Disjunctive Quantum Logic in Dynamic Perspective

In Coecke (2002) we proposed the intuitionistic or disjunctive representation of quantum logic, i.e., a representation of the property lattice of physical systems as a complete Heyting algebra of logical propositions on these properties, where this complete Heyting algebra goes equipped with an additional operation, the operational resolution, which identifies the properties within the logic of propositions. This representation has an important application towards dynamic quantum logic, namely in describing the temporal indeterministic propagation of actual properties of physical systems. This paper can as such by conceived as an addendum to Quantum Logic in Intuitionistic Perspective that discusses spin-off and thus provides an additional motivation. We derive a quantaloidal semantics for dynamic disjunctive quantum logic and illustrate it for the particular case of a perfect (quantum) measurement.     

A Generic Disjunctive/Conjunctive Decomposition Model for n-ary Relations

This paper discusses a generic decomposition model that represents an arbitrary n-ary relation as a disjunctive or conjunctive combination of a number of n-ary component relations of a prespecified type. An important subclass of order-preserving decompositions is defined and its properties are derived. The generic model is shown to subsume various known models as special cases, including the models of Boolean factor analysis, hierarchical classes analysis, and disjunctive/conjunctive nonmetric factor analysis. Moreover, it also subsumes a broad range of new models as exemplified with a novel model for multidimensional parallelogram analysis and novel three-way extensions of nonmetric factor analysis. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.     

A Capacitarian Account of Culpable Ignorance

Ignorance usually excuses from responsibility, unless the person is culpable for the ignorance itself. Since a lot of wrongdoing occurs in ignorance, the question of what makes ignorance culpable is central for a theory of moral responsibility. In this article I examine a prominent answer, which I call the ‘volitionalist tracing account,’ and criticize it on the grounds that it relies on an overly restrictive conception of responsibility‐relevant control. I then propose an alternative, which I call the ‘capacitarian conception of control,’ and on the basis of it I advance an account of culpable ignorance that avoids the skeptical upshots of the volitionalist proposal. If correct, my account establishes three important truths: agents can be directly in control of their ignorance, they can be directly responsible for more than actions and omissions, and their moral obligations extend beyond the performance of intentional actions and omissions.     

Willful Ignorance

Michelle Moody-Adams suggests that “the main obstacle to moral progress in social practices is the tendency to widespread affected ignorance of what can and should already be known.” This explanation is promising, though to understand it we need to know what willful (affected, motivated, strategic) ignorance actually is. This paper presents a novel analysis of this concept, which builds upon Moody-Adams (1994) and is contrasted with a recent account by Lynch (2016).     

On Disjunctive Rights

This article examines the idea of disjunctive rights—an idea first suggested by Joel Feinberg and more recently advocated by Richard Arneson. Using a hypothetical scenario to bring forward a conflict between two rights that cannot be simultaneously fulfilled, the suggestion that the conflict can be solved by describing the right‐holders as holding disjunctive rights—rights that involve, in a significant way, a disjunction—is scrutinized. Several interpretations of the idea of disjunctive rights are examined from the perspectives of the interest theory and will theory of rights. Ultimately, the idea of disjunctive rights fails to provide an acceptable solution to the problem at hand, as each interpretation has unacceptable implications. This conclusion challenges the compossibilist thesis, according to which moral rights do not, ultimately, conflict. Alternatively, if one wishes to keep the possibility of compossibility and disjunctive rights, the mainstream theories of rights must be revised or rejected.     

On Ignorance: A Reply to Peels

Rik Peels has ingeniously argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In this response, I defend the ??Standard View of Ignorance?? according to which they are equivalent. In the course of doing so, some important lessons will emerge concerning the nature of ignorance and its relationship to knowledge.     

无知与奸诈

晋代葛洪(字稚川,号抱朴子,约公元284—364年)是一位著名的中医学家、儒家和道家,著有《抱朴子外篇》、《抱朴子内篇》、《金匮药方》、《肘后备急方》、《神仙传》、《隐逸传》、《集异》等书。受其生活年代的文化背景及现实的影响,葛洪是一位颇有成就的炼丹家,然而其对封建迷信的危害却有一定的认识,并力图破除一些迷信现象。今读到其中两则故事,遂生联想,乃作札记。     

Compensation for Historical Emissions and Excusable Ignorance

This article defends the idea of applying principles of corrective justice to the matter of climate change. In particular, it argues against the excusable ignorance objection, which holds that historical emissions produced at a time when our knowledge of climate change was insufficient ought to be removed from the equation when applying rectificatory principles to this context. In constructing my argument, I rely on a particular interpretation of rectificatory justice and outcome responsibility. I also address the individualism objection by showing why we should view states as relevant agents of climate change. This argument is built on the assumption that states are institutions set up to coordinate and regulate human interaction, so as to protect their citizens from the unwanted consequences of such interaction.     

