Saying and Showing: Art, Literature and Religious Understanding

I argue that works of art and literature can be primary expressions of religious ideas, i.e., ones not dependent on other modes of communication like preaching or theology. This does not mean, however, that such works are independent of criticism, for an artist or writer can show something that is untrue, immoral, crude, and so on. I maintain that art and literature may criticize theology, or vice versa; or, thirdly, the relationship between them may be reciprocal, and I illustrate these three possibilities via Ibsen's Brand, Goethe's Faust, and the film Dead Man Walking.     

Histories and Landscapes: Two Categories of Artwork Suitable for Reformed Churches

Abstract

There are few examples of paintings or sculptures in churches of the Reformed tradition today. I argue that, despite this, it is in fact consonant with the writings of early Reformed thinkers, such as John Calvin, Martin Bucer, and Huldrych Zwingli, to allow for the use of certain types of artwork in these churches. I make a start by arguing that each of these thinkers affirmed works of art that may be described as histories. I then go on to look at how we can use ideas central to the theology of John Calvin to argue for the use of landscapes in Reformed churches. Finally, I consider how we might use such works of art in churches in order to address concerns about their use that members of the Reformed community may have.     

Reader and story,viewer and film: On transference and interpretation2

Two sides in Freud's attitude towards literature and art are presented: Freud the sensitive listener, whose interest in art is a potential springboard for a rich interdisciplinary dialogue; and Freud the conquistador, whose wish for power in ‘invaded’ territories is related to troublesome aspects of ‘pathography’ and ‘applied analysis’. The unique contribution of psychoanalysis may not be discovering objectively the true unconscious content of works of art, but rather enriching the exploration of the potential transitional space evolving between artist, work of art and readers or viewers, enhancing our sensitivity to multiple meanings and complex emotional influences of art. This requires exploring our own subjective experiences of art, which may be described as transferences (when art is mostly perceived as a source of insight) or countertransferences (when artists and their work are basically experienced as troubled patients). Transference (broadly defined) and interpretation tend to intermingle, both in the clinical analytic encounter, and in any reading/viewing of art, be it by laymen, analysts or other scholars. Several examples from the psychoanalytic study of literature and film are given, and three pairs of contrasting interpretations are studied, concerning Kafka's The metamorphosis, Minghella's The English Patient and Polanski's Chinatown.     

What Mary Didn't Read: On Literary Narratives and Knowledge

In the philosophy of art, one of the most important debates concerns the so‐called ‘cognitive value’ of literature. The main question is phrased in various ways. Can literary narratives provide knowledge? Can readers learn from works of literature? Most of the discussants agree on an affirmative answer, but it is contested what the relevant notions of truth and knowledge are and whether this knowledge and learning influence aesthetic or literary value. The issue takes on a wider, not only philosophical, importance as it is one of the central tenets of humanistic education that art and literature are valuable not only because the pleasure they afford. This paper offers a new line of argument in departing from propositional truth, arguing that literary narratives provide aesthetically significant knowledge, however, this knowledge cannot be captured in propositional form. My position depends crucially on Frank Jackson's influential knowledge argument. The paper describes a modified ‘What Mary Didn't Read’ case. In doing so, it is argued that the knowledge literary works provide should be understood as a type of experiential knowing of ‘what it is like’ analogous to what Mary acquires in the original case of seeing a new colour for the first time. 1 1 I would like to thank first and foremost David Weberman for his comments on the draft of this paper. Also, I am grateful to colleagues at the 7th In‐house Philosophy Graduate Conference of Central European University for a productive discussion. Thirdly, I am indebted to Howard Robinson and Philip Goff for illuminating debates about Jackson's thought experiment.
     

What Love Is Not: Lessons from Martin Luther King,Jr.

Focusing on the concept and practice of love sheds light on Martin Luther King, Jr.’s negative political theology. King was fundamentally concerned with what love is not, and it is this negation that colors his political vision. I do not take King’s political theology to be either primarily derivative of American liberal Protestantism or primarily derivative of folk African American religion, or of some syncretism of these. Rather, I take King to be participating in a tradition of negative theology that pairs the critique of idolatry with attention outward and inward, to the marginalized and to spiritual life.     

Holiness in the Making

In this essay, I will argue that a political theology of human work can provide the sacramental principle underlying the theology of labor. This principle could complement the foundations of Catholic social teaching, since the sacramental aspects of work have not been made very explicit in the ethical framework of the Church's theology of work. The view of labor as the active participation in God's future is an important aspect of such a theology. In order to serve as a foundation for faith‐based labor organizing, I will claim that it needs to be complemented by a sacramental view of labor as art, a labor‐aesthetic that undergirds a labor‐ethic, in which labor itself becomes a sign and instrument of the way the Church becomes God's work in the world. First, I will sketch an outline of some of the major positions on labor in modern Catholic theology. Then, I will draw on the writings of the British poet and painter David Jones to explore a sacramental view of human work, arguing that a sacramental view of work could support the Church's social criticism of laborer's circumstances.     

