The effect of monetary reward and punishment on the repetition of responses under open and closed task conditions

Subjects were given one study and two test trials on a list of paired associates. Critical responses on the first test were those which were rewarded or punished by gain or withdrawal of money. Between subjects variables were (a) whether the critical responses on test 1 were right or wrong, and (b) whether subjects were informed of the second test before or after test 1. On test 2, subjects were asked to repeat their test 1 responses to the appropriate stimuli. When subjects were unaware that they would receive a second test, rewarding a response on test 1 increased its probability of repetition on test 2; punishment had no significant effect. When subjects were aware that they would be tested again, the reward/ punishment treatment had no effect. An explanation based on the Law of Effect is rejected in favour of a cognitive explanation, utilizing the total time hypothesis.     

New strings for old: The role of similarity processing in an incidental learning task

This paper reports three experiments that examine the role of similarity processing in McGeorge and Burton's (1990) incidental learning task. In the experiments subjects performed a distractor task involving four-digit number strings, all of which conformed to a simple hidden rule. They were then given a forced-choice memory test in which they were presented with pairs of strings and were led to believe that one string of each pair had appeared in the prior learning phase. Although this was not the case, one string of each pair did conform to the hidden rule. Experiment 1 showed that, as in the McGeorge and Burton study, subjects were significantly more likely to select test strings that conformed to the hidden rule. However, additional analyses suggested that rather than having implicitly abstracted the rule, subjects may have been selecting strings that were in some way similar to those seen during the learning phase. Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to try to separate out effects due to similarity from those due to implicit rule abstraction. It was found that the results were more consistent with a similarity-based model than implicit rule abstraction per se.     

Recent books

Recent studies have shown that the basic evaluative conditioning (EC) effect (originally neutral stimuli acquiring an affective value congruent with the valence of the affective stimulus they were paired with) seems to be limited to participants who are unaware of the stimulus pairings. If participants are aware of the pairings, reactance effects occur (i.e., changes in the opposite direction of the valence of the affective stimulus). To examine whether these reactance effects are due to processes of conscious countercontrol or whether the ratings reflect intrinsic feelings towards the stimuli, a new procedure was developed that included a bogus‐pipeline condition. In this procedure, which was adapted from attitude research, participants were connected to bogus lie detector equipment leading them to believe that their “true” affective‐evaluative responses were being observed. In Experiment 1, reactance effects occurred also in this procedure, suggesting that the effect is spontaneous and not due to processes of conscious countercontrol. In Experiment 2, these effects were replicated using a between‐subjects design in addition to the standard within‐subjects control condition.     

Self-esteem and perceptions of conveyed impressions: is negative affectivity associated with greater realism?

Two studies examined the notion that negative affectivity (Watson & Clark, 1984) is associated with more accurate perceptions of conveyed impressions in social interactions. In Study 1 (n = 160), low self-esteem (LSE) and high self-esteem (HSE) subjects were paired with either an LSE or an HSE partner. After a 15-min interaction, they rated themselves, their partners, and how they believed their partners would rate them on 20 adjectives related to social competence. Study 2 (n = 40) was identical except that each interaction was observed by 2 observers who rated each participant, and participants also rated how they believed an observer would rate them. LSE subjects exhibited greater accuracy only with respect to the elevation component of observers' ratings; HSE subjects overestimated the positivity of observers' evaluations, whereas LSE subjects were relatively accurate. However, LSE subjects exhibited less overall accuracy with respect to their partners' ratings. We argue that when these results are considered with earlier research, there is no support for the notion of depressive realism in assessing conveyed impressions.     

Assessment and selection of paired associate strategies: A developmental study

First, third, and fifth graders who had been instructed to use an interaction strategy and a repetition strategy on two separate paired associate tasks were asked on which task they had remembered better and why. Subjects were then given another paired associate task and told they could use any way they wanted to remember. Memory performance was better when the interaction strategy was used than when the repetition strategy was used. A significant majority of third and fifth graders correctly judged which task they had performed better on, and the number of subjects doing so increased with grade. Only among fifth graders, did the majority of subjects explain their judgments by referring to the use of the interaction strategy. Use of the interaction strategy on Task 3 did not increase with grade but was shown by a significant majority of first and fifth graders. Use of the interaction strategy on Task 3 was more frequent among subjects who referred to the use of the interaction strategy in explaining their choice of their more successful task than among those who did not.     

