Concept empiricism: a methodological critique

Thanks to Barsalou's, Damasio's, Glenberg's, Prinz' and others' work, neo-empiricism is gaining a deserved recognition in the psychology and philosophy of concepts. I argue, however, that neo-empiricists have underestimated the difficulty of providing evidence against the amodal approach to concepts and higher cognition. I highlight three key problems: the difficulty of sorting out amodal predictions from neo-empiricist predictions, the difficulty of finding experimental tasks that are not best solved by imagery and the difficulty of generalizing findings concerning a given cognitive process in a given context to other cognitive processes or other contexts. Finally, solutions to these three problems are considered.     

The infant vocal-conditioning literature: a theoretical and methodological critique

Most studies of operant conditioning of infant vocalization do not fully use the experimental-analysis-of-behavior methodology that behavioral researchers have developed to study operant phenomena. This could be a contributing factor in their failure to correctly operationalize the definition of reinforcement, severely limiting the amount of information they can provide about operant learning in infants. Furthermore, single-subject-design studies may be added to supplement or replace group experimental designs in the study of infant vocal conditioning if we are to recognize the different learning processes that affect infant learning. Finally, single-subject experimental designs may be crucial to the development of an effective technology of early language intervention.     

Jensen's reaction-time investigations of intelligence: A critique

Jensen has reported a series of reaction-time studies which lead him to conclude that various parameters correlate significantly with IQ. Certain of these parameters are especially emphasized because of their theoretical background and the resulting theoretical light they shed upon the nature of intelligence. Two of the lime-lighted parameters are slope of RT across set size and increasing correlations of RT with IQ as set size increases. I review these studies in detail. I conclude that Jensen's claims are unwarranted. There are many difficulties in his approach that cover the entire gamut from method to data to theory. Some original reseach of my own is reported to illustrate the methodological problems with Jensen's procedure. The data that he alludes to often do not support his claims. The theory that he applies does not fit his paradigm. My conclusion: such research is not easy.     

Masculinity,femininity, and androgyny: A methodological and theoretical critique

The three primary purposes of this investigation are: (1) to apply confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to responses from three instruments [Bem Sex Role Inventory (BSRI), Comrey Personality Scale (CPS), and Australian Sex Role Scale (ASRS) developed by Antill and his colleagues] designed to measure masculinity (M) and femininity (F); (2) to determine the correlation between M and F on each instrument and to relate the results to the design of the instrument; and (3) to describe a new theoretical model that posits global M and global F to be multifaceted, higher order constructs. When CFA was used to define one M and one F factor from responses to each instrument, the disattenuated correlations between M and F were +0.58 (BSRI), ?.50 (ASRS), and ?1.0 (CPS). Thus, responses from two instruments supported the separation of M and F, but differed in the direction of the correlation for the two traits, while the third provided remarkably strong support for a bipolar MF continuum. Despite the apparent inconsistency, the observed correlations were explicable in terms of the design of each instrument. While the two-factor model provided a reasonable fit for the BSRI, more complicated models were better able to fit responses to the ASRS and CPS. Results from this investigation and other research were used to formulate a new theoretical model.     

Memory,emotional processing,and anxiety: A critique

This article explores evidence for an emotional processing view of the role of memory in anxiety disorders. It is argued that Lang (1977) and Foa and Kozak’s (1985) emotional processing hypothesis is adequate to account for mechanisms involved in most anxiety syndromes, but is less suitable for explaining persistent fear behavior in Panic Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. An alternative explanation for these disorders is provided.     

Memory, emotional processing, and anxiety: A critique

This article explores evidence for an emotional processing view of the role of memory in anxiety disorders. It is argued that Lang (1977) and Foa and Kozak’s (1985) emotional processing hypothesis is adequate to account for mechanisms involved in most anxiety syndromes, but is less suitable for explaining persistent fear behavior in Panic Disorder and Generalized Anxiety Disorder. An alternative explanation for these disorders is provided.