合作中责任比较和分配评价差异的ERPs研究

为了考察在合作任务中,个体对任务结果的比较阶段及分配阶段的脑电变化,本研究采用事件相关电位技术,考察三个任务变量:情境(贡献、责任)、比较(大、小)、分配(贡献原则、平均原则)对合作结果评价的影响。结果发现,责任比贡献诱发更大的FRN和更小的P3;贡献大小诱发的FRN和P3无差异,但责任大比责任小诱发更大的FRN和更小的P3。分配评价阶段,罚金反馈比奖金反馈诱发更大的FRN,基于贡献(责任)分配比基于平均分配的方案诱发出更大的P3。这表明合作背景中仅在责任比较中表现出自我服务偏向,在分配评价阶段未显示自我服务偏向。     

儿童的分配公平性:心理理论的作用

心理理论是影响儿童分配公平性的重要因素之一。"多重动机"的理论假设认为心理理论能够帮助儿童在不同的动机中权衡利弊,找到满足自我利益和他人需求之间的平衡;其中,感知需求、推断意图、理解情绪是影响独裁者博弈、最后通牒博弈、第三方惩罚中分配公平性的主要成分。未来研究需为此提供更多实证依据,探讨不同类型的公平分配与心理理论各组成成分的关系,以及可否通过训练心理理论能力促进儿童公平概念的发展。     

内群体偏爱与儿童基于贡献的分配公平性:心理理论的调节作用

本研究考察了贡献和内群体偏爱两种分配动机对儿童分配公平性的影响,并探讨了心理理论在其中的作用。通过比较63名6~8岁儿童在不同群体条件下对贡献不同的接受者的分配结果和分配策略的差异,结果发现：（1）在所有群体条件下,儿童都会分配给贡献多的接受者更多的资源,但当外群体成员贡献多且内群体成员贡献少时,儿童也会分配给贡献多的接受者相比于其他群体条件更少的资源,并更多的采用群体关系策略对这一行为作出解释;（2）心理理论能力越高的儿童分配给贡献多的接受者的资源数量受群体关系的影响越小,且使用贡献策略的频率越高,使用群体关系策略的频率越低。这些结果表明6~8岁儿童在资源分配过程中会优先考虑公平动机,且心理理论能力强的儿童更少表现出内群体偏爱。     

最后通牒博弈中提议者情绪预测偏差对公平决策的影响:公平感知的作用

为探讨提议者情绪预测偏差对公平决策的影响以及其中介机制,采用了两轮最后通牒博弈提议者实验任务,第一轮测量分配方案被接受和拒绝的情绪预测偏差,第二轮测量提议者的分配方案。研究结果表明:(1)提议者情绪预测偏差影响公平决策;(2)公平感知在提议者情绪预测偏差与公平决策间起部分中介作用。研究认为,提议者对积极结果的情绪预测偏差,会降低其公平感知,进而降低其分配方案公平性; 提议者对消极结果的情绪预测偏差,会提高其公平感知,进而增加其分配方案公平性。     

同伴接纳对儿童公平分配行为的影响

为考察同伴接纳与儿童公平分配行为之间的关系,以独裁者博弈和最后通牒博弈两种范式,对小学126名儿童进行了研究。结果表明:(1)同伴接纳对儿童公平分配行为的影响因博弈范式而不同,它主要影响了儿童在独裁者博弈中分配的公平性,在该范式中,同伴接纳水平高的儿童,公平分配行为更高;(2)在独裁者博弈中,受欢迎儿童的公平分配行为最高,被拒绝儿童的公平分配行为最低;(3)受欢迎儿童和被忽视儿童在两种范式中,都有较高的公平分配行为,而被拒绝儿童和普通儿童在独裁者博弈中分配的公平性,均显著低于他们在最后通牒博弈中的表现。     

家庭微系统对幼儿心理理论的影响:因素、过程和机制

基于国内外家庭对幼儿心理理论影响的研究,可将家庭微系统分成三个子系统:家庭基本环境子系统(包含家庭社会经济地位和兄弟姐妹数量类型)、父母与儿童互动子系统(包含依恋类型、教养方式、情绪表达和亲子游戏)和兄弟姐妹与儿童互动子系统(包含合作冲突和假装游戏)。家庭微系统对幼儿心理理论的影响机制模型可假设为:家庭基本环境子系统中家庭社会经济地位影响着父母与儿童互动子系统,兄弟姐妹数量类型影响着兄弟姐妹与儿童互动子系统。父母与儿童互动子系统、兄弟姐妹与儿童互动子系统中的各变量均通过心理状态术语使用这一中介变量进而影响儿童心理理论的发展。该模型需要实证研究加以进一步验证。     

群体情境下儿童的分配公平性

群体情境下儿童的资源分配决策受到群体身份、群体地位和群体规范的影响。在群体因素与公平分配之间, 儿童或坚持公平正义, 或偏向群体利益。这三种群体因素对儿童的分配公平性均造成了影响; 个体因素也会影响群体情境下儿童的分配决策。未来研究应对群体因素多加关注, 通过操控分配情境中的群体信息, 尝试探讨三种群体因素之间的相互作用, 以进一步了解复杂的群体情境下儿童的分配公平性。群体情境下影响分配公平性的个体因素也是需要未来研究逐一验证和讨论的问题。     

