Investigating how ostracizing others affects one’s self-concept

Abstract

Social relationships are connected with an individual’s self-concept, so events that influence one’s relationships subsequently influence one’s self-concept. Ostracism, being excluded and ignored, is an aversive experience involving both a target (the one being ostracized) and source (the one ostracizing). We will discuss previous limitations of source paradigms and how we addressed them when developing our paradigms. We will also highlight current source research, from a co-edited special issue, and how this research is relevant to an individuals’ self-concept. Lastly, we will suggest how cognitive dissonance work can ground source research within a larger theoretical framework and inspire future research. We consider how one’s self-concept influences cognitive dissonance related to knowingly harming others through ostracism.     

The semantic pointer theory of emotion: Integrating physiology,appraisal, and construction

Emotion theory needs to explain the relationship of language and emotions, and the embodiment of emotions, by specifying the computational mechanisms underlying emotion generation in the brain. We used Chris Eliasmith’s Semantic Pointer Architecture to develop POEM, a computational model that explains numerous important phenomena concerning emotions, including how some stimuli generate immediate emotional reactions, how some emotional reactions depend on cognitive evaluations, how bodily states influence the generation of emotions, how some emotions depend on interactions between physiological inputs and cognitive appraisals, and how some emotional reactions concern syntactically complex representations. We contrast our theory with current alternatives, and discuss some possible applications to individual and social emotions.     

Explicit candecomp/parafac solutions for a contrived 2 × 2 × 2 array of rank three

Kruskal, Harshman and Lundy have contrived a special 2 × 2 × 2 array to examine formal properties of degenerate Candecomp/Parafac solutions. It is shown that for this array the Candecomp/Parafac loss has an infimum of 1. In addition, the array will be used to challenge the tradition of fitting Indscal and related models by means of the Candecomp/Parafac process.     

Providing compensation promotes forgiveness for replaceable,but not irreplaceable,losses

ABSTRACT

The present study aimed to examine how the replaceability of a loss moderates the effectiveness of compensation. In Study 1, we sampled real-life experiences of experiential loss, material loss, or loss of materials to which the victims had special attachment, and assayed subsequent feelings toward the transgressor who caused the loss. The results showed that for those who reported losses of an experience or cherished material object, perpetrators’ offers of compensation did not facilitate forgiveness. In Study 2, by manipulating replaceability of hypothetical losses in vignettes, we showed that compensation for replaceable losses effectively elicits forgiveness from a victim, but compensation for irreplaceable losses is ineffective. A series of mediation analyses showed that the effect of replaceability on forgiveness is explained by the victim’s perception of whether their loss was sufficiently recovered. We discuss the function of compensation and its inherent limitations.     

Religious ecology,floaters, and crime: the links between social capital,institutionally disengaged youth,and homicide

We consider two distinct research streams in macro-criminology. The first is how religious ecology, articulated as bridging and bonding capital, is linked to the rates of violence. The second concerns how institutionally disconnected youth, known as “floaters,” are highly vulnerable to violence because they fall outside their community’s umbrella of social control. Using county-level data on religious ecology, institutional engagement, and violence, we connect the two ideas with the following theoretical story line. When a community’s religious ecology is characterized by more bonding capital (versus bridging capital), such places provided fewer institutional entry points for crime-prone youth, thus increasing the proportion of floaters in the area. Because these floaters lack institutional social control, we should observe higher rates of violence as a result. Our analysis offers a social control mechanism by which social capital influences the rates of violence at the macro-level. We discuss the implications of our findings.     

The Intersections of Sexuality, Gender, and Race: Identity Research at the Crossroads

Psychology’s engagement with an intersectional perspective on social identities continues to grow. This special issue is significant in its use of intersectionality to complicate thinking about sexual orientation as a singular, homogenous category. Furthermore, it spotlights how intersectional positions within the range of sexual minority identities articulate with multiple other dimensions of identity, including gender, racial ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and age. In addition to recognizing the important contributions of this issue’s authors, in this commentary we relate their efforts to current trends in intersectionality research, including the contrasting ways intersectionality is applied in psychology. We observe that the authors portray intersectionality as either primarily concerned with multiple marginalized identities or as a more generalized theory of identity, and the authors use intersectionality as a framework, a theory, and an approach to social justice. We then address critiques of intersectionality theory that appear in the field of feminist/gender studies, showing how articles in this special issue both exemplify and challenge those critiques. Last, we focus on next steps in intersectionality research, focusing especially on the question of how intersectionality can best inform theory and methods in psychology.     

