Can false memories spontaneously recover?

Can false memories that were suppressed at one time spontaneously recover at a later time? Fuzzy trace theory and activation-monitoring theory predict that false memories in the Deese, Roediger, and McDermott (DRM) procedure become substantially reduced as list learning progresses because participants employ a memory-editing process. It follows that if the editing process is rendered less effective, false memories should spontaneously recover. We found that after DRM lists were well learned and false recognition to critical words was substantially reduced by multiple study–test trials, those false memories spontaneously recovered when participants were either rushed or delayed on a retest. We attributed the reduction in false recognition over trials to a memory-editing process that suppresses false recognition as participants gradually learn which words were in the lists and which words, though similar, were not. Rushing or delaying the participants on a retest made it more difficult for them to edit their memory, and false memories spontaneously returned.     

Can false memories prime problem solutions?

Previous research has suggested that false memories can prime performance on related implicit and explicit memory tasks. The present research examined whether false memories can also be used to prime higher order cognitive processes, namely, insight-based problem solving. Participants were asked to solve a number of compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems, half of which had been primed by the presentation of Deese/Roediger–McDermott (DRM) lists whose critical lure was also the solution to the problem. The results showed that when the critical lure: (a) was falsely recalled, CRAT problems were solved more often and significantly faster than problems that were not primed by a DRM list and (b) was not falsely recalled, CRAT problem solution rates and times were no different than when there was no DRM priming. A second experiment demonstrated that these outcomes were not a simple artifact of the inclusion of a recall test prior to the problem solving task. The implications of these results are discussed with regard to the previous literature on priming and the adaptive function of false memories.     

Can false memories be created through nonconscious processes?

Presentation times of study words presented in the Deese/Roediger and McDermott (DRM) paradigm varied from 20 to 2000 ms per word in an attempt to replicate the false memory effect following extremely short presentations reported by. Both in a within-subjects design (Experiment 1) and in a between-subjects design (Experiment 2) subjects showed memory for studied words as well as a false memory effect for related critical lures in the 2000-ms condition. However, in the conditions with shorter presentation times (20 ms in Experiment 1; 20 and 40 ms in Experiment 2) no memory for studied words, nor a false memory effect was found. We argue that there is at present no strong evidence supporting the claim for a nonconscious basis of the false memory effect.     

Can false memories prime alternative solutions to ambiguous problems?

Research has demonstrated that false memories are capable of priming and facilitating insight-based problem-solving tasks by increasing solution rates and decreasing solution times. The present research extended this finding by investigating whether false memories could be used to bias ambiguous insight-based problem-solving tasks in a similar manner. Compound remote associate task (CRAT) problems with two possible correct answers, a dominant and a non-dominant solution, were created and normed (Experiment 1). In Experiment 2, participants were asked to solve these CRAT problems after they were given Deese/Roediger-McDermott lists whose critical lures were also the non-dominant solution to half of the corresponding CRATs. As predicted, when false memories served as primes, solution rates were higher and solution times were faster for non-dominant than dominant CRAT solutions. This biasing effect was only found when participants falsely recalled the critical lure, and was not found when participants did not falsely recall the critical lure, or when they were not primed. Results are discussed with regard to spreading activation models of solution competition in problem-solving tasks and current theories of false memory priming effects.     

Can false memories be corrected by feedback in the DRM paradigm?

Normal processes of comprehension frequently yield false memories as an unwanted by-product. The simple paradigm now known as the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm takes advantage of this fact and has been used to reliably produce false memory for laboratory study. Among the findings from past research is the difficulty of preventing false memories in this paradigm. The purpose of the present experiments was to examine the effectiveness of feedback in correcting false memories. Two experiments were conducted, in which participants recalled DRM lists and either received feedback on their performance or did not. A subsequent recall test was administered to assess the effect of feedback. The results showed promising effects of feedback: Feedback enhanced both error correction and the propagation of correct recall. The data replicated other data of studies that have shown substantial error perseveration following feedback. These data also provide new information on the occurrence of errors following feedback. The results are discussed in terms of the activation-monitoring theory of false memory.     