幼儿在不同规范标准下的意图判断：“副作用”效应

在幼儿对主人公的行为意图做出判断后加入奖惩任务,用意图"有无"判断和星星分配的数量作为考察"副作用"效应的指标,探讨幼儿在不同规范标准下能否利用理性策略对主人公的心理状态进行推断。结果发现:(1)幼儿对带来积极和消极"副作用"的行为意图"有无"判断没有差异;(2)相比于消极"副作用",幼儿倾向于给带来积极"副作用"的行为者分配更多的星星作为奖励;(3)"副作用"效价对4、 5、 6岁幼儿分配行为的影响是一致的;(4)在道德规范标准和约定规范标准下,"副作用"效价对4、 5、 6岁幼儿分配行为的影响是一致的。结果表明:(1)使用星星分配数量作为指标考察幼儿的行为意图判断更敏感。(2)幼儿会把违背规范的行为推断为有意的,遵守规范的行为推断为无意的。且这种表现在4～6岁之间具有稳定性。不同规范标准下,幼儿的这一表现没有差异。(3)研究结果支持了意图判断"副作用"效应的理性推理观点。     

不同社会情境对儿童奖惩分配公平性的影响

为探讨社会排斥和社会接纳情境下儿童奖惩分配公平性,研究采用个体-偶然排斥范式和第三方奖惩分配范式,对8~9岁儿童奖惩分配公平性行为和奖惩分配公平性判断进行研究,结果发现：（1）社会排斥组被试的奖惩分配公平性行为显著多于社会接纳组,奖惩分配不公平性行为显著少于社会接纳组。9岁组被试的奖惩分配公平性行为显著多于8岁组,奖惩分配不公平性行为显著少于8岁组;（2）社会排斥组被试的奖惩分配公平性判断显著高于社会接纳组,9岁组被试的奖惩分配公平性判断显著高于8岁组,奖惩分配不公平性判断显著低于8岁组。结论：社会情境影响儿童的奖惩分配公平性,在排斥情境下,8~9岁儿童的奖惩分配公平性明显提升;8~9岁儿童的奖惩分配公平性随年龄增长有上升趋势。     

生态责任分配正义原则何以可能

人类已经遇到了严重的生态危机，承担生态责任势在必行。人类要承担生态责任，就需要确立承担生态责任所依据的原则，而其中生态责任分配正义原则的建构尤为重要，因为存在着生态责任主体的认定和环境正义问题。生态责任分配正义原则要具有可能性，应具备普遍必然性、自律和他律的统一性、公平性和普遍有效性。我们可以依据如下理论和现实确立它的内容：自然界与人类社会相统一，所以人类应保护自然界；自然物具有生存权，应受到尊重；基于不同性质国家对生态环境的破坏程度，确定它们生态责任的大小。生态责任分配正义原则具体包括不伤害原则、不干涉原则、积极保护原则和合理补偿原则。     

Equity,equality, and need: Three principles of justice or one? An analysis of “equity as desert”

Contemporary reviews of the psychology of distributive justice have tended to emphasize three main allocation principles, equity, equality, and need, and to propose that each operates within a specific sphere of influence. However, results in this area are not entirely consistent, and do not tie in readily with work on attributions of responsibility. This article reviews research into this issue and attempts to encorporate the three principles, together with the notion of causal responsibility, with a single compound equity principle, labelled “equity as desert” (EAD), based on traditional historical and philosophical conceptions of proportional desert. Two empirical studies are reported in support of this idea. The author argues that a compound equity principle of the kind proposed here may be able to provide a unifying theme in an otherwise fragmented area.     

Hobbes's Account of Distributive Justice as Equity

This paper examines the rationale for and grounds and implications of Hobbes's redefinition of distributive justice as equity. I argue that this unprecedented reformulation served to ensure the justness of distributive laws. Hobbes acknowledges that the sovereign can distribute rights and goods iniquitously by failing to treat citizens as equals. However, he insists that improper allocations are not unjust, properly speaking – they do not `wrong' citizens. To support this claim, Hobbes puts forth the un-Aristotelian maxim that merit in distributive justice is due by grace alone. You deserve what the sovereign gives you: there is no desert prior to and independent of his allocation of rights. For Hobbes, distributive justice does not track but create merit. It follows that distributive laws cannot fail to give what is due (which would be unjust). This paper proceeds to analyze the nature of the limits equity sets to the apportionment of goods. I argue that these limits are moral and purely procedural: citizens cannot invoke equity to claim a fair share of the goods distributed. Thanks to Hobbes's redefinition of distributive justice, the justness of the sovereign's conduct, and hence his legal immunity, remains intact.     

