The explicit and implicit dance in psychoanalytic change

How the implicit/non-declarative and explicit/declarative cognitive domains interact is centrally important in the consideration of effecting change within the psychoanalytic arena. Stern et al. (1998) declare that long-lasting change occurs in the domain of implicit relational knowledge. In the view of this author, the implicit and explicit domains are intricately intertwined in an interactive dance within a psychoanalytic process. The author views that a spirit of inquiry (Lichtenberg, Lachmann & Fosshage 2002) serves as the foundation of the psychoanalytic process. Analyst and patient strive to explore, understand and communicate and, thereby, create a 'spirit' of interaction that contributes, through gradual incremental learning, to new implicit relational knowledge. This spirit, as part of the implicit relational interaction, is a cornerstone of the analytic relationship. The 'inquiry' more directly brings explicit/declarative processing to the foreground in the joint attempt to explore and understand. The spirit of inquiry in the psychoanalytic arena highlights both the autobiographical scenarios of the explicit memory system and the mental models of the implicit memory system as each contributes to a sense of self, other, and self with other. This process facilitates the extrication and suspension of the old models, so that new models based on current relational experience can be gradually integrated into both memory systems for lasting change.     

REVISING PSYCHOANALYTIC INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PAST

The author reviews a contemporary cognitive psychology perspective on memory that views memory as being composed of multiple separate systems. Most researchers draw a fundamental distinction between declarative/explicit and non-declarative/implicit forms of memory. Declarative memory is responsible for the conscious recollection of facts and events - what is typically meant by the everyday and the common psychoanalytic use of the word 'memory'. Non-declarative forms of memory, in contrast, are specialised processes that influence experience and behaviour without representing the past in terms of any consciously accessible content. They operate outside of an individual's awareness, but are not repressed or otherwise dynamically unconscious. Using this theoretical framework, the question of how childhood relationship experiences are carried forward from the past to influence the present is examined. It is argued that incorporating a conceptualisation of non-declarative memory processing into psychoanalytic theory is essential. Non-declarative memory processes are capable of forming complex and sophisticated representations of the interpersonal world. These non-declarative memory processes exert a major impact on interpersonal experience and behaviour that needs to be analysed on its own terms and not mistakenly viewed as a form of resistance.     

Introduction: A Systems View

Our goal in this series of four papers is a further refinement of a theory of interaction for psychoanalysis, with a specific focus on the concept of intersubjectivity. Psychoanalysis has addressed the concept of intersubjectivity primarily in the verbal/explicit mode. In contrast, infant research has addressed the concept of intersubjectivity in the nonverbal/implicit mode of action sequences, or procedural knowledge. We propose that an integration of explicit/linguistic with implicit/nonverbal theories of intersubjectivity is essential to a deeper understanding of therapeutic action in psychoanalysis today. To shed light on an implicit/nonverbal dimension of intersubjectivity in psychoanalysis, we include concepts from adult psychoanalysis, infant research, developmental systems theories, and nonverbal communication, particularly the distinction between implicit processing out of awareness and explicit processing at the declarative/verbal level. We conclude with an adult psychoanalytic case illustrating the integration of implicit/nonverbal forms of intersubjectivity into adult treatment.     

Dream actors in the theatre of memory: Their role in the psychoanalytic process2

The author notes that neuropsychological research has discovered the existence of two long‐term memory systems, namely declarative or explicit memory, which is conscious and autobiographical, and non‐declarative or implicit memory, which is neither conscious nor verbalisable. It is suggested that pre‐verbal and pre‐symbolic experience in the child's primary relations is stored in implicit memory, where it constitutes an unconscious nucleus of the self which is not repressed and which influences the person's affective, emotional, cognitive and sexual life even as an adult. In the analytic relationship this unconscious part can emerge essentially through certain modes of communication (tone of voice, rhythm and prosody of the voice, and structure and tempo of speech), which could be called the ‘musical dimension’ of the transference, and through dream representations. Besides work on the transference, the critical component of the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis is stated to consist in work on dreams as pictographic and symbolic representations of implicit pre‐symbolic and pre‐verbal experiences. A case history is presented in which dream interpretation allowed some of a patient's early unconscious, non‐repressed experiences to be emotionally reconstructed and made thinkable even though they were not actually remembered.     

