Normative data for semantically associated Spanish word lists that create false memories

The present study provides norms for Spanish word lists that have been used to create false memories in native speakers of Spanish. The word lists reported are based on the Roediger and McDermott (1995) lists that have been used extensively to examine illusory memories. We employed Roediger and McDermott’s critical lures, translated them into Spanish, and created semantically associated Spanish word lists by testing native Spanish speakers. The resulting lists were then normed with additional native Spanish speakers. Overall, the participants recalled 53% of the list items and 32% of the critical lures with the word lists developed. In addition, 74% of the list items and 69% of the critical lures were recognized by the participants. The present study adds to the literature by providing a set of Spanish lists that can be used by researchers interested in evaluating false memories in individuals who speak Spanish. These norms may be downloaded from www.psychonomic.org/archive.     

Imagination can create false autobiographical memories

Previous studies have shown that imagining an event can alter autobiographical beliefs. The current study examined whether it can also create false memories. One group of participants imagined a relatively frequent event and received information about an event that never occurs. A second group imagined the nonoccurring event and received information about the frequent event. One week before and again 1 week immediately after the manipulation, participants rated the likelihood that they had experienced each of the two critical events and a series of noncritical events, using the Life Events Inventory. During the last phase, participants were also asked to describe any memories they had for the events. For both events, imagination increased the number of memories reported, as well as beliefs about experiencing the event. These results indicate that imagination can induce false autobiographical memories.     

The effect of mood on false memory for emotional DRM word lists

In the present study, we investigated the effect of participants’ mood on true and false memories of emotional word lists in the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm. In Experiment 1, we constructed DRM word lists in which all the studied words and corresponding critical lures reflected a specified emotional valence. In Experiment 2, we used these lists to assess mood-congruent true and false memory. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three induced-mood conditions (positive, negative, or neutral) and were presented with word lists comprised of positive, negative, or neutral words. For both true and false memory, there was a mood-congruent effect in the negative mood condition; this effect was due to a decrease in true and false recognition of the positive and neutral words. These findings are consistent with both spreading-activation and fuzzy-trace theories of DRM performance and have practical implications for our understanding of the effect of mood on memory.     

The effects of mediated word lists on false recall and recognition

False memory effects were explored using unrelated list items (e.g., slope, reindeer, corn) that were related to mediators (e.g., ski, sleigh, flake) that all converged upon a single nonpresented critical item (CI; e.g., snow). In Experiment 1, participants completed either an initial recall test or arithmetic problems after study, followed by a final recognition test. Participants did not falsely recall CIs on the initial test; however, false alarms to CIs did occur in recognition, but only following an initial recall test. In Experiment 2, participants were instructed to guess the CI, followed by a recognition test. The results replicated Experiment 1, with an increase in CI false alarms. Experiment 3 controlled for item effects by replacing unrelated recognition items from Experiment 1 with both CIs and list items from nonpresented lists. Once again, CI false alarms were found when controlling for lexical characteristics, demonstrating that mediated false memory is not due simply to item differences.     

Output monitoring tests reveal false memories of memories that never existed

Three experiments were conducted to assess participants' beliefs about potential false memories that might have occurred during free recall tests. An input–output monitoring test was administered that required participants to discriminate between items that were studied and recalled, studied and not recalled, or were entirely new. Critical lures from Roediger and McDermott's (1995) paradigm were inserted into this test. The results demonstrated that participants believed erroneously recalled items were both studied and recalled. The intriguing finding was that unrecalled items were believed to have been studied approximately 80% of the time, and half of those were also believed to have been recalled. This result represents a dual false memory effect in which items were believed to have been studied and also to have been recalled. The ramifications of this new procedure are discussed in terms of proposed experiments that might clarify the genesis of these false memories.     

Output monitoring tests reveal false memories of memories that never existed

Three experiments were conducted to assess participants' beliefs about potential false memories that might have occurred during free recall tests. An input-output monitoring test was administered that required participants to discriminate between items that were studied and recalled, studied and not recalled, or were entirely new. Critical lures from Roediger and McDermott's (1995) paradigm were inserted into this test. The results demonstrated that participants believed erroneously recalled items were both studied and recalled. The intriguing finding was that unrecalled items were believed to have been studied approximately 80% of the time, and half of those were also believed to have been recalled. This result represents a dual false memory effect in which items were believed to have been studied and also to have been recalled. The ramifications of this new procedure are discussed in terms of proposed experiments that might clarify the genesis of these false memories.     

