An Elegy,a Love Song,and a Lullaby

In the course of the past decade, I have found himself looking as much to poets and the experience of reading poetry as to the work of other analysts in my ongoing effort to become a psychoanalyst. Both the poet and the psychoanalyst are individuals whose life's work is that of making “raid[s] [on] the inarticulate” (Eliot, 1940, p. 128) in their effort to delve as deeply as possible into what it is to be human and to render that experience in the medium of language. To this end, I offer a reading of Seamus Heaney's (1987) “Clearances,” an elegy Heaney wrote for his mother soon after her death. I explore the ways in which the experience of mourning—whether in a poem or in an analytic experience—is not simply “conveyed” (as if illuminating something already there) but created in the very act of writing/saying the poem or of bringing feelings to life in words in an analytic session.

I begin by presenting a brief biographical account of Heaney not to “explain” his poetry in analytic terms but to allow the reader to create a more imaginative, more human reading of the poem as he or she enters into the conversation between the life of the man and the life of the poetry. Then I discuss the ways in which “Clearances” comes to life as a variety of coexisting forms of love that together shape an experience of grief.     

Freud,the Serpent and the Sexual Enlightenment of Children

Abstract

This paper examines Freud's interpretation of the myth of the Fall, which he sent to Jung in December of 1911. After a textual-historical exegesis of the Genesis narrative, I argue that many features of the myth, which Freud construed in Oedipal terms, are more intelligible in light of his theories of infantile sexual researches, which he abandoned in 1910. The etiological shift away from infantile sexual researches (and the consequent Oedipalization of analytic theory) were 1) not prompted solely by clinical considerations, and 2) heralded dramatic changes in attitudes toward children and the rejection of paternal authority in Freud and his circle, and 3) corresponding changes in the structure and organization of the psychoanalytic movement itself, creating an orthodoxy or “party line”.

The term “orthodoxy” means “uniformity of belief”, and is usually applied to religious groups, whose dogmatic emphasis on a specific body of doctrine serves to define the group's membership and boundaries, and to exclude “unbelievers” from its midst. In this sense, Freud's style of leadership was distinctly “religious”. Due to deep seated resistances in the analytic world, it is possible that disparities between Freud's earlier and later attitudes toward children will never be thematized and explored with the attention and seriousness they deserve. But the attempt must be made, and by exploring the Genesis narrative, we can grasp the personal and political motives that molded Freud's theory of religion, and glimpse the outlines of paths not taken in the clinical theory.     

Altruistic love in psychoanalysis opportunities and resistance

Many patients manifest a desire to help the analyst. This is usually understood as being derivative of defensive aims or in the service of other primary motivations. This paper argues for the developmental and clinical importance of primary altruistic aims, which are often warded off by the patient because of his or her fears of exploitation or rejection. Several pathogenic beliefs and varieties of psychopathology result from the failure of the patient's caretakers to allow the child to contribute to their welfare, to “take”; the child's “help.”; Similarly, some patients require tangible evidence that they are having a positive impact on their analyst. Ordinary “good‐enough”; technique often reinforces the patient's view that he or she has nothing to offer. A full appreciation by the analyst of the importance to patients of having their altruistic gestures and concerns recognized and accepted can open up possibilities for analytic progress and therapeutic growth. Various sources of resistance to and misunderstanding of these dynamics are explored, ranging from ethical concerns to certain traits that cluster in the personalities of analysts.     

From analytic pragmatism to historical materialism: Frankfurt school critical theory and the Quine-Duhem thesis

My aim in this paper is to explore an affinity between early critical theory and analytical philosophy. The affinity is in a fairly unexpected area: philosophy of science. I argue that early critical theory embraces a view of science which is a natural if somewhat unfamiliar extension of the pragmatist one defended by Quine. In particular, I argue that Horkheimer has a version of the Quine-Duhem thesis (“underdetermination of theory choice by the evidence”). How do the Frankfurt and analytical versions of the underdetermination thesis differ? Quine and others have taken the thesis to motivate a form of pragmatism. What this means is that it is certain interests that ultimately determine the choice of theory: chief among them, an interest in simplicity of our theories. However, the Critical Theorists offer us a distinctly historical materialist version of the underdetermination thesis, in which it is the imperatives of the prevailing mode of production, for example, capitalism, which are decisive. The result is an unfamiliar Marxist version of an otherwise familiar thesis from the analytic tradition.     

