Developmental progression in the confidence‐accuracy relationship in event recall: insights provided by a calibration perspective

The development of discrimination and realism was investigated in the event recall of 156 8‐year‐olds, 133 10‐year‐olds and 146 adults, using categorical confidence judgements. Target questions were either a mixture of misleading and unbiased (‘non‐bombardment’), or restricted to one question format (‘bombardment’). The confidence judgements of all age groups discriminated between incorrect and correct responses to unbiased questions, but with misleading questions, this ability was undermined in the children, particularly when ‘bombarded’. Calibration‐style analyses of unbiased questions revealed a systematic confidence–accuracy association across age and question mix for unbiased questions. For misleading questions, however, the absence of a drop in performance from intermediate to low confidence at all ages suggested relative underconfidence at the lowest confidence level. At high confidence levels, there was evidence of realistic congruence between confidence and performance in adults, but this was not the case in the 10‐year‐olds when bombarded with misleading questions, or in the 8‐year‐olds, regardless of bombardment. Exploratory analyses of question difficulty revealed poor calibration across ages for difficult unbiased questions, and in the 8‐year‐olds, even for easy unbiased questions when intermixed with misleading questions. Bombardment with difficult misleading questions further undermined children's calibration. Implications for the role of social and cognitive factors in the development of metacognitive monitoring are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cognitive procedures for correcting proxy‐response biases in surveys

To reduce survey costs, major surveys rely on self‐ and proxy‐responses. The use of proxies can reduce data quality introducing biases in the survey estimates. This paper identifies one source of systematic differences between self‐ and proxy‐reports: proxies' higher reliance on inferences. Using data from the National Health Interview Survey on Disability (NHIS‐D), proxy‐response biases were modelled by independently collected measures of cognitive inferences. Conditional likelihood judgements about a number of disabilities (e.g. likelihood that a person has a disability given another disability) predicted the conditional disability reports for proxy‐ but not for self‐respondents (e.g. the proportion of respondents who reported difficulty learning after reporting difficulty communicating). A model of self/proxy differences was estimated on data from the 1994 NHIS‐D and tested against 1995 data. The correlation between predicted and actual differences was 0.76. The correlation between predicted and actual proxy‐reports was 0.95. Such research can be used to estimate and correct for systematic proxy‐response biases. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐confidence,anxiety, and post‐purchase dissonance: a panel study

This study proposes an integrated conceptual model of the antecedents of post‐purchase dissonance. Data were gathered via a two‐stage panel study among consumers who made purchase of technology items. Study results demonstrate that consumer chronic characteristics (i.e., trait anxiety and generalized self‐confidence) not only directly influence post‐purchase dissonance positively and negatively but also are mediated by consumers' temporary feelings (i.e., state anxiety and specific self‐confidence) toward a purchase situation, and then indirectly influence post‐purchase dissonance positively and negatively. Trait anxiety positively influences state anxiety and that generalized self‐confidence and specific self‐confidence negatively influence state anxiety. Furthermore, trait anxiety appears to negatively influence specific self‐confidence, and generalized self‐confidence appears to negatively influence trait anxiety and positively influence specific self‐confidence.     

A Sense of ‘unrealness’ about the death of a loved‐one: An exploratory study of its role in emotional complications among bereaved individuals

After a loss, some people develop complicated grief (CG) and depression. A recent cognitive‐behavioural model postulates that three processes account for such problems: (a) lack of integration of the loss with implicit autobiographical knowledge about the relationship with the lost person, (b) negative cognitions and (c) avoidance behaviours. In the current study, it was proposed that the ‘lack of integration of the loss’ is mainly an implicit process, but has an explicit, introspectively accessible counterpart in the form of ‘a sense of unrealness’ that can be defined as a subjective sense of uncertainty or ambivalence about the irreversibility of the separation. The role of this ‘sense of unrealness’ was studied using self‐reported data from 397 mourners. Among other things, findings showed that items constituting unrealness were distinct from those of CG and depression. In addition, unrealness was significantly associated with CG, when controlling for negative cognitions, avoidance and concomitant depression. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of self‐rated ability in the accuracy of confidence judgements in eyewitness memory and general knowledge

It is argued that confidence stems in part from self‐rated ability in a domain of knowledge and that in eyewitness memory such perceptions are erroneous. Two experiments tested these hypotheses. In both experiments participants rated their relative ability in the domains of eyewitness memory and general knowledge and subsequently took tests of each, giving confidence ratings for each item attempted. In both studies, self‐rated ability predicted performance for general knowledge, but not eyewitness memory. Across participants confidence ratings were significant predictors of accuracy for general knowledge, but not for eyewitness memory. In Experiment 1 self‐rated ability was predictive of confidence ratings for both domains, although this effect was weaker in Experiment 2. The argument that the accuracy of confidence judgements in eyewitness memory is undermined by a lack of insight into relative expertise is therefore supported. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐regulated learning of basic arithmetic skills: A longitudinal study

