Free Will,Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise

I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an agent and his or her environment can be consistent with more than one such sequence, and thus different actions can be “agentially possible”. The agential perspective is supported by our best theories of human behaviour, and so we should take it at face value when we refer to what an agent can and cannot do. On the picture I defend, free will is not a physical phenomenon, but a higher‐level one on a par with other higher‐level phenomena such as agency and intentionality.     

Geographies of Meaningful Living

Because it is significantly unclear what ‘meaningful’ does or should pick out when applied to a life, any account of meaningful living will be constructive and not merely clarificatory. Where in our conceptual geography is ‘meaningful’ best located? What conceptual work do we want the concept to do? What I call agent‐independent and agent‐independent‐plus conceptions of meaningfulness locate ‘meaningful’ within the conceptual geography of agent‐independent evaluative standards and assign ‘meaningful’ the work of commending lives. I argue that the not wholly welcome implications of these more dominant approaches to meaningfulness make it plausible to locate ‘meaningful’ on an alternative conceptual geography — that of agents as end‐setters and of agent‐dependent value assessments — and to assign it the work of picking out lives whose time‐expenditures are intelligible to the agent. I respond to the challenge confronting any subjectivist conception of meaningfulness that it is overly permissive.     

Example,please! Comparing the effects of single customer reviews and aggregate review scores on online shoppers' product evaluations

Many websites of online retail stores display two forms of electronic word of mouth on a single product site, namely single customer reviews and aggregate review scores. This study compares the effects of simultaneously presented single customer reviews and aggregate review scores on product evaluations of visitors of online retail stores. We hypothesize that well‐argued single customer reviews should be more influential than aggregate review scores that display the mean rating of all published reviews of a product. Drawing on a 2 × 2 factorial online experiment, we show that a single customer review is effective, even when potential buyers do not perceive it as representing overall customer satisfaction. Effects of the aggregate review score are weaker and completely mediated by a potential buyer's estimate of overall customer satisfaction. Trust in product reviews as a credible source of product‐related communication moderates some of these effects. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Epistemological Role of Episodic Recollection

In what respects is episodic recollection active, and subject to the will, like perceptual imagination, and in what respects is it passive, like perception, and how do these matters relate to its epistemological role? I present an account of the ontology of episodic recollection that provides answers to these questions. According the account I recommend, an act of episodic recollection is not subject to epistemic evaluation—it is neither justified nor unjustified—but it can provide one with a distinctive source of warrant for judgements about the past when it is accompanied by knowledge that one is recollecting, as well as knowledge of what one is recollecting. While the account concedes that when one recollects one’s attitude to what is recollected cannot be one of observation, it nevertheless accommodates the notion that episodic recollection involves a form of mental time‐travel—a case of re‐visiting, or re‐acquaintance with, some past episode.     

Is the privacy paradox a relic of the past? An in‐depth analysis of privacy attitudes and privacy behaviors

The privacy paradox states that online privacy concerns do not sufficiently explain online privacy behaviors on social network sites (SNSs). In this study, it was first asked whether the privacy paradox would still exist when analyzed as in prior research. Second, it was hypothesized that the privacy paradox would disappear when analyzed in a new approach. The new approach featured a multidimensional operationalization of privacy by differentiating between informational, social, and psychological privacy. Next to privacy concerns, also, privacy attitudes and privacy intentions were analyzed. With the aim to improve methodological aspects, all items were designed on the basis of the theory of planned behavior. In an online questionnaire with N = 595 respondents, it was found that online privacy concerns were not significantly related to specific privacy behaviors, such as the frequency or content of disclosures on SNSs (e.g., name, cell‐phone number, or religious views). This demonstrated that the privacy paradox still exists when it is operationalized as in prior research. With regard to the new approach, all hypotheses were confirmed: Results showed both a direct relation and an indirect relation between privacy attitudes and privacy behaviors, the latter mediated by privacy intentions. In addition, also an indirect relation between privacy concerns and privacy behaviors was found, mediated by privacy attitudes and privacy intentions. Therefore, privacy behaviors can be explained sufficiently when using privacy attitudes, privacy concerns, and privacy intentions within the theory of planned behavior. The behaviors of SNS users are not as paradoxical as was once believed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

