought suppression. Taken together, there are several indicators that generally impaired thought suppression may be an important feature of social phobia.     

Subclinical and clinical depression: Are analogue studies justifiable?

A group of subclinically depressed students SS (N = 36) was compared with a group of mildly depressed patients MP (N = 48) and a group of severely depressed patients SP (N = 33) on 21 raw symptom severity scores in the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). Stepwise discriminant function analysis yielded two significant functions, the first representing severity in core symptoms of depression. Symptom severity scores were then adjusted to allow for differences in total BDI scores among the groups and the adjusted scores were reanalysed. Two significant functions were again found, the first representing severity in only three of the core symptoms defining depression according to DSM III. The adjusted scores were further adjusted to equate the groups for differences in score variance and the discriminant analysis was repeated. Again two significant functions were found. The first, clearly representing a dimension of subclinical-clinical depression, was defined by a set of core symptoms smaller than that specified in the DSM III definition of major depression. It is argued that clinical and subclinical depression differ mainly in the absolute severity of the core symptoms defining depression but that subclinical shows a relative emphasis of some, and a relative de-emphasis of other core symptoms. It is concluded that subclinical depression in students offers a fairly accurate ‘model’ of clinical depression and that analogue studies are, to a reasonable extent, justifiable.     

Attempted suppression of social threat thoughts: Differential effects for social phobia and healthy controls?

Thought suppression research in the area of social phobia provides conflicting evidence regarding whether individuals demonstrate a general deficit or successful suppression. This paper reports the outcome of two studies using an online thought suppression paradigm measuring activation of target thoughts. Study 1 examined the effects of suppressing social threat stimuli with a healthy control group. Surprisingly, the results showed that participants demonstrated non-suppression of this stimuli class. Study 2 compared individuals with social phobia to a control group using the same stimuli as Study 1. Results revealed that following instructions to suppress social threat stimuli, individuals with social phobia demonstrated successful suppression, whilst the control group, as in Study 1, did not. The lack of suppression of social threat information by the control group may reflect functional impression-management of social threat stimuli. Whereas, successful suppression of these stimuli by individuals with social phobia, may contribute to diminished habituation to such information.     

Fostering social and emotional intelligence: What are the best current strategies in parenting?

This review focuses on parenting practices that are beneficial or antagonistic to the development of emotional and social intelligence in children. We start by reviewing the somewhat nebulous concepts of emotional and social intelligence. This is followed by an examination of the association between well‐known parenting styles such as authoritative, authoritarian, permissive, and directive parenting and various indicators of child emotional and social intelligence. The strategic emotion‐coaching parenting style is also examined for its connections to comparable child outcomes. Parenting practices such as inductive discipline and parental availability also appear to cultivate emotional and social intelligence in children. Finally, overparenting is discussed as a parenting practice that apparently corrupts the development of these traits in emerging adults. We conclude that best practices, where emotional intelligence and social intelligence are the benchmarks, blend parental care and concern with a degree of parental demands on children that are appropriate for their developmental stage.     

Group remembering: does social loafing underlie collaborative inhibition?

When people collaborate to recall information, they experience collaborative inhibition, a deficit in recall relative to nominal groups (the pooled, nonredundant recall of individuals working alone). That is, people recalling in groups do not perform up to their potential. Collaborative inhibition may be due to retrieval interference (e.g., B. H. Basden, D. R. Basden, S. Bryner, & R. L. Thomas, 1997) or to motivational factors such as social loafing in the group situation. Five experiments examined the role of motivational factors by varying monetary incentives, recall criterion, personal accountability, group cohesion, and group gender. Increasing motivation sometimes increased the overall level of recall but failed to eliminate the collaborative inhibition effect. The results suggest that collaboration interferes with an individual's ability to reconstruct his or her knowledge.     

Non‐specific encoding of threat in social phobia and panic disorder

This study employs a release of proactive interference technique to explore encoding‐related processes in social phobia. Twenty‐six individuals with social phobia and 24 individuals with panic disorder participated in the memory task. Significant release of proactive interference was found when neutral and threat dimensions were encoded, but not when social and physical threat dimensions, or when positive and threat dimensions were presented. Threat was therefore differently encoded depending on the active encoding context in which semantic processing occurred. Individuals with social phobia or panic disorder did not differ in the release of proactive interference. The present experiment consequently yields little support for the specificity hypothesis in memory of anxious individuals. Instead, the findings generally demonstrate that threat encoding is similar for people with social phobia and those with panic disorder.     

Intelligence and emotional disorders: Is the worrying and ruminating mind a more intelligent mind?

Previous research has shown that anxiety and depression symptoms are negatively associated with measures of intelligence. However, this research has often not taken state distress and test anxiety into account, and recent findings indicate possible positive relationships between generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), worry, and intelligence. The present study examined the relationships between GAD, depression, and social anxiety symptoms, as well as their underlying cognitive processes of worry, rumination, and post-event processing, with verbal and non-verbal intelligence in an undergraduate sample (N = 126). While the results indicate that verbal intelligence has positive relationships with GAD and depression symptoms when test anxiety and state negative affect were taken into account, these relationships became non-significant when overlapping variance was controlled for. However, verbal intelligence was a unique positive predictor of worry and rumination severity. Non-verbal intelligence was a unique negative predictor of post-event processing. The possible connections between intelligence and the cognitive processes that underlie emotional disorders are discussed.     