A picture is worth a thousand lies: Using false photographs to create false childhood memories

Because image-enhancing technology is readily available, people are frequently exposed to doctored images. However, in prior research on how adults can be led to report false childhood memories, subjects have typically been exposed to personalized and detailed narratives describing false events. Instead, we exposed 20 subjects to a false childhood event via a fake photograph and imagery instructions. Over three interviews, subjects thought about a photograph showing them on a hot air balloon ride and tried to recall the event by using guided-imagery exercises. Fifty percent of the subjects created complete or partial false memories. The results bear on ways in which false memories can be created and also have practical implications for those involved in clinical and legal settings.     

Priming and false memories from Deese-Roediger-McDermott lists on a fragment completion test with children

This study examined priming and false memories with children on a word fragment completion task using the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Forty-five 4th- and 5th-grade children were shown lists of words and instructed to fill in fragments with the first word that came to mind (implicit instructions) or with the words that were presented during study (explicit instructions). Reliable priming to critical lure words was found under implicit retrieval instructions, and false memory to critical lure words was found under explicit retrieval instructions. However, priming under implicit retrieval instructions did not depend on whether the critical lure word was in the study list. In addition, greater false memory was observed under explicit test instructions. The results replicate and extend research on DRM false memory illusion with children to include implicit retrieval and word fragment completion. Explanations of false memory including gist failure (Brainerd, Reyna, & Forrest, 2002) and implicit associative response (Underwood, 1965) are considered.     

Temporal numerosity estimates for word lists

The Ss estimated the number of items seen when sequences of words were presented tachistoscopically at presentation rates from 4 to 16 words/sec. The degree of underestimation increased with increasing rates of presentation, and the maximum average counting rate was between 6 and 7 words/sec. In the second phase of the study, they were asked to recall as many words as possible from short sequences of words presented at rapid rates, as well as to estimate the number of words seen but not available for recall. The total number of words seen, as judged from these two reports, agreed closely with the counting rates. The number of words correctly recalled decreased with increasing presentation rates.     

Examining differences in the levels of false memories in children and adults using child-normed lists

Several previous studies have demonstrated that children, when compared with adults, exhibit both lower levels of veridical memory and fewer intrusions when given semantically associated lists. However, researchers have drawn these conclusions using semantically associated word lists that were normed with adults, which may not lead to the same level of activation or gist generation in children. In the current study, the authors used similar associative word lists normed with children and then evaluated the memory of children and adults using these newly normed lists as well as the typical adult-normed lists. Results indicate that children showed lower true and false memories with both the child-normed and adult-normed lists. Thus, these data suggest that the negative relationship between age and false memories in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM; J. Deese, 1959; H. L. Roediger & K. B. McDermott, 1995) paradigm is not an artifact of the age group used to construct the lists.     

Evidence that nonconscious processes are sufficient to produce false memories

Are nonconscious processes sufficient to cause false memories of a nonstudied event? To investigate this issue, we controlled and measured conscious processing in the DRM task, in which studying associates (e.g., bed, rest, awake...) causes false memories of nonstudied associates (e.g., sleep). During the study phase, subjects studied visually masked associates at extremely rapid rates, followed by immediate recall. After this initial phase, nonstudied test words were rapidly presented for perceptual identification, followed by recognition memory judgments. On the perceptual identification task, we found significant priming of nonstudied associates, relative to control words. We also found significant false recognition of these nonstudied associates, even when subjects did not recall this word at study or identify it at test, indicating that nonconscious processes can cause false recognition. These recognition effects were found immediately after studying each list of associates, but not on a delayed test that occurred after the presentation of several intervening lists. Nonconscious processes are sufficient to cause this memory illusion on immediate tests, but may be insufficient for more vivid and lasting false memories.     

Strategies for verifying false autobiographical memories

This study examined the types of strategies people use to verify putative childhood memories and the degree to which their preferred strategies are restricted in typical memory implantation studies. We asked subjects to describe a situation in which they recalled a false childhood experience and a hypothetical situation in which they pretended to have developed a false memory after taking part in a memory implantation study. We also asked them how they did (or would) determine the source of the event. We found that subjects relied primarily on other people and cognitive strategies to verify their experiences. These results suggest that laboratory situations cultivate false memories in part because they prevent people from talking to others about the false event, which causes them to rely on less optimal strategies.     

