Mental Excess and the Constitution View of Persons

Constitution theorists have argued that due to a difference in persistence conditions, persons are not identical with the animals or the bodies that constitute them. A popular line of objection to the view that persons are not identical with the animals/bodies that constitute them is that the view commits one to undesirable overpopulation, with too many minds and too many thinkers. Constitution theorists are well aware of these overpopulation concerns and have gone a long way toward answering them. However, there is one mental excess worry that remains especially problematic. It is argued here that the worry about too many thoughts, or too many instantiations of mentality in general, remains a serious threat to the constitution view of persons. What exactly the threat is and how it arises is described in detail in Section III. It is then shown that attempts to allay the concern are unsuccessful. I argue, in particular, that appealing to the distinction between derivative and non-derivative instantiation fails to solve the problem.     

The inclosure scheme and the solution to the paradoxes of self-reference

Proponents of the explanatory gap claim that consciousness is a mystery. No one has ever given an account of how a physical thing could be identical to a phenomenal one. We fully understand the identity between water and H₂O but the identity between pain and the firing of C-fibers is inconceivable. Mark Johnston [Journal of philosophy (1997), 564–583] suggests that if water is constituted by H₂O, not identical to it, then the explanatory gap becomes a pseudo-problem. This is because all “manifest kinds”—those identified in experience—are on a par in not being identical to their physical bases, so that the special problem of the inconceivability of ‘pain = the firing of C-fibers’ vanishes. Moreover, the substitute relation, constitution, raises no explanatory difficulties: pain can be constituted by its physical base, as can water. The thesis of this paper is that the EG does not disappear when we substitute constitution for identity. I examine four arguments for the EG, and show that none of them is undermined by the move from constitution to identity.     

Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and the Problem of Mental Causation

Non-Cartesian substance dualism (NCSD) maintains that persons or selves are distinct from their organic physical bodies and any parts of those bodies. It regards persons as ‘substances’ in their own right, but does not maintain that persons are necessarily separable from their bodies, in the sense of being capable of disembodied existence. In this paper, it is urged that NCSD is better equipped than either Cartesian dualism or standard forms of physicalism to explain the possibility of mental causation. A model of mental causation adopting the NCSD perspective is proposed which, it is argued, is consistent with all that is currently known about the operations of the human central nervous system, including the brain. Physicalism, by contrast, seems ill-equipped to explain the distinctively intentional or teleological character of mental causation, because it effectively reduces all such causation to ‘blind’ physical causation at a neurological level.     

The Ontological Status of Persons*

Chisholm held that persons are essentially persons. The Constitution View affords a non‐Chisholmian way m defend the thesis that persons are essentially persons. The Constitution View shows how persons are constituted by‐but not identical to‐human animals. On the Constitution View, being a person determines a person's persistence conditions. On the Animalist View, being an animal determines a person's persistence conditions. Things of kind K have ontological significance if their persistence conditions are determined by their being members of K. On Chisholm's view, persons have ontological significance, but animals do not. On Animalism, animals have ontological significance, but persons do not. After explaining the notion of ontological significance, this article argues that persons do have ontological significance, and hence that Animalism is not true     

Sumner On Desires and Well-Being

Berkeley holds that objects in the world are constituted of ideas. Some commentators argue that for Berkeley, ideas are identical to acts of perception; this is taken to proceed from his view that ideas are like pains. In this paper, I evaluate the identity claim. I argue that although it does not follow from the pain analogy, nonetheless the texts suggest that Berkeley does think ideas and acts are identical. I show how Berkeley can account for objects persisting over time and being perceivable by multiple observers, even if the ideas that constitute them are intermittent and dependent on particular actors.     

Beyond the Tools of the Trade: Heidegger and the Intelligibility of Everyday Things

In everyday life, we constantly encounter and deal with useful things without pausing to inquire about the sources of their intelligibility. In Div. I of Being and Time, Heidegger undertakes just such an inquiry. According to a common reading of Heidegger's analysis, the intelligibility of our everyday encounters and dealings with useful things is ultimately constituted by practical self‐understandings (such as being a gardener, shoemaker, teacher, mother, musician, or philosopher). In this paper, I argue that while such practical self‐understandings may be sufficient to constitute the intelligibility of the tools and equipment specific to many practices, these “tools of the trade” are only a small portion of the things we encounter, use, and deal with on a daily basis. Practical self‐understandings cannot similarly account for the intelligibility of the more mundane things—like toothbrushes and sidewalks—used in everyday life. I consider whether an anonymous self‐understanding as “one,” “anyone,” or “no one in particular” —das Man—might play this intelligibility‐constituting role. In examining this possibility, another type of self‐understanding comes to light: cultural identities. I show that the cultural identities into which we are “thrown,” rather than practical identities or das Man, constitute the intelligibility of the abundance of mundane things that fill our everyday lives. Finally, I spell out how this finding bears on our understanding of Heidegger's notion of authenticity.     

