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WLODEK RABlNOWlCZ TONI R
NNOW‐RASMUSSEN 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2003,66(2):389-403
The authors of this paper earlier argued that concrete objects, such as things or persons, may have final value (value for their own sake), which is not reducible to the value of states of affairs that concern the object in question. Our arguments have been challenged. This paper is an attempt to respond to some of these challenges, viz. those that concern the reducibility issue. The discussion presupposes a Brentano‐inspired account of value in terms of fitting responses to value bearers. Attention is given to a yet another type of reduction proposal, according to which the ultimate bearers of final value are abstract particulars (so‐called tropes) rather than abstract states or facts. While the proposal is attractive ((fone entertains the existence of tropes), it confronts serious difficulties. To recognise tropes as potential bearers of final value, along with other objects, is one thing; but to reduce the final value of concrete objects to the final value of tropes is another matter. 相似文献
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Charles Taylor 《The Philosophical quarterly》2000,50(199):242-249
Books reviewed in this article:
John McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality
John McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality 相似文献
John McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality
John McDowell, Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality 相似文献
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J. Adam Carter Benjamin Jarvis Katherine Rubin 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(2):249-263
We argue that the so-called ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ Value Problems for knowledge are more easily solved than is widely appreciated. Pritchard, for instance, has suggested that only virtue-theoretic accounts have any hopes of adequately addressing these problems. By contrast, we argue that accounts of knowledge that are sensitive to the Gettier problem are able to overcome these challenges. To a first approximation, the Primary Value Problem is that of understanding how the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than does the property of being true. The Secondary Value Problem is one of understanding how, for instance, the property of being knowledge confers more epistemic value on a belief than does the property of being jointly true and justified. We argue that attending to the fact that beliefs are continuing states reveals that there is no difficulty in appreciating how knowledge might ordinarily have more epistemic value than mere true belief or mere justified true belief. We also explore in what ways ordinary cases of knowledge might be of distinctive epistemic value. In the end, our proposal resembles the original Platonic suggestion in the Meno that knowledge is valuable because knowledge is somehow tied to the good of truth. 相似文献
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Terance D. Miethe 《The Journal of psychology》2013,147(5):441-453
Four scaling techniques for measuring human values were compared, using the measurement properties of test-retest reliability, discriminatory power, convergent validity, and achievement of substantive results consistent with theoretical expectations. The standard rank-order version of the Rokeach Value Survey was superior to a 100-point rating, magnitude estimation, and the handgrip scaling procedure with respect to each of these fundamental measurement requirements. Because it exhibited less measurement error than the other methods, rank-order scaling is shown to be the best technique for measuring human values even though it achieves only an ordinal level of measurement. 相似文献
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M. ORESTE FIOCCO 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2007,74(2):364-380
The notion of conceivability has traditionally been regarded as crucial to an account of modal knowledge. Despite its importance to modal epistemology, there is no received explication of conceivability. One purpose of this paper is to argue that the notion is not fruitfully explicated in terms of the imagination. The most natural way of presenting a notion of conceivability qua imaginability is open to cogent criticism. In order to avoid such criticism, an advocate of the modal insightfulness of the imagination must broaden the idea of what it is to be imaginable. I argue that this required broadening renders the imagination idle (in this context). Consequently, I distinguish two different accounts of the evidential basis of modal knowledge and present a more general argument that concludes that the very notion of conceivability should be eschewed in modal epistemology. 相似文献
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Toni Rønnow‐Rasmussen 《International Journal of Philosophical Studies》2013,21(4):495-508
AbstractPeople are prone to ascribe value to persons they love. However, the relation between love and value is far from straightforward. This is particularly evident given certain views on the nature of love. Setting out from the idea that what causes us to have an attitude towards an object need not be found in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper depicts love as an attitude that takes non‐fungible persons as intentional objects. Taking this view as a starting point, the paper shows why it is difficult to combine with certain views on value. The main challenge comes from the idea that value judgments are universalizable. This view squares badly with the thought that the people whom we love are irreplaceable. Introducing the idea that properties may have different functions in the intentional content of the attitude, this paper determines what precisely it is about love that makes it hard to combine with universalizability. Moreover, it suggests two ways of meeting this challenge. 相似文献
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David Rose Edouard Machery Stephen Stich Mario Alai Adriano Angelucci Renatas Berninas Emma E. Buchtel Amita Chatterjee Hyundeuk Cheon In‐Rae Cho Daniel Cohnitz Florian Cova Vilius Dranseika ngeles Eraa Lagos Laleh Ghadakpour Maurice Grinberg Ivar Hannikainen Takaaki Hashimoto Amir Horowitz Evgeniya Hristova Yasmina Jraissati Veselina Kadreva Kaori Karasawa Hackjin Kim Yeonjeong Kim Minwoo Lee Carlos Mauro Masaharu Mizumoto Sebastiano Moruzzi Christopher Y. Olivola Jorge Ornelas Barbara Osimani Carlos Romero Alejandro Rosas Lopez Massimo Sangoi Andrea Sereni Sarah Songhorian Paulo Sousa Noel Struchiner Vera Tripodi Naoki Usui Alejandro Vzquez del Mercado Giorgio Volpe Hrag Abraham Vosgerichian Xueyi Zhang Jing Zhu 《No?s (Detroit, Mich.)》2019,53(1):224-247
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Justin P. McBrayer 《The Southern journal of philosophy》2007,45(2):289-302
The value problem for knowledge is the problem of explaining why knowledge is cognitively more valuable than mere true belief. If an account of the nature of knowledge is unable to solve the value problem for knowledge, this provides a pro tanto reason to reject that account. Recent literature argues that process reliabilism is unable to solve the value problem because it succumbs to an objection known as the swamping objection. Virtue reliabilism (i.e., agent reliabilism), on the other hand, is able to solve the value problem because it can avoid the swamping objection. I argue that virtue reliabilism escapes the swamping objection only by employing what I call an entailment strategy. Furthermore, since an entailment strategy is open to the process reliabilist (in two different forms), I argue that the process reliabilist is also able to escape the swamping objection and thereby solve the value problem for knowledge. 相似文献
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为评估不同受教育程度和文化水平的个体是否存在中国传统价值观念冲突的压力,编制价值观念冲突问卷,用以筛查价值观念冲突的压力对个体自杀行为的影响.通过对240例农村青年自杀死亡者及正常对照者的心理解剖访谈研究,验证此问卷具有较好的信度和效度,可用于甄别高应激群体价值观念冲突的压力,是自杀研究和干预的实用筛查工具. 相似文献
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S. L. HURLEY 《Philosophy and phenomenological research》2006,72(2):418-424
Justice, Luck, and Knowledge (JLK) contributes to recent developments in two areas, moral responsibility and distributive justice. Prominent luck‐neutralizing approaches to distributive justice, exemplified in work by Cohen and by Roemer, argue that justice requires equal distribution of goods for which people aren't responsible. Such views of justice haven't focused attention on responsibility itself. Meanwhile, responsibility has been illuminat‐ingly articulated in work including, and influenced by, Frankfurt's seminal essays. My book brings these separate lines of work, on justice and on responsibility, into contact, examining how the new articulation of responsibility constrains the roles responsibility can play in distributive justice. Part I focuses on responsibility and its inverse correlate, luck; Part II assesses responsibility‐based approaches to justice in light of preceding arguments about responsibility. (See JLK, 4–5 on responsibility, reactive attitudes, and accountability.) 相似文献