Are preference reversals reduced when made explicit?

Previous research has shown that preferences for options, such as gambles, can reverse depending on the response mode. These preference reversals have been demonstrated when tasks were performed sequentially. That is, subjects completed one task before beginning another. In an attempt to eliminate preference reversals, we asked subjects to perform tasks simultaneously. That is, subjects made two types of responses for each pair of gambles before evaluating the next pair. In the condition with no financial incentives, preference reversal rates were slightly reduced. In another condition, subjects were paid for their participation and they were allowed to play a gamble with real monetary compensation. A gamble pair was randomly selected, and if a subject's responses in the two tasks were consistent for that pair, he or she was allowed to play the ‘preferred’ gamble. Otherwise, the experimenter selected the gamble from the pair. With these financial incentives, systematic preference reversals were eliminated for two of the three task combinations. Preference reversals continued to occur for attractiveness ratings versus selling prices, although, even for that pair of tasks, the reversal rate was significantly reduced. For all three task pairs, preference orders from the two tasks appeared to merge into more consistent orders.     

A simple model for the utility of gambling

A model of the utility of gambling is presented in a modified von Neumann-Morgenstern format. Axioms imply a utility function that preserves preferences between sure things and between gambles. The addition of a utility of gambling term to the expected utility of a gamble preserves preference comparisons between gambles and sure things. Aspects of the utility of gambling are noted, and comparisons are made to standard concepts of risk attitudes.The author is indebted to Joseph Sani for valuable discussions on the topic of this paper.     

A Note on the Power of Multiattribute One‐switch Utility Functions

One‐switch utility functions model situations in which the preference between two alternatives switches only once as the outcome of one attribute of both alternatives changes from low to high. Recent research cites evidence that the sum of exponential functions (sumex) is the most convincing type for modelling one‐switch utility functions. Sumex functions allow to model exactly one preferential switch and they are convenient for estimating one‐switch utility functions. However, it is unclear so far if sumex functions are suitable to model preferential switches that are perceivable by a decision maker. This paper first analyses how different the utility of two alternatives before and after a preferential can be modelled with sumex functions given that the preferential switch is caused by a particular attribute outcome improvement. It thereafter investigates how accurately decision makers perceive such utility differences. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Decomposition of multivariate utility functions in non-additive expected utility theory

In expected utility many results have been derived that give necessary and/or sufficient conditions for a multivariate utility function to be decomposable into lower-dimensional functions. In particular, multilinear, multiplicative and additive decompositions have been widely discussed. These utility functions can be more easily assessed in practical situations. In this paper we present a theory of decomposition in the context of nonadditive expected utility such as anticipated utility or Choquet expected utility. We show that many of the results used in conventional expected utility carry over to these more general frameworks. If preferences over lotteries depend only on the marginal probability distributions, then in expected utility the utility function is additively decomposable. We show that in anticipated utility the marginality condition implies not only that the utility function is additively decomposable but also that the distortion function is the identity function. We further demonstrate that a decision maker who is bivariate risk neutral has a utility function that is additively decomposable and a distortion function q for which q(½) = ½.     

决策过程中的记忆可提取性效用

记忆的可提取性效用是人们在评估过往事件时所感受到的愉悦或满意程度, 这种评估建立在人们从记忆中提取出的信息基础上。研究发现, 人们对过往事件进行评估时会出现违反效用最大化原则的决策, 主要表现在三个实验现象上：峰终律、时长忽视和违背单调叠加性。研究者多从原型判断的角度去理解这些现象, 但可提取性效用是否还有其他内在机制仍然有待进一步研究。     

群组成员行动目标的一致性对群体实体性的影响:动作形式一致性的调节作用

群体被视为一个有机整体的特性被称为群体实体性。研究从行为的行动目标和动作形式两个特征维度出发,探讨了行动目标一致性和动作形式一致性如何共同作用于群体实体性。结果发现,在不同群体规模下,群体成员具有一致目标的群体实体性均高于不一致条件,但只有当行为发生在群体情景且符合合理性原则时,动作形式一致性对该影响关系才起到调节作用。该结果表明,只有当行为发生在群体情景且符合合理性原则时,行动目标和动作形式才联合作用于群体实体性。     

Psychological models in predicting uptake of prenatal screening

Abstract

The purpose of the current study was to determine which psychological models are most useful in predicting uptake of a prenatal screening test, maternal-serum alphafetoprotein screening for spina bifida and Down's syndrome. 1000 women eligible for the test completed standardised self-report questionnaires at two routine clinic visits to an antenatal clinic prior to the time when the test could take place. 902 underwent the screening test; 51 declined the test; and 47 did not undergo the test, giving no reason for this to staff. Knowledge of the test, the subjective expected utility attached to the test, and attitudes to doctors and medicine were all significant predictors of uptake behaviour. Results of a discriminant function analysis demonstrated distinct psychological processes underlying each of these three uptake behaviours, explaining 21% of the variance in uptake of screening. If uptake of screening is examined not as a dichotomous variable but as a group of behaviours, predictive models are identified accordingly. This would lead to rnodels of health-related behaviours as a heterogeneous rather than homogeneous phenomena, predicted and influenced by different causes.     