Affect and the weight of idealistic versus pragmatic concerns in decision situations

Individuals consider abstract values and principles important aspects of their identities. Nonetheless, they often make judgments and decisions that contradict these values and principles for the sake of pragmatic benefits. Assuming that the process of weighting idealistic and pragmatic concerns is context sensitive, the present research argues that affect influences the relative weight of idealistic versus pragmatic concerns in decision situations owing to its influence on the level of abstraction at which individuals represent situations mentally. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that more positive affect increases the prominent weighting of idealistic over pragmatic concerns while less positive affect leads to less differentiation between the relevance of idealistic and pragmatic concerns. Studies 3 and 4 test the assumption that affective influences on mental abstraction are crucial for affect‐dependent shifts in the weighting of idealistic and pragmatic concerns. By bringing together theorizing on affect and cognition with recent theorizing on the role of mental abstraction for decision processes, this article highlights a mechanism through which decisions can be influenced by feelings that goes beyond the mechanisms that have typically been discussed in the affect and cognition literature so far.     

Orangutans (Pongo abelii) and a gorilla (Gorilla gorilla gorilla) match features in familiar and unfamiliar individuals

Great apes can perceive images as representative of corresponding real-life objects. Coupled with the potential advantages of identifying specific members of one’s species and mounting evidence for individual recognition in other non-humans, it seems likely that great apes would have the ability to identify conspecifics in photographs. The ability of four orangutans and a gorilla to match images of individuals of their own and a closely related but unfamiliar species was examined here for the first time. First, the subjects matched photographs of familiar conspecifics taken at various time points in a delayed matching-to-sample procedure (Experiment 1). Second, they matched different photographs of unfamiliar individuals of a different species (Experiment 2) at above chance levels. These results suggest that the subjects matched photographs by matching physical features, not necessarily by recognizing the identity of the individuals depicted. However, they also quickly learned to select photographs of familiar individuals when these photographs were paired with photographs of unfamiliar individuals of their own species (Experiment 3), and three subjects showed transfer to novel images of familiar and unfamiliar individuals. Thus, the findings support the idea that subjects attended to physical features to identify individuals that they could categorize on the basis of familiarity.     

Transfer from “edible” categorization training to feeding behavior in pigeons (Columba livia)1

Abstract: We investigated a transfer from an operant experimental situation to a feeding situation in pigeons using real objects as stimuli. Four pigeons were trained in an operant box to categorize familiar edible items as positives and inedible items as negatives with a go/no‐go procedure. Next, two pairs of unfamiliar edible items were added as stimuli. One of the paired stimuli was arbitrarily assigned as positive and the other as negative. We tested the subjects in their home cages to see whether they would feed on the items they were trained to categorize as positives. In three of the six cases in which categorization training was successful, they continued to peck the positive items. This result suggests that the pigeons transfer what they learned in the operant training situation to the feeding situation.     

Spatial separation of target and competitor cues enhances blocking of human causality judgements

Three experiments were carried out. Each required subjects to make judgements about the causal status of cues following a two-stage blocking procedure. In Stage 1 a competitor cue was consistently paired with an outcome, and in Stage 2 the competitor continued to be paired with the outcome but was accompanied by a target cue. It was predicted that causal judgements for the target would be reduced by the presence of the competitor. In Experiments 1 and 2 the blocking procedure was implemented as a computer simulation of a card game during which subjects had to learn which cards produced the best payouts. The cues that subjects used to make their judgement were colours and symbols that appeared on the backs of the cards. When the target and competitor cues appeared on the same card blocking effects did not emerge, but when they appeared as part of different cards blocking effects were found. Thus, spatial separation of target and competitor cues appeared to facilitate blocking. Experiment 3 replicated the blocking result using spatially separated target and competitor cues.     

Chance favours only the prepared mind: Incubation and the delayed effects of peer collaboration

Research has shown that the beneficial effects of peer collaboration are not always apparent until some time has elapsed. Such delayed effects are not readily incorporated in current models of collaborative learning, but because they constitute incubation effects in the psychological sense of the term, they should in principle be consistent with cognitive accounts of how incubation occurs. Accordingly, the paper reports three studies which test whether, in accordance with cognitive models of incubation, the delayed effects of peer collaboration could result from: (a) the breaking over time of unhelpful mental sets, (b) the engagement in post‐collaborative reflective appraisal, and (c) the experience of subsequent events that, thanks to collaboration, can be used productively. The studies involved 9‐ to 12‐year‐old children working on the factors relevant to floating and sinking. The results provide no evidence for the relevance of set breaking or reflective appraisal, but suggest strongly that peer collaboration can ‘prime’ children to make good use of subsequent input. It is argued that in addition to clarifying how the delayed effects occur and applying incubation models in a novel context, the results flag up issues that are common to collaborative and cognitive theory, and that neither address adequately.     