Situating Time in the Leibnizian Hierarchy of Beings

Leibniz's widely influential account of time provides a significant puzzle for those seeking to locate this account within his hierarchical ontology. Leibniz follows his scholastic predecessors in supposing that there are different grades of being, with substances being the most real and all other things possessing their reality via their relationships to substance. Following this picture, Leibniz suggests that phenomenal bodies only possess the being that they derive from the substances (i.e., monads) that ground them. Some would argue that time likewise only possesses its being based on the bodies that it relates. Contrary to this suggestion (i.e., that time is twice removed from substances), I will argue that time is derived directly from rational souls. Thus, I will argue that time is on an ontological par with the phenomenal world of bodies.     

Operating within the mainstream: Coping and adjustment among a sample of homosexual youths

A sample (N = 37) of African American adolescent homosexual males was administered a questionnaire that focused on four areas of social psychological functioning (self‐identity, family relation, school‐work relations, and social adjustment). The findings contradicted several past studies that reported in general that homosexual males experience crippling cognitive dissonance. Even with the existence of homophobia in the society, the adolescents were found to possess an adequate social psychological attitude and survival skills. The sampled adolescents reported being comfortable with their sexual orientation even though the majority of them had not disclosed their homosexuality. The respondents reported how they managed self‐presentation among heterosexual persons. The adolescents appeared well‐adjusted and stable in their social functioning and disagreed with the idea that they needed professional counseling.     

Humanities,Social Sciences and Islamic Studies

Three avenues in Islamic studies are distinguished. The humanities study the languages, texts and history of Islam as a civilisation and religion. The main difficulty confronting them is to understand properly the texts studied. Anthropology, sociology and political science constitute the main contribution of the social sciences. Here the main difficulty lies in explaining religious data correctly within their context. In religious studies, the third avenue, the main problem is to interpret correctly the way in which Muslim communities and persons have understood their cultural tradition and the religious elements which belong to it. Focusing on the people's intentions which make Islam a religion rather than a social system or ideology enables Islam to be understood from the perspective of religious studies.     

Being, <Emphasis Type="Italic">aevum</Emphasis>, and nothingness: Edith Stein on death and dying

This article seeks to present for the first time a more systematic account of Edith Stein’s views on death and dying. First, I will argue that death does not necessarily lead us to an understanding of our earthly existence as aevum, that is, an experience of time between eternity and finite temporality. We always bear the mark of our finitude, including our finite temporality, even when we exist within the eternal mind of God. To claim otherwise, is to make identical our eternity with God’s eternity, thereby undermining the traditional Scholastic argument, which Stein holds, that there is no real relation between the being (and, therefore, (a)temporality) of God and the being of human persons. Second, I will argue that Stein excludes the category of potentiality from her discussion of death as a relation between the fullness or actuality of being and nothingness. In fact, death is more a relation between possibility/potentiality and nothingness than a relation between actual fullness and nothingness. What Stein describes as fullness ought to be read as potential.

A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity

The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P₁ at time T₁ is numerically identical with a person P₂ at a later time T₂, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in virtue of their nonphysical souls. I argue here that this view faces a new and arguably insuperable dilemma: either (a) souls, like physical bodies, change over time, in which case the soul theory faces an analogue problem of diachronic soul identity, or (b) souls, unlike physical bodies, do not change over time, in which case the soul theory cannot explain why souls relate to particular bodies over time and so at best only partially explains personal identity. I conclude that the soul theory fares no better than physicalist-friendly accounts of personal identity such as bodily- or psychological-continuity-based views.     

Corpus Meum: Disintegrating Bodies and the Ideal of Integrity

This essay shows that Jean‐Luc Nancy's reconceptualization of corporeality in such texts as L'Intrus and Corpus can be an important ally to feminist theories of body. I introduce Nancy's ontology and argue that his rejection of the unified, integrated body of humanist discourses in favor of dis‐integrated bodies constituted by multiple alterities and his consequent reinterpretation of body as a “being‐exscribed” begin the task of thinking bodies beyond traditional dualisms and their ahistorical and rationalist frameworks. I then address three potential criticisms of Nancy's work and suggest that though there may be reasons to move cautiously in adopting the framework he provides, his work harbors resources directly beneficial to critiques of prevailing forms of gender normativity. Quel étrange moi! —Jean‐Luc Nancy, Corpus     

LOWE'S DEFENCE OF CONSTITUTION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF WEAK EXTENSIONALITY

E.J. Lowe is one of the few philosophers who defend both the existence of spatially coincident entities and the Principle of Weak Extensionality that no two objects which have proper parts have exactly the same proper parts at the same time. Lowe maintains that when spatially coincident things like the statue and the lump of bronze are in a constitution relation, the constituted entity (the statue) has parts that the constituting entity (the lump) doesn't, hence the compatibility with Weak Extensionality. My contention is that his argument for why the statue has parts the lump of bronze lacks can also be used to show that the lump of bronze has parts the statue doesn't. This will mean that there is no basis for saying the statue and the lump are in a constitution relation. I argue for accepting a modified account of constitution and abandoning the Principle of Weak Extensionality.     