Background. Several studies have examined young primary school children's use of strategies when solving simple addition and subtraction problems. Most of these studies have investigated students’ strategy use as if they were isolated processes. To date, we have little knowledge about how math strategies in young students are related to other important aspects in self‐regulated learning. Aim. The main purpose of this study was to examine relations between young primary school children's basic mathematical skills and their use of math strategies, their metacognitive competence and motivational beliefs, and to investigate how students with basic mathematics skills at various levels differ in respect to the different self‐regulation components. Sample. The participants were comprised of 27 Year 2 students, all from the same class. Method. The data were collected in three stages (autumn Year 2, spring Year 2, and autumn Year 3). The children's arithmetic skills were measured by age relevant tests, while strategy use, metacognitive competence, and motivational beliefs were assessed through individual interviews. The participants were divided into three performance groups; very good students, good students, and not‐so‐good students. Results. Analyses revealed that young primary school children at different levels of basic mathematics skill may differ in several important aspects of self‐regulated learning. Analyses revealed that a good performance in addition and subtraction was related not only to the children's use of advanced mathematics strategies, but also to domain‐specific metacognitive competence, ability attribution for success, effort attribution for failure, and high perceived self‐efficacy when using specific strategies. Conclusions. The results indicate that instructional efforts to facilitate self‐regulated learning of basic arithmetic skills should address cognitive, metacognitive, and motivational aspects of self‐regulation. This is particularly important for low‐performing students.     

The Relationship of Reliability and Validity of Personality Tests to Frame‐of‐Reference Instructions and Within‐Person Inconsistency

The efficacy of both frame‐of‐reference (FOR) instructions and a measure of within‐person inconsistency in predicting grade point average was investigated. The IPIP Big Five personality questionnaire was given to 329 students with generic instructions and ‘at school’ FOR instructions. The Wonderlic Personnel Test was also administered. A measure of within‐person inconsistency was created based on the standard deviations of responses to items within the same Big Five dimension. The validity of conscientiousness was greater when FOR instructions were given. The measure of within‐person inconsistency provided incremental validity over that of conscientiousness and cognitive ability. Additionally, within‐person inconsistency moderated the relationship between conscientiousness and performance for the participants without the FOR instructions. Practical implications are discussed.     

Loneliness is associated with a greater self-reference effect in episodic memory when compared against a close friend

Loneliness describes a negative experience associated with perceived social disconnection. Despite the clear links between loneliness and mental and physical health, relatively little is known about how loneliness affects cognition. In this study, we tested the effect of loneliness on cognitive distance between the self and others, using a task in which participants completed a surprise memory task for adjectives implicitly encoded in relation to the self, a close friend or a celebrity. We assessed item memory sensitivity, metacognitive sensitivity, metacognitive efficiency and source memory for positive and negative words. In addition, participants reported their trait loneliness and depression. Results revealed an overall self-referential advantage compared with both friend and celebrity encoded items. Likewise, a friend-referential advantage was identified compared to celebrity-encoded items. Individuals who experienced more loneliness showed a greater self-referential bias in comparison to words encoded in relation to a close friend, and a smaller friend-referential bias in comparison to words encoded in relation to celebrity. These findings suggest that loneliness is reflected in a greater cognitive distance between the self and close friends in relation to memory biases. The results have important implications for understanding the social contextual effects on memory and the cognitive ramifications of loneliness.     

Prejudice in person memory: Self‐threat biases memories of stigmatized group members

The present research investigated whether self‐threat biases memory via retrieval‐induced forgetting. Results show that people under self‐threat whose goal is to restore their self‐worth by making prejudicial judgments that deprecate others are more likely to exhibit an enhanced RIF effect for positive items and a reduced RIF for negative items ascribed to a stereotyped target (i.e., homosexual). Overall, the present findings are consistent with the view that motivation can affect the magnitude of RIF effects in person memory and that, in turn, they can serve as mechanisms for justifying desired conclusions.     

Effects of sleep deprivation on executive functioning,cognitive abilities,metacognitive confidence,and decision making

Performance on many decision‐making tasks is underpinned by metacognitive monitoring, cognitive abilities, and executive functioning. Fatigue‐inducing conditions, such as sleep loss, compromise these factors, leading to decline in decision performance. Using a 40‐hr sleep deprivation protocol, we examined these factors and the resulting decision performance. Thirteen Australian Army male volunteers (aged 20–30 years) were tested at multiple time points on psychomotor vigilance, inhibitory control, task switching, working memory, short‐term memory, fluid intelligence, and decision accuracy and confidence in a medical diagnosis‐making test. Assessment took place in the morning and night over two consecutive days, during which participants were kept awake. Consistent with previous work, cognitive performance declined after a night without sleep. Extending previous findings, self‐regulation and self‐monitoring suffered significantly greater declines immediately after the sleepless night. These results indicate that the known decline in complex decision‐making performance under fatigue‐inducing conditions might be facilitated by metacognitive rather than cognitive mechanisms.     