Memory dysfunction in caudate infarction caused by Heubner's recurring artery occlusion

We report five cases with caudate infarction due to Heubner's recurring artery occlusion, in which we conducted detailed memory examinations in terms of explicit memory and implicit memory. We performed the auditory verbal learning test as explicit memory tasks, and motor and cognitive procedural memory tasks, developed by Komori, as implicit memory tasks. Comparing normal control subjects with patients with left caudate infarction due to Heubner's recurring artery occlusion demonstrated lower scores on both declarative and motor procedural memory tasks. These results suggest that the left caudate nucleus may be related with both declarative memory and procedural memory.     

Challenging the role of implicit processes in probabilistic category learning

Considerable interest in the hypothesis that different cognitive tasks recruit qualitatively distinct processing systems has led to the proposal of separate explicit (declarative) and implicit (procedural) systems. A popular probabilistic category learning task known as the weather prediction task is said to be ideally suited to examine this distinction because its two versions, “observation” and “feedback,” are claimed to recruit the declarative and procedural systems, respectively. In two experiments, we found results that were inconsistent with this interpretation. In Experiment 1, a concurrent memory task had a detrimental effect on the implicit (feedback) version of the task. In Experiment 2, participants displayed comparable and accurate insight into the task and their judgment processes in the feedback and observation versions. These findings have important implications for the study of probabilistic category learning in both normal and patient populations.     

Novice motor performance: Better not to verbalize

Offline verbalization about a new motor experience is often assumed to positively influence subsequent performance. Here, we evaluated this presumed positive influence and whether it originates from declarative or from procedural knowledge using the explicit/implicit motor-learning paradigm. To this end, 80 nongolfers learned to perform a golf-putting task with high error rates (i.e., explicit motor learning), and thus relied on declarative knowledge, or low error rates (i.e., implicit motor learning), and thus relied on procedural knowledge. Afterward, they either put their memories of the previous motor experience into words or completed an irrelevant verbal task. Finally, they performed the putting task again. Verbalization did not improve novice motor performance: Putting was impaired, overall, and especially so for high-error learners. We conclude that declarative knowledge is altered by verbalization, whereas procedural knowledge is not.     

Contributions of memory circuits to language: the declarative/procedural model

The structure of the brain and the nature of evolution suggest that, despite its uniqueness, language likely depends on brain systems that also subserve other functions. The declarative/procedural (DP) model claims that the mental lexicon of memorized word-specific knowledge depends on the largely temporal-lobe substrates of declarative memory, which underlies the storage and use of knowledge of facts and events. The mental grammar, which subserves the rule-governed combination of lexical items into complex representations, depends on a distinct neural system. This system, which is composed of a network of specific frontal, basal-ganglia, parietal and cerebellar structures, underlies procedural memory, which supports the learning and execution of motor and cognitive skills, especially those involving sequences. The functions of the two brain systems, together with their anatomical, physiological and biochemical substrates, lead to specific claims and predictions regarding their roles in language. These predictions are compared with those of other neurocognitive models of language. Empirical evidence is presented from neuroimaging studies of normal language processing, and from developmental and adult-onset disorders. It is argued that this evidence supports the DP model. It is additionally proposed that "language" disorders, such as specific language impairment and non-fluent and fluent aphasia, may be profitably viewed as impairments primarily affecting one or the other brain system. Overall, the data suggest a new neurocognitive framework for the study of lexicon and grammar.     

Memory systems within a cognitive architecture

This article addresses the division of memory systems in relation to an overall cognitive architecture. As understanding the architecture is essential to understanding the mind, developing computational cognitive architectures is an important enterprise in computational psychology (computational cognitive modeling). The article proposes a set of hypotheses concerning memory systems from the standpoint of a cognitive architecture, in particular, the four-way division of memory (including explicit and implicit procedural memory and explicit and implicit declarative memory). It then discusses in detail how these hypotheses may be validated through examining qualitatively the literature on memory. A quick review follows of computational simulations of a variety of quantitative data (which are not limited to narrowly conceived “memory tasks”). Results of accounting for both qualitative and quantitative data point to the promise of this approach.     

Insight, working through, and practice: the role of procedural knowledge

A conception of insight is proposed, based on a systems and information-processing framework and using current neuroscience concepts, as an integration of information that results in a new symbolization of experience with a significant change in self-image and a transformation of non-declarative procedural knowledge into declarative knowledge. Since procedural memory and knowledge, seen to include emotional and relationship issues, is slow to change, durable emotional and behavioral change often requires repeated practice, a need not explicitly addressed in standard psychoanalytic technique. Working through is thus seen as also encompassing nondynamic factors. The application of these ideas to therapeutic technique suggests possible therapeutic interventions beyond interpretation. An illustrative clinical vignette is presented.     