What is it to be aware of your awareness of red? A review essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given

In this review essay of Michelle Montague’s The Given we focus on the central thesis in the book: the awareness of awareness thesis. On that thesis, a state of awareness constitutively involves an awareness of itself. In Section 2, we discuss what the awareness of awareness thesis amounts to, how it contrasts with the transparency of experience, and how it might be motivated. In Section 3, we discuss one of Montague’s two theoretical arguments for the awareness of awareness thesis. A view that accepts the awareness of awareness thesis, Montague argues, is to be preferred over competing views because it outperforms them in accounting for the property attributions one makes in perceptual experience. We suggest that it is not clear that this argument for the awareness of awareness thesis is successful. Finally, in Section 4 we consider the relation between Montague’s view of color experience and what she calls Strawson’s datum, arguing that Montague may not be able to explain this datum as straightforwardly as she supposes. This, we suggest, threatens Montague’s second theoretical argument for the awareness of awareness thesis.     

Rationality,perception, and the all-seeing eye

Seeing—perception and vision—is implicitly the fundamental building block of the literature on rationality and cognition. Herbert Simon and Daniel Kahneman’s arguments against the omniscience of economic agents—and the concept of bounded rationality—depend critically on a particular view of the nature of perception and vision. We propose that this framework of rationality merely replaces economic omniscience with perceptual omniscience. We show how the cognitive and social sciences feature a pervasive but problematic meta-assumption that is characterized by an “all-seeing eye.” We raise concerns about this assumption and discuss different ways in which the all-seeing eye manifests itself in existing research on (bounded) rationality. We first consider the centrality of vision and perception in Simon’s pioneering work. We then point to Kahneman’s work—particularly his article “Maps of Bounded Rationality”—to illustrate the pervasiveness of an all-seeing view of perception, as manifested in the extensive use of visual examples and illusions. Similar assumptions about perception can be found across a large literature in the cognitive sciences. The central problem is the present emphasis on inverse optics—the objective nature of objects and environments, e.g., size, contrast, and color. This framework ignores the nature of the organism and perceiver. We argue instead that reality is constructed and expressed, and we discuss the species-specificity of perception, as well as perception as a user interface. We draw on vision science as well as the arts to develop an alternative understanding of rationality in the cognitive and social sciences. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our arguments for the rationality and decision-making literature in cognitive psychology and behavioral economics, along with suggesting some ways forward.     

How agency can solve interventionism’s problem of circularity

Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation is beset by a problem of circularity: the analysis of causes is in terms of interventions, and the analysis of interventions is in terms of causes. This is not in itself an argument against the correctness of the analysis. But by requiring us to have causal knowledge prior to making any judgements about causation, Woodward’s theory does make it mysterious how we can ever start acquiring causal knowledge. We present a solution to this problem by showing how the interventionist notion of causation can be rationally generated from a more primitive agency notion of causation. The agency notion is easily and non-circularly applicable, but fails when we attempt to capture causal relations between non-actions. We show that the interventionist notion of causation serves as an appropriate generalisation of the agency notion. Furthermore, the causal judgements based on the latter generally remain true when rephrased in terms of the former, which allows one to use the causal knowledge gained by applying the agency notion as a basis for applying Woodward’s interventionist theory. We then present an overview of relevant empirical evidence from developmental psychology which shows that our proposed rational reconstruction lines up neatly with the actual development of causal reasoning in children. This gives additional plausibility to our proposal. The article thus provides a solution to one of the main problems of interventionism while keeping Woodward’s analysis intact.     

The disclosure of a metaphysical horizon,or how to escape dialectics

Abstract

In a footnote to The Inoperative Community French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy wonders how to escape Hegelian dialectics. Because Nancy in his later work often returns to this attempt of a ‘disclosure of our metaphysical horizon’, we not only consider this note as a crucial one in his attempt to ‘disclose’ our metaphysical horizon; on top of that, we think this note is really worthwhile considering for our philosophical era in general: how to think after the so called ‘end of metaphysics’? Nancy’s work is an explicit confrontation with this horizon. Therefore, in this paper we prefer to reconstruct his line of thought in this, from the influence of Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot, over Friedrich Hegel up to Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida. We focus on the way attempts for the disclosure of our metaphysical horizon out from the problem of community, one of the central topics in his work. We conclude with a discussion why Nancy’s ontological framework has the potential to break up the metaphysical horizon of our philosophical era.     