Ignorance of ignorance

I discuss the question of when knowledge of higher order ignorance is possible and show in particular that, under quite plausible assumptions, knowledge of second order ignorance is impossible.     

Rational Moral Ignorance

What should a person do when, through no fault of her own, she ends up believing a false moral theory? Some suggest that she should act against what the false theory recommends; others argue that she should follow her rationally held moral beliefs. While the former view better accords with intuitions about cases, the latter one seems to enjoy a critical advantage: It seems better able to render moral requirements ‘followable’ or ‘action-guiding.’ But this tempting thought proves difficult to justify. Indeed, whether it can be justified turns out to depend importantly on the rational status of epistemic akrasia. Furthermore, it can be argued, from premises all parties to the moral ignorance debate should accept, that rational epistemic akrasia is possible. If the argument proves successful, it follows that a person should sometimes act against her rationally held moral convictions.     

Ignorance and Virtue

Abstract

Julia Driver has argued that there is a class of virtues that are compatible with or even require that an agent be ignorant in some respect. In this paper I argue for an alternative conception of the relationship between ignorance and virtue. The dispositions constitutive of virtue must include sensitivity to human limitations and fallibility. In this way the virtues accommodate ignorance, rather than require or promote it. I develop my account by considering two virtues in particular: tolerance (the paradigm for my account) and modesty (which Driver employs as the paradigm for her account). Although several philosophers have offered alternatives to Driver's account of modesty and others have discussed tolerance as a moral virtue, an adequate account of the role of ignorance in the specification of the virtues generally has yet to be provided. I believe that similarities between the two virtues are instructive for defining that role.     

一个关于非直谓语句的逻辑系统

非直谓现象普遍存在于许多领域中。在数学中,对集合的最小元的定义是非直谓的。在逻辑中,罗素悖论的产生是由于允许非直谓地定义一个集合,即“所有不包含它自身的集合的集合”。莱布尼兹对“同一性”的定义——“a与b是相同实体当且仅当对所有性质f,如果f（a）则f（b）,反之亦然”——是非直谓的。罗素构造分歧类型论的动机不是来自形式系统的悖论,而是来自日常语言中的悖论。本文的目标是构造一文化景观命题逻辑来刻画关于特定的非直谓语句的推理。一个非直谓语句的表达预设了一个语句集,一个典型的非直谓语句是“拿破仑具备一名伟人将军的所有德性”（罗素的例子）。本文所关注的是“一阶”非直谓语句,即仅预设直谓语句集的非直谓语句。非直谓语句的一个性质是：一个非直谓语句等价于它所预设的语句集中的成员（可能无穷）的合取。这一性质需要在要构造的逻辑系统的句法中被表达出来,而针对此本文所采用的手段是在命题逻辑系统的符号中加入“命题量词”,也就是说本文要构造一个量化命题逻辑系统。在形式化部分,本文给出了这个逻辑的句法、语义、希尔伯特公理系统和它的完全性证明。     

A Temporal Logic for Sortals

With the past and future tense propositional operators in its syntax, a formal logical system for sortal quantifiers, sortal identity and (second order) quantification over sortal concepts is formulated. A completeness proof for the system is constructed and its absolute consistency proved. The completeness proof is given relative to a notion of logical validity provided by an intensional semantic system, which assumes an approach to sortals from a modern form of conceptualism.     

A Logic for Information Systems

A conception of an information system has been introduced by Pawlak. The study has been continued in works of Pawlak and Orlowska and in works of Vakarelov. They had proposed some basic relations and had constructed a formal system of a modal logic that describes the relations and some of their Boolean combinations. Our work is devoted to a generalization of this approach. A class of relation systems and a complete calculus construction method for these systems are proposed. As a corollary of our main result, our paper contains a solution of a Vakarelov's problem: how to construct a formal system that describes all the Boolean combinations of the basic relations.     

On Ignorance: A Vindication of the Standard View

Rik Peels has once again forcefully argued that ignorance is not equivalent to the lack or absence of knowledge. In doing so, he endeavors to refute the Standard View of Ignorance according to which they are equivalent, and to advance what he calls the “New View” according to which ignorance is equivalent (merely) to the lack or absence of true belief. I defend the Standard View against his new attempted refutation.     

Profiles of Dialogue for Evaluating Arguments from Ignorance

This investigation uses the technique of the profile of dialogue as a tool for the evaluation of arguments from ignorance (also called lack-of-evidence arguments, negative evidence, ad ignorantiam arguments and ex silentio arguments). Such arguments have traditionally been classified as fallacies by the logic textbooks, but recent research has shown that in many cases they can be used reasonably. A profile of dialogue is a connected sequence of moves and countermoves in a conversational exchange of a type that is goal-directed and can be represented in a normative model of dialogue. Selected case studies are used to probe special features of using the profile technique as applied to arguments from ignorance of a kind that occur frequently in everyday conversational exchanges. One of these special features is the use of Gricean implicature. Another is the need to use negative profiles of argument.