The cognitive and neural architecture of sequence representation

The authors theorize that 2 neurocognitive sequence-learning systems can be distinguished in serial reaction time experiments, one dorsal (parietal and supplementary motor cortex) and the other ventral (temporal and lateral prefrontal cortex). Dorsal system learning is implicit and associates noncategorized stimuli within dimensional modules. Ventral system learning can be implicit or explicit It also allows associating events across dimensions and therefore is the basis of cross-task integration or interference, depending on degree of cross-task correlation of signals. Accordingly, lack of correlation rather than limited capacity is responsible for dual-task effects on learning. The theory is relevant to issues of attentional effects on learning; the representational basis of complex, sequential skills; hippocampal-versus basal ganglia-based learning; procedural versus declarative memory; and implicit versus explicit memory.     

The effect of implicit and explicit practice in the development of decision making in volleyball serving

This experiment investigated the effect of explicit, implicit, and sequential learning (implicit-explicit) on the acquisition and retention of decision-making skill in volleyball. The participants were 60 female novices, ages 10 to 12 years. The experimental groups followed three different methods of training: (a) explicit practice for the development of declarative knowledge, (b) implicit practice for the development of the procedural knowledge, (c) sequential practice (implicit first and then explicit), and (d) control group that participated only in the measurements. A pre-test, a post-test, and a retention test measured the response time and accuracy of the decision-making skill. Analysis indicated that all experimental groups improved over time while the control group did not. The sequential group was faster and more accurate than the implicit group, and the latter was faster and more accurate than the explicit one. The sequential group outperformed implicit and explicit groups on both speed and accuracy of decision. It seems that both explicit and implicit processes, when they take place in sequence, interact positively, and this method improves speed and accuracy of decision making rather than when each mode of learning (implicit or explicit) occurs separately. If the role of working memory is reduced at the early stages of learning, the accumulation of declarative knowledge (explicit learning) may benefit from accumulation of procedural knowledge and enhance decision-making skill.     

Categorization by movement direction: Retrieval-induced forgetting of motor sequences grouped by motion features

We investigated the organized storage of motor sequences in memory by assuming that processes related to interference at retrieval are indicative of memory organization. Effects resulting from these processes, thus, would allow inferences on how motor sequences are represented and organized. Participants learned motor sequences that were categorized by the direction of the initial movement. The subsequent selective retrieval of a subset of sequences of one category resulted in retrieval-induced forgetting (RIF) for the non-retrieved sequences of the same category. RIF occurred in an explicit recall test (Experiment 1), as well in an implicit test assessing memory with novel cues (Experiment 2). The results suggest that RIF affected motor programmes and that other cues as the used effectors (here movement direction) can be used for the organization of procedural memory. Basic retrieval dynamics apparently operate within the declarative and procedural systems in a similar way.     

Reconsidering therapeutic action: Loewald, cognitive neuroscience and the integration of memory's duality

Both Loewald's relational theory of memory and the Self-Memory System (SMS) of cognitive neuroscience describe a dual memory system, one system that is experience-near sensory-perceptual, and the other, symbolic and conceptual. In contrast to perspectives that locate therapeutic action in either altering implicit procedural memories or interpreting explicit historical content, we argue that psychological health emerges from effective integration of both memory systems, achieved through a combination of transference dynamics and analytic insight. We support this position by elaborating four key assumptions of the loewaldian and SMS perspectives, followed by application to a clinical example. We highlight the power of certain integrative autobiographical memories called 'self-defining memories' in assisting an understanding of transference dynamics and providing metaphoric touchstones to guide subsequent treatment.     

Effects of emotional arousal on multiple memory systems: evidence from declarative and procedural learning

Extensive evidence documents emotional modulation of hippocampus-dependent declarative memory in humans. However, little is known about the emotional modulation of striatum-dependent procedural memory. To address how emotional arousal influences declarative and procedural memory, the current study utilized (1) a picture recognition and (2) a weather prediction (WP) task (a probabilistic classification learning task), which have been shown to rely on hippocampal- and striatum-based memory systems, respectively. Observers viewed arousing or neutral pictures after (Experiment 1) or during (Experiment 2) WP training trials. A 1-wk delayed picture recognition memory test revealed enhanced declarative memory for arousing compared with neutral pictures. Arousal during encoding impaired initial WP acquisition but did not influence retention when tested after a 1-wk delay. Data from a subsequent 3-mo delayed test, however, suggested that arousal during acquisition may enhance remote WP retention. These results suggest a potential dissociation between how readily emotional arousal influences hippocampus-dependent and striatum-dependent memory systems in humans.     