Aging,Spirituality, and Time: A Qualitative Study

We examined the concepts of aging, time, spirituality, and future care needs in four randomly selected informants from a group of 54 never-married childless older women. Using data from the Generativity and Lifestyles of Older Women (GLOW) study, we questioned how women’s perceptions of these concepts came together in current older age. We employed cultural theory, (our theoretical framework), ethnography, (our methodological framework), and phenomenology, (our philosophical foundation) to produce a portrait of each woman interviewed. Through a three-session interview process, we elicited the women’s life stories, reasons for childlessness, and topics that emerged as significant to the women, including aging, a sense of time remaining, and spirituality. A key finding was that the context of each woman’s life, both biographical and historical, transpired as a foundation for these concepts. That is, a woman’s “place in time” shaped their experiences of aging, as well as her reasons for childlessness and perceptions of finitude.     

Using a Fork as a Hairbrush: Investigating Dual Routes to Release from Functional Fixedness

Functional fixedness involves difficulty with conceptualizing creative object uses. When it obstructs problem‐solving, individuals must reframe their approach. We examined how different training techniques—chunk decomposition (i.e., considering an object’s basic parts and physical properties) and constraint relaxation (i.e., considering an object’s different functions)—might rely upon different routes to creative reframing. Additionally, we investigated how different forms of cognitive load interact with these dual routes. Participants learned one of three techniques. Chunk decomposition participants created object breakdown diagrams; constraint relaxation participants created object functions lists; and free association (control) participants wrote a word that they associated with each of several concrete nouns. After training, participants attempted to solve five functional fixedness problems. E1 investigated how increasing germane cognitive load via either direct or indirect prompting affected training transfer. Experiment 2 investigated how reducing extraneous cognitive load by providing no transfer instructions and using an eye‐closure strategy. Across both experiments, results supported differences in accuracy and response latency by training. However, chunk decomposition and constraint relaxation did not follow the same pattern, suggesting different mechanisms of the effect. We discuss possible applications to increase innovation in real‐world domains such as education, business, and engineering.     

The Proteus Effect: The Effect of Transformed Self‐Representation on Behavior

Virtual environments, such as online games and web‐based chat rooms, increasingly allow us to alter our digital self‐representations dramatically and easily. But as we change our self‐representations, do our self‐representations change our behavior in turn? In 2 experimental studies, we explore the hypothesis that an individual’s behavior conforms to their digital self‐representation independent of how others perceive them—a process we term the Proteus Effect. In the first study, participants assigned to more attractive avatars in immersive virtual environments were more intimate with confederates in a self‐disclosure and interpersonal distance task than participants assigned to less attractive avatars. In our second study, participants assigned taller avatars behaved more confidently in a negotiation task than participants assigned shorter avatars. We discuss the implications of the Proteus Effect with regards to social interactions in online environments.     

Moral Realism,Social Construction,and Realism,Social Construction,and Communal Ontology

The paper examines two forms of naturalistic moral realism, “Microstructure realism” (MSR) and “Reason realism” (RR). The latter, as we defend it, locates the objectivity of moral facts in socially constructed reality, but the former, as exemplified by David Brink’s model of naturalistic moral realism, secures the objectivity of moral facts in their micro-structure and a nomic supervenience relationship. We find MSR’s parity argument for this account of moral facts implausible; it yields a relationship between moral facts and their natural-scientific constitution that has a queer, slapped-together quality. We argue that the relationship needs to be spelled out by a process of social construction, involving collective intentionality and constitutive rules. We explain how our constructivist model of RR differs from a form of it defended by Michael Smith (1994), which analyzes moral facts by reference not to construction but rather to a hypothetical situation of full rationality. We agree with Smith, as against Bernard Williams, that a rational agent may have reasons for acting that go beyond the agent’s “subjective motivational set,” but we locate such reasons by reference to the agent’s membership in an actual community, and we explore the prospects for moral objectivity given this constraint on moral reasons.     

On the nature and order of organizational processing: A reply to Peterson

Several points in the original article by Palmer and Rock (1994) are clarified in light of Peterson’s (1994) commentary. First, we address several issues related to the nature and order of organizational processes in our theory. We argue that many of her objections result from misconceptions about our theory. We attempt to clarify the relevant issues, including the fact that we intended the theory to describe an ordering of processes in cascade rather than as a sequence of classical discrete stages. Second, we discuss Peterson’s objections to our discussion of her findings on the relation between figure-ground processing and object recognition. We argue against her “prefigural recognition” proposal on logical grounds and provide an alternative account of her findings in terms of our theory.     