Multi‐Criteria Evaluation for Collaborative Circulating Farming with Collective Operations Between Arable and Cattle Farmers

Tokachi sub‐prefecture in Hokkaido is one of the most famous dairy and crop farming regions in Japan. It is known that Tokachi is faced with various difficult problems such as soil degradation, water contamination and unpleasant odours because of the excessive use of chemical fertilizers and inappropriate treatment of livestock excretion. In this paper, we focus on Shihoro town where agricultural outputs are relatively large in Tokachi, and propose collaborative circulating farming with collective operations between arable and cattle farmers. Under the assumption that the decision‐maker in this problem is a representative of a farming organization who hopes for sustainable agricultural development and values the intentions of local residents including arable and cattle farmers in this region, we employ multi‐attribute utility theory in order to evaluate multiple alternatives of the farming management problem. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Critique of Sharif’s and Pitt’s Models of Technology

abstract

In this article Pitt’s and Sharif’s models of technology are discussed. These models are based on two different conceptions of technology, which are technology as “instrument” and as “making use of instrument.” Sharif considers technology as a collection of empowering tools, including technoware, humanware, infoware and orgaware. On the other hand, Pitt sees technology as “humanity at work.” Based on his definition, Pitt proposes a model of technology with three components; first-order transformation, second-order transformation, and the assessment of feedback mechanism. In this article this model will be explained and criticized. After that, Sharif’s model is criticized in the light of Pitt’s theory and it will be shown that Pitt’s model provides a better understanding of different aspects of technology. For example, it will be argued how Pitt’s model is efficient in explaining dynamicity, transfer and control of technology along with its soft dimensions, while Sharif’s model is incapable of doing so. In the next part, Pitt’s model is criticized and it is shown that the mechanism of knowledge progress suggested by this model is controversial and Pitt’s framework cannot support the idea of indigenous technology. Furthermore, the ability of Pitt’s model in describing different technological phenomena is called into question, since this model provides a superficial view of the complexity of an assessment of technology’s consequences. Finally, a list is proposed that contains minimal requirements that every model of technology is expected to explain. It is incumbent on technology theoreticians to consider this list.     

The rhetorical foundation of philosophical argumentation

The rejection of rhetoric has been a constant theme in Western thought since Plato. The presupposition of such a debasement lies at the foundation of a certain view of Reason that I have called propositionalism, and which is analyzed in this article. The basic tenets of propositionalism are that truth is exclusive, i.e. it does not allow for any alternative, and that there is always only one proposition which must be true, the opposite one being false. Necessity and uniqueness are the ideals of propositionalism. But the question of the necessity of such a necessity is bound to arise. Foundationalism and propositionalism are intrinsically related. Since necessity excludes alternatives, rhetoric, which is based on the possibility of opposite standpoints, is unavoidably devalued as the crippled child of Reason, identical to sophistry or eristic. But propositionalism cannot justify itself and provide a justification for its own foundation without circle or contraditction. Since it responds to the problem of eradicating problems and alternatives through propositional entities, propositionalism is ultimately based on questioning to which it replies in the mode of denial. The unavowed foundation of Reason is therefore the question of questioning, even though this very question is suppressed as propositionalism. The trace of such a question is not only historical, but can also be seen, for instance, in the role played by the principle of contradiction in the constitution of propositional Reason (Artitotle): opposite propositions are not the expression of a problematic situation, they are either possible or successively unique propositions.We want to replace propositionalism by problematology which allows for the conceptualization of alternatives, thereby rendering a true rhetoric possible. Argumentation cannot then be equated with eristic any more, as propositionalism maintained.Rationality must be seen as having questioning as its true starting-point. Reason must be rhetorical if it is to survive the death of propositionalism which took place after the radical criticisms of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. Even if it is still hard ffor philosophers and rhetoricians to think within another framework and even though they prefer endlessly to deconstauct the old one instead of changing it, problematology is bound to impose itself as the new voice for rationality, because Reason has always endeavored to solve problems. Propositionalism has been only one way of conceiving problems, based on the view that solutions could be but the suppression of questioning.