MINDING OTHERS' BUSINESS

What do we do when a loved one is seriously messing up her life? While Kantianism describes the predicament nicely as a tension between love and respect, it is not well‐suited to resolving it. Kantian respect prevents minding another's business in cases where love demands it. Virtue ethics can readily explain the predicament as a tension between the virtues of sympathy and humility. Moreover, by changing the focus away from the other as a setter of ends and toward the would‐be‐benefactor's own degree of practical wisdom, virtue ethics permits a more nuanced set of loving responses to self‐destructive people.     

The boundaries of minimization as a technique for improving affect: good for the goose but not for the gander?

Research on minimization as a coping strategy suggests that it alleviates negative affect following threats. In contrast, research on minimization as a support‐giving strategy suggests that it does more harm than good. Does this mean that minimization works when it is self‐generated, but does not when it is offered by others? The present study examined the effect of self‐ and externally‐ generated minimizations on people with high and low self‐esteem following a self‐threat. Results suggest that externally‐generated minimizations do not alleviate negative affect when they occur before the recipient has had time to cope. Discussion centers around the implications of these findings for past research, as well as distinctions between how people with low versus high self‐esteem cope with negative events.     

Religion,Statelessness, and Belonging

Before 1948, and stretching back more than 1800 years, the Jewish people suffered all the problems of statelessness. The Zionist movement, 1897–1948, strove to end the condition of Jewish exile and statelessness. The great historical irony and tragedy is that the establishment of the State of Israel brought about the Nakba, the catastrophe, of the Palestinian people. Both the Israelis and the Palestinians see themselves as the victims of the conflict. They seem to be competitors in what I call a “suffering sweepstakes.” One of the problems with victimhood is that it prevents victims from assuming responsibility for their actions, including the victimization of others. In the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, both sides are victims and both sides are victimizers. The least helpful thing people can do – and regrettably many well‐meaning people do this – is to portray the situation in terms of a zero‐sum game, in which, if you’re pro‐Palestinian, you must be anti‐Israeli, and vice versa. We must be both pro‐Palestinian and pro‐Israeli, because we are pro‐people and, therefore, pro‐peace. The achievement of peace necessitates a two‐state solution based on some recognition of the two narratives. The best fulfilment of Zionism will come when there is a Palestinian state alongside the State of Israel.     

Is Objective Consequentialism Compatible with the Principle that “Ought” Implies “Can”?

Some philosophers hold that objective consequentialism is false because it is incompatible with the principle that “ought” implies “can”. Roughly speaking, objective consequentialism is the doctrine that you always ought to do what will in fact have the best consequences. According to the principle that “ought” implies “can”, you have a moral obligation to do something only if you can do that thing. Frances Howard-Snyder has used an innovative thought experiment to argue that sometimes you cannot do what will in fact have the best consequences because you do not know what will in fact have the best consequences. Erik Carlson has raised two objections against Howard-Snyder’s argument. This paper examines Howard-Snyder’s argument as well as Carlson’s objections, arguing that Carlson’s objections do not go through but Howard-Snyder’s argument fails nonetheless. Moreover, this paper attempts to show that objective consequentialism and other objectivist moral theories are compatible with the principle that “ought” implies “can”. Finally, this paper analyses a special kind of inability: ignorance-induced inability.     

Why Keep a Dog and Bark Yourself? Making Choices for Non‐Human Animals

Animals are usually considered to lack the status of autonomous agents. Nevertheless, they do appear to make ostensible choices. This article considers whether, and how, I should respect animals' choices. I propose a concept of volitionality which can be respected if, and insofar as, doing so is in the best interests of the animal. Applying that concept, I (we) will argue that an animals' choices be respected when the relevant human decision maker's capacities to decide are potentially challenged or compromised. For example, it will be best to respect the animals' choice when the human decision maker: (1) lacks accurate knowledge of the animal's subjective experiences; (2) does not know what will lead to desirable experiences or allow for the avoidance of undesirable ones; (3) is biased; (4) is less aware of the animal's specific situation; (5) cannot appreciate all elements comprehensively, including considering any (content‐neutral) value to the animal being allowed to make and implement a choice, such as where a lack of control or liberty would be unpleasant or where an animal would usefully learn from the process of choice‐making; and (6) when the animal's choice is achievable. This additionally suggests that we may often beneficially choose to set up situations that empower animals to make better choices.     