Does collaborative remembering reduce false memories?

Collaborative remembering refers to recall by groups rather than by an individual. Three experiments investigated whether, relative to individual remembering, collaborative remembering decreased correct recall and false recall using the Deese‐Roediger‐McDermott paradigm. Participants were first asked to study and recall five lists of 15 words that were each semantically associated with a critical non‐presented word. Half the participants recalled the words by themselves, while the remaining half were assigned to pairs and collaboratively recalled the words. In Experiment 1, pairs produced the same number of false or correct words as individuals who were tested alone. In Experiment 2, the interpersonal closeness of the groups was also manipulated: friends and pairs who were not friends were assigned to the collaborative groups. Both friends and non‐friends produced fewer false or correct words than individuals. Experiment 3, in which the performance of the individuals and non‐friend pairs were compared using a recall test of the same 75 words as the previous experiments, replicated the results of Experiment 2. These results are discussed in terms of the retrieval‐strategy disruption.     

How does negative emotion cause false memories?

Remembering negative events can stimulate high levels of false memory, relative to remembering neutral events. In experiments in which the emotional valence of encoded materials was manipulated with their arousal levels controlled, valence produced a continuum of memory falsification. Falsification was highest for negative materials, intermediate for neutral materials, and lowest for positive materials. Conjoint-recognition analysis produced a simple process-level explanation: As one progresses from positive to neutral to negative valence, false memory increases because (a) the perceived meaning resemblance between false and true items increases and (b) subjects are less able to use verbatim memories of true items to suppress errors.     

Remembering words not presented in lists: Can we avoid creating false memories?

Can subjects avoid creating false memories as outlined in Roediger and McDermott’s (1995) false recognition paradigm if they are forewarned about this memory illusion? We presented subjects with semantically related word lists, followed by a recognition test. The test was composed of studied words, semantically related nonstudied words (critical lures), and unrelated nonstudied words. One group of subjects was uninformed about the false recognition effect, a second group was urged to minimize all false alarms, and a third group was forewarned about falsely recognizing critical lures. Compared with the uninformed and cautious subjects, the forewarned subjects reduced their false alarm rate for critical lures, and they made remember and know judgments equally often for recognized studied words and critical lures. But forewarning did not eliminate the false recognition effect, as these subjects and those in the other groups made numerous false recognitions in this task.     

Can rhesus monkeys spontaneously subtract?

Animals, including pigeons, parrots, raccoons, ferrets, rats, New and Old World monkeys, and apes are capable of numerical computations. Much of the evidence for such capacities is based on the use of techniques that require training. Recently, however, several studies conducted under both laboratory and field conditions have employed methods that tap spontaneous numerical representations in animals, including human infants. In this paper, we present the results of 11 experiments exploring the capacity of semi-free-ranging adult rhesus monkeys to spontaneously compute (i.e. single trial, no training) the outcome of subtraction events. In the basic design, we present one quantity of objects on one stage, a second quantity on a second stage, occlude both stages, and then remove one or no objects from each stage. Having watched these events, a subject is then allowed to approach one stage and eat the food objects behind the occluder. Results show that rhesus monkeys correctly compute the outcome of subtraction events involving three or less objects on each stage, even when the identity of the objects is different. Specifically, when presented with two food quantities, rhesus monkeys select the larger quantity following subtractions of one piece of food from two or three; this preference is maintained when subjects must distinguish food from non-food subtractions, and when food is subtracted from either one or both initial quantities. Furthermore, rhesus monkeys are capable of representing zero as well as equality when two identical quantities are contrasted. Results are discussed in light of recent attempts to determine how number is represented in the brains of animals lacking language.     

Emotions and false memories: valence or arousal?