Social anxiety in children: social skills deficit, or cognitive distortion?

BACKGROUND: Treatments for childhood social anxiety have traditionally employed social skills training, based on the assumption that effected children have social skills deficits. Recent conceptualisations of social anxiety in adults have questioned this assumption, and have suggested that socially anxious individuals merely believe that they have skill deficits. A recent study using children provided preliminary confirmation of this for younger populations, and also suggested that beliefs about appearing nervous are of particular importance. METHODS: Two groups of children, aged 10-11 years (analogue high social anxiety/low social anxiety), participated in a conversation with an unfamiliar adult. They then rated their performance in a number of domains, after which independent observers also rated their performances. RESULTS: Independent observers were unable to distinguish between the low and high social anxiety groups. However, high socially anxious children rated themselves as appearing significantly less skilled than their low socially anxious counterparts. Notably, high socially anxious children rated themselves particularly poorly in terms of how nervous they looked. CONCLUSIONS: Socially anxious children may not necessarily display social skill deficits. However, they may believe that they appear nervous during social encounters. Clinicians should consider using CBT techniques to address these concerns, rather than relying on social skill remediation.     

Sudden gains in cognitive behavioral treatment for depression: when do they occur and do they matter?

Despite the use of efficacious treatments for depression, individuals differ in both the degree to which they recover and the rate at which recovery occurs. Tang and colleagues found that depressed patients who had sudden improvements in their symptomatology not only maintained these gains, but also enjoyed more improvement and higher rates of recovery than those without sudden gains (J. Consulting Clin. Psychol. 67(6) (1999) 894; J. Consulting Clin. Psychol. 70(2) (2002) 444). Our study examined the role of sudden gains in a cognitive-behavioral group treatment for depression. Results indicated that 41.9% of patients experienced sudden gains. Furthermore, sudden gains occurring in the first third of treatment appear to have special importance. Participants enjoying early sudden gains had significantly larger changes in depressive symptom scores over the course of treatment than those without sudden gains and were marginally more likely to be treatment responders compared to those without early sudden gains. In contrast to Tang and DeRubeis (J. Consulting Clin. Psychol. 67(6) (1999) 894), however, sudden gains were not associated with cognitive changes.     

Are cognitive symptoms of schizophrenia mediated by abnormalities in emotional arousal?

We tested 28 individuals with schizophrenia (SZ) and 16 healthy individuals on a test of logical reasoning and "cognitive gating," defined as the ability to discriminate between relevant and irrelevant information in confirming or disconfirming a given belief. The Logical Reasoning and Cognitive Gating Task tests both processes under neutral and affect-laden conditions. This is done by presenting formally identical constructs using benign and emotionally arousing language. When separated by symptom profiles, we found statistically significant differences for performance and arousal response between patients with delusions, patients with formal thought disorder, and patients with neither delusions nor formal thought disorder, as well as between patients and healthy controls. When analyzed by error type, we found that nearly all errors by delusional patients were caused by overly restrictive information choice, a pattern that may be related to a delusional patient's tendency to "jump to conclusions" on Bayesian probabilistic tasks. This is in contrast to patients with formal thought disorder, whose low performance resulted also from overly extensive information choice. The tendencies towards restriction were exacerbated by arousal, which is consistent with studies on cognition and arousal in healthy individuals. After briefly examining research on emotional arousal and SZ, and the interaction between emotional arousal and restriction of perceptual cues in healthy individuals, we conclude by suggesting a model which accounts for the distinctive cognitive characteristics of delusional patients by their possessing distinct vulnerabilities to emotional arousal. Specifically, these results suggest the possibility that delusional patients process information in a manner that is essentially intact. However, delusional patients may possess an acute vulnerability to emotional arousal that might cause delusional individuals to behave cognitively as if they were healthy individuals under significantly more severe forms of stress.     

Psychiatric disorders and dissatisfaction with social relationships: does type of relationship matter?

The specificity of the association between 9 Axis I psychiatric disorders and quality of the relationship with spouse, relatives, and friends was evaluated for married participants who completed the Ontario Health Survey Mental Health Supplement (N = 4,933). When the authors controlled for the quality of other social relationships, not getting along with one's spouse was related to 6 disorders, with the strongest associations found for generalized anxiety disorder, major depression, panic, and alcohol problems; 4 associations remained significant when they controlled for comorbid disorders. Not getting along with relatives and friends was generally unrelated to psychiatric disorders when they controlled for the other social relationships. Results indicate that the association between marital quality and psychiatric disorders is not an artifact of general social dissatisfaction and that this association is significant for several disorders.     

