Attention as a cueing function during kindergarten children's dimensional change task performance

The purpose of this experiment is to test whether shift flexibility in kindergarten children is a joint function of rule‐usage and inhibition of attention. Sixty‐six children were given either a distraction or facilitation condition in a computerized version of the dimensional change card sort task. In the distraction condition, the background of the post‐shift matching stimulus was inconsistent with the relevant matching dimension. In the facilitation condition, the background of the post‐shift matching stimulus was consistent with the relevant matching dimension. Results revealed that children made few errors in the standard version of the shift task, thereby supporting Cognitive complexity and control theory's contention that 5‐year‐old children shift easily across dimensions due to their use of higher‐order setting rules to solve contradictions. The proportion of errors increased however in the distraction condition suggesting that attention to the background interfered with children's ability to shift between dimensions. Therefore, these data provide evidence that refocusing attention to dimensions along with rule‐use processes affect shift flexibility and argue for the inclusion of both factors into theoretical accounts of shift performance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

IGT-Open: An open-source,computerized version of the Iowa Gambling Task

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is commonly used to understand the processes involved in decision-making. Though the task was originally run without a computer, using a computerized version of the task has become typical. These computerized versions of the IGT are useful, because they can make the task more standardized across studies and allow for the task to be used in environments where a physical version of the task may be difficult or impossible to use (e.g., while collecting brain imaging data). Though these computerized versions of the IGT have been useful for experimentation, having multiple software implementations of the task could present reliability issues. We present an open-source software version of the Iowa Gambling Task (called IGT-Open) that allows for millisecond visual presentation accuracy and is freely available to be used and modified. This software has been used to collect data from human subjects and also has been used to run model-based simulations with computational process models developed to run in the ACT-R architecture.     

Age-related trends in Stroop and conflicting motor response task findings

Inhibition problems are reportedly at the heart of several childhood pathologies and learning disorders, but few instruments are available for their in-depth investigation. The main aim of the present study was to investigate the development of a capacity to inhibit automatic responses in young and middle childhood. For this purpose, 100 children between 6 and 11 years old were administered two tests that measure executive inhibition: an animal Stroop task (in a paper-and-pencil version of the computerized original proposed by Wright and colleagues in 2003) and a conflicting motor response task. Our results indicate that performance clearly improves in both tests during the course of a child's development and the data obtained with the paper-and-pencil animal Stroop task overlap with those obtained with the computerized version. When the task calls for a stronger inhibitory control (the incongruent situation in the Stroop task and in the opposite condition in the conflicting motor response test) the trend of the response times is less homogeneous, peaking in the youngest and oldest age brackets considered. The positivity and significance of the correlation coefficients between the two tests also suggest that the two measures are tapping cognitive abilities that are developing in a parallel fashion.     

Cognitive deficits of executive functions and decision‐making in obsessive‐compulsive disorder

The nature of cognitive deficits in obsessive‐compulsive disorder (OCD) is characterized by contradictory findings in terms of specific neuropsychological deficits. Selective impairments have been suggested to involve visuospatial memory, set shifting, decision‐making and response inhibition. The aim of this study was to investigate cognitive deficits in decision‐making and executive functioning in OCD. It was hypothesized that the OCD patients would be less accurate in their responses compared to the healthy controls in rational decision‐making on a version of the Cambridge gambling task (CGT) and on the color‐word interference test and on a version of the Tower of Hanoi test (tower test) of executive functioning. Thirteen participants with OCD were compared to a group of healthy controls (n = 13) matched for age, gender, education and verbal IQ. Results revealed significant differences between the OCD group and the healthy control group on quality of decision‐making on the CGT and for achievement score on the tower test. On these two tasks the OCD group performed worse than the healthy control group. The symptom‐dimension analysis revealed performance differences where safety checking patients were impaired on the tower test compared to contamination patients. Results are discussed in the framework of cognition and emotion processing and findings implicate that OCD models should address, specifically, the interaction between cognition and emotion. Here the emotional disruption hypothesis is forwarded to account for the dysfunctional behaviors in OCD. Further implications regarding methodological and inhibitory factors affecting cognitive information processing are highlighted.     

Age-related trends in Stroop and conflicting motor response task findings.

Inhibition problems are reportedly at the heart of several childhood pathologies and learning disorders, but few instruments are available for their in-depth investigation. The main aim of the present study was to investigate the development of a capacity to inhibit automatic responses in young and middle childhood. For this purpose, 100 children between 6 and 11 years old were administered two tests that measure executive inhibition: an animal Stroop task (in a paper-and-pencil version of the computerized original proposed by Wright and colleagues in 2003) and a conflicting motor response task. Our results indicate that performance clearly improves in both tests during the course of a child's development and the data obtained with the paper-and-pencil animal Stroop task overlap with those obtained with the computerized version. When the task calls for a stronger inhibitory control (the incongruent situation in the Stroop task and in the opposite condition in the conflicting motor response test) the trend of the response times is less homogeneous, peaking in the youngest and oldest age brackets considered. The positivity and significance of the correlation coefficients between the two tests also suggest that the two measures are tapping cognitive abilities that are developing in a parallel fashion.     