Parts Ground the Whole and Are Identical to It

What is the relation between parts taken together and the whole that they compose? The recent literature appears to be dominated by two different answers to this question, which are normally thought of as being incompatible. According to the first, parts taken together are identical to the whole that they compose. According to the second, the whole is grounded in its parts. The aim of this paper is to make some theoretical room for the view according to which parts ground the whole they compose while being, at the same time, identical to it.     

Remaking the She-Devil: A Critical Look at Feminist Approaches to Beauty

Cosmetic surgery provides a problematic case for feminist theorizing about femininity and women's relationship with their bodies. Feminist accounts of femininity and beauty are unable to explain cosmetic surgery without undermining the women who opt for it. I argue that cosmetic surgery may have less to do with beauty and more to do with being ordinary, taking one's life into one's own hands, and determining how much suffering is fair.     

Factorial similarity of letter and number series comprising identical rules

Letter series and number series tests, comprising items based on identical rules, were administered in a counterbalanced design to 320 undergraduates in order to determine the similarity of factorial structure by means of Tucker’s coefficients of congruence. Results indicated that the letter and number series tests, in which each item in one had a same-rule counter-part in the other, possessed limited factorial similarity because only 4 of the 8 identically constituted factors yielded coefficients of congruence between .80 and .91 (median = .85). Examination of item-wise patterns of responses of the persons, whose total scores on the letter series tests were five or more points lower than their total scores on the corresponding number series tests, revealed certain tactics of this group (n = 92) that might account for the lack of adequate factorial similarity.     

Factorial similarity of letter and number series comprising identical rules

Letter series and number series tests, comprising items based on identical rules, were administered in a counterbalanced design to 320 undergraduates in order to determine the similarity of factorial structure by means of Tucker’s coefficients of congruence. Results indicated that the letter and number series tests, in which each item in one had a same-rule counter-part in the other, possessed limited factorial similarity because only 4 of the 8 identically constituted factors yielded coefficients of congruence between .80 and .91 (median = .85). Examination of item-wise patterns of responses of the persons, whose total scores on the letter series tests were five or more points lower than their total scores on the corresponding number series tests, revealed certain tactics of this group (n = 92) that might account for the lack of adequate factorial similarity.     

Piecing together numerical language: children's use of default units in early counting and quantification

When asked to ‘find three forks’, adult speakers of English use the noun ‘fork’ to identify units for counting. However, when number words (e.g. three) and quantifiers (e.g. more, every) are used with unfamiliar words (‘Give me three blickets’) noun‐specific conceptual criteria are unavailable for picking out units. This poses a problem for young children learning language, who begin to use quantifiers and number words by age 2, despite knowing a relatively small number of nouns. Without knowing how individual nouns pick out units of quantification – e.g. what counts as a blicket– how could children decide whether there are three blickets or four? Three experiments suggest that children might solve this problem by assigning ‘default units’ of quantification to number words, quantifiers, and number morphology. When shown objects that are broken into arbitrary pieces, 4‐year‐olds in Experiment 1 treated pieces as units when counting, interpreting quantifiers, and when using singular–plural morphology. Experiment 2 found that although children treat object‐hood as sufficient for quantification, it is not necessary. Also sufficient for individuation are the criteria provided by known nouns. When two nameable things were glued together (e.g. two cups), children counted the glued things as two. However, when two arbitrary pieces of an object were put together (e.g. two parts of a ball), children counted them as one, even if they had previously counted the pieces as two. Experiment 3 found that when the pieces of broken things were nameable (e.g. wheels of a bicycle), 4‐year‐olds did not include them in counts of whole objects (e.g. bicycles). We discuss the role of default units in early language acquisition, their origin in acquisition, and how children eventually acquire an adult semantics identifying units of quantification.     

Are Wittgenstein’s Hinges Rational World-Pictures? The Groundlessness Theory Reconsidered

Some philosophers have argued that Wittgenstein’s hinges, the centrepiece of his book On Certainty, are the “ungrounded ground” on which knowledge rests. It is usually understood by this that hinges provide a foundation for knowledge without being themselves epistemically warranted. In fact, Wittgenstein articulates that hinges lack any truth-value and are neither justified nor unjustified. This inevitably places them wholly outside the categorial framework of JTB epistemology. What I call the “groundlessness interpretation”, inspired by OC 166, understands the fundamental pieces of our cognitive scaffolding this way. The view has been largely successful. I argue that this interpretation is incomplete for two basic reasons: first, it is not based on undisputed evidence; second, by assuming that hinges are committed to reality by epistemic fiat, it looks as if Wittgenstein is asking us to blindly trust them regardless of their actual content. Contrary to this, I argue that Wittgenstein describes hinges as illuminating world-pictures that reflect reality and are answerable to facts in a derivate way. As the book shows, hinges originate in our engagement with reality and, while considered unquestionable, could be challenged, reassessed, and replaced by new ones. This indicates that hinges are both the result of knowledge-acquisition and somewhat continuous with one’s set of beliefs. It follows that hinges are ultimately rational, and so, apt instruments to confront scepticism.