The effects of mood on false memories have not been studied systematically until recently. Some results seem to indicate that negative mood may reduce false recall and thus suggest an influence of emotional valence on false memory. The present research tested the effects of both valence and arousal on recall and recognition and indicates that the effect is actually due to arousal. In fact, whether participants' mood is positive, negative, or neutral, false memories are significantly more frequent under conditions of high arousal than under conditions of low arousal.     

Are nonconscious processes sufficient to produce false memories?

Seamon, Luo, and Gallo (1998) reported evidence that nonconscious processes could produce false recognition in a converging-associates task, whereby subjects falsely remember a nonstudied lure (e.g., sleep) after studying a list of related words (bed, rest, awake...). Zeelenberg, Plomp, and Raaijmakers (2003) failed to observe this false recognition effect when list word recognition was at chance. We critically evaluate the evidence for nonsconscious processing and report the results of a new experiment designed to overcome previous methodological limitations. Consistent with Seamon et al., we found that conscious activation of a related lure during study was not necessary for its subsequent recognition; consistent with Zeelenberg et al., we found no evidence for recognition of related lures under conditions where there was no memory for studied words. It is currently unknown whether conscious recollection of the studied items is necessary for false recognition or if nonconscious activation of the lure is sufficient.     

Distinguishing true from false memories in forensic contexts: Can phenomenology tell us what is real?

We studied the extent to which subjective ratings of memory phenomenology discriminate true‐ and false‐memory responses, and whether degree of gist‐based processing influences false memory and phenomenology, in a classic forensic task, the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (GSS). Participants heard a narrative of a robbery followed by suggestive questions about the content of the narrative. They were asked to rate the items they recognized as studied using the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ). Consistent with studies of word lists, there were phenomenological differences between true and false memory responses: memory phenomenology was richer for true than for false memories, which supports opponent‐process accounts of false memory such as fuzzy‐trace theory. Thus, phenomenology is a useful means for differentiating experienced from non‐experienced events in forensic contexts. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can pastoral counselling recover its roots in madness?

Modern pastoral counselling had its origins in North America in the experience of people, who suffered from psychiatric illnesses and who believed them to be spiritual crises, which would respond to pastoral care. In the United Kingdom many of those involved in the foundation of the pastoral care and counselling movement also worked in psychiatric hospitals. In both Europe and America pastoral counselling has largely forsaken its roots in psychiatry. However, recent research amongst mental health service users/survivors reveals how important spiritual care and counsel are and how few resources are available to provide this service from psychiatry, religious organisations or secular counselling services. The results of three research projects in Somerset are described and the significance of the recovery of pastoral counselling to fill the vacuum of spiritual care is explored.     

Can fabricated evidence induce false eyewitness testimony?

False information can influence people's beliefs and memories. But can fabricated evidence induce individuals to accuse another person of doing something they never did? We examined whether exposure to a fabricated video could produce false eyewitness testimony. Subjects completed a gambling task alongside a confederate subject, and later we falsely told subjects that their partner had cheated on the task. Some subjects viewed a digitally manipulated video of their partner cheating; some were told that video evidence of the cheating exists; and others were not told anything about video evidence. Subjects were asked to sign a statement confirming that they witnessed the incident and that their corroboration could be used in disciplinary action against the accused. See‐video subjects were three times more likely to sign the statement than Told‐video and Control subjects. Fabricated evidence may, indeed, produce false eyewitness testimony; we discuss probable cognitive mechanisms. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The origin of children's implanted false memories: Memory traces or compliance?

A longstanding question in false memory research is whether children's implanted false memories represent actual memory traces or merely result from compliance. The current study examined this question using a response latency based deception task. Forty-five 8-year-old children received narratives about a true (first day at school) and false event (hot air balloon ride). Across two interviews, 58/32% of the participants developed a partial/full false memory. Interestingly, these children also showed higher false recall on an unrelated DRM paradigm compared to children without a false memory. The crucial finding, however, was that the results of the deception task revealed that children with partial and full false memories were faster to confirm than to deny statements relating to the false event. This indicates that children's implanted false memories reflect actual memory traces, and are unlikely to be explained by mere compliance.     