Can mindfulness modify your thoughts? A study in the context of social phobia

IntroductionSocial phobia is said to be the commonest anxiety disorder (Furmark, 2002). Cognitive Behavior Therapy appears to be the most recommended form of psychological treatment for this condition (Federoff & Taylor, 2001; Willutzki et al., 2012). Dismantling studies have raised doubts regarding the utility of cognitive restructuring in bringing about decrease in symptoms (Barrera et al., 2016; Pompoli et al., 2018). Mindfulness, a ‘third-wave’ concept, seems to contradict the philosophy of ‘restructuring’ with its apparent stress on non-judgmental observation (Hayes, 2004). This approach postulates that acceptance of cognitions and emotions as therapeutic in contrast to traditional cognitive behavior therapy approach, which advocates restructuring and modifications of cognitions.ObjectiveThe current study attempted to study the ‘restructuring’ effects of mindfulness in persons with social phobia.MethodThirty-nine clients with a primary diagnosis of social phobia (ICD – 10) participated in the Mindfulness Integrated Cognitive Behavior Therapy (MICBT) program, which consisted of eight sessions. MINI International Neuropsychiatry Interview Plus, Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale, Fear of Negative Evaluation, Meta Cognitions Questionnaire and Five-Facet Mindfulness Questionnaire were administered pre and post of the therapeutic program.ResultsThe results demonstrated that MICBT had a significant effect on reducing the scores on fear of negative evaluation and bringing about changes in metacognitions.ConclusionMindfulness could be sufficient as a therapeutic strategy to bring about changes in the cognitions of clients with social phobia without using cognitive restructuring.     

Depression and selection of positive and negative social feedback: motivated preference or cognitive balance?

In this commentary we examine Swann, Wenzlaff, Krull, and Pelham's (1992) findings with respect to each of 5 central propositions in self-verification theory. We conclude that although the data are consistent with self-verification theory, none of the 5 components of the theory have been demonstrated convincingly as yet. Specifically, we argue that depressed subjects' selection of social feedback appears to be balanced or evenhanded rather than biased toward negative feedback and that there is little evidence to indicate that depressives actively seek negative appraisals. Furthermore, we suggest that the studies are silent with respect to the motivational postulates of self-verification theory and that a variety of competing cognitive and motivational models can explain Swann et al.'s findings as well as self-verification theory.     

How many processes underlie category-based induction? Effects of conclusion specificity and cognitive ability

Two studies investigated participants' sensitivity to the amount and diversity of the evidence when reasoning inductively about categories. Both showed that participants are more sensitive to characteristics of the evidence for arguments with general rather than specific conclusions. Both showed an association between cognitive ability and sensitivity to these evidence characteristics, particularly when the conclusion category was general. These results suggest that a simple associative process may not be sufficient to capture somekey phenomena of category-based induction. They also support the claim that the need to generate a superordinate category is a complicating factor in category-based reasoning and that adults' tendency to generate such categories while reasoning has been overestimated.     

Who is looking at me? The cone of gaze widens in social phobia

Gaze direction is an important cue that regulates social interactions and facilitates joint attention. Although humans are very accurate in determining gaze directions in general, they have a surprisingly liberal criterion for the presence of mutual gaze. Using an established psychophysical task that required observers to adjust the eyes of a virtual head to the margins of the area of mutual gaze, we examined whether the resulting cone of gaze is altered in people with social phobia. It turned out that during presence of a second virtual person, the gaze cone's width was specifically enlarged in patients with social phobia as compared to healthy controls. The size of this effect was correlated with the severity of social anxiety. As this effect was found for merely virtual lookers, it seems to be a fundamental mechanism rather than a specific effect related to the fear of being observed and evaluated by others.     

Understanding perfectionism and depression in an adult clinical population: Is outcome expectancy relevant to psychological functioning?

Perfectionism is a personality trait defined by high standards of performance, which has been identified as a risk factor for major depressive disorder (MDD). The present study examined if outcome expectancy involved in perfectionism differs for individuals with depression compared to non-depressed controls, and how outcome expectancy relates to depression symptoms. This study included 49 depressed and 42 non-depressed participants. Perfectionism and depression severity were measured via self-report instruments. This study is the first to provide preliminary evidence that outcome expectancies involved in perfectionism may be related to psychological functioning in depression. Individuals with depression demonstrated higher negative and lower positive outcome expectancies associated with perfectionism compared to non-depressed participants. Perfectionism outcome expectancies are also related to depression severity and symptoms. Future research should prospectively investigate relationships of outcome expectancy involved in perfectionism in individuals at risk for depression.     

Poor performance on cognitive tasks in depression: Doing too much or not enough?

Depressed people perform poorly on cognitive tasks. It is unclear whether these deficits are due to decreased devotion of task-related resources or to increased attention to non-task-related information. In the present study, we examined the degree to which depressed and healthy adults displayed pupillary motility that varied at the frequency of presented stimuli on a cognitive task, which we interpreted as task-related processing, and at other frequencies, which we interpreted as reflecting intrinsic processing. Depressed participants made more consecutive errors than did controls. More pupillary motility at other frequencies was associated with poorer performance, whereas more pupillary motility at the frequency of presented stimuli was associated with better performance. Depressed participants had more pupillary motility at other frequencies, which partially mediated observed deficits in cognitive performance. These findings support the hypothesis that allocating cognitive resources to intrinsic processing contributes to observed cognitive deficits in depression.