St Benedict's Rule as the Antidote to Regulatory Inflation The Way of St Benedict,Rowan Williams,Bloomsbury, 2020 (ISBN 978‐1‐4729‐7307‐8), 160 pp., pb £8.99

There is much to learn from what Rowan Williams calls the ‘undramatic and transformative wisdom’ of the Rule of St Benedict. Expanding on Williams' penetrating reading of the Rule, this article analyzes aspects of Benedictine spirituality that might be useful in contemporary political and social debates, especially around issues of race and affirmative action. From the viewpoint of Benedictine spirituality, true empowerment comes from affirmation and recognition based not just on external regulations but also on inner and personal validation. Unconscious biases can be effectively tackled not only through external censure but especially through the demanding discipline of self‐knowledge. The promotion of both inner validation and self‐knowledge requires an environment of trust. The main challenge for healthy communities is creating the conditions for converting self‐defensiveness and suspicion into trust.     

Metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements: The role of perceived differences in item recognition

This research investigated the hypothesis that metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements are based on the recognition or nonrecognition of an event together with perceived or expected differences in the recognizability of events from different sources. The hypothesis was tested with a multinomial source-monitoring model that allowed separation of source-guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items. Experiments 1A and 1B manipulated the number of item presentations as relevant source information and revealed differential guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items, with a bias to attribute unrecognized items to the source associated with poor item recognition. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated the findings with a manipulation of presentation time and extended the analysis to subjective differences in item recognition. Experiments 3A and 3B used more natural source information by varying type of acoustic signal and demonstrated that subjective theories about differences in item recognition are sufficient to elicit differential source-guessing biases for recognized and unrecognized items. Together the findings provide new insights into the cognitive processes underlying source memory decisions, which involve episodic memory and reconstructive tendencies based on metacognitive beliefs and general world knowledge.     

Metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements: the role of perceived differences in item recognition

This research investigated the hypothesis that metacognitive inferences in source memory judgements are based on the recognition or nonrecognition of an event together with perceived or expected differences in the recognizability of events from different sources. The hypothesis was tested with a multinomial source-monitoring model that allowed separation of source-guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items. Experiments 1A and 1B manipulated the number of item presentations as relevant source information and revealed differential guessing tendencies for recognized and unrecognized items, with a bias to attribute unrecognized items to the source associated with poor item recognition. Experiments 2A and 2B replicated the findings with a manipulation of presentation time and extended the analysis to subjective differences in item recognition. Experiments 3A and 3B used more natural source information by varying type of acoustic signal and demonstrated that subjective theories about differences in item recognition are sufficient to elicit differential source-guessing biases for recognized and unrecognized items. Together the findings provide new insights into the cognitive processes underlying source memory decisions, which involve episodic memory and reconstructive tendencies based on metacognitive beliefs and general world knowledge.     

Knowing Other People: A Second‐Person Framework

What does it mean to know another person, and how is such knowledge different from other kinds of knowledge? These questions constitute an important part of what I call ‘second‐person epistemology’ – the study of how we know other people. I claim that knowledge of other people is not only central to our everyday lives, but it is a kind of knowledge that is unlike other kinds of knowledge. In general, I will argue that second‐person knowledge arises from repeated interactions with another person, and that it also requires employment of certain cognitive abilities and a unique kind of second‐order knowledge. This paper provides the framework for a second‐person epistemology by examining some of our ordinary claims about what it means to know another person. I describe four conditions that typically characterize knowing another person. Then I describe the psychological grounds of knowing a person. Finally, I conclude with some thoughts about the unique symmetries of second person knowledge and the role of such knowledge in our broader epistemological endeavours.     

Mirror Self‐Recognition and Self‐Identification

That great apes are the only primates to recognise their reflections is often taken to show that they are self‐aware—however, there has been much recent debate about whether the self‐awareness in question is psychological or bodily self‐awareness. This paper argues that whilst self‐recognition does not require psychological self‐awareness, to claim that it requires only bodily self‐awareness would leave something out. That is that self‐recognition requires ‘objective self‐awareness’—the capacity for first person thoughts like ‘that's me’, which involve self‐identification and so are vulnerable to error through misidentification. This objective self‐awareness is distinct from bodily or psychological self‐awareness, requires cognitive sophistication and provides the beginnings of a more conceptual self‐representation which might play a role in planning, mental time travel and theory of mind.     