Creating false memories for brand names

Using the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM) paradigm, participants are presented with lists of associated words (e.g., bed, awake, night etc). Subsequently, they reliably have false memories for related but non‐presented words (e.g. SLEEP). The present study investigated whether false memories could be created for brand names (e.g. Morrisons, Sainsbury's, Waitrose and TESCO) using the DRM paradigm and whether the effect was reduced if stimuli were presented in brand appropriate fonts compared with a plain font. Participants were presented with lists of brand names in plain or brand appropriate fonts, followed by a distractor task or free recall. Finally, they had a recognition task. Both false recall and false recognition of non‐presented brand names occurred. Brand specific fonts at study had no effect on recall but increased overall recognition. There was considerable variability in levels of false recall and false recognition amongst lists and across participants and reasons for this are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Children's emotional false memories

Eight- and 12-year-old children were presented with neutral and negative emotional Deese-Roediger-McDermott lists equated on familiarity and associative strength. Both recall and recognition (A') measures were obtained. Recall measures exhibited the usual age increments in true and false recollection. True neutral items were better recalled and recognized than true negative emotional items. Although the children showed more false recall for neutral than for negative emotional lists, false recognition was higher for negative emotional than for neutral items. A' analyses also showed that whereas true neutral information and false neutral information were easily discriminated by children regardless of age, the same was not the case for true and false negative emotional information. Together, these results suggest that although children may be able to censor negative emotional information at recall, such information promotes relational processing in children's memory, making true and false emotional information less discriminable overall.     

Children's kinematic false memories

ABSTRACT

Individuals misrecognise as seen the never-presented natural continuation of an action. These false memories derive from the running of kinematic mental models of the actions seen, which rest on motor inferences from implicit knowledge. We verified an implied prediction: kinematic false memories should be detectable even in children. The participants in our experiments first observed photos in which actors were about to perform actions on objects. At recognition they were presented with the original photos, plus (a) distractors representing the unseen natural continuation of the original actions, (b) distractors representing the beginning of other actions on the same objects and (c) distractors representing completed different actions on the same objects. In contrast to the original studies in which participants expressed their confidence in recognition, in our experiments the participants catgorirzed the action as seen or not seen. After replicating the original results with the dichotomous recognition task (Experiment 1), we detected spontaneous false memories also in children (Experiment 2).     

Photographs cause false memories for the news

What is the effect on memory when seemingly innocuous photos accompany false reports of the news? We asked people to read news headlines of world events, some of which were false. Half the headlines appeared with photographs that were tangentially related to the event; others were presented without photographs. People saw each headline only once, and indicated whether they remembered the event, knew about it, or neither. Photos led people to immediately and confidently remember false news events. Drawing on the Source Monitoring Framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), we suggest that people often relied on familiarity and other heuristic processes when making their judgments and thus experienced effects of the photos as evidence of memory for the headlines.     

Creating false memories for events that occurred before versus after the offset of childhood amnesia

We examined whether false images and memories for childhood events are more likely when the event supposedly took place during the period of childhood amnesia. Over three interviews, participants recalled six events: five true and one false. Some participants were told that the false event happened when they were 2 years old (Age 2 group), while others were told that it happened when they were 10 years old (Age 10 group). We compared participants’ reports of the false event to their reports of a true event from the same age. Consistent with prior research on childhood amnesia, participants in the Age 10 group were more likely than participants in the Age 2 group to remember their true event and they reported more information about it. Participants in the Age 2 group, on the other hand, were more likely to develop false images and memories than participants in the Age 10 group. Furthermore, once a false image or memory developed, there were no age-related differences in the amount of information participants reported about the false event. We conclude that childhood amnesia increases our susceptibility to false suggestion, thus our results have implications for court cases where early memories are at issue.     

Building false memories without suggestions

People can come to remember doing things they have never done. The question we asked in this study is whether people can systematically come to remember performing actions they never really did, in the absence of any suggestion from the experimenter. People built LEGO vehicles, performing some steps but not others. For half the people, all the pieces needed to assemble each vehicle were laid out in order in front of them while they did the building; for the other half, the pieces were hidden from view. The next day, everyone returned for a surprise recognition test. People falsely and confidently remembered having carried out steps they did not; those who saw all the pieces while they built each vehicle were more likely to correctly remember performing steps they did perform but equally likely to falsely remember performing steps they did not. We explain our results using the source monitoring framework: People used the relationships between actions to internally generate the missing, related actions, later mistaking that information for genuine experience.