BECOMING RELATED: THE EDUCATION OF A PSYCHOANALYST

The author uses a “professional memoir,” a story about his first experiences in clinical work, to illustrate what he believes to be certain fundamental aspects of an analytic attitude. Taking place in a psychiatric hospital, it is meant to highlight the central place of intuition, emotional receptivity, empathy, relatedness—and their inherent dangers—in engaging therapeutically with patients' emotional disturbances. The author postulates that these and related aspects of clinical psychoanalysis are not sufficiently emphasized in psychoanalytic training and are often eclipsed by idealizations of psychoanalytic theories and their derivative techniques, third‐party demands for evidence‐based data, preoccupations with neurobiological correlates of experience, etc. Despite the clinical fact that psychoanalysis can be extraordinarily helpful to patients, he questions whether clinical psychoanalysis is rightly regarded as a “treatment.”     

DREAMING THE ANALYTIC SESSION: A CLINICAL ESSAY

This is a clinical paper in which the author describes analytic work in which he dreams the analytic session with three of his patients. He begins with a brief discussion of aspects of analytic theory that make up a good deal of the context for his clinical work. Central among these concepts are (1) the idea that the role of the analyst is to help the patient dream his previously “undreamt” and “interrupted” dreams; and (2) dreaming the analytic session involves engaging in the experience of dreaming the session with the patient and, at the same time, unconsciously (and at times consciously) understanding the dream. The author offers no “technique” for dreaming the analytic session. Each analyst must find his or her own way of dreaming each session with each patient. Dreaming the session is not something one works at; rather, one tries not to get in its way.     

Political Divide in the Consulting Room*

This paper addresses a treatment relationship that tests the analyst’s capacity for empathy within an impinging political context. It involves a Ferenczian “relaxation of technique” within the analytic frame, while the analytic couple attempts to negotiate a polarized transference and countertransference. Specifically, within a long-term treatment imbued with positive transference, my patient becomes openly outraged by my insensitive anti-Trump remarks. Increasing confrontations around the expression of political views illuminate our otherness. He complains of psychic ostracism within a liberal cultural context, which tolerates no divergence from mainstream liberal ideas or discourse. I come to embody the oppressive other: the liberal “thought police”, “silencing” him for his perspective. Empathic breaches between us take center stage: how I don’t see the world as he does, and don’t see or hear him.     

Principlism,Pragmatism, or Reconstructionist Confucianism? —Some Comments on Ni Peimin’s English Translation of the Analects

This essay provides a few critical points of view on Ni Peimin’s recent English translation of the Analects. It shows that his translations of ren into “human-heartedness” and of li into “ritual propriety” may indicate a willingness to recast these Confucian concepts in the modern ideology of western subjectivism or individualism, whereas Confucianism is not in the direction of such ideologies. Moreover, while Ni seems to offer a “no-rule” view of Confucian virtue ethics, he cannot deny the existence of moral rules and principles in the Confucian system. It is insufficient for him to emphasize the importance of Confucian “instructions” or “methods” as he does without explicating their relations to Confucian rules. Additionally, Ni’s gongfu Confucianism provides a necessary and healthy step back from the contemporary principlism that has been dominant and popular in contemporary politics, ethics, and applied ethics, but Ni goes too far in denying the importance of the moral rules and principles that are implicit or explicit in the Confucian ritual practices and upheld in Confucius’s Analects.     

Review Essay: Constructivism with a Human Face

Irwin Hoffman's book Ritual and Spontaneity includes, but goes well beyond, his series of seminal papers—written over the past several decades—developing a psychoanalytic, constructivist perspective. A new, existential framework depicts what Hoffman calls the “psychobiological bedrock” at the core of the human process of constructing meaning—the lifelong effort to create a livable, subjective world in face of our ever present sense of loss, suffering, and, ultimately, mortality.