Comparability of Self‐Reported Conscientiousness Across 21 Countries

In cross‐national studies, mean levels of self‐reported phenomena are often not congruent with more objective criteria. One prominent explanation for such findings is that people make self‐report judgements in relation to culture‐specific standards (often called the reference group effect), thereby undermining the cross‐cultural comparability of the judgements. We employed a simple method called anchoring vignettes in order to test whether people from 21 different countries have varying standards for Conscientiousness, a Big Five personality trait that has repeatedly shown unexpected nation‐level relationships with external criteria. Participants rated their own Conscientiousness and that of 30 hypothetical persons portrayed in short vignettes. The latter type of ratings was expected to reveal individual differences in standards of Conscientiousness. The vignettes were rated relatively similarly in all countries, suggesting no substantial culture‐related differences in standards for Conscientiousness. Controlling for the small differences in standards did not substantially change the rankings of countries on mean self‐ratings or the predictive validities of these rankings for objective criteria. These findings are not consistent with mean self‐rated Conscientiousness scores being influenced by culture‐specific standards. The technique of anchoring vignettes can be used in various types of studies to assess the potentially confounding effects of reference levels. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Procrastination as self‐regulation failure of performance: effects of cognitive load,self‐awareness,and time limits on ‘working best under pressure’

Effects of cognitive load, objective self‐awareness and time limits on the self‐regulation of performance speed and accuracy were investigated between procrastinators and non‐procrastinators. In experiment 1 chronic procrastinators completed fewer items (slow speed) and made more errors (less accuracy) than non‐procrastinators under high but not low cognitive load conditions when the time span was limited and brief. In experiment 2 chronic procrastinators performed slower than non‐procrastinators under a 2 second, but not under no limit, 1 second, or 4 second time limit conditions. Chronic procrastinators compared to non‐procrastinators also performed more slowly and made more performance errors under objective self‐awareness conditions regardless of the length of time. These experiments indicate that chronic procrastinators regulate ineffectively their performance speed and accuracy when they ‘work under pressure’ (defined by high cognitive load, objective self‐awareness, and imposed time limitations). Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐Enhancement on a Self‐Categorization Leash: Evidence for a Dual‐Process Model of First‐ and Third‐Person Perceptions

Research suggests that first‐ and third‐person perceptions are driven by the motive to self‐enhance and cognitive processes involving the perception of social norms. This article proposes and tests a dual‐process model that predicts an interaction between cognition and motivation. Consistent with the model, Experiment 1 (N = 112) showed that self‐enhancement drove influence judgments when messages were normatively neutral—people reported first‐person perceptions for in‐group‐favoring messages and third‐person perceptions for out‐group‐favoring messages. Experiment 2 (N = 208) showed an additive effect when social norms were also in‐group‐enhancing, but showed a decreased effect when social norms and group‐enhancement were discordant. The findings are hard to reconcile with pure motivational or cognitive explanations, but are consistent with the proposed dual‐process model.     

Sources of Variance in Personality Facets: A Multiple‐Rater Twin Study of Self‐Peer,Peer‐Peer,and Self‐Self (Dis)Agreement

ABSTRACT This study considered the validity of the personality structure based on the Five‐Factor Model using both self‐ and peer reports on twins' NEO‐PI‐R facets. Separating common from specific genetic variance in self‐ and peer reports, this study examined genetic substance of different trait levels and rater‐specific perspectives relating to personality judgments. Data of 919 twin pairs were analyzed using a multiple‐rater twin model to disentangle genetic and environmental effects on domain‐level trait, facet‐specific trait, and rater‐specific variance. About two thirds of both the domain‐level trait variance and the facet‐specific trait variance was attributable to genetic factors. This suggests that the more personality is measured accurately, the better these measures reflect the genetic structure. Specific variance in self‐ and peer reports also showed modest to substantial genetic influence. This may indicate not only genetically influenced self‐rater biases but also substance components specific for self‐ and peer raters' perspectives on traits actually measured.     

Feeling Transparent: On Metaperceptions and Miscommunications

Individuals’ metaperceptions regarding how another person views them tend to be egocentrically biased by their own private self‐knowledge: They overestimate the extent to which their traits, feelings, and intentions are ‘transparent’, perceiving more congruence between their inner self and the other person's impressions than actually exists. In the present article, we examine the factors, such as self‐awareness and feelings of closeness, that increase individuals’ propensity to exaggerate their transparency to others. We also examine the interpersonal consequences of transparency overestimation and the related signal amplification bias, considering how they can reduce the likelihood of relationship formation, derail the seeking and provision of social support in ongoing relationships, and more generally lead to relational conflict. Lastly, we discuss the interventions available to reduce these biases.