A matter of font type: The effect of serifs on the evaluation of scientific abstracts

Text‐based communication is one of the substantial ways of spreading scientific information. While the content and contextual aspects of written words have been widely researched, the impact of font characteristics on text perception is an almost blank page. The following study deals with the influence of serifs on the evaluation of online‐presented scientific abstracts. Yet there is only evidence for faster reading times when texts are presented in sans‐serif fonts, although the opposite is stated in parts of the literature. The present work examines if the presence or absence of serifs also have an impact on the appraisal of scientific texts when all other important font characteristics do not change. For this purpose, 188 university students participated in an online experiment and rated different aspects of scientific abstracts as well as of the research outlined in the abstracts. The results show that missing serifs led to increased reading speed. However, and in contrast to the perceptual fluency hypothesis, the presence of serifs had a positive effect on all evaluation dimensions. The results of a second study with 187 participants also indicated that reading fluency counteracted the liking of texts. Implications for future studies and media production are discussed.     

“The Thing Happened as He Wished”: Recovering an American Indian Cultural Psychology

One of the chief questions confronting mental health professionals who serve American Indian communities is how best to offer genuinely helpful services that do not simultaneously and surreptitiously reproduce colonial power relations. To ensure that counselors and therapists do not engage in psy‐colonization, it is crucial to recognize the sometimes divergent cultural foundations of mental distress, disorder, and well‐being in “Indian Country.” In this article, I will consider four excerpts from a research interview undertaken among my own people, the Aaniiih Gros Ventres of north‐central Montana. At a superficial level, these excerpts seem to reinforce reigning sensibilities that are readily familiar within the mental health professions. And yet, closer analysis of these interview excerpts reveals several tantalizing facets of an indigenous cultural psychology that may well continue to shape life and experience among tribal members in this setting. I recover this distinctive cultural psychology through archival representations of cultural and community life, including analysis of an important tribal myth. This analysis makes possible an alterNative interpretation of these interview excerpts, grounded in an aboriginal cosmology, that yields important implications for conceiving a more inclusive knowledge base for psychology that only robust community engagement can reveal.     

Motivated inaction: when collective disadvantage does not induce collective action

Why do people often fail to act out against their disadvantage? One explanation has been in terms of just‐world beliefs, which cloud perceptions of injustice. An additional route to inaction is proposed here: Just‐world believers refrain from acting because they do not see the necessity, as they expect in a just world all will turn out well in the long run (i.e., all‐will‐be‐well motivation). This hypothesis was tested in a situation of collective injustice typically studied by collective action researchers; namely, demonstration attendance/collective action intentions of students confronted with government cuts. Results revealed high just‐world believers were less likely to engage in collective action. Importantly, effects were mediated by all‐will‐be‐well motivation. Implications for studying determinants of inaction are discussed.     

Who should manage care? The case for patients

After establishing that it is essential that health care be rationed in some fashion, the paper examines the arguments for and against clinicians as gatekeepers. It first argues that bedside clinicians do not have the information needed to make allocation decisions. Then it claims that physicians at the bedside can be expected to make the wrong choice for two reasons: their commitment to the Hippocratic ethic forces them to pursue the patient's best interest (even when resources will produce only very marginal benefit and could do much more good elsewhere) and their values will lead them to calculate the net value of treatments incorrectly. Alternative decision makers are considered. It is argued that both groups of physicians and administrators will also make allocations incorrectly and that leaving the allocation decisions to patients themselves is the best approach. Mechanisms for fair and efficient rationing by patients at the societal and individual level are examined.     