Measuring decision‐making competence in Chinese adults

In this study, we translated and localized the Adult Decision‐making Competence scale (A‐DMC) and tested its reliability and validity with large samples. Results show the Chinese A‐DMC has relatively good reliability (Cronbach's alpha above 0.6 and test–retest reliability coefficients ranging from 0.44 to 0.78 on all subscales), comparable with the original version. Regarding validity, results of exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis support the one‐factor model, indicating the A‐DMC has good internal consistency and construct validity. A‐DMC scores correlated positively with cognitive ability, constructive decision‐making styles, and good decision outcomes. Additionally, individuals with higher A‐DMC scores were found to perform better on the Cambridge gambling task and Iowa gambling task. These results confirm the validity of the Chinese version of the A‐DMC, which is suitable for measuring decision‐making competence in Chinese adults.     

Interval length and time-use by children with AD/HD: a comparison of four models

Predictions made by 4 competing models of time use by children with AD/HD were tested using a computerized version of the Matching Familiar Figures Test in 2 studies. In Study 1 teacher-identified AD/HD children (N = 10) and non-AD/HD controls (N = 10) completed the task under 3 different trial duration conditions (5, 10, and 15 s). In Study 2 the same task was completed by a group of children with a diagnosis of Hyperkinetic Disorder (N = 12) and controls (N = 12). In both studies AD/HD children performed poorly on trials of both 5- and 15-s duration but as well as controls on the 10-s trials. This quadratic function provided support for the State Regulation Deficit model of time use in AD/HD. The value of tailoring the temporal features of learning contexts to the conceptual style of AD/HD children is discussed.     

The effects of funny and serious task content and expectations of fun versus importance on children's cognitive performance

This study investigated how children's performance on a cognitive task was influenced by funny and serious task content, and by fun or important instructions. Eighty‐four children in Grades 1 and 5 performed two versions of a paired‐associates word‐learning task, which paired nonsense words with novel definitions and illustrations. All children completed a version in which the definitions and illustrations were funny, and a version in which they were not, with either fun or important instructions. Results revealed significantly better performance on the funny than on the serious version, but only when the funny version was presented first. There were no significant effects of task instructions. The findings confirm that making children's cognitive tasks funnier can enhance task performance. Although there were no effects of expectations as created by task instructions, the enhancing effect of funny content was influenced by children's expectations as created by their prior experience with the task.     

The link between infant attention to goal‐directed action and later theory of mind abilities

Various studies have shown that infants in their first year of life are able to interpret human actions as goal‐directed. It is argued that this understanding is a precondition for understanding intentional actions and attributing mental states. Moreover, some authors claim that this early action understanding is a precursor of later Theory of Mind (ToM) development. To test this, we related 6‐month‐olds’ performance in an action interpretation task to their performance in ToM tasks at the age of 4 years. Action understanding was assessed using a modified version of the Woodward‐paradigm ( Woodward, 1999 ). At the age of 4 years, the same children were tested with the German version of the ToM scale developed by Wellman and Liu (2004 ). Results revealed a correlation between infants’ decrement of attention to goal‐directed action and their ability to solve a false belief task at the age of 4 years with no modulation by language abilities. Our results indicate a link between infant attention to goal‐directed action and later theory of mind abilities.     

Stability of choices in a risky decision‐making task: a 3‐year longitudinal study with children and adults

In a 3‐year follow‐up to Levin and Hart's ( 2003 ) study, we observed the same children, now 9–11 years old, and their parents in the same risky decision‐making task. At the aggregate level the same pattern of means was observed across time periods. At the individual level the key variables were significantly correlated across time periods for both children and adults. Taken together with the results from the original study and earlier studies, these results solidify the following conclusions: children utilize both probability and outcome information in risky decision‐making; the tendency to make more risky choices to avoid a loss than to achieve a gain of equal magnitude, which is a major tenet of the leading theories of risky decision‐making, occurs for children as well as adults; children make more risky choices than adults; temperamental predictors of risky choice are valid for children as well as for adults. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Differences in paper-and-pencil versus computerized line bisection according to ADHD subtype and hand-use

Two versions of the line bisection task, paper-and-pencil and computerized, were administered to non-medicated children (5-12 years) with and without Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Fifteen children were classified with ADHD-Inattentive type (ADHD-I), 15 were classified with ADHD-Combined or Hyperactive-Impulsive type (ADHD-C), and 15 children served as controls. During the paper-and-pencil task, and irrespective of hand-use, participants with ADHD-C bisected lines with a right bias, whereas participants with ADHD-I showed a leftwards bias. Interestingly, during the computerized version, an opposite pattern of hemineglect was observed with a leftwards bias for participants with ADHD-C and a rightwards bias for participants with ADHD-I. These findings suggest that different task demands are associated with the paper-and-pencil and computerized tasks. The findings also suggest that the two subtypes differ according to their cognitive profile, and possibly differ as to their underlying neural impairment.     

