New displays and new emotions: a commentary on Rozin and Cohen (2003)

In this article, the authors elaborate on 3 ideas advanced in P. Rozin and A. B. Cohen's (2003) innovative study of facial expression. Taking a cue from their discovery of new expressive behaviors (e.g., the narrowed eyebrows), the authors review recent studies showing that emotions are conveyed in more channels than usually studied, including posture, gaze patterns, voice, and touch. Building on their claim that confusion has a distinct display, the authors review evidence showing distinct displays for 3 self-conscious emotions (embarrassment, shame, and pride), 5 positive emotions (amusement, desire, happiness, love, interest), and sympathy and compassion. Finally, the authors offer a functional definition of emotion to integrate these findings on "new" displays and emotions.     

Confusion,concentration, and other emotions of interest: commentary on Rozin and Cohen (2003)

P. Rozin and A. B. Cohen's (2003) method of sending students out to observe each other in familiar circumstances undoubtedly exaggerated the apparent prevalence of confusion, concentration, and worry. The expressions they observed probably ranged from regulatory feedback and communicative signals to expressions of the "intellectual emotions" described by C. Darwin (1872/1965). Appraisal theories can easily accommodate these affective states; there is no need to postulate new "basic emotions" unless one adheres to a rigid categorical view of emotion. Finally, Rozin and Cohen have made a valuable contribution by reminding us of the importance of emotions related to interest.     

Clarifying Cohen: A Response to Jubb and Hall

In this brief essay, we clarify Cohen’s ‘Facts and Principles’ argument, and then argue that the objections posed by two recent critiques of Cohen—Robert Jubb (Res Publica 15:337–353, 2009) and Edward Hall (Res Publica 19:173–181, 2013)—look especially vulnerable to the charge of being self-defeating. It may still be that Cohen’s view concerning facts and principles is false. Our aim here is merely to show that two recent attempts to demonstrate its falsity are unlikely to succeed.     

Now you see it,now you don't--the confusing case of confusion as an emotion: commentary on Rozin and Cohen (2003)

P. Rozin and A. B. Cohen (2003) contend that confusion is an emotion because it is valenced, it has a distinct facial expression, and it has a distinct internal state. On the basis of these criteria, they call for further study of this unstudied stateand challenge emotion researchers to consider "confusion" to be an emotion. The author agrees with Rozin and Cohen (2003) that confusion is an affective state, is valenced, has an (internal) object, may be expressed facially, and that laypersons may, under certain circumstances, consider it an emotion. However, its expression is likely to be an expressive component of emotions for which goal obstruction is central. Further, confusion may also not be as commonly considered an emotion by laypersons, as Rozin and Cohen contend. Finally, confusion is not unstudied, only most of the time it is not emotion researchers who do the researching.     

A questionable questionnaire: a rejoinder to Marks

In a recent article Marks argues that two previous articles in this journal in 1986 and 1988, questioning the construct validity of the Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire, should be dismissed due to methodological flaws and overwhelming evidence to the contrary. In this response to Marks, the methodologies of the two studies in question are clarified and defended. Research and other evidence supporting the two Chara studies are presented. It is concluded that the construct validity of the imagery questionnaire has not been established and that further investigations of the questionnaire, and particularly its rating scale, are warranted.     

Response to Erich Loewy: commentary

The capacity to suffer, the vulnerability with respect to suffering, confers on all animals with that capacity (not just human beings) a prima facie right not to be caused suffering. Nurturing in order to stave off such suffering is the first act of the community toward the individual, primarily in infancy. Hence for Loewy, autonomy, the gradual growth of self-determination in individuals, is grounded in a broader moral commitment of the community, that of beneficence. This is the critical point in his argument, for it represents a wholesale critique of modern libertarianism. Libertarians, in contrast to Loewy's argument, seem to ground the nature of the community in the prima facie right of autonomy. For Loewy, the community not only has an obligation to refrain from harming individuals (nonmaleficence), but it also has an active duty to ameliorate and prevent, as far as possible, the suffering of its members. Thus, if there is a social contract, it is one of nurturing one another to overcome the vulnerability of suffering, not primarily one of protecting autonomy. This is most significant for clinical ethics as well. Once the primary obligation to ameliorate suffering is no longer necessary, when the individual loses or does not have the primary moral worth prompted by the capacity to suffer, then secondary and symbolic obligations emerge. Loewy is thereby able to suggest a "calculus" of moral worth, wherein our obligations to individuals in a permanent vegetative state or to anencephalics (almost always the individual will have lost the capacity to suffer through some cerebral event) must be weighed against other primary obligations. Although Loewy admits that grounding clinical ethics in the capacity to suffer might be "thin," it nevertheless prompts serious discussion about the nature of the "good" in good clinical ethics decisions.     

Trying on and Trying Out: Participatory Action Research as a Tool for Literacy and Identity Work in Middle Grades Classrooms

This article explores the role of collaborative, ethnographic, participatory action research (PAR) with eighth grade students as a set of possible literacy practices for involving students with issues connected to their lives, resources, language(s), and communities. Findings are based on a year of fieldwork conducted as part of shared inquiry into one public school community’s experiences with gentrification and meeting the complex needs of diverse learners. Findings bring to life the ways in which PAR facilitates the redefining of reading, writing, and research; the reconsideration of languages; the rethinking of literacy practices; and the repositioning of participants within and beyond given research endeavors.     

Recent Adolescent MMPI Norms: T-Score Elevation Comparisons to Marks and Briggs

Minnesota Multiphasic Personality inventory (MMPI) norms developed by Marks and Briggs (1967/1972) have served as the standard adolescent norms used for over 10 years. Additional adolescent, norms, have recently been produced by Gottesman, Hanson, Kroeker, and Briggs (1987) and by Colligan and Offord (1989), thereby providing MMPI users with a potential choice of adolescent norms. Our study examines the effects of these adolescent norm sets on single-scale and profile elevations. In addition, we examine the ability of these norm sets to generate T-score values that would serve to discriminate accurately among adolescents in outpatient (n = 100), inpatient (n = 100), and normal (n = 100) settings. Results indicated teat the choice of adolescent norms resulted in important differences in profile elevation. Findings from the discriminant function analyses, however, indicated that these normative sets were roughly equivalent in discriminating among adolescents in the three settings.