Supervaluation-Style Truth Without Supervaluations

Kripke’s theory of truth is arguably the most influential approach to self-referential truth and the semantic paradoxes. The use of a partial evaluation scheme is crucial to the theory and the most prominent schemes that are adopted are the strong Kleene and the supervaluation scheme. The strong Kleene scheme is attractive because it ensures the compositionality of the notion of truth. But under the strong Kleene scheme classical tautologies do not, in general, turn out to be true and, as a consequence, classical reasoning is no longer admissible once the notion of truth is involved. The supervaluation scheme adheres to classical reasoning but violates compositionality. Moreover, it turns Kripke’s theory into a rather complicated affair: to check whether a sentence is true we have to look at all admissible precisification of the interpretation of the truth predicate we are presented with. One consequence of this complicated evaluation condition is that under the supervaluation scheme a more proof-theoretic characterization of Kripke’s theory becomes inherently difficult, if not impossible. In this paper we explore the middle ground between the strong Kleene and the supervaluation scheme and provide an evaluation scheme that adheres to classical reasoning but retains many of the attractive features of the strong Kleene scheme. We supplement our semantic investigation with a novel axiomatic theory of truth that matches the semantic theory we have put forth.     

Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth

Journal of Philosophical Logic - The model of self-referential truth presented in this paper, named Revision-theoretic supervaluation, aims to incorporate the philosophical insights of Gupta and...     

Author Correction: Supervaluation-Style Truth Without Supervaluations

Journal of Philosophical Logic - The original version of the article unfortunately contained a mistake. In the Acknowledgments section of the original version of the article, the grant number of...     

Truth Without Reference: The Use of Fictional Names

Topoi - Singular terms without referents are called empty or vacuous terms. But not all of them are equally empty. In particular, not all proper names that fail to name an existing object fail in...     

Additivity in adaptation to optical tilt

Tests of proprioceptive adaptation (head-hand), visual adaptation (eye-head), and both components (eye-hand) were made during 15-min exposure to 20 degrees tilt in two experiments. In both experiments, subjects alternated exposures in which they explored hallways (hall) or viewed their active hand (hand), but in Experiment 2 subjects received two exposures to each condition, while in Experiment 1 only one exposure was given. Hall exposure produced greater visual change, and hand exposure produced greater proprioceptive change; but in both conditions, when order of conditions was controlled, the sum of performance on visual and proprioceptive tests was not statistically different from performance on the common test. In Experiment 2, adaptive components appeared to be inversely related, both within and between exposure conditions, thus providing some evidence of a reciprocal relationship, but a reliable negative correlation between components was not found. Finally, adaptation increased over alternation-repetition of exposure tasks in the second experiment, even though adaptation appeared limited within any given exposure. Results are interpreted in terms of the linear model, and the possible role of attentional factors in processing sensory inconsistencies is discussed.     

Close to the Truth

Philosophia - We often think or say that someone was wrong about something but almost right about it or close to the truth. This can mean more than one thing. Here, I propose an analysis of the...     

他对前妻说真情

聪明能干的小郝娶了娴淑文静的慧娟做妻子,这在村里传为美谈。但结婚不到半年,厄运便接踵而至:先是养殖场鱼池里的鱼死了大半,损失达十几万元:接着小郝又出了车祸,骑摩托车撞伤了腿:两个月后,老母亲又去世了。这接二连三的打击使他陷入了迷惘与困惑,整日唉声叹气。后来,     

Truth Values and the Value of Truth

This paper explores the ways in which truth is better than falsehood, and suggests that, among other things, it depends on the kinds of proposition to which these values are attached. Ordinary singular propositions like It is raining seem to fit best the bivalent scheme of classical logic, the general proposition It is always raining is more appropriately rated according to how often it rains, and a practically vague proposition like The lecture will start at 1 is appropriately rated according to its nearness to exactness. Implications for logic of this rating system are commented on.     

On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth

Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions often stems from inflationary approaches allegiance to alethic monism, pluralist approaches are able to avoid this explanatory inadequacy and the resulting skepticism, though at the cost of inviting other conceptual difficulties. A novel approach, alethic functionalism, attempts to circumvent the problems faced by pluralist approaches while preserving their main insights. Unfortunately, it too generates additional problems – namely, with its suspect appropriation of the multiple realizability paradigm and its platitude-based strategy – that need to be dissolved before it can constitute an adequate inflationary approach to the nature of truth.     

The Principle of Additivity and Its Relation to Clinical Decision Making

Clients (N = 178) with varying degrees of organic indicators were administered a psychological battery including the Memory for Designs Test (MFD; Graham & Kendall, 1960) to assess the extent to which joint presence of organic indicators affected the sensitivity of the MFD in identifying organicity. Joint presence failed to add to the discriminability of the MFD, although individual instruments such as the PLAT (Arithmetic) and WAIS-R (PIQ < VIQ) clearly discriminated across the MFD.     

A Contextual-Hierarchical Approach to Truth and the Liar Paradox

This paper presents an approach to truth and the Liar paradox which combines elements of context dependence and hierarchy. This approach is developed formally, using the techniques of model theory in admissible sets. Special attention is paid to showing how starting with some ideas about context drawn from linguistics and philosophy of language, we can see the Liar sentence to be context dependent. Once this context dependence is properly understood, it is argued, a hierarchical structure emerges which is neither ad hoc nor unnatural.     

Truth in the Investigations

According to a widespread interpretation, in the Investigations Wittgenstein adopted a deflationary or redundancy theory of truth. On this view, Wittgenstein’s pronouncements about truth should be understood in the light of his invocation of the equivalences ‘p’ is true = p and ‘p’ is false = not p. This paper shows that this interpretation does not do justice to Wittgenstein’s thoughts. I will be claiming that, in fact, in his second book Wittgenstein is returning to the pre-Tractarian notion of bipolarity, and that his new development of this notion in the Investigations excludes the redundancy-deflationary reading. Wittgenstein’s thoughts about truth are instead compatible with another interpretative option: Wittgenstein remains faithful to his methodological pronouncements, and he merely presents us with (grammatical) platitudes about the notions of “true” and “false”.