Virtual-reality-based attention assessment of ADHD: ClinicaVR: Classroom-CPT versus a traditional continuous performance test

Virtual-reality-based assessment may be a good alternative to classical or computerized neuropsychological assessment due to increased ecological validity. ClinicaVR: Classroom-CPT (VC) is a neuropsychological test embedded in virtual reality that is designed to assess attention deficits in children with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) or other conditions associated with impaired attention. The present study aimed to (1) investigate the diagnostic validity of VC in comparison to a traditional continuous performance test (CPT), (2) explore the task difficulty of VC, (3) address the effect of distractors on the performance of ADHD participants and typically-developing (TD) controls, and (4) compare the two measures on cognitive absorption. A total of 33 children diagnosed with ADHD and 42 TD children, aged between 7 and 13 years, participated in the study and were tested with a traditional CPT or with VC, along with several cognitive measures and an adapted version of the Cognitive Absorption Scale. A mixed multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) revealed that the children with ADHD performed worse on correct responses had more commissions and omissions errors than the TD children, as well as slower target reaction times . The results showed significant differences between performance in the virtual environment and the traditional computerized one, with longer reaction times in virtual reality. The data analysis highlighted the negative influence of auditory distractors on attention performance in the case of the children with ADHD, but not for the TD children. Finally, the two measures did not differ on the cognitive absorption perceived by the children.     

Social cognition is not reducible to theory of mind: When children use deontic rules to predict the behaviour of others

The objective of this paper is to discuss whether children have a capacity for deontic reasoning that is irreducible to mentalizing. The results of two experiments point to the existence of such non‐mentalistic understanding and prediction of the behaviour of others. In Study 1, young children (3‐ and 4‐year‐olds) were told different versions of classic false‐belief tasks, some of which were modified by the introduction of a rule or a regularity. When the task (a standard change of location task) included a rule, the performance of 3‐year‐olds, who fail traditional false‐belief tasks, significantly improved. In Study 2, 3‐year‐olds proved to be able to infer a rule from a social situation and to use it in order to predict the behaviour of a character involved in a modified version of the false‐belief task. These studies suggest that rules play a central role in the social cognition of young children and that deontic reasoning might not necessarily involve mind reading.     

Young children's difficulty with inhibitory control in a social context1

Abstract: The authors’ prior research has documented that young children's behaviors in the Dimensional Change Card Sorting (DCCS) task can be influenced by their observation of another person performing the task and has suggested that young children committed perseverative errors in a social context. The present study explored whether children who committed perseverative errors in the social context also committed perseverative errors in the standard DCCS task. Three‐ and 4‐year‐old children were given the standard DCCS and the observation version of the DCCS, and the relationship between them was examined. The results showed that the correlation between these two tasks was significant. Furthermore, 4‐year‐old children displayed more difficulty in the observation version than in the standard DCCS, whereas 3‐year‐olds did not. The results are discussed in terms of the development of inhibitory control and social cognition.     

Inhibitory and working memory demands of the day–night task in children

Gerstadt, Hong, and Diamond (1994) investigated the development of inhibitory control in children aged 3½ – 7 years using the day–night task. In two studies we build on Gerstadt et al.'s findings with a measure of inhibitory control that can be used throughout childhood. In Study 1 (twenty‐four 3½‐year‐olds and sixteen 5‐year‐olds) we modified Gerstadt et al.'s day–night task. Using this modified task we obtained further evidence for the development of inhibitory control in children between 3½ and 5‐years‐old. We also obtained data suggestive of more moderate working memory development. In Study 2 we tested 84 children aged between 3½ and 11 years. The aim was to determine how much inhibition and working memory taxed children of different ages. We obtained evidence that inhibitory demands were high and that inhibitory development was non‐linear, with rapid improvements in children between 3½ and 5 years and only modest improvements thereafter. In contrast, working memory demands were low and working memory development was more linear. We interpret these findings as evidence that working memory has relatively little impact on performance in our modified version of the day–night task.     