A functional view of artistic evaluation

I develop and defend the following functional view of art: a work of art typically possesses as an essential feature one or more points, purposes, or ends with reference to the satisfaction of which that work can be appropriately evaluated. This way of seeing a work’s artistic value as dependent on its particular artistic ends (whatever they may be) suggests an answer to a longstanding question of what sort of internal relation, if any, exists between the wide variety of values (moral, cognitive, aesthetic, etc.) that may be possessed by works of art and their value qua works of art.     

Heidegger,Art, and the Overcoming of Metaphysics

In this paper, I advance a new interpretation of Heidegger's reflections on art as we find them in his essay, ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’. I begin, in Section 1, by uncovering the fundamental concern that motivates Heidegger's essay. I show that Heidegger's reflections on art are part of his attempt to uncover a path beyond the history of metaphysics. I then suggest, in Section 2, that while Heidegger does think that art may allow for the overcoming of metaphysics, recent interpreters [Dreyfus ( 2005 ), Thomson ( 2011 ), and Young ( 2001 )] have mistook the kind of art that Heidegger has in mind here. The kind of art that can allow for the overcoming of metaphysics, I argue, is not art that simply thematizes and/or reconfigures cultural worlds (as these interpreters have argued). It is instead what Heidegger calls ‘primal poesy’. After discussing the nature of primal poesy, I show in more detail how this kind of art may be capable of getting us beyond the history of metaphysics in Section 3. Finally, in Section 4, I reconsider the more common reading of ‘The Origin of the Work of Art’ in light of the interpretation I've offered in Sections 2 and 3.     

On Prayer in Anglican Systematic Theology

For an ecclesial tradition that does not have a particularly strong history of systematic theology, it is curious that several of those currently engaged in the production of large‐scale, multi‐volume projects of systematic theology are Anglican theologians. In this article, I investigate three such projects: Sarah Coakley’s God, Sexuality and the Self: An Essay ‘On the Trinity’, Graham Ward’s How the Light Gets In: Ethical Life I, and Katherine Sonderegger’s Systematic Theology – Vol. 1: The Doctrine of God. In the first section, I examine these examples of systematic theology in light of Stephen Sykes’s analysis of the state of the discipline in Anglican theology. Then, in the second section, I identify a common characteristic shared by Coakley, Ward, and Sonderegger: the grounding of systematic theology in the practice of prayer. I argue that although these contemporary systematicians might not see themselves as enunciating an Anglican systematics, the systematic seriousness they accord to matters of prayer can be interpreted as articulations of the Anglican propensity to grant theological priority to the liturgy. In the final section, I suggest that for all the theological opportunities made available by the systematic reclamation of prayer, these invariably positive embraces of prayer leave little space for what might be called the Schattenseite of prayer. There is a ‘shadow‐side’ to the history and practice of prayer that I argue needs to be appropriately theorized if the category of prayer is to have a future in the discipline of systematic theology.     

The Problem of Criteria and the Necessity of Natural Theology

Most streams of Christianity have emphasized the unknowability of God, but they have also asserted that Christ is the criterion through whom we may have limited access to the depths of God, and through whose life and death we can formulate the doctrine of God as Triune. This standpoint, however, leads to certain complications regarding ‘translating’ the Christian message to adherents of other religious traditions, and in particular the question, ‘Why do you accept Christ as the criterion?’, is one that Christian thinkers have attempted to answer in different ways. There are two influential responses to this query in recent Christian thought: an ‘evidentialist’ approach which gradually moves from a theistic metaphysics to a Christ‐centred soteriology, and an ‘unapologetic’ standpoint which takes God's self‐disclosure in Christ as the perspectival lens through which to view the world. The opposition between these two groups is primarily over the status of ‘natural theology’, that is, whether we may speak of a ‘natural’ reason, which human beings possess even outside the circle of the Christian revelation, and through which they may arrive at some minimalist understanding of the divine reality. I outline the status of ‘natural theology’ in these strands of contemporary Christian thought, from Barthian ‘Christomonism’ to post‐liberal theology to Reformed epistemology, and suggest certain problems within these standpoints which indicate the need for an appropriately qualified ‘natural theology’. Most of the criticisms leveled against ‘natural theology’, whether from secular philosophers or from Christian theologians themselves, can be put in two groups: first, the arguments for God's existence are logically flawed, and, second, even if they succeed they do not point to the Triune God that Christians worship. In contrast to such an old‐fashioned ‘natural theology’ which allegedly starts from premises self‐evidently true for all rational agents and leads through an inexorable logic to God, the qualified version is an attempt to spell out the doctrinal beliefs of Christianity such as the existence of a personal God who interacts with human beings in different ways, and outline the reasons offered in defence of such statements. In other words, without denying that Christian doctrines operate at one level as the grammatical rules which structure the Christian discourse, such a natural theology insists on the importance of the question of whether these utterances are true, in the sense that they refer to an objective reality which is independent of the Christian life‐world. Such a ‘natural theology’, as the discussion will emphasize, is not an optional extra but follows in fact from the internal logic of the Christian position on the universality of God's salvific reach.     

