Balance in Life and Declining Marginal Utility of Diverse Resources

Declining marginal utility (DMU) describes the reduced value that additional units of money or consumer goods have in comparison to units acquired earlier. We extend this idea to social resources and activities such as socializing time, free time, and number of children, suggesting that most resources will show DMU as the person experiences more of them. In Study 1, participants reported how many years of adult life they would sacrifice to have increasingly more of each resource or activity. Income showed declining marginal utility, but other goods showed an ideal-level pattern in which they were valued less after an optimal amount. In Phase 2 of Study 1, we assessed the mix of activities people most prefer. Participants rated the desirability of various combinations of time spent in different activities. Spending all of one’s free time in a pleasant activity was not as desirable as spending some of the time in other desirable, but less enjoyable, activities. In Study 2, we used a representative sample of the world to assess people’s affect balance (positive minus negative moods) on the previous day, along with how much time they spent in activities such as socializing with family and friends. The most popular activity was socializing with family and friends, but even here there was DMU for more hours of this behavior. We also analyzed several forms of well-being in reference to household income. Income showed a clear DMU pattern using daily moods as the outcome, as well as for life evaluations and satisfaction with standard of living. The results of the two studies explain why people do not pursue happiness by spending all of their time in the most pleasant activities, such as socializing, but instead choose a mixture of activities. A desire for balance in human activities and resources has important implications for the structure of the workplace, leisure time, work hours, and other important domains of life.     

Decomposition of multivariate utility functions in non-additive expected utility theory

In expected utility many results have been derived that give necessary and/or sufficient conditions for a multivariate utility function to be decomposable into lower-dimensional functions. In particular, multilinear, multiplicative and additive decompositions have been widely discussed. These utility functions can be more easily assessed in practical situations. In this paper we present a theory of decomposition in the context of nonadditive expected utility such as anticipated utility or Choquet expected utility. We show that many of the results used in conventional expected utility carry over to these more general frameworks. If preferences over lotteries depend only on the marginal probability distributions, then in expected utility the utility function is additively decomposable. We show that in anticipated utility the marginality condition implies not only that the utility function is additively decomposable but also that the distortion function is the identity function. We further demonstrate that a decision maker who is bivariate risk neutral has a utility function that is additively decomposable and a distortion function q for which q(½) = ½.     

时间定价对亲社会行为的影响

时间定价就是将金钱价格赋予时间之上,用金钱来衡量时间的价值。已有研究表明,时间定价激活时间经济价值最大化的心理定势,使个体更看重时间的经济回报,花更少的时间帮助他人。但是,时间定价对亲社会行为的影响可能并不仅仅局限于时间利他。本研究通过三个实验,除了考察时间定价对时间利他的影响外,还进一步探讨时间定价对金钱利他的影响。结果显示,时间定价不仅影响个体的时间利他行为,也削弱了金钱利他行为。这表明,时间定价所激活的经济效用心理定势不仅仅局限于时间这一种资源的效用。     

A possible basis for conservatism in signal detection and probabilistic categorization tasks

It is commonly claimed that conservative placement of the criterion in signal detection is due to the form of the utility function of money, to conservatism in the estimation of prior probabilities, or to probability matching tendencies. This article shows how conservatism could be caused by a systematic misconception of the shape of the underlying distributions. An experiment is described in which subjects were asked to make posterior probability judgments after performing numerical analogues of signal detection. The posterior probability judgments were radical, i.e., high posterior probabilities were overestimated and low posterior probabilities were underestimated; if this pattern of radical probability estimation reflects the subjects’ understanding of the underlying distributions, it would account for conservative criterion placement.     

Road-sign utility as judged by drivers with different amounts of driving experience

This study starts from the hypothesis that sign perception depends on the motivational valences of signs. Two groups of drivers with different amounts of driving experience rated Swedish road signs on dimensions assumed to indicate perceived sign utility. The ratings were performed against a scenario that included traffic officials' intentions to simplify the sign system. One dimension was amount of reduction in frequency of occurrence; subjects indicated percentages of reduction they believed to be reasonable. A second dimension was appropriateness of complete elimination of a sign from the traffic environment; subjects rated the degree to which elimination was reasonable. Subjective frequency of sign occurrence was rated last. Construct validation procedures showed strong correlations between reduction and elimination ratings only for the higher-experience group. Contrary to expectation, both groups showed the same high level of positive attitudes toward all signs. As expected, frequency was a judgmental base for utility, though weakly, except for permissive signs. It was more extensively related to utility for the higher-experience group, particularly for percentage ratings. Curvilinear relationships obtained between frequency and utility for permissive and road guidance signs.     