The role of perseveration in children's symbolic understanding and skill

In the first few years of life, children become increasingly sensitive to the significance of a variety of symbolic artifacts. An extensive body of research has explored very young children's ability to use symbol‐based information as a guide to current reality. In one common task, for example, children watch as a miniature toy is hidden in a scale model, and are then asked to retrieve a larger version of the toy from the corresponding place in the room itself. Two‐and‐a‐half‐year‐old children perform very poorly in most versions of this task. Their most common error is to perseverate; that is, they search again at the location where the toy was last hidden. Two studies examined the degree to which 2¹/₂‐year‐olds’ high rate of perseveration and poor performance stem from problems with inhibitory control. Results showed that problems with inhibitory control contribute very little to 2¹/₂‐year‐old children's difficulty with the task. Instead, the results confirm young children's great difficulty appreciating and exploiting symbol–referent relations.     

Mental models or methodological artefacts? Adults' naïve responses to a test of children's conceptions of the earth

Vosniadou and Brewer (1992) claim that children's drawings and answers to questions show that they have naïve, theory‐like ‘mental models’ of the earth; for example, they believe it to be flat, or hollow with people inside. However, recent studies that have used different methods have found little or no evidence of these misconceptions. The contrasting accounts, and possible reasons for the inconsistent findings, were tested by giving adults (N=484) either the original task (designed for 5‐year olds) or a new version in which the same drawing instructions and questions were rephrased and clarified. Many adults' responses to the original version were identical to children's ‘naïve’ drawings and answers. The new version elicited substantially fewer non‐scientific responses. These findings indicate that even adults find the original instructions and questions ambiguous and confusing, and that this is the principal reason for their non‐scientific drawings and answers. Since children must find the task even more confusing than adults, this explanation very probably applies to many of their non‐scientific responses, too, and therefore accounts for the discrepant findings of previous research. ‘Naïve’ responses result largely from misinterpretation of Vosniadou and Brewer's apparently simple task, rather than from mental models of the earth.     

A Scanpath Analysis of the Risky Decision‐Making Process

In the field of eye tracking, scanpath analysis can reflect the sequential and temporal properties of the cognitive process. However, the advantages of scanpath analysis have not yet been utilized in the study of risky decision making. We explored the methodological applicability of scanpath analysis to test models of risky decision making by analyzing published data from the eye‐tracking studies of Su et al. (2013); Wang and Li (2012), and Sun, Rao, Zhou, and Li (2014). These studies used a proportion task, an outcome‐matched presentation condition, and a multiple‐play condition as the baseline for comparison with information search and processing in the risky decision‐making condition. We found that (i) the similarity scores of the intra‐conditions were significantly higher than those of the inter‐condition; (ii) the scanpaths of the two conditions were separable; and (iii) based on an inspection of typical trials, the patterns of the scanpaths differed between the two conditions. These findings suggest that scanpath analysis is reliable and valid for examining the process of risky decision making. In line with the findings of the three original studies, our results indicate that risky decision making is unlikely to be based on a weighting and summing process, as hypothesized by the family of expectation models. The findings highlight a new methodological direction for research on decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Underlying Architecture of the Creative Worlds of Children: Young Persons from the UK and China Unwittingly Generate More Concepts that Violate Ontological Category Structure Than Do Older Adults During an Exemplar‐Generation Task

Is our cognition the underlying architecture of the recurrent and pan‐cultural imaginative ideas of children and adolescents? Recent cross‐cultural studies show that children and adolescents recall proportionally more creative, counterintuitive concepts than older adults. One outstanding concern is that cultural transmission is also constrained by how concepts emerge into culture. Hence, a broad sample of age demographics in UK and China (10–58 years; N = 90) participated in an exemplar‐generation task where participants assembled statements exemplifying conceptual categories of positive and negative emotion, imagery, humor, and inferential potential. Multiple regression analysis considering counterintuitiveness and age revealed young persons generated significantly more imaginative, counterintuitive ideas than older adults, in both UK and China groups. This cross‐cultural support for an underlying cognitive architecture of human creativity builds on Ward's (1994) research on structured imagination.     

The development of visual working memory capacity during early childhood

The change detection task has been used in dozens of studies with adults to measure visual working memory capacity. Two studies have recently tested children in this task, suggesting a gradual increase in capacity from 5 years to adulthood. These results contrast with findings from an infant looking paradigm suggesting that capacity reaches adult-like levels within the first year. The current study adapted the change detection task for use with children younger than 5 years to test whether the standard version of the task was too difficult and may have underestimated children's capacity. Results showed that 3- and 4-year-olds could successfully complete this modified task and that capacity increased roughly linearly, from 2 or 3 items during this period to 3 or 4 items between 5 and 7 years. Furthermore, performance did not differ significantly between the modified version and a replication of the standard version with 5- and 7-year-olds. Thus, there is no evidence that previous research with the change detection task underestimated children's capacity. Further research is needed to understand how performance relates across the infant looking task and change detection to provide a more complete picture of visual working memory capacity over development.