Two sorts of natural theology

Usually, natural theology is understood as the project of providing arguments for the existence of God. This project is endorsed by Moreland and Craig. McGrath, on the other hand, says that this project fails. In the first part of this article, I show how McGrath’s dismissal of arguments for the existence of God follows from his view of natural theology. In the second part, I argue that McGrath’s natural theology contains an accurate critique of Moreland and Craig’s way of doing natural theology, a critique that exposes two major problems in their treatment of the moral argument for the existence of God. In the third part, I propose a way of providing arguments for the existence of God that avoids the problems pointed out by McGrath, namely a way of arguing that seeks to show how theology may improve a certain non-theistic understanding of a natural phenomenon.     

DOUGHNUTS AND DICKIE

In this paper, I assess Dickie's institutional theory of art. I compare the earlier and later forms of the theory, and I point to various problems of detail with these accounts. I then proceed by arguing that Dickie's definition excludes Krispy Kreme doughnut boxes from possessing the status of being works of art, and it excludes those who made them from possessing the status of being artists. The intention is not to offer a counter example to Dickie's account. Rather, the complaint is that there could be no philosophical point or interest in a concept of art which excludes these doughnut boxes. The best way to see this is by contrast with a concept of art that includes them. Thus I outline what I call a ‘creative’ account. What we want is a concept of art which helps us understand a certain phenomenon in the world – the phenomenon that we call ‘art’. In this light, I argue that Dickie's institutional theory tells us nothing about why people want to make art and nothing about why they want to experience it. By contrast, the creative theory, which embraces both doughnut boxes and things in galleries, is more explanatory.     

Enchanted nature,dissected nature: the case of Galen’s anatomical theology

Through the historical portrait of Galen, I argue that even an enchanted nature does not prevent the performance of violence against nature. Galen (129–c. 216 CE), the great physician-philosopher of antiquity, is best known for his systematization and innovation of the Hippocratic medical tradition, whose thought was the reigning medical orthodoxy from the medieval period into the Renaissance. His works on anatomy were the standard that Vesalius’ works on anatomy overturned. What is less known about Galen’s study of anatomy, however, is its philosophical and theological edge. In this paper, I show that it is precisely because nature is enchanted that Galen undertakes the grisly practices of anatomical dissection and vivisection, which entail violence against nature. First, I illustrate the violent character of Galen’s anatomical experiments. Second, I elucidate Galen’s anatomical methodology as a form of philosophizing and theologizing with a scalpel. Third, I explicate the importance of the demonstration of divine teleology that anatomical dissection reveals. Fourth, I sketch how anatomical dissection as a way of knowing nature and God becomes a kind of anatomical, liturgical theology. I conclude that, at least for Galen, an enchanted nature is not in itself exempt from violence.     

Home and hiddenness: queer theology,domestication and institutions

ABSTRACT

This essay examines tropes of hiddenness and domestication in queer theology, particularly in light of the increasing mainstreaming of queer theologies in institutional (e.g. university, seminary, church) settings, and the inclusion of queer theologies by straight academics and teachers on their syllabi. Drawing on James C. Scott’s work on revolution as a luxury of the elite (by way of the Arab Spring, the UK riots of 2011, and the US demonstrations in 2014), and Judith Halberstam’s construction of “failure” as a strategy of queer resistance, I ask whether there will continue to be a role for “shadow queernesses” which reject institutional acceptability. However, I also suggest that the increased visibility of queer theology within mainstream institutions does not inevitably imply compromise or “toothlessness,” but may in fact testify to the pre-existing presence of queer diversity in multiple contexts and the inhabitation by queer scholars of various “homes.”     