Monetary Primes Increase Differences in Predicted Life-Satisfaction Between New and Old Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs)

Dynamics between money and happiness has attracted many scholars due to its importance in everyday lives but there is no study on the psychological consequences of priming money on life-satisfaction judgments. We examined whether students report life-satisfaction of themselves and that of others differently, after being reminded of money and whether such judgments differ for new versus old institutes of higher education. Students from a new Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) at Gandhinagar and from an old IIT at Bombay were asked to rate how satisfied currently they are with their lives in general and were also asked to predict how satisfied students are at other new and old IITs. Exposure to money did not affect self-reported satisfaction ratings and predictions of life-satisfaction for other students at old IITs. However, predicted life-satisfaction for students at new IITs reduced in presence of money. This made the difference in predicted student life satisfactions between old and new IITs more pronounced after priming money. Money selectively affects life-satisfaction predictions depending on the context and social value of an institution, probably because money makes the market-pricing mode of thought salient. These findings have important implication for education both in Asia and other countries.     

Diminishing Returns to Income, Companionship – and Happiness

From philosophical and intuitive sources, I find three goods that should serve as ultimate ends in assessing a high quality of life: subjective well-being, human development, and justice. With acknowledged plural ends (we use them whether we acknowledge them or not), each takes its value from its scarcity relative to the other two – a version of diminishing marginal utility. Contrary to economists' belief that income (together with leisure) is the source of all utility, evidence shows that companionship, which does not pass through the market, has higher utility and contributes more to well-being than does income. But if money income has diminishing marginal utility, so does this competing good, companionship. With arguments drawn from the meaning of happiness, I show that happiness, too, may have diminishing marginal utility and that often it must rely for its hedonic and social value on such other goods as human development and justice.     

Materialism Moderates the Effect of Accounting for Time on Prosocial Behaviors

Accounting for time is defined as putting a price on time. Researchers have demonstrated that accounting for time reduces the time individuals spend on others; however, its association with monetary donations has not been examined. We hypothesized that accounting for time will activate a utility mindset that would affect one’s allocation of time and money. In Study 1, the mediating effect of utility mindsets on the relationship between accounting for time and prosocial behavior was examined. In Study 2, we examined the effect of accounting for time on time spent helping and donating money, and the moderating role of material values on the relationship between accounting for time and prosocial behavior. Results showed that accounting for time activated a mindset of utility maximization that, in turn, reduced participants’ prosocial behavior; moreover, materialism moderated the effect of accounting for time on prosocial behavior.     

The emergent father role

Using data collected before and after birth of a couple's first child, change in each parent's view of men as fathers was investigated in a short-term longitudinal study. Semantic differential scales tapped the man's image of self as father, the woman's image of husband as father, and each parent's rating of the baby's adjustment. Interview questions provided information on circumstances of the birth, the father's early child care activities, and parents' previous child care experience. Men's judgments of their own effectiveness as fathers declined from before the birth to afterward. Wives' judgments of their husbands' effectiveness as fathers also declined over that same period, but wives rated husbands higher than husbands rated themselves at both times. A single-equation multiple regression model, adapted from a structural model, was estimated to explain change in both spouses' ratings of the man's paternal role competence. It revealed that working-class spouses agreed on the basis for their judgments of the father's role performance, in that both judged him mainly in terms of how much he participated in child care. Middle-class spouses disagreed on the basis for their judgments of fathers, however. The middle-class men rated their own performance in the father role mainly in terms of the baby's adjustment; if they judged the baby to be happier, they judged themselves to be more competent as fathers. The middle-class women did not rate fathers on that basis. Instead, the middle-class women's ratings responded to the circumstances of the birth and to the father's participation in child care chores. Findings are discussed in terms of family role theory, social-class differences in the father's role, and recent change in expectations for men's parental role.This research was supported by NIMH Grant No. MH15735 and earlier by NICHD Grant No. HD 13103.     

Metamemory for narrative text

In this experiment, we investigated metamemory for narrative text passages. Subjects read two stories and made memory predictions for the idea units in one and rated the importance of ideas in the other. Half of the subjects were asked to recall the story immediately after reading the passages and half were asked to recall 1 week later; half received passages with single inconsistent idea units and half received passages with corresponding consistent idea units. All subjects made confidence judgments about the accuracy of their recall. Subjects’ prediction ratings were related to recall, as shown by significant prediction accuracy quotients. Importance ratings were related to recall on the delayed test but not on the immediate test. Memory prediction ratings predicted recall better than did importance ratings. The absolute level of memory predictions did not differ with delay, but subjects did give higher confidence judgments on an immediate than on a delayed test. Subjects recalled the inconsistent idea better than the consistent idea for one story but not for the other. For both stories, subjects predicted that they would remember the inconsistent ideas better, suggesting that they have avon Restorff-type view, rather than a schema view, of memory. We conclude that subjects can predict their memory for the idea units in narrative text.     