When Consumers Prefer Bundles with Noncomplementary Items to Bundles with Complementary Items: The Role of Mindset Abstraction

Past research shows that consumers evaluate bundles with complementary items more favorably than they evaluate bundles with noncomplementary items. In a series of four experiments that involve evaluation, willingness to pay, and real choice, we show that this well‐established effect is moderated by the level of mindset abstraction. Complementarity (vs. noncomplementarity) among bundle items prompts relatively concrete (vs. abstract) thinking (study 1). Consequently, consumers evaluate complementary (vs. noncomplementary) bundles more favorably when they think in more concrete (vs. abstract) terms (study 2) or when the consumption context involves lower (vs. higher) spatial (study 3) or temporal (study 4) distance. These effects are mediated by consumers’ heightened sense of “feeling right” during decision making under construal fit (study 4). Finally, the level of complementarity among bundle items differentially influences mental abstraction because of consumers’ tendency to perceive bundles as a single inseparable unit. Therefore, the effect attenuates when consumers adopt a separating—rather than a connecting—mindset (study 3). Overall, this work significantly extends past research on product bundles and offers several managerial implications.     

Heterogeneity impairs numerical matching but not numerical ordering in preschool children

Do preschool children appreciate numerical value as an abstract property of a set of objects? We tested the influence of stimulus features such as size, shape, and color on preschool children's developing nonverbal numerical abilities. Children between 3 and 5 years of age were tested on their ability to estimate number when the sizes, shapes, and colors of the elements in an array were varied (heterogeneous condition) versus when they did not vary (homogeneous condition). One group of children was tested on an ordinal task in which the goal was to select the smaller of two arrays while another group of children was tested on a match‐to‐sample task in which the goal was to choose one of two visual arrays that matched the sample in number. Children performed above chance on both homogeneous and heterogeneous stimuli in both tasks. However, while children showed no impairment on heterogeneous relative to homogeneous arrays in the ordering task, performance was impaired by heterogeneity in the matching task. We suggest that nonverbal numerical abstraction occurs early in development, but specific task objectives may prevent children from engaging in numerical abstraction.     

A dual-process account of digit invariance learning

Performance in the McGeorge and Burton (1990) digit invariance task was originally thought to be mediated by unconscious abstraction of a “rule” that identified the invariant feature across all study items. Subsequent explanations have suggested explicit strategy use or similarity-to-exemplar matching rather than abstraction. This paper presents data that suggest that both similarity and abstraction can be used under different task demands. Delay between study and test afforded abstraction of the invariant knowledge whereas reducing the pool of study exemplars enhanced responding based on specific similarity. These results parallel effects found in the categorization literature. Rule abstraction in this sense may be due to statistical learning of feature frequency rather than abstraction of a central tendency or a complex/conceptual rule. Categorizing responses into subjective memory states (remember/know/guess) demonstrates that neither the similarity matching nor the abstraction mechanism uses information from episodic memory. Confidence measures show that participants are more confident of responses when the prototypical representation is used but not specific similarity. Taken together, these data suggest that abstracted knowledge is not held consciously but that participants have meta-awareness of when they are using the abstracted representation.     

A dual-process account of digit invariance learning

Performance in the McGeorge and Burton (1990) digit invariance task was originally thought to be mediated by unconscious abstraction of a “rule” that identified the invariant feature across all study items. Subsequent explanations have suggested explicit strategy use or similarity-to-exemplar matching rather than abstraction. This paper presents data that suggest that both similarity and abstraction can be used under different task demands. Delay between study and test afforded abstraction of the invariant knowledge whereas reducing the pool of study exemplars enhanced responding based on specific similarity. These results parallel effects found in the categorization literature. Rule abstraction in this sense may be due to statistical learning of feature frequency rather than abstraction of a central tendency or a complex/conceptual rule. Categorizing responses into subjective memory states (remember/know/guess) demonstrates that neither the similarity matching nor the abstraction mechanism uses information from episodic memory. Confidence measures show that participants are more confident of responses when the prototypical representation is used but not specific similarity. Taken together, these data suggest that abstracted knowledge is not held consciously but that participants have meta-awareness of when they are using the abstracted representation.     