The Many Faces of Trauma - Psychic trauma as an inner experience

Abstract

Two types of memory processes, declarative and non-declarative have been identified by cognitive scientists. Cognitive science is currently making a distinction between 1) declarative memory and non-declarative memory. This paper is concerned with one type of non-declarative memory, procedural memory. Declarative knowledge refers to the things we know such as names, places, dates. Procedural knowledge is information associated with a highly practiced schema or action which is usually not conscious when the sequence is activated. The implications of procedural knowledge for psychoanalytic treatment are now beginning to be explored. This paper is a further step in this exploration.

It has been hypothesized that because of the automaticity of learned procedures underlying character pathology, character change can best be accomplished by intervening at the procedural level. This paper suggests that such interventions are optimal when they are noninterpretive and occur within the context of an interactive, mutually regulated, dyadic system. Procedures, when they become accessible to the analyst through empathy and introspection, can be, and in the case discussed below, were addressed within the context of the dyad. The psychotherapy of an adult man with difficulties at the procedural level is utilized to illustrate the importance of noninterpretive interventions that address the procedure in order to engage it in the dyad where it can begin to undergo therapeutic transformation. This paper illustrates the importance of understanding procedural knowledge and how this can provide a valuable additional tool to shape the modes of therapeutic action utilized in psychoanalytic treatment.     

Cognitive procedural learning in early Alzheimer's disease: impaired processes and compensatory mechanisms

Introduction. The aim of this study was to study cognitive procedural learning in early Alzheimer's disease (AD). Methods. Cognitive procedural learning was assessed using the Tower of Hanoi (TH) task. In order to take account of possible interactions between different systems during cognitive procedural learning, we also measured non‐verbal intellectual functions, working memory, and declarative memory. Results. Our results showed an apparent preservation of cognitive procedural learning in AD and a deleterious effect of the disease on verbal intelligence and declarative memory. Correlational analyses revealed a difference between AD patients and control participants in the type of processing they applied to the task. Conclusion. The non‐involvement of declarative memory would appear to be partly responsible for a slowdown in the cognitive procedural dynamics of AD patients. As the AD patients were unable to use their declarative memory, they were still in a problem‐solving mode at the end of the learning protocol and had to implement higher order cognitive processes (i.e., compensatory mechanisms) to perform the procedural task.     

The past and future of the past tense

What is the interaction between storage and computation in language processing? What is the psychological status of grammatical rules? What are the relative strengths of connectionist and symbolic models of cognition? How are the components of language implemented in the brain? The English past tense has served as an arena for debates on these issues. We defend the theory that irregular past-tense forms are stored in the lexicon, a division of declarative memory, whereas regular forms can be computed by a concatenation rule, which requires the procedural system. Irregulars have the psychological, linguistic and neuropsychological signatures of lexical memory, whereas regulars often have the signatures of grammatical processing. Furthermore, because regular inflection is rule-driven, speakers can apply it whenever memory fails.     

The COST of explicit memory

Within Piaget there is an implicit theory of the development of explicit memory. It rests in the dynamical trajectory underlying the development of causality, object, space and time – a complex (COST) supporting a symbolic relationship integral to the explicit. Cassirer noted the same dependency in the phenomena of aphasias, insisting that a symbolic function is being undermined in these deficits. This is particularly critical given the reassessment of Piaget’s stages as the natural bifurcations of a self-organizing dynamic system. The elements of a theoretical framework required to support explicit memory are developed, to include, (1) the complex developmental trajectory supporting the emergence of the explicit in Piaget, (2) the concrete dynamical system and the concept of a non-differentiable time contained in Bergson’s theory required to support a conscious, as opposed to an implicit remembrance, (3) the relation to current theories of amnesia, difficulties posed by certain retrograde amnesic phenomena, the role of the hippocampus and limitations of connectionist models, (4) the fact that nowhere in this overall framework does the loss of explicit memory imply or require the destruction of experience “stored in the brain.”