Impact of an individualist vs. collectivist context on the social valorization of internal explanations

The theory of the norm of internality emphasizes the role of Western individualism in the normativity of internal explanations. The present study examines the link between the social value accorded to targets expressing internal vs. external explanations and individualist vs. collectivist contexts. Sixty-three male and female French management sciences students evaluated two targets (internal vs. external) in a simulated recruitment situation. The job vacancy was partially manipulated to create individualist vs. collectivist contexts. Participants were asked to state whether or not they would recruit the targets and to describe the targets on traits relating to social utility (market value) and social desirability (likeability). As expected, the results showed that the effect of the targets' internality on recruitment judgments and perceived social utility was stronger in the individualist context than in the collectivist context. However, the analysis also revealed that the participant's gender moderated the impact of the context on the evaluation of the targets. The results showed that the context strongly affected the men's judgments, whereas it had no effect on the women's judgments.     

The enduring effect of availability

The present study addressed whether experienced ease of retrieval of autobiographical events affects trait judgments made immediately and after a delay (Experiment 1) and whether this influence is modulated by either of two discounting instructions (Experiment 2). In Experiment 1, participants first attempted to retrieve 6 or 12 personal memories for different traits and then made ease of retrieval and self-trait judgments immediately or 1 week later. In Experiment 2, participants made immediate ratings and then delayed ratings under 3 instructional manipulations: a generic instruction to repeat these judgments, to make these ratings after they were reminded of their original recall total, or to make these ratings after they had their retrieval ease discounted or augmented. In each experiment, an enduring effect of availability was obtained in that the relationship between ease of retrieval and self-trait rating was only slightly affected by the delay. Being reminded of the original number of recalled memories nullified the relationship between ease of retrieval and trait rating. However, discounting or augmenting ease of retrieval, which altered ease of retrieval ratings, did not. Potential explanations for an enduring effect of availability are discussed.     

Experiences extended across time: Evaluation of moments and episodes

Intuitions relating to outcomes extended over time are examined. Utility integration is proposed as a normative rule for the evaluation of extended episodes. In Experiment 1, subjects explicitly compared aversive experiences of varying durations. By several measures, disutility was a marginally decreasing function of episode duration, even for experiences that were thought to become increasingly aversive. This pattern is a qualitative violation of the integration rule. In Experiment 2, subjects made global evaluations of a hypothetical person's aversive experiences, on the basis of a series of subjective ratings of discomfort made at periodic intervals. The results showed an extreme sensitivity to improving or deteriorating trend and a striking neglect of duration. The final moments of an extended episode appear to exert a strong influence on the overall judgment. This leads to violations of monotonicity when adding some moments of moderate pain reduces judgments of global aversiveness.     

Consensus at zero acquaintance: replication, behavioral cues, and stability.

That observers tend to agree in their ratings of a target even if they have never interacted with that target has been called consensus at zero acquaintance. The basic finding that consensus is highest for judgments concerning a target's degree of extraversion (EV) and somewhat weaker for judgments of conscientiousness is replicated. Several potential observable cues that might be used by judges when rating targets are examined. The finding that ratings of physical attractiveness correlate with judgments of EV is replicated. In Study 1, rapid body movements and smiling were also found to correlate with EV judgments. The level of consensus declined when initially unacquainted Ss interacted one-on-one (Study 2), but did not decline--and even increased--when Ss interacted in a group (Study 3). Ss judged as extraverted at zero acquaintance were also seen as extraverted after interacting with others.     

Context effects on tempo and pleasantness judgments for Beatles songs

Context effects on tempo and pleasantness judgments of different tempos were demonstrated in three experiments using Beatles songs. In Experiments 1 and 2, we explored how listening to versions of the same song that were played at different tempos affected tempo and pleasantness ratings. In both experiments, contrast effects were found on judgments of tempo, with target tempos rated faster when context tempos were slow than when they were fast. In both experiments, we also showed that the peak of the pleasantness rating function shifted toward the values of the context tempos, reflecting disordinal context effects on pleasantness relationships. Familiarity with the songs did not moderate these effects, and shifts in tempo ratings did not correlate with shifts in most pleasant target tempos when context was manipulated within subjects. In Experiment 3, we examined how manipulations of context tempos for one song affected judgments of the same song as compared with judgments of other more or less similar songs. For tempo ratings, contrast effects transferred to ratings of a similar song, but for pleasantness ratings, assimilative shifts of ideals were found only for the same song and not for similar songs. This pattern of results was supportive of independent bases for the two context effects.     