Hartshorne’s Dipolar Theism and the Mystery of God

Anselm said that God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, but he believed that it followed that God is greater than can be conceived. The second formula—essential to sound theology—points to the mystery of God. The usual way of preserving divine mystery is the via negativa, as one finds in Aquinas. I formalize Hartshorne’s central argument against negative theology in the simplest modal system T. I end with a defense of Hartshorne’s way of preserving the mystery of God, which he locates in the actuality of God rather than in the divine existence or essence. This paper was delivered during the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God.     

Words that reveal: Jean-Yves Lacoste and the experience of God

Much of the contemporary discussion of religion seems to do away with the very possibility of revelation. In this article, I use Lacoste’s phenomenology of la parole to rethink a theology of revelation in terms of God’s personal self-giving in experience. After examining Lacoste’s views of the relationship between philosophy and theology, his liturgical reduction and what this means for an understanding of experience and knowledge, and his thought of la parole more broadly, I give critical consideration to how he thinks the possibility of God’s address to humanity. Lacoste maintains that God’s presence in experience may be known through affection, and, indeed, that the word may so move us that we are able to recognise that presence. He uses the notion of self-evidence rather than the usual phenomenological category of evidence to evince the reasonableness of this response. I argue that while Lacoste accords due deference to a traditional understanding of revelation as the repetition or unfolding of a word addressed to us in the past, his thought also allows us to think revelation as a contemporary event, the hermeneutics of which allow us to know God in ways that are new.     

Discoveries and Dangers in Teaching Theology with PowerPoint

PowerPoint can be a genuine aid to theological education by providing a medium for employing visual art in the classroom. But PowerPoint does not and should not replace the ordinary stuff of teaching and learning theology: reading, lecturing, discussing texts, and writing papers. Like any other tool, its pedagogical benefit depends on discerning use. Particular care must be used to blunt PowerPoint's tendency to produce a disembodied, decontextualized learning environment. Using PowerPoint to incorporate art into theology classes is not merely a strategy for making verbal points more powerfully. Art can sometimes go where theological words cannot.     

“Make no provision for the flesh”: recognizing the incarnation in and after Augustine

This article argues for the importance of the intelligibility of the sexed body to incarnational theology. Building on Mark Jordan's reading of Augustine, I focus on the paradox of the incarnation as both the bodily sign (signa) of God and God Godself as the thing that the sign signifies (res). Through an analysis of the debates around Leo Steinberg's work on the meaning of Christ's genitals in Renaissance art, I explore the ways in which depicting the incarnation is a paradoxical exercise of depicting God's fully human body. I argue that attention to the paradox of the incarnation as both sign and thing can disrupt ideologies of sexual difference that force bodies to be intelligible as unambiguously sexed, while the question of sexual difference can work within incarnational theology to disturb the equivalence of full humanity and unambiguous maleness.     

KARL BARTH AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

It is commonly held that Karl Barth emphatically rejected the usefulness of philosophy for theology. In this essay I explore the implications of Barth's theological epistemology for the relationship and proper boundaries between philosophy and theology, given its origin in Barth's theology of revelation. I seek to clarify Barth's position with respect to philosophy by distinguishing the contingency of its offence from any necessary incompatibility. Barth does not reject philosophy per se, but the way in which philosophy is typically conducted. This is made explicit through an analysis of Barth's censure of the uncritical acceptance in theology of modernist philosophical presuppositions. I nuance Barth's response to a collection of philosophical assumptions that are rarely distinguished in theological literature. Finally, I highlight a representative instance of Barth's reflections on philosophy in relationship to theology, to demonstrate that the criterion for evaluating the usefulness of philosophical assumptions and methods in the service of theology is the same criterion by which theology is itself evaluated.     

“Upbuilding Examples” for Adults Close to Children

Both in formal situations (as school teachers, football trainers, etc.) and in many, often unpredictable informal situations (both inside and outside institutions)—adults come close to children. Whether we intend it or not, we continually give them examples of what it is to live as a human being, and thereby we have a pedagogical responsibility. I sketch what it could mean to let ourselves “be built up”, in a Kierkegaardian sense, on the foundation of unconditional love, presupposing that this love is possible for all human beings. Kierkegaard’s Upbuilding discourses invite each reader to engage in a dialogue with the possibilities in the text. Thereby the reader may become aware of his or her present situation in life and see possible alternatives. These discourses or “talks” (taler in Danish) exemplify a manner of indirect communication which perhaps may be transferred to encounters with works of art in general: How could I let examples in literature, pictures, films and music invite and challenge me—to ask myself who I am right now and who I ought to be? My aim is to present an alternative to the instrumental advices that adults are given today. I attempt to clarify the leading concept “upbuilding examples”, sketch the difference between upbuilding, education and Bildung, refer to works of art that seem to have upbuilding possibilities, and consider why upbuilding examples should be studied and how they could be studied in small self-governed groups of adults.