Decentered online Bible instruction: How active learning enhances the study of Scripture

The field of biblical studies lends itself well to decentered online learning – a kind that uses active learning to engage primary texts and their interpretations. Not only does such an approach work well in online and hybrid formats, it more readily welcomes readings that are more contextual, constructive, and collaborative. Three aspects best characterize a decentered approach to active learning online: an orientation toward primary texts, collaborative inquiry, and enhanced learner initiative. This essay describes the significance of each in turn, along with naming some best practices. I argue that this approach not only shifts focus toward learners and the learning environment, it works particularly well for teaching Bible courses online and in hybrid formats where interpretation of primary sources is the fundamental goal.     

Sharing Values

In this paper, we consider one of the ways in which shared valuing is normatively significant. More specifically, we analyze the processes that can reliably provide normative grounding for the standing to rebuke others for their failures to treat something as valuable. Yet problems with grounding this normative standing quickly arise, as it is not immediately clear why shared valuing binds group members together in ways that can sustain the collective pursuit of shared ends. Responding to this difficulty is no easy task, since doing so requires demonstrating that the standing to call on one's fellow participants because of shared forms of valuing is not merely a side effect of members authority to call on their fellow participants to do their fair share in a collective endeavor. This is, to the best of our knowledge, a problem that the sparse literature on shared valuing has yet to consider. We argue that the best way to address this difficulty is to consider the real‐world complexity of how forms of valuing come to be shared within well‐structured collectives and how members internalize the evaluative tendencies that sustain shared valuing. To accomplish those ends, we examine two different ways that shared valuing is cultivated within well‐structured groups and the corresponding ways that members internalize forms of valuing; specifically, we examine differences between forms of valuing that are passed downward from the top of a group, as they are in the U.S. Military, and forms of valuing that bubble‐up through local patterns of interaction, as they do among the Zapatistas of Chiapas.     

Ability, breadth, and parsimony in computational models of higher-order cognition

Computational models will play an important role in our understanding of human higher‐order cognition. How can a model's contribution to this goal be evaluated? This article argues that three important aspects of a model of higher‐order cognition to evaluate are (a) its ability to reason, solve problems, converse, and learn as well as people do; (b) the breadth of situations in which it can do so; and (c) the parsimony of the mechanisms it posits. This article argues that fits of models to quantitative experimental data, although valuable for other reasons, do not address these criteria. Further, using analogies with other sciences, the history of cognitive science, and examples from modern‐day research programs, this article identifies five activities that have been demonstrated to play an important role in our understanding of human higher‐order cognition. These include modeling within a cognitive architecture, conducting artificial intelligence research, measuring and expanding a model's ability, finding mappings between the structure of different domains, and attempting to explain multiple phenomena within a single model.     

Choice confidence in the webrooming purchase process: The impact of online positive reviews and the motivation to touch

The webrooming purchase process (i.e. searching for information online and then buying the product offline) is the most extended cross‐channel shopping behaviour. With the aim of offering a better understanding of this behaviour, this research relies on information processing and uncertainty reduction theories to propose that consumers use the online information to make the offline purchase with a higher degree of confidence. We examine the effects of a previous online interaction with a product on the preferences and decision at the physical store, as well as on the outcomes of the experience. In this path to purchase, we analyse how positive online customer reviews, as a specific form of electronic word of mouth, help the consumer to improve their experience, given their great potential to reduce the consumer's uncertainty in a purchase situation. In addition, the role of the motivation to touch the product is examined. The results of two studies show that the combination of an online search and an offline purchase improves the consumers' purchase experience in pre‐choice variables (i.e. purchase intentions), choice and post‐choice variables (i.e. search‐process satisfaction and choice confidence). Moreover, reading a positive online customer review influences choice confidence, and all the variables considered in the research when it is received at the physical store. Finally, the results stress the importance of the motivation to touch when studying multichannel shopping behaviour, given its direct and moderating effects on the webrooming purchase process. Implications for theory and practice are discussed. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.