Equity and Self-Interest: Effects on Perceptions of Intent,Liking, and Desire to Reciprocate

In two experiments subjects were given information about how one person in a dyadic interaction had allocated outcomes to self and the other participant. The interaction was depicted as competitive in Experiment 1 and noncompetitive in Experiment 2. Subjects made judgments about the allocator's intentions and the recipient's liking for the allocator and desire to reciprocate outcome distribution. Subjects were instructed to respond toward the recipient in either an objective or empathic manner. Subjects logically utilized disparity in outcome distribution in determining the allocator's intent to benefit him/herself. Overall, equitable distributions led to the highest judgments of recipient liking; as inequity increased, ratings about liking decreased. However, empathic subjects in Experiment 2 showed different patterns of rated recipient liking as a function of the direction of the inequity. Judgments about intent to reciprocate were also affected by the orientation of the observer. The results were discussed with particular reference to differential thresholds for advantageous versus disadvantageous inequity. In addition, mathematical models describing the dependent measures were derived and validated, providing results consistent with past research utilizing ratio models of judgment within the context of equity theory.     

Differential predictability of preferences and choices

A combined multi-attribute utility and expectancy-value model has repeatedly been found to yield a worse fit to choices than to preference ratings. The present study investigated two possible explanations for this finding. First, people's belief-value structures may change in the choice task as they try to find the best alternative. Second, a difficult choice task may cause the decision maker to use simplifying heuristics. In the first of two experiments, subjective belief-value structures were measured on two occasions separated by about one week. Immediately before the second measurement, different groups of subjects performed a choice task, gave preference ratings, or performed a control task. The results did not support an interpretation of the greater difficulty of predicting choices in terms of changes in belief-value structures. However, the notion of simplifying heuristics received support by the finding that adopting simpler versions of the original model improved the predictions of the choices. In the second experiment, beliefs were measured immediately before or after each of a series of choices or preference ratings. The results indicated that although temporary changes in beliefs may occur, they can hardly provide a full account of the differential predictability of preferences and choices.     

Order effects in sequentially judged options due to the direction of comparison

Many real-world judgment tasks present options in sequence. Typically, these judgments are made step-by-step, immediately after considering each option, or end-of-sequence, after all have been seen. We report similar order effects in both procedures, due to direction of comparison. It appears that judges form an impression of each new option by comparing it to those that preceded it. Using that option’s features as a “checklist,” more weight is given to unique ones than to ones shared with previous options. This unidirectional comparison process produces increasing ratings in options with unique positive features, and decreasing ratings when options have unique negative features. By manipulating the barriers to making multiple comparisons, we show that the direction-of-comparison effect is not limited to judgment tasks with sequential presentation. Even simultaneously presented options may show order effects, if they are judged one at a time—in sequence. Possible explanations and implications are discussed.     

Evaluating characteristics of false memories: Remember/know judgments and memory characteristics questionnaire compared

Subjects hearing a list of associates to a nonpresented lure word later often claim to have heard the lure (Deese, 1959; Roediger & McDermott, 1995). To examine the characteristics of such false memories, subjects completed a memory characteristics questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988) or made remember/know (RK; Gardiner & Java, 1993) judgments for previously heard theme associates and nonpresented lures. MCQ ratings indicated that false memories for lures had less auditory detail and less remembered feelings and reactions than memories for presented words. In addition, rates of false recognition for lures were significantly lower than rates of correct recognition when items from various themes were intermixed instead of blocked at acquisition and subjects made MCQ ratings instead of RK judgments. This demonstrates that false memories can be affected both by how they are acquired and by how extensively they are examined at retrieval.     

Prior distributions for random choice structures

We study various axioms of discrete probabilistic choice, measuring how restrictive they are, both alone and in the presence of other axioms, given a specific class of prior distributions over a complete collection of finite choice probabilities. We do this by using Monte Carlo simulation to compute, for a range of prior distributions, probabilities that various simple and compound axioms hold. For example, the probability of the triangle inequality is usually many orders of magnitude higher than the probability of random utility. While neither the triangle inequality nor weak stochastic transitivity imply the other, the conditional probability that one holds given the other holds is greater than the marginal probability, for all priors in the class we consider. The reciprocal of the prior probability that an axiom holds is an upper bound on the Bayes factor in favor of a restricted model, in which the axiom holds, against an unrestricted model. The relatively high prior probability of the triangle inequality limits the degree of support that data from a single decision maker can provide in its favor. The much lower probability of random utility implies that the Bayes factor in favor of it can be much higher, for suitable data.