The impact of rater agreeableness and rating context on the evaluation of poor performance

We tested the effects of rater agreeableness on the rating of others’ poor performance in performance appraisal (PA). We also examined the interactions between rater agreeableness and two aspects of the rating context: ratee self‐ratings and the prospect of future collaboration with the ratee. Participants (n= 230) were allocated to one of six experimental groups (a 3 × 2 between‐groups design) or a control group (n= 20). Participants received accurate, low‐deviated, or high‐deviated self‐ratings from the ratee. Half were notified they would collaborate with the ratee in a future task. High rater agreeableness, positive deviations in self‐rating, and the prospect of future collaboration were all independent predictors of higher PA ratings. The interactions between rater agreeableness and rating context were very small. We argue that conflict avoidance is an important motivation in the PA process.     

Event-related brain potentials and subjective probability in a learning task

In a paired associate learning task, subjects responded to each presentation of a nonsense syllable by typing both a three-letter associate and a rating of their confidence that this response was correct or incorrect. Average event-related potentials (ERPs) elicited by the subsequent presentation of the actual paired syllable varied with the interaction of confidence and trial outcome. A larger amplitude P300 was elicited by syllables that informed subjects that they were correct when they thought they were incorrect or that they were incorrect when they thought they were correct than by syllables that confirmed subjects expectations. That this average ERP result was indeed an effect on P300 amplitude, and not an artifact of single-trial variability in P30O latency, was confirmed with a trial-by-trial latency adjustment procedure. Consistent with findings from other tasks, P300 amplitude varied inversely with the subj ective probability of the ERP-eliciting events.     

Failures to find suppression of episodic memories in the think/no-think paradigm

Anderson and Green (2001) had subjects learn paired associates and then selectively suppress responses to some of them. They reported a decrease in final cued recall for responses that subjectshad been instructed not to think of and explained their data as resulting from cognitive suppression, a laboratory analog of repression. We report three experiments designed to replicate the suppression/repression results. After subjects learned a series of A-B word pairs (e.g., ordsea-roach), they were then asked to respond to some items and not to think of other items when shown their cues 1, 8, or 16times. During a final recall test, they were cued with either asame (direct)probe (ordeal-__) or a n independent(indirect) probe (insect-r__) . None of our experiments showed reliable suppression effects with either the same or independent-probe tests. Suppression is apparently not a robust experimental phenomenon in the think/no-think paradigm.     

Monitoring the future: object and source memory for real and imagined events

In these experiments a memory‐monitoring decision is made, whereby subjects must decide not only whether or not to‐be‐learned stimuli will be remembered—the focus of all of the past research into the Judgement of Learning (JOL)—but also whether they will be able to assess the source of those stimuli, as assessed by a new measure, Judgement of Source (JOS). In Experiment 1 subjects had to judge whether they would remember the occurrence and the source of items that were either seen or imagined. Although seen items were better remembered and sourced than imagined, subjects were unable to predict this outcome: they underestimated their ability to recall seen items and overestimated their ability to recall imagined items. In Experiment 2 subjects had to discriminate between self‐performed or other‐performed enacted or imagined events. We expected that the motor cues associated with overt performance should provide more sensory information than had the visual input in Experiment 1, and this should help subjects to discriminate between real and imagined items. As predicted, JOL magnitude showed that subjects were now able to predict accurately that they would recall more enacted events than imagined events. JOS magnitude showed that subjects incorrectly predicted that self‐enactment would assist source memory compared to imagination. However, it was the source of other‐focused events which was more accurately remembered. The results are discussed in terms of Koriat's (1997) view about cue utility in making JOLs. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Major Challenges for African Women Theologians in Theological Education (1989–2008)

The paper reflects on the major challenges for African women theologians in theological education as presented and experienced in the Circle of Concerned African Women Theologians (“Circle”) which was launched in Ghana in 1989 as a community of African women theologians who come together to reflect on what it means to them to be women of faith within their experiences of religion, culture, politics and social‐economic structures in Africa. Four major challenges are identified that African women theologians have had to contend with and which are still present, namely (1) re‐defining the identity of African women theologians; (2) promoting more women to study theology and be on permanent staff; (3) inclusion of African women's theology in the theological curriculum; and (4) collaboration with male theologians.