This review describes Hoffman's encompassing, existential perspective and discusses how, within this framework, he uses his dialectical sensibility to frame our understanding of both parenting and analysis as “semisacred” activities. The “dialectic of ritual and spontaneity”—the vital clash between disciplined adherence to the analytic frame and personally expressive deviations from it—represents the creative tension between the “magical” dimension of analytic authority and the healing influence of a genuinely expressive human relationship. Hoffman's perspective on the self-interested, “dark side” of the analytic relationship is compared with Winnicott's views on the vital, therapeutic role of “hate” and the paradoxical process by which the patient comes to “use” the analyst.

Unlike most postmodernist “constructivists,” Hoffman openly reveals his underlying belief in certain “transcultural, transhistorical universals”—his “psychobiological bedrock.” In acknowledging these “essentials” (assumptions about human nature) that in some form are integral, yet often hidden, elements of any system of thought, Hoffman saves his own dialectical constructivism from falling into dichotomous (constructivist vs. essentialist) thinking.     

“The Gift of an Apple or the Twist of an Arm”: Negotiation in Couples and Couple Therapy

This paper explores the role of negotiation in couples and couple therapy from a relational perspective, situated at the interface of psychoanalytic and systems theories, that emphasizes intersubjectivity. We consider the clinical processes through which members of a couple may be helped to develop competence in basic elements of intimate communication and negotiation, including reflective listening, mentalization, and recognition. Clinical examples illustrate therapeutic movement from projective-introjective “transference” repetitions within a couple's relationship toward a growing ability to transcend the intrapsychic “demons” that haunt the couple. Specific technical measures are described, including the use of communication “exercises” and “homework” in the context of analytic couple therapy—what we term working from the outside-in and the inside-out—as well as the potential functions of a cotherapist team for particular couples.     

Some Dare Call It Conspiracy: Labeling Something a Conspiracy Theory Does Not Reduce Belief in It

“Conspiracy theory” is widely acknowledged to be a loaded term. Politicians use it to mock and dismiss allegations against them, while philosophers and political scientists warn that it could be used as a rhetorical weapon to pathologize dissent. In two empirical studies conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk, I present an initial examination of whether this concern is justified. In Experiment 1, 150 participants judged a list of historical and speculative theories to be no less likely when they were labeled “conspiracy theories” than when they were labeled “ideas.” In Experiment 2 (N = 802), participants who read a news article about fictitious “corruption allegations” endorsed those allegations no more than participants who saw them labeled “conspiracy theories.” The lack of an effect of the conspiracy‐theory label in both experiments was unexpected and may be due to a romanticized image of conspiracy theories in popular media or a dilution of the term to include mundane speculation regarding corruption and political intrigue.     

Developing a Psychoanalytic Practice

Abstract

This paper examines two methods of developing a psychoanalytic practice. The first is an “internal” approach that helps a patient make the transition from therapy to analysis with the same analyst. This may be accomplished by attenuating the patient's unconscious fears of analysis as a facilitator of an anticipated regressive loss of control and as a reactivator of feared desires and impulses. Increased motivation for analysis may also result from a therapy that leads the patient to an awareness that an ongoing level of distress is internal, together with the experience of a deepened therapy and of the analyst as safe and potentially providing relief. The second method of developing an analytic practice is an “external” approach that provides others, such as analytic, mental health, medical, and academic colleagues, an experience of the analyst as person and some idea of the type of work he or she does.     