Global Distributive Justice

The paper discusses the problem of global distributive justice. It proposes to distinguish between principles for the domestic and for the global or intersocietal distribution of wealth. It is argued that there may be a plurality of partly diverging domestic conceptions of distributive justice, not all of which need to be liberal egalitarian conceptions. It is maintained, however, that principles regulating the intersocietal distribution of wealth have to be egalitarian principles. This claim is defended against Rawls's argument in The Law of Peoples that egalitarian principles of distributive justice should not be applied globally. Moreover, it is explained in detail, why Rawls's "duty of assistance to burdened societies" cannot be an appropriate substitute for a global principle of distributive justice.     

Children's and adolescents' intuitive judgements about distributive justice: Integrating need,effort, and luck

This study investigated the principles that children and adolescents rely on when allocating a resource fairly. In a series of three experiments, 51 Swiss children (aged 7 and 9 years) and 309 German children (aged 6, 9, and 15 years) participated. A different situational context was presented in each experiment, where luck, need and effort of two protagonists were systematically varied. Primary-school children relied mainly on need when making distributive justice judgements. Effort became more prominent as the allocation principle in adolescence. Equality occurred rarely in all age groups. Integrational capacity and the ability to differentiate between the three situational contexts increased from childhood to adolescence. The data suggest the conclusion that the development of distributive justice decisions has both generalized and context-specific components.     

Teenage Childbearing,Reproductive Justice,and Infant Mental Health

Reproductive justice advocates emphasize the rights of women to choose to have children, to decide the conditions under which they give birth, and to parent their children with support, safety, and dignity. This article examines what a reproductive justice perspective contributes to infant mental health work with teenage mothers and their families. It explores the historical framing of teenage pregnancy in which young mothers are the cause of a variety of social problems and in which the primary policy and practice approach is pregnancy prevention. The article offers alternative framings of teenage childbearing, based on reproductive justice principles, which focus on social conditions surrounding teenage parenthood and the meaning of motherhood in the lives of young women. These alternative frames shift the practice agenda to eradicating unjust social conditions and providing supports for young women in their roles as parents. The article then describes ways in which two infant mental health programs have incorporated reproductive justice principles into their work with young families: Chicago's community doula model and Florida's Young Parents Project for court-involved teenage parents. Finally, the article extracts a set of principles deriving from a reproductive justice perspective that are relevant to infant mental health work with young families.     

Rawlsian Justice and the Social Determinants of Health

In this article, we suggest that the evidence regarding the social determinants of health calls for a deep re‐thinking of our understanding of distributive justice. Focusing on John Rawls's theory of distributive justice in particular, we argue that a full reckoning with the social determinants of health requires a re‐working of Rawls's principles of justice. We argue first that the social bases of health – a Rawlsian conception of the social determinants of health – should be considered a social primary good. We argue second that including the social bases of health as a social primary good would lead the parties to the original position to choose an additional principle of justice and assign it lexical priority over Rawls's second principle. According to this principle, inequalities in people's share of the social bases of health are to be arranged so as to improve the health status of those least advantaged on the social health gradient.     

The Legal and Ethical Fiction of “Pure” Confidentiality

In the newly emerging debates about genetics and justice three distinct principles have begun to emerge concerning what the distributive aim of genetic interventions should be. These principles are: genetic equality, a genetic decent minimum, and the genetic difference principle. In this paper, I examine the rationale of each of these principles and argue that genetic equality and a genetic decent minimum are ill-equipped to tackle what I call the currency problem and the problem of weight. The genetic difference principle is the most promising of the three principles and I develop this principle so that it takes seriously the concerns of just health care and distributive justice in general. Given the strains on public funds for other important social programmes, the costs of pursuing genetic interventions and the nature of genetic interventions, I conclude that a more lax interpretation of the genetic difference principle is appropriate. This interpretation stipulates that genetic inequalities should be arranged so that they are to the greatest reasonable benefit of the least advantaged. Such a proposal is consistent with prioritarianism and provides some practical guidance for non-ideal societies–that is, societies that do not have the endless amount of resources needed to satisfy every requirement of justice.     

The genetic difference principle

In the newly emerging debates about genetics and justice three distinct principles have begun to emerge concerning what the distributive aim of genetic interventions should be. These principles are: genetic equality, a genetic decent minimum, and the genetic difference principle. In this paper, I examine the rationale of each of these principles and argue that genetic equality and a genetic decent minimum are ill-equipped to tackle what I call the currency problem and the problem of weight. The genetic difference principle is the most promising of the three principles and I develop this principle so that it takes seriously the concerns of just health care and distributive justice in general. Given the strains on public funds for other important social programmes, the costs of pursuing genetic interventions and the nature of genetic interventions, I conclude that a more lax interpretation of the genetic difference principle is appropriate. This interpretation stipulates that genetic inequalities should be arranged so that they are to the greatest reasonable benefit of the least advantaged. Such a proposal is consistent with prioritarianism and provides some practical guidance for non-ideal societies--that is, societies that do not have the endless amount of resources needed to satisfy every requirement of justice.