Does test-induced priming play a role in the creation of false memories?

We investigated the role of test-induced priming in creating false memories in the Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm, in which subjects study lists of related words (bed, rest, awake) and then falsely recall or recognise a related word (sleep) on a later test. However, in experiments using three different procedures, we found that the number of related words tested prior to the critical word had surprisingly little impact on false recall and recognition. We manipulated the location of the critical item in tests of yes/no recognition, word-stem cued recall, and part-set cued recall. We consistently obtained high probabilities of false recall and recognition, but the probability was unaffected by the number of related items presented prior to the test of the critical item. Surprisingly, test-induced priming of the critical item does not seem to play a large role in this memory illusion.     

When do false memories cross language boundaries in English—Spanish bilinguals?

To determine whether false memories cross language boundaries, we presented English-Spanish bilinguals with conceptually related word lists for five study-test trials. Some lists were heard in English, some in Spanish, and they were then followed by a recognition memory test composed of studied words, conceptually related nonstudied critical words, and unrelated words presented in the same language used at study or in a different language. Even though participants were instructed to recognize only previously heard words, they falsely recognized both same-language and different-language critical words. With practice, participants increased their accurate recognition of list words and decreased their false recognition of critical words when the study-test language was the same, and they decreased their false recognition of list words and critical words when the language differed. False memories can cross language boundaries when participants rely on conceptual representations from the word lists, but these errors decrease over trials as participants increasingly rely on language-specific lexical representations.     

Are trauma victims susceptible to "false memories"?

Laboratory studies using word-list paradigms have provided evidence that nontraumatized individuals falsely recall or recognize events that never occurred. In the present study, H. L. Roediger and K. B. McDermott's false-memory paradigm (1995) was utilized to examine possible source monitoring deficits in individuals with PTSD. Traumatized individuals with PTSD were compared with traumatized individuals without PTSD and with nontraumatized control participants. Participants heard lists of related words (e.g., bed, night) that were associates of a critical nonpresented word (e.g., sleep) and were given immediate free recall and later recognition tests. Traumatized participants with and without PTSD generated more false recalls of critical nonpresented words than did nontraumatized participants. False recall was related to trait anxiety and PTSD severity. The results are consistent with a general source-monitoring deficit in trauma-exposed individuals.     

Are false memories more difficult to forget than accurate memories? The effect of retention interval on recall and recognition

What is the effect of retention interval on accurate and false recollection in the Deese, Roediger, and McDermott (DRM) procedure? Previous research has suggested that false recall is more persistent than accurate recall, but the recognition results have been inconsistent. In two parametric studies, we tested recall and recognition for the same DRM lists, over retention intervals that ranged from no delay to a 2-month delay. We found that accurate and false memory were diminished by increases in retention interval, false memory persistence was present for recall and recognition, greater persistence for false memory than for accurate memory was more readily observed for recall than recognition, and the highthreshold (Pr), signal detection (d’), and nonparametric (A’) recognition measures differed in their sensitivity for detecting change. The effect of retention interval on accurate and false memory is consistent with expectations from fuzzy trace theory. In the DRM procedure, truth is not more memorable than fiction.     

Imagination and memory: Does imagining implausible events lead to false autobiographical memories?

Previous studies have reported that imagination can induce false autobiographical memories. This finding has been used to suggest that psychotherapists who have clients imagine suspected repressed memories of childhood sexual abuse may, in fact, be inducing false memories for the imagined events. In this study, at Time 1 and then, 2 weeks later, at Time 2, 145 subjects rated each of 20 events on the Life Events Inventory as to whether each had occurred to them in childhood. One week after Time 1, the subjects were told that 2 target events were plausible and 2 were implausible. They were then asked to imagine 1 plausible and 1 implausible target event. Plausibility and imagining interacted to affect occurrence ratings; whereas imagining plausible events increased the change in occurrence ratings, imagining implausible events had no effect on occurrence ratings.