Of Innocence and Experience: Commentary on Paper by Stuart A. Pizer

In providing the background to a pivotal session, Stuart Pizer reveals his clinical work as an unsupervised neophyte, prior to his own analysis and analytic training. These early therapeutic efforts were flawed, leaving Pizer at times “grimacing with mortification 26 years after the fact.” But they were also extraordinarily helpful to the patient. Schaffer discusses the challenge of supervising similarly talented beginners: how does one teach psychoanalysis without desiccating a treatment? How does one teach a relational approach, with no “basic model” and few rules, to a beginning analyst infused with an unformulated, yet often passionate, sense of what is “curative”? Pizer recognizes that were he to meet the same patient today, he would not conduct the same treatment. Now trained and analyzed, not to mention more cautious and “worldweary,” Pizer would not do what he did then. But what if he were the supervisor then? Schaffer concludes her discussion by asking Pizer how he, now a seasoned analyst, would supervise his early therapist self.     

Allport's Life and Allport's Psychology

ABSTRACT This article addresses some of the relations between Gordon Allport's life and his psychological theories, focusing on two themes: (a) Allport's junior-year prize-winning recounting of Harvard's “Rinehart” legend–the changes and distortions he introduced in his version of the core legend suggest altruistic sublimation of motives for power and prestige; and (b) Allport's relationship with “Jenny,” the mother of “Ross,” his college roommate (he twice published her letters to him as Letters from Jenny.). I suggest that the need to differentiate himself from Ross was one contributing factor to such Allportian theoretical notions as the functional autonomy of motives and the sharp differentiation between “normal” and “abnormal.”     

Analytical Psychology and Science: Adversaries or Allies?

This article examines C. G. Jung's relationship to science as a paradigm and the relationship between the Jungian community and science. The impact of Jungian “isolation” in terms of academic dialogue, cross-theoretical influence, and absence from the public sphere is also discussed. The author examines how findings from science can enhance our functioning as analytic clinicians and improve our ability to communicate the wealth found in analytical psychology to a variety of audiences outside Jungian circles. Finally, research on analytic interaction and analytic theories of the mind/psyche is explored as well as general research that has implications for analytical psychology and psychoanalytic theory.     

THE LANGUAGE OF <Emphasis Type="Italic">YES</Emphasis> IN A WORLD OF <Emphasis Type="Italic">NO</Emphasis>: A GAY MAN REDISCOVERS HIS SILENCED SELF

Developmental issues arising from the dilemma of the protogay male child (as defined by Blum and Pfetzing in 1997) and the assaults to his sense of self are discussed in the context of the impact of the analytic attitude. Clinical material is offered as a 50-year-old gay man, troubled by his inability to form a lasting loving relationship with a man, experiences integration in the analytic relationship, stemming from what he describes as the “Yes” offered by his female analyst.     

Technique as a Case-Specific Problem: Reply to Commentaries

Seligman's appreciative response to the discussions of his paper is most concerned with the issues raised in Leon Kleimberg's critique of his “modifications of technique.” The dialogue between Kleimberg's and his point of view, with the latter echoed as it in Case and Dent's and Frosch's, reflects a number of key convergences and divergences between the American relational perspective and the British Independents'. Both approaches rely on a fundamentally dyadic perspective that stresses how the analyst's work is fundamentally shaped in response to the patient's internal objects. At the same time, although he is sympathetic to Kleimberg's concerns, he questions the idea of technique as a fixed set of uncontaminated practices. Instead, he endorses the North American relational idea that whatever the analyst does in the name of “technique” cannot be extricated from the transference-countertransference in which it is implicated. From this point of view, technical decisions are most likely to be experienced by the patient, and very often by the analyst, as inevitably reflecting one aspect of another of the patient's internal object world from within the phanstasmatically organized matrix of each analytic relationship. In addition, he is concerned that analysts' rigidly adhering to “technical” positions will reduce their likelihood of being effective with the widest range of patients, an increasing number of whom may not accept the traditional analytic practices. The mentalization concept, although not guiding his decisions in the case, is useful in describing many such situations.     

Counting the Consequences

James's Fairness in Trade seeks to offer an account of fair trade that is “internal” to an existing practice he describes as “mutual market reliance.” This paper distinguishes several senses of the distinction between “internal” and “external” that occur in the book and asks how, in its various senses, the distinction shapes and influences judgments about the fairness of the practice.