Social game theory: Preferences,perceptions, and choices

ABSTRACT

Building on classic game theory, psychologists have explored the effects of social preferences and expectations on strategic behaviour. Ordinary social perceivers are sensitive to additional contextual factors not addressed by game theory and its recent psychological extensions. We review the results of a research programme exploring how observers judge “players” (i.e., individuals making strategic decisions in social dilemmas) on the dimensions of competence and morality. We explore social perception in several well-known dilemmas, including the prisoner’s dilemma, the volunteer’s dilemma, and the trust dilemma. We also introduce a novel self-presentational dilemma. In research conducted over a decade and a half, we have found that judgements of competence are sensitive to both players’ choices and the dilemma’s (expected and actual) outcomes. In contrast, judgements of morality respond strongly to players’ behaviour and little else. We discuss how these social-perceptual patterns might affect expectations, preferences, and strategic choices.     

Sisters of the Heart: How Women's Friendships Heal

In this article we focus on the healing aspects of women's intimate friendships with other women. In particular, we discuss the role of female neurohromone oxytocin “the love hormone” in the promotion of health and wellbeing among women. We assert that the intimate women friendship construct can enhance psychotherapy's healing and empowering functions. In this context, we examine how women's friendships can inform feminist psychotherapy. Moreover, we discuss the feminist therapeutic relationship as an intimate bond, and compare it with women's friendships. We conclude with the introduction of the special issue on “Sisters of the Heart: Women Psychotherapist Reflections on Female Friendships.”     

2D location biases depth-from-disparity judgments but not vice versa

Visual cognition in our 3D world requires understanding how we accurately localize objects in 2D and depth, and what influence both types of location information have on visual processing. Spatial location is known to play a special role in visual processing, but most of these findings have focused on the special role of 2D location. One such phenomena is the spatial congruency bias, where 2D location biases judgments of object features but features do not bias location judgments. This paradigm has recently been used to compare different types of location information in terms of how much they bias different types of features. Here we used this paradigm to ask a related question: whether 2D and depth-from-disparity location bias localization judgments for each other. We found that presenting two objects in the same 2D location biased position-in-depth judgments, but presenting two objects at the same depth (disparity) did not bias 2D location judgments. We conclude that an object’s 2D location may be automatically incorporated into perception of its depth location, but not vice versa, which is consistent with a fundamentally special role for 2D location in visual processing.     

Who you could have known: divine hiddenness,epistemic counterfactuals,and the recalcitrant nature of natural theology

We argue there is a deep conflict in Paul Moser’s work on divine hiddenness (DH). Moser’s treatment of DH adopts a thesis we call SEEK: DH often results from failing to seek God on His terms. One way in which people err, according to Moser, is by trusting arguments of traditional natural theology to lead to filial knowledge of God. We argue that Moser’s SEEK thesis commits him to the counterfactual ACCESS: had the atheist sought after God in harmony with how God reveals himself, she would have had access to filial knowledge of God. By failing to incorporate arguments or propositional evidence for God’s existence, Moser’s account leaves the doubting seeker without any evidential reason to think that either SEEK or ACCESS is true. Without this rational motivation in place, the doubting seeker is unlikely to seek after God in the way ACCESS describes. We argue that natural theology provides an evidential epistemic aid to motivate persons to seek God the way ACCESS describes. Thus, Moser is mistaken. Such arguments can be evidentially helpful in coming to know God. In conclusion, we explain how our reply naturally fits how we form and maintain trusting interpersonal relationships with others.     

Skill transfer through goal-driven representation mapping

In this paper, we present an approach to transfer that involves analogical mapping of symbols across different domains. We relate this mechanism to Icarus, a theory of the human cognitive architecture. Our system can transfer skills across domains hypothesizing maps between representations, improving performance in novel domains. Unlike previous approaches to analogical transfer, our method uses an explanatory analysis that compares how well a new domain theory explains previous solutions under different mapping hypotheses. We present experimental evidence that the new mechanism improves transfer over Icarus’ basic learning processes. Moreover, we argue that the same features which distinguish Icarus from other architectures support representation mapping in a natural way and operate synergistically with it. These features enable our analogy system to translate a map among concepts into a map between skills, and to support transfer even if two domains are only partially analogous. We also discuss our system’s relation